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In this dissertation, I propose a reductive account of causation. This account may be 
stated as follows: 
 
 Causation: c is a cause of e within a possibility horizon H  iff 
a) c is process-connected to e, and 
b) e security-depends on c within H. 
 
More precisely, my suggestion is that there are two kinds of causal relata: 
instantaneous events (defined in Chapter 4) and possibility horizons (defined in 
Chapter 5). Causation is a ternary relation between two actual instantaneous events – 
the cause c and the effect e – and a possibility horizon H.   
 I argue that causation has a dual nature: on the one hand, a cause must be 
connected to its effect via a genuine process; on the other hand, a cause must make a 
difference to its effect.  
The first condition – namely, the condition of process-connection (defined in 
Chapter 6) – captures the sense in which a cause must be connected to its effect via a 
genuine process. This condition allows my account to separate causation from mere 
correlation, distinguish genuine causes from preempted backups, and capture how a 
cause must be at the right level of detail relative to its effect (Chapter 7).   
The second condition – namely, the condition of security-dependence (defined in 
Chapter 8) – captures the sense in which a cause must make a difference to its effect. 
This condition allows my account to yield intuitively correct verdicts on the 
counterexamples to the transitivity and intrinsicness of causation, resolve the 
problem of profligate omissions, accommodate structurally isomorphic but causally 
different cases, and handle contrastive causal claims (Chapter 9 and 10). 
Finally, my proposed account of causation logically entails restricted versions 
of three important principles of causal reasoning concerning the sufficiency of 
counterfactual dependence for causation, and the transitivity and intrinsicness of 
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Introduction and methodology 
 
What is causation? And why should we care about what it is?  
Let me begin by suggesting an answer to the second of these two 
questions. There are two main reasons why we should care about what 
causation is. The first reason is that causation plays a central role in our 
everyday lives. Everything we do, and everything that happens to us, involves 
causation: we act on our surroundings to bring things about or make things 
happen, and our surroundings act on us. Correspondingly, our understanding 
of causation plays a central role in our daily decisions: in practically every daily 
decision, we are using our understanding of how to bring about the specific 
outcomes we desire – even in such mundane activities as getting the kettle 
boiling, getting the toast nice and brown, etc. The fact that causation plays 
such a central role in our lives provides the first reason why we should care 
about what it is.  
The second reason emerges once we notice that causation is closely 
connected with other things we care about, such as morality, perception, 
knowledge, and reference. According to consequentialist theories of morality, 
for example, the rightness of an action is determined by its consequences, i.e. 
by its effects. According to causal theories of perception and knowledge, we 
perceive and gain knowledge of the external world by coming into causal 
contact with it. According to causal theories of reference, the name ‘Socrates’ 
refers to Socrates because there is a causal chain from the original naming of 
Socrates to our use of the name ‘Socrates’ today, etc. Although one may of 
course question each of these theories, it is hard to deny that causation is in 
some way connected with morality, perception, knowledge, and reference. 
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Further connections include the connections between causation and 
explanation, prediction, manipulability and responsibility.1 Because of these 
connections, gaining a better understanding of causation might in turn help us 
gain a better understanding of other areas that we care about. 
What, then, is causation? In spite of the central role of causation, 
philosophers have not yet been able to arrive at an account of causation that is 
‘at once clean, precise, and widely agreed upon’.2 Indeed, some have begun to 
doubt whether it is realistic to hope for such an account. Thus, after a detailed 
critical survey of the literature, Paul and Hall write: 
 
‘After surveying the literature in some depth, we conclude that, as yet, there is 
no reasonably successful reduction of the causal relation. And correspondingly, 
there is no reasonably successful conceptual analysis of a philosophical causal 
concept. No extant approach seems able to incorporate all of our desiderata for 
the causal relation, nor to capture the wide range of our causal judgments and 
applications of our causal concept. Barring a fundamental change in approach, 
the prospects of a relatively simple, elegant and intuitively attractive, unified 
theory of causation, whether ontological reduction or conceptual analysis, are 
dim.’3  
 
However, I believe that such pessimism is unwarranted. During the past 
decades, the debate about how best to give an account of causation has been 
intense. And, as Paul and Hall themselves point out, this debate has yielded 
important insights:4 although the debate has not yet produced a fully successful 
account of causation, it has sharpened our understanding of the challenges that 
such an account must overcome, and it has produced a wealth of cases that 
bring into focus surprising features of the causal relation.  
                                                
1 Schaffer (2003), p. 29. 
2 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 1. 
3 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 249. 
4 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 1. 
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My aim in this dissertation is to build on these contributions to propose 
a new account of causation. More precisely, my aim is to propose an account 
of what may be called singular causation, as opposed to general causation. The 
relation of singular causation holds, to a first approximation, between token 
events. Thus, the claim that ‘the lightning strike caused the forest fire’ – where 
we are talking about a particular lightning strike and a particular forest fire – is 
an example of a singular causal claim. The relation of general causation, on the 
other hand, holds between event types. Thus, the claim that ‘lightning strikes 
cause forest fires’ is an example of a general causal claim. For this reason, 
general causation is also called ‘type level causation’.5 
In choosing to focus on singular rather than general causation, I am 
following a general trend in the philosophical literature on causation. Many of 
the most influential contributions to the debate have focused on singular 
causation. In particular, singular causation is the target of David Lewis’s two 
seminal papers, ‘Causation’ and ‘Causation as Influence’,6 and indeed, of most 
work in the counterfactual tradition.7 In this literature, singular causation is 
sometimes also called ‘token causation’, ‘actual causation’ or simply 
‘causation’.8 Since I will focus exclusively on singular causation in the 
following, I will follow the practice of calling it simply ‘causation’. 
Stated briefly, then, my aim is to provide an account of singular 
causation. As anyone familiar with the literature will know, however, accounts 
of causation differ from each other not merely in their contents, but also in 
their more specific aims and associated criteria of success. For example, an 
account aiming to fully characterise causation in non-causal terms differs in its 
aims and associated criteria of success from an account aiming to deepen our 
understanding of causation, while relying on our pre-existing ability to identify 
                                                
5 Lewis (1986d) and (2004a). See also e.g. Hitchcock (2007), p. 497; Paul and Hall (2013), p. 7; 
Woodward (2003), p. 40. 
6 Lewis (1986d) and (2004a). 
7 Hitchcock (2007), p. 497. 
8 Blanchard and Schaffer (forthcoming), p. 3; Halpern and Hitchcock (2015), p. 413-14. 
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causal structures. And an account aiming to capture our concept of causation 
again differs in its aims and associated criteria of success from an account 
aiming to lay bare what it is, out in the world, that we are targeting when we 
make causal claims.  
All of these projects provide valuable insights into the nature of 
causation and it is often possible, while pursuing one kind of project, to draw 
on insights from projects with other aims and criteria of success. In developing 
an account, however, it is crucial at all times to keep to a single vision of the 
aims and associated criteria of success that one is attempting to satisfy. 
Otherwise, it is far too easy to subtly shift one’s position, depending on what is 
most convenient in dealing with the case at hand.9 I therefore devote the 
remainder of this chapter to the task of giving a precise characterisation of the 
aims and associated criteria of success of my proposed account. 
I begin by drawing up the question that I aim to answer, using 
considerations of eligibility and charity to use to pick out the causal relation 
with greater precision (section 1). Next, I set out the aims and criteria of 
success for the biconditional I propose in this dissertation (section 2).  
 
1.  Drawing up the question      
Some assumptions are so fundamental that they underlie the very questions we 
ask. In the following, I will be making one such assumption: that reality has 
structure. Early versions of this idea can be found in the writings of Armstrong 
and Lewis.10 However, the idea has been developed and defended most fully by 
Sider in Writing the Book of the World.11 Sider here gives the following initial 
characterisation of structure: 
 
                                                
9 See e.g. Paul and Hall (2013), p. 26. 
10 Armstrong (1978a) and (1978b); Lewis (1983). 
11 Sider (2011). 
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‘Discerning “structure” means discerning patterns. It means figuring out the 
right categories for describing the world. It means “carving reality at its joints”, 
to paraphrase Plato. It means inquiring into how the world fundamentally is, as 
opposed to how we ordinarily speak or think of it.’12 
 
The idea that reality has structure is easiest to appreciate when we consider 
properties and relations. According to the idea that reality has structure, some 
properties and relations do objectively better at ‘carving reality at its joints’ 
than others. For example, the property of being an electron does objectively better 
at carving reality at its joints than the property of being an electron or a cow; the 
relation of exerting a force on does objectively better than the relation of being one 
metre away from or exerting a force on, etc.13  
Sider develops and generalises this notion of structure so that it can be 
applied much more widely.14 For my purposes here, however, the details of 
these further developments do not matter. What matters is simply the basic 
assumption that the world has structure and, in particular, that some properties 
and relations do objectively better than others at ‘carving reality at its joints’. I 
do not think this is an unreasonable assumption. However, I will not attempt 
to defend it here. Rather, I will simply hope that this is an assumption that my 
reader will share. With this assumption in place, I will now move on to the 
main task of this section: delineating the question that my proposed account of 
causation aims to answer.  
When we are considering a term such as ‘cause’, there are two kinds of 
questions we may ask. We may ask semantic questions, i.e. questions about what 
the term means. For example, we may ask: what is the meaning of ‘cause’? And 
we may ask metasemantic questions, i.e. questions about what determines the 
meaning of a term. For example, we may ask: what determines the meaning of 
‘cause’?  
                                                
12 Sider (2011), p. 1. 
13 Sider (2011), pp. 2-3. 
14 See, in particular, Sider (2011), pp. 85 – 104.  
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To delineate the question that my proposed account of causation aims to 
answer, it will be useful to begin by considering the metasemantic question of 
what determines the meaning of ‘cause’. One simple and attractive answer to 
this question is provided by what Sider calls ‘simple charity-based 
descriptivism’.15 According to simple charity-based descriptivism, there are two 
factors that play a role in determining the meaning of a term:  
The first factor is charity to use: when we are considering a community of 
speakers who use a particular term τ, one of the things we need to take into 
account when we are trying to decide whether a given interpretation of τ is 
correct is the extent to which this interpretation makes the speakers’ beliefs (or 
reasonable beliefs) come out true.  
The second factor is eligibility: when we are trying to decide whether a 
given interpretation of τ is correct, we should not merely consider charity to 
use – we should also consider how well the suggested interpretation succeeds 
at ‘carving at the joints’. This second component of simple charity-based 
descriptivism presupposes the idea that the world is structured, so that – at 
least in some cases – some suggested interpretations are objectively more joint-
carving, and hence more eligible, than others.  
Clearly, both charity to use and eligibility come in degrees. According to 
simple charity-based descriptivism, the correct interpretation of a term τ is 
simply the interpretation that achieves the best balance between the two.16 
Simple charity-based descriptivism entails that in some cases the correct 
interpretation may be one that is, in fact, not very charitable: charity to use and 
eligibility trade off, and an interpretation that carves much better at the joints 
than its rivals may therefore win out overall, in spite of the fact that it is not as 
charitable.17 Sometimes, this feature of simple charity-based descriptivism leads 
                                                
15 Sider (2011), p. 31. 
16 Sider (2011), pp. 31-32. Simple charity-based descriptivism is closely based on Lewis (1983), 
and (1984). Essentially the same view is defended in Weatherson (2003). 
17 Sider (2011), pp. 31-32. 
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to counterintuitive results. For this and other reasons, it is likely that simple 
charity-based descriptivism – at least in the version considered here – should 
be rejected as a general metasemantic theory.18  
However, simple charity-based descriptivism does yield exactly the right 
results when applied to theoretical terms, including natural kind terms, since 
these terms are intended to carve at the joints. To illustrate this point, one may 
for example consider the case of theoretical terms in physics, such as ‘electron’. 
The term ‘electron’ is intended to carve at the joints. Thus, a highly joint-carving 
interpretation of ‘electron’ should trump less joint-carving, but more charitable 
interpretations: when there is a mismatch between the physicists’ theory of 
‘electrons’ and the correct theory (which may not have been discovered yet) 
about whatever is the most joint-carving property in the vicinity, then the 
intuitively correct thing to say is that the physicists are mistaken – not that they 
are talking correctly about something else.19 
It seems reasonable to take ‘cause’ to be a theoretical term in this sense: 
it is intended to carve at the joints. Indeed, the importance we attribute to the 
distinction between causes and non-causes – both in philosophical theory and 
in our everyday lives, where the distinction underlies e.g. attributions of 
                                                
18 Sider (2011), pp. 32-33. 
19 Sider (2011), p. 32. It may be helpful to think of this in terms of a distinction between first-
order and second-order beliefs and intuitions. Consider, for example, knowledge. First-order 
beliefs and intuitions about knowledge are concerned with the question whether a person 
knows that p in some particular case. Second-order beliefs and intuitions are concerned with 
the question whether our first-order beliefs and intuitions can be mistaken – for example, 
whether we can be mistaken in our intuitive judgements about whether a person knows that p 
in some particular case. In the case of physics, we have a strong second-order intuition that 
physicists can, within limits, be mistaken in their first-order beliefs and intuitions about, for 
example, electrons. Similarly, in the case of knowledge, we have a strong second-order 
intuition that we can, within limits, be mistaken in our first-order judgements about whether a 
person knows that p in a particular case. Accepting simple charity-based descriptivism allows 
us to respect these second-order intuitions, since simple charity-based descriptivism allows for 
the possibility that we can, within limits, be mistaken in our use of terms such as ‘knows’ and 
‘electron’: according to simple charity-based descriptivism, such mistakes occur when there is a 
highly eligible candidate meaning in the vicinity, and the superior eligibility of this candidate 
meaning trumps the fact that it makes some of our claims come out false. See Weatherson 
(2003), pp. 25-26. 
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responsibility – would be hard to justify if we were not intending our talk 
about causation to carve at the joints. And if ‘cause’ is indeed a theoretical term 
in this sense, then it is reasonable to hold that the meaning of ‘cause’ is 
determined according to simple charity-based descriptivism, or a relevantly 
similar metasemantic theory.  
On this view, the correct interpretation of ‘cause’ is simply the 
interpretation that strikes the best balance between eligibility and charity to 
use. My aim in this dissertation will be to answer just this question: 
 
If simple charity-based descriptivism – or a relevantly similar metasemantic 
theory – is true, then the answer to this question will, ipso facto, be an answer to 
the semantic question: what does ‘cause’ mean? In that case, one may think of 
my project simply as the project of giving a semantics for ‘cause’. 
 It is, however, important to note that the interest and relevance of The 
Question is independent of whether simple charity-based descriptivism – or a 
relevantly similar metasemantic theory – is true. To see this, suppose that there 
is some mismatch between our use of the term ‘cause’ and the most joint-
carving relation in the vicinity. And suppose further that the correct 
metasemantic theory is such that the intended interpretation of our term 
‘cause’ is not at all sensitive to eligibility. In that case, our term ‘cause’ may 
have a highly non-joint-carving meaning. And answering The Question will not 
at all help us to determine what that meaning is.  
Instead, we may think of The Question as being concerned with the 
semantics of a different term, ‘cause*’, introduced via the following stipulation: 
 
‘Let the meaning of ‘cause*’ be the meaning that would achieve the best 
balance between eligibility and charity to use, if the word ‘cause’ were replaced 
The Question: which interpretation of ‘cause’ strikes the best balance between 
eligibility and charity to use? 
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by ‘cause*’ in all sentences believed (or reasonably believed) by competent 
speakers of English.’20 
 
Why should we take an interest in the semantics of ‘cause*’? There are two 
reasons. Firstly and most importantly, the project of producing a semantics for 
‘cause*’ is interesting considered as a metaphysical project. For when we are 
concerned with the semantics of ‘cause*’, we are concerned with the question 
of what is the most joint-carving relation in the vicinity of our ordinary term 
‘cause’. And answering this question gives us a deeper insight into the structure 
of reality – into how to carve reality at its joints – which is, arguably, one of the 
main goals of metaphysical inquiry.21  
Indeed, considered as a project in metaphysics, the project of producing 
a semantics for our ordinary term ‘cause’ has little or no value, unless it is 
presumed that the meaning of our ordinary term ‘cause’ is somehow 
responsive to facts about eligibility. For if the meaning of ‘cause’ is not 
responsive to such facts, producing a semantics for ‘cause’ amounts to nothing 
more than ‘producing a semantics for a fragment of English’.22 And as Hall 
asks, ‘[w]hy should scientists, philosophers of science, or metaphysicians care 
about that?’23 
 Secondly and more speculatively, we may have a more practical reason to 
take an interest in the semantics of ‘cause*’. For even if the meaning of our 
ordinary term ‘cause’ in fact differs somewhat from the meaning of ‘cause*’, 
the meaning of ‘cause*’ is arguably what we should mean by ‘cause’, given that 
the relation expressed by ‘cause*’ is more joint-carving than the relation 
expressed by our ordinary term ‘cause’. Sider, for example, makes the 
normative claim that ‘it’s better to think and speak in joint-carving terms’.24 
                                                
20 This stipulation is inspired by a similar stipulation proposed by Sider (2011), p. 76.  
21 Sider (2011), p. 1. 
22 Hall (2007b), p. 3. 
23 Hall (2007b), p. 3. 
24 Sider (2011), p. 61. 
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 These considerations show that the importance and relevance of The 
Question is independent of whether an answer to The Question produces a 
semantics for our ordinary term ‘cause’ or only for ‘cause*’: the project of 
answering The Question is important as a metaphysical project – and, perhaps, as 
a project in prescriptive semantics.25  
Since I believe that the meaning of our ordinary English term ‘cause’ is 
the meaning that strikes the best balance between eligibility and charity to use, 
so that ‘cause’ and ‘cause*’ have precisely the same meaning, I will simply use 
‘cause’ in the following. However, the reader should bear in mind at all times 
the assumption I have made about the meaning of ‘cause’, and feel free to 
replace ‘cause’ with ‘cause*’ as appropriate. 
 
2.  The shape of the answer: a biconditional 
In this dissertation, I shall given an answer to The Question in the form of a 
biconditional. In this section, I set out in more detail what I aim for in 
providing this answer. I begin (section 2.1) by considering the left-hand side of 
the biconditional. I then clarify that I aim to provide an ontological reduction 
of causation (section 2.2), and finally, I set out the degree of necessity with 
which the biconditional should hold (section 2.3). 
 
2.1  The left-hand side of the biconditional 
Before we can write out the left-hand side of the biconditional, a question 
arises concerning the adicity of the causal relation, i.e. the number of the causal 
relata. It is traditionally assumed that causation is a binary relation, and this 
assumption in turn dictates the traditional formulation of the left-hand side of 
the biconditional. As Schaffer writes:  
 
                                                
25 Although I have relied on semantic and metasemantic considerations to arrive at The 
Question, it is thus a question about what causation is out in the world, in the spirit of 
Williamson (2007). 
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‘Causation is widely assumed to be a binary relation: c causes e. Anyone familiar 
with the literature will recognize the pattern. One starts with ‘c causes e if and 
only if . . .’ and then considers how to continue.’26 
 
However, this assumption of binarity prejudges the issue: prior to looking at 
the details of which relation strikes the best balance between eligibility and 
charity to our use of ‘cause’, there is no compelling reason to assume that 
causation is a binary relation.  
It is indeed true that the surface form of our causal claims suggests that 
causation is a binary relation: typically, causal claims take the form ‘c causes e’. 
However, one cannot always read off the adicity of a relation from the surface 
form of our claims about it. To take just one example, consider the relation of 
simultaneity. The surface form of our claims about simultaneity suggests that 
simultaneity is a binary relation, since claims about simultaneity take the form 
‘a is simultaneous with b’. However, the theory of relativity tells us that the 
relation of simultaneity is in fact ternary – with the third relatum being a frame 
of reference.27 
At present, I therefore believe that we should leave all options open in 
our formulation of the left-hand side of biconditional. For this reason, I take it 
as my aim to complete the following biconditional, where it is left open 
whether the causal relation includes further relata:  
 
c is a cause of e relative to [ . . . ] if and only if [ . . . ] 
 
More precisely, this should be understood as a biconditional schema,28 where 
‘c’ and ‘e’ are variables standing for the primary causal relata, which we may, for 
now, think of as token events (for more on the primary causal relata, see 
Chapter 4). To complete the left-hand side of this biconditional, we then need 
                                                
26 Schaffer (2005), p. 297. 
27 Cf. Schaffer (2016), p. 17. 
28 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 25. 
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to determine whether there are any further causal relata – and if so, what they 
are. I shall argue that there is a further relatum – namely, what I call a possibility 
horizon (see Chapter 5). 
  Note that I use the ordinary English term ‘cause’ in my statement of the 
left-hand side of the biconditional. My reason for doing so is that I believe, as 
discussed in section 1, that the meaning of our ordinary term ‘cause’ is the 
meaning that strikes the best balance between eligibility and charity to use. To 
avoid relying on this assumption, however, one may rewrite the biconditional, 
replacing ‘cause’ with the term ‘cause*’ introduced in section 1: 
 
 c is a cause* of e relative to [ . . . ] if and only if [ . . . ] 
 
As mentioned above, the reader should feel free to replace ‘cause’ with ‘cause*’ 
as appropriate.  
 
2.2  Ontological reduction 
A good answer to The Question completes the biconditional in a way that is 
informative. Thus, we need to rule out ways of completing the biconditional that 
are true – even necessarily true – but utterly uninformative, such as the 
following:  
 
 c is a cause of e if and only if e is an effect of c. 
 
In the following, I will set myself a more specific goal, which ensures that the 
completed biconditional is suitably informative. This goal is based on the 
assumption that causation is not an irreducible, perfectly fundamental feature 
of the world. Rather, causation reduces to other more fundamental, non-causal 
features of the world.  
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While this reductionist assumption is not uncontroversial,29 it is widely 
shared in the literature. For example, Hall writes:  
 
‘a sensible metaphysical position is that facts about what causes what reduce to 
facts about the complete history of physical states the world occupies, together 
with facts about the fundamental laws that govern the evolution of these 
states.’30 
 
I will not argue for this assumption here, except by attempting to show that 
the project it prompts us to undertake can be successfully carried out. 
Plausibly, however, the success of this project is all that is required to vindicate 
the reductionist assumption.31 
 What is this project? Given the reductionist assumption, a natural aim in 
completing the biconditional is to show how causation reduces to more 
fundamental, non-causal features of reality. Borrowing a term from Paul and 
Hall, we may describe an account of causation that is intended to achieve this 
aim as an ontological reduction of causation.32 The name is apt because it shows 
where an account with the above aim must be situated relative to two crucial 
distinctions: the distinction between ontological and conceptual accounts, and the 
distinction between reductive and non-reductive accounts. 
 It is relatively simple to draw the distinction between ontological and 
conceptual accounts of causation: ontological accounts aim to lay bare what 
causation is out in the world, whereas conceptual accounts (often referred to as 
analyses) aim to illuminate our concept of causation.  
The distinction between reductive and non-reductive accounts is harder to 
pin down. Simply put, an account of causation is reductive just in case it shows 
                                                
29 For defences of the anti-reductionist position, see e.g. Armstrong (2004), and Tooley (1990). 
For a short discussion, see Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 67-69.  
30 Hall (2007b), p. 2. Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 7-8. 
31 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 69. 
32 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 29. 
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how facts about what causes what obtain in virtue of facts about non-causal 
features of the world. At the linguistic level, this means that an account of 
causation is reductive when it provides necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions for causation stated in purely non-causal terms, where a term is non-
causal just in case it refers to a non-causal feature of the world.  
 To give a full characterisation of the distinction between reductive and 
non-reductive accounts, however, more needs to be said. For how exactly 
should we draw the distinction between causal and non-causal terms or, 
correspondingly, between causal and non-causal features of the world? This 
question is especially difficult because any feature of the world to which 
causation is reduced must in some sense be causal, in virtue of the very fact that 
causation reduces to it.33 Because of these difficulties, I will not attempt to 
define what it takes for a term, or a feature of the world, to be non-causal. 
Rather, I will rest content with the following incomplete characterisation of 
what is required from a reductive account:  
 An account is clearly not reductive if it makes use of explicitly causal 
terms, such as ‘cause’, ‘effect’, ‘consequence’, ‘make happen’, ‘intervene’, 
‘manipulate’, etc. This suggests a requirement that a reductive account must 
satisfy: it must not use terms that feature on the above list.34  
Sometimes it is easy to see that a proposed account fails to meet this 
requirement: if one or more of the prohibited terms features on the right-hand 
side of the biconditional, the proposed account clearly fails to be reductive. In 
other cases, it may not be immediately obvious whether a proposed account 
meets the requirement. Consider, for example, an account that reduces 
causation to, among other things, relations of counterfactual dependence. The 
term ‘depends counterfactually on’ is not on the list of prohibited explicitly 
causal terms. So, at a first glance, it might seem that the proposed account 
                                                
33 I am grateful to Katherine Hawley for making me aware of this point. 
34 This requirement is parallel, for example, to van Inwagen’s requirement that an answer to 
his Special Composition Question must not make use of explicitly mereological terms such as 
’part’, ’whole’, ’fusion’, etc. See van Inwagen (1990), p. 31. 
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meets the requirement. To see whether it in fact does so, however, we must 
ask whether the proposed account can be completed without relying on terms 
from the prohibited list. In this case, the proposed account must, to be 
complete, include an account of the truth conditions of the counterfactuals it 
relies on. And if these truth-conditions in turn involve terms from the 
prohibited list, then the account fails to be reductive.35 
In many cases, a proposed account of causation can be shown to be 
non-reductive because it fails to meet the requirement presented here. 
However, the requirement is open-ended in at least two ways: I have not given 
a full list of prohibited terms, and I have not said at what point an account can 
be considered complete. Thus, I have not yet given a characterisation that 
allows me to show that a proposed account is reductive. Paul and Hall offer 
the following ideal requirement for a reductive account: 
 
‘show, explicitly, how facts about causation are grounded in facts about 
fundamental physical states, together with facts about the fundamental physical 
laws governing their evolution.’36 
 
This offers the positive suggestion that facts about fundamental physical states 
and facts about the fundamental physical laws should be allowed into the 
reductive basis. On this suggestion, then, an account of causation that is based 
solely on these facts counts as being sufficiently reductive.  
 My account of causation comes close to satisfying this ideal requirement: 
it is based on four basic ingredients – complete states, laws of nature 
understood as rules specifying the temporal evolution of complete states, 
relations of overall similarity between complete states, and the space of 
metaphysically possible worlds. 
                                                
35 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), p. 38. 
36 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 40. 
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Finally, it is worth noting that the aim of giving an ontological reduction 
of causation has implications for the relation between the two sides of the 
biconditional: the aim of giving an ontological reduction requires that the facts 
about what causes what, stated on the left-hand side of the biconditional, 
should reduce to the non-causal facts stated on the right-hand side.  
More generally, I aim to complete the biconditional in such a way that 
the two sides are not on a par: firstly, I aim to complete the biconditional in 
such a way that the facts on the right-hand side are ontologically more 
fundamental than the facts on the left-hand side. Secondly and relatedly, I aim to 
complete the biconditional in such a way that the right-hand side is explanatorily 
prior to the left-hand side: the facts about what causes what, stated on the left-
hand side, should be explained by the more fundamental, non-causal facts 
stated on the right-hand side, and not vice versa.  
If you like, you may think of the relation between the two sides of the 
biconditional in terms of grounding, where ‘grounding’ is used simply as ‘a 
placeholder for some relation of non-causal, ontological dependence’.37 Given 
this very minimal notion of grounding, my aim is to complete the biconditional 
in such a way that the facts about what causes what, stated on the left-hand 
side, are grounded in – depend on, or obtain in virtue of – the facts stated on the 
right-hand side. 
 
2.3  Truth in all deterministic worlds 
I aim to arrive at a completed biconditional that is true in all worlds governed 
by forwards deterministic laws that are time-translation invariant, and do not 
permit action at a temporal distance.38 We may think of this as an implicit 
restriction on the biconditional I propose: it applies to worlds whose laws are 
forwards deterministic, time-translation invariant, and do not permit action at a 
temporal distance; otherwise, it simply falls silent.  
                                                
37 Sartorio (2016), p. 8.  
38 Paul and Hall (2013) adopt similar restrictions (see Paul and Hall (2013), p. 8).  
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An account of causation that applies only to this class of worlds is 
obviously incomplete: even though deterministic laws usually give an excellent 
account of the macroscopic goings-on in the actual world, quantum physics 
suggests that the actual world is governed by indeterministic laws. To arrive at 
an account of causation that applies to the actual world, we therefore need an 
account of causation under indeterministic laws. Given this, why focus on 
developing an account of causation that is restricted to deterministic worlds? 
My reason is that it seems plausible that the very same causal relation is 
found in deterministic and indeterministic worlds. Given this, it makes sense to 
begin with the comparatively easier task of arriving at an account of causation 
that applies only to deterministic worlds: this already imposes sufficient 
constraints on the proposed account, and it avoids the added complexities that 
arise when dealing with indeterministic laws.39 My hope is that my proposed 
account may then eventually be generalised, so as to apply smoothly to worlds 
governed by indeterministic as well as deterministic laws. 
In addition, it is worth noting that even though I only consider worlds 
with forwards deterministic laws that are time-translation invariant and do not 
permit action at a temporal distance, the class of worlds under consideration 
still includes many very different kinds of worlds. Consider, for example, a 
world governed by the rules of Conway’s Game of Life. Paul and Hall describe 
such a world as follows: 
 
‘space is divided up into discrete cells, each of which can either be occupied or 
unoccupied; time is divided up into discrete moments; the pattern of 
occupation of the cells at one moment is lawfully and deterministically fixed by 
the pattern of occupation of the cells at the prior moment.’40 
 
                                                
39 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), p. 63. 
40 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 56; cf. Maudlin (2004). For the original description, see Gardner 
(1970).  
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Although such a world is very different from our own, we are able to recognise 
causal relations. And since this world has forwards deterministic laws that are 
time-translation invariant and do not permit action at a temporal distance, it is 
included among the worlds under consideration. Thus, my proposed 
biconditional needs to yield correct verdicts about what causes what in such a 
world. This already rules out a significant class of accounts of causation, 
namely accounts that attempt to reduce causation to transfers of conserved 
quantities:41 in Conway’s Game of Life, there are no transfers of conserved 
quantities, but there are still causal relations that need to be accommodated by 
my proposed account.42 
 Finally, my proposed account is only intended to apply to cases where 
the candidate cause c occurs strictly earlier than the effect e (within some 
appropriately chosen frame of reference). In other cases – that is, in putative 
cases of simultaneous or backwards causation – my account simply does not 
apply. I remain neutral on the question of whether there are genuine cases of 
simultaneous or backwards causation.43 Either way, however, I do not need to 
exclude worlds that permit simultaneous or backwards causation: my account 
can still be applied in such worlds – though only to those cases where the 
candidate cause c occurs strictly earlier than the effect e.44 If there are cases of 
simultaneous or backwards causation, I leave aside the question of whether my 
account of causation can be generalised to cover such cases, or they require a 
separate treatment.   
 
                                                
41 Such as the accounts of Dowe (2000); Fair (1979); and Salmon (1994).  
42 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), p. 56. 
43 For a brief discussion, see Collins, Hall, and Paul (2004b), pp. 9-12. 
44 By contrast, Paul and Hall impose the further restriction on the class of worlds under 
consideration that the laws must not permit backwards causation (see Paul and Hall (2013), p. 
8. I have chosen the different option outlined above for two reasons: first, merely limiting the 
questions to which my account applies, rather than limiting the class of worlds, ensures that 
my account applies more widely. Second, it is not clear that a prohibition against laws 
permitting simultaneous or backwards causation can be stated without appealing to implicitly 
or explicitly causal terms. 
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3.  Conclusion 
To sum up, we may give the following characterisation of the aim of my 
















My aim is to provide an account of causation, presented as a biconditional,  
 
 c is a cause of e relative to […] if and only if […] 
 
where the meaning of the word ‘cause’ on the left-hand side is the meaning that 
strikes the best balance between eligibility and charity to use, and where the 
biconditional is completed in such a way that  
1) it provides an ontological reduction of causation, showing how causation 
reduces to more fundamental, non-causal features of the world, and 
2) it is true in all instances where c occurs strictly earlier than e (within some 
appropriately chosen frame of reference), and where the relevant world is 
governed by forwards deterministic laws that are time-translation invariant 
and do not permit action at a temporal distance. 









The dual nature of causation 
 
In this chapter I give an overview of my proposed account of causation. The 
key to this account is the idea that causation has a dual nature: on the one 
hand, a cause must be connected to its effect via a genuine process; on the other 
hand, a cause must make a difference to its effect.  
 As I have set out in detail in Chapter 1, my aim is to identify the best 
candidate meaning of ‘cause’ – that is, the relation out in the world that strikes 
the best balance between eligibility and charity to our use of ‘cause’. To identify 
this relation, we need to pay close attention to our use of ‘cause’ as it is 
revealed in the pre-theoretic causal judgements of competent speakers. In the 
following, I will use ‘intuition’, ‘intuitive’, ‘intuitively’, etc., to mark such 
judgements.  
Given that my aim is to find the relation out in the world that strikes the 
best balance between eligibility and charity to our use of ‘cause’, intuitions 
should not be treated as non-negotiable ‘data’:1 we need to leave open the 
possibility that the best candidate meaning of ‘cause’ is one whose imperfect 
charity to use is outweighed by its superior eligibility. Rather, we may think of 
our intuitions as well-intentioned, but perhaps incomplete, reports of the 
causal relation out in the world – and our task now is to use these reports as 
guides to find out what the causal relation out in the world really is. 
In the following, I will argue that a close study of our intuitive 
judgements – and, in particular, of the tensions between different intuitive 
judgements – suggests that causation has a dual nature. To bring this out, I 
                                                
1 Cf. Hall (2007b), p. 2. 
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begin (in section 1) by giving a brief characterisation of the intuitive 
judgements that characterise our use of ‘cause’ and, in particular, of the 
tensions between them. Next, I argue (in section 2) that these tensions suggest 
that the causal relation itself has a dual nature.   
  
1.  Tales of the beast: our use of ‘cause’ 
Intuitions about causation may be divided into two kinds: intuitions about 
specific cases, and intuitions about general principles.  
By now, the literature on causation contains a multitude of specific cases 
where we have firm intuitions and widespread agreement about what causes 
what. These intuitive judgements about specific cases are our main guides to 
the causal relation out in the world. And the degree to which a proposed 
candidate meaning of ‘cause’ can accommodate these intuitive judgements is 
the main measure of its charity to use.  
The second kind of intuitions about causation deal with general 
principles, such as the intuitive principle that counterfactual dependence is 
sufficient for causation, or that causation is a transitive relation. Such principles 
sanction particular causal inferences. For example, the principle that 
counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causation sanctions the inference 
from ‘e depends counterfactually on c’ to ‘c is a cause of e’, and the principle 
that causation is a transitive relation sanctions the inference from ‘c is a cause 
of d’ and ‘d is a cause of e’ to ‘c is a cause of e’. These principles summarise key 
features of our practices of causal inference, and I believe that we should 
consider these practices to be an integral part of our use of ‘cause’.  
To give a clear presentation of specific cases, I will frequently rely on 
neuron diagrams. In section 1.1, I set out the conventions governing the 
interpretation of neuron diagrams, leaving an overview over all cases discussed 
in this dissertation for Appendix B.  
Concerning intuitive principles of causal inference, I shall focus on what 
I take to be the three most important principles: the intuitive principle that 
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counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causation, the intuitive principle 
that causation is a transitive relation, and the intuitive principle that causation 
is intrinsic to a process. I present these intuitive principles in section 1.2. 
Finally, I show (in section 1.3) that there are deep tensions between the three 
intuitive principles and our intuitions about specific cases. 
 
1.1  Specific cases: representation using neuron diagrams 
Neuron diagrams do an excellent job of ‘representing a complex situation 
clearly and forcefully, allowing the reader to take in at a glance its central causal 
characteristics’.2 For this reason, I will frequently use neuron diagrams to 
represent specific cases. In this section, I introduce the conventions governing 
the interpretation of neuron diagrams, and illustrate how we may use neuron 
diagrams to represent the causal structure of real life situations.3  
 Let us begin by considering the following neuron diagram, illustrating 








        
 
 
Figure 1 shows a system of neurons, including the stimulatory and inhibitory 
channels between them.4 Neurons are indicated by circles. If a neuron fires, it 
is coloured green; if it does not fire, it is left blank. Stimulatory channels 
between neurons are indicated with arrows; inhibitory channels are indicated 
with a line ending with a blob.  
                                                
2 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 10.  
3 I discuss the interpretation of neuron diagrams further in Chapter 3 section 4, and add 
conventions for naming neuron events in Chapter 4 section 2.3.  
4 In the following, I number figures consecutively within each chapter. 
     A    C 
     B    D 
     E 
  t1        t2     t3      Figure 1
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The neuron diagram should be read from left to right. On the far left is 
shown what happens at time t1: neurons A and B both fire. Further to the right 
is shown what happens at the later time t2: neuron C fires, while neuron D fails 
to fire. And furthest to the right is shown what happens at the still later time t3: 
neuron E fires. In the following, I use italicized letters to denote the firings of 
neurons. Thus, ‘A’ denotes the firing of A, ‘B’ denotes the firing of B, etc.  
It is part of the conventions for interpreting neuron diagrams that we 
assume, unless an explicit stipulation is made to the contrary, that the pattern 
of firings evolves forward in accordance with the following neuron laws:  
 
i. The firing of a neuron lasts only an instant. 
ii. When a neuron fires, it sends signals through its out-going stimulatory 
and inhibitory channels; otherwise, it sends no signals. 
iii. A signal sent at time ti arrives at the next neuron at time ti+1.  
iv. For any time t, if a neuron receives no signals or receives at least one 
inhibitory signal at time t, it does not fire at t. 
v. For any time t, if a neuron receives at least one stimulatory signal and no 
inhibitory signals at t, it fires at t. 
 
To illustrate, we may now see how these conventions play out in the neuron 
diagram above: A fires at time t1, and sends signals through its out-going 
stimulatory and inhibitory channels. Its stimulatory signal reaches C at time t2, 
and its inhibitory signal reaches D at time t2. In addition, B fires at time t1 and 
sends a stimulatory signal, which reaches D at time t2. At time t2, C thus 
receives a stimulatory signal (from A) and no inhibitory signals, and C 
therefore fires at time t2. By contrast, D receives an inhibitory signal (from A) 
at time t2, and D therefore does not fire at time t2. Finally, the stimulatory 
signal from C reaches E at time t3, and since E receives no inhibitory signals at 
that time, E therefore fires at time t3. 
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The conventions stated above cover most of the cases I will discuss in 
this dissertation. In a few cases, however, I use neuron diagrams with special 
features. For example, I sometimes consider stubborn neurons that require 
two stimulatory signals in order to fire, or neurons that can fire in two or more 
different ways – for example, either in uniform green or in stripes. When I do 
so, I explicitly state how the conventions above should be extended to cover 
the case at hand.  
Finally, I adopt the convention of treating the information contained in a 
neuron diagram as complete, in the sense that there is no hidden information 
that may overturn the judgements we reach by considering what is explicitly 
represented in the neuron diagram. 
 As I will now illustrate, neuron diagrams may be used to give a 
perspicuous representation of real life cases. For example, Figure 1 above may 
be used to represent the structure of the following real-life situation:  
 
Early preemption: Suzy throws a rock at a window and the window shatters. If 
Suzy had not thrown, Billy – who is standing right next to her – would have 
thrown his rock, and the window would still have shattered. 
 
Figure 1 represents the structure of Early preemption as follows: A (i.e. the firing 
of neuron A) represents Suzy’s throw, C represents Suzy’s rock flying towards 
the window, and E represents the shattering of the window. Furthermore, B 
represents Billy’s readiness to throw, and D’s failure to fire represents Billy’s 
failure to throw.  
Furthermore, the pattern of stimulatory and inhibitory channels between 
the neurons represents (simplified versions of) the nomological relationships 
between these events: Suzy’s rock flies towards the window at t2 if and only if 
Suzy throws at t1; Billy throws his rock at t2 if and only if he is ready to throw 
at t1 and Suzy does not throw at t1; and the window shatters at t3 if and only if 
Suzy’s rock is flying towards it at t2 or Billy throws at t2.  
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The pattern of stimulatory and inhibitory channels also captures the 
counterfactual structure of the case: in the real life situation, the window would 
still have shattered if Suzy had not thrown – because of Billy’s throw. 
Correspondingly, the neuron laws ensure that E would still have occurred even 








        
 
 
Throughout this dissertation, we shall look at a variety of real-life cases and use 
neuron diagrams to bring out their structure. In Appendix B, I give an 
overview of all the neuron diagrams considered in this dissertation.  
 
1.2  Intuitive principles of causal inference: sufficiency of 
counterfactual dependence, transitivity, and intrinsicness 
In the following, I will focus on three general principles that capture our most 
central practices of causal inference.5 These three principles may be summed 
up as follows:  
 
I. Counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causation. 
II. Causation is a transitive relation. 
III. Causation is intrinsic to a causal process. 
 
                                                
5 These three principles are among the basic claims about causation listed in Paul and Hall 
(2013), p. 4. 
     A    C 
     B    D 
     E 
  t1        t2     t3      Figure 1*
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Each of these principles sanctions a particular kind of causal inference. In this 
section, I will say more about how we should understand each of these 
principles and, correspondingly, what the associated causal inference is.  
Let us begin with the first principle – that counterfactual dependence is 
sufficient for causation. In Chapter 8, I discuss the evaluation of the relevant 
counterfactuals in detail. For now, however, we may rely on our intuitive 
understanding of counterfactuals. Based on this, we may give the following 
preliminary statement of the principle, making it more perspicuous what kind 
of inference it sanctions (here and in my statement of the following two 
principles, the asterisk indicates that I do not endorse this principle):  
 
        * Sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation:  
if e depends counterfactually on c, then c causes e.  
 
The second principle states that causation is a transitive relation. We may 
restate this principle as follows, to clarify the kind of inference it sanctions: 
 
        * Transitivity of causation: if there is a set of events {d1, d2, . . . , dn},  
such that c causes d1, d1 causes d2, . . . , and dn causes e, then c causes e.6 
 
Finally, the third principle – that causation is intrinsic to a causal process – 
requires a little more explanation. It should be understood roughly as follows: 
when c causes e, this relation holds in virtue of the laws of nature together with 
the intrinsic character of c, e, and the process connecting c to e – any other 
features of the environment are irrelevant. Lewis spells out and motivates this 
principle as follows:  
 
                                                
6 This principle is equivalent to the following simpler principle: if c causes d and d causes e, 
then c causes e. I have chosen the above statement of the principle because this makes things 
go more smoothly when I present a restricted principle of transitivity in Chapter 11. 
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‘Suppose we have processes – courses of events, which may or may not be 
causally connected – going on in two distinct spatiotemporal regions, regions of 
the same or of different possible worlds. Disregarding the surroundings of the 
two regions, and disregarding any irrelevant events that may be occurring in 
either region without being part of the process in question, what goes on in the 
two regions is exactly alike. Suppose further that the laws of nature that govern 
the two regions are exactly the same. Then can it be that we have a causal 
process in one of the regions but not in the other? It seems not. Intuitively, 
whether the process going on in a region is causal depends only on the intrinsic 
character of the process itself, and on the relevant laws. The surroundings, and 
even other events in the region, are irrelevant.’7 
 
Lewis’s statement of this principle is objectionably vague. In particular, he does 
not say what it takes for an event to be part of a process.8 For now, however, 
we may simply rely on our intuitive understanding of what it takes for an event 
to be part of a process. Based on this, we may give a preliminary statement of 
the principle as follows: 
 
        * Intrinsicness of causation: if c causes e, and a structure of events S, including all the 
events that are involved in a process connecting c to e, is governed by the same 
laws and exactly matches a structure of events S *, then the counterpart c* of c 
in S * is a cause of the counterpart e* of e in S *. 
 




                                                
7 Lewis (1986e), p. 205. 
8 Hall (2004b), p. 239; Paul and Hall (2013), p. 126. 
9 For further discussion of the intrinsicness principle, see Hall (2002) and (2004b); Paul and 
Hall (2013), pp. 124-131; and Sartorio (2016), pp. 71-75. 
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1.3  Tensions between the intuitive principles and our intuitions about 
specific cases 
Our intuitions about specific cases come into prima facie conflict with each of 
the three general principles set out above. In the following, I will consider each 
principle in turn and show how such conflicts arise. 
 
1.3.1  Counterexamples to the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation 
In this section, I consider two kinds of cases that both present apparent 
counterexamples to the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation: 
cases of omission-involving causation, and cases where the candidate cause is, 
so to speak, at the wrong level of detail relative to the effect. I suggest that 
cases of omission-involving causation do not present genuine counterexamples 
to the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence, while cases involving 
mismatch in the level of detail do. 
Cases involving omissions are often cited as counterexamples to the 
sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation.10 Consider, for 
example, the following case:  
 
The flowers: Suzy goes on holiday and Billy promises to water her flowers while 
she is away. However, Billy does not water the flowers and the flowers die.  
 
In this case, the death of the flowers depends counterfactually on Billy’s failure 
to water them: if Billy had not failed to water the flowers, they would not have 
died. Correspondingly, we intuitively judge that Billy’s failure to water the 
flowers is a cause of their death. So far, there is no counterexample to the 
sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation.  
However, the death of the flowers also depends counterfactually on 
other people’s failures to water them – for example, the death of the flowers 
                                                
10 See e.g. Beebee (2004), pp. 294-95; McGrath (2005), pp. 126-30; Sartorio (2010), pp. 262-3; 
Thomson (2003), pp. 95-98. 
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depends counterfactually on the queen of England’s11 failure to water them: if 
she had watered the flowers, they would not have died. Intuitively, however, 
the queen’s failure to water the flowers is not a cause of their death.12 This is 
sometimes called the problem of profligate omissions: if we accept omissions as 
causal relata, and we hold that counterfactual dependence is sufficient for 
causation, then we end up with many more omissions as causes than we would 
normally accept.13  
 I believe that we should accept the intuitive verdict that the queen’s 
failure to water the flowers is not a cause of their death. Even so, I will argue 
that cases such as this do not present counterexamples to the sufficiency of 
counterfactual dependence for causation: as I suggest in Chapter 8, what 
matters for causation is a special kind of counterfactual dependence – namely, 
counterfactual dependence within a possibility horizon. This notion of 
counterfactual dependence is inextricably bound up with a notion of relevant 
possibilities: a possibility horizon consists in a restricted class of possible 
worlds containing only those worlds that represent relevant possibilities. Since 
the queen’s watering the flowers is not a relevant possibility – as Schaffer 
writes, ‘we never supposed that the queen would deign to water [the] flowers’14 
– the queen’s watering the flowers is treated as impossible within the contextually 
relevant possibility horizon. And so we find that, within the contextually 
relevant possibility horizon, the death of the flowers does not depend 
counterfactually on the queen’s failure to water them (for my treatment of this 
case, see Chapter 10 section 1). 
 There are, however, cases of a different kind that I believe do put 
pressure on the principle that counterfactual dependence (even when this is 
understood as counterfactual dependence within a possibility horizon) is 
sufficient for causation. These are cases where the effect depends 
                                                
11 More precisely, the queen of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
12 See e.g. Sartorio (2010), pp. 262-3; Schaffer (2005), p. 300. 
13 See e.g. Bernstein (2014), p. 429. 
14 Schaffer (2005), p. 302. 
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counterfactually on an event that, intuitively, is at the wrong level of detail. As 
a first example, consider the following case:  
 
Scarlet: The pigeon Sophia has been conditioned to peck at scarlet to the 
exclusion of all other colours. She is presented with a scarlet triangle and pecks 
at it.15  
 
Sophia’s pecking depends counterfactually on the triangle’s being scarlet: if the 
triangle had not been scarlet, Sophia would not have pecked. Correspondingly, 
we intuitively judge that the triangle’s being scarlet is a cause of Sophia’s 
pecking. So far, there is no counterexample to the sufficiency of counterfactual 
dependence.  
But now consider the event of the triangle’s being red. Once again, we 
have counterfactual dependence: if the triangle had not been red, Sophia would 
not have pecked – for in any world in which the triangle is non-red, it is also 
non-scarlet, and Sophia pecks only at scarlet. Should we therefore say that the 
triangle’s being red is a cause of Sophia’s pecking? Doing so seems at best 
strained: intuitively, the mere event of the triangle’s being red is not a cause – 
the cause is the triangle’s being scarlet.16 We thus find a prima facie tension 
between our intuitions about this specific case and the intuitive principle that 
counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causation. 
 In the above case, the problem is that the effect depends 
counterfactually on an event that is, intuitively, at a too coarse level of detail to 
fit the effect. We may similarly construct cases in which the effect depends 
counterfactually on an event that is, intuitively, at a too fine level of detail to fit 
the effect. Consider, for example, the following case:  
 
                                                
15 This case is closely based on a case presented in Yablo (1992a), p. 257. For similar cases, see 
Yablo (1992b), p. 415, and Sartorio (2010), pp. 266-69. 
16 Cf. Yablo (1992b), p. 415; Sartorio (2010), pp. 266-69. 
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 Red: The pigeon Delia has been conditioned to peck at red to the exclusion of 
all other colours. She is presented with a scarlet triangle and pecks at it. In the 
lab where she is, the researchers use just two colours – scarlet and emerald. If 
Delia had not been presented with a scarlet triangle, she would have been 
presented with an emerald triangle.17  
 
In this case, Delia’s pecking depends counterfactually on the triangle’s being 
red. Correspondingly, we intuitively judge that the triangle’s being red is a 
cause of Delia’s pecking. So far, no counterexample. However, Delia’s pecking 
also depends counterfactually on the triangle’s being scarlet – for if the triangle 
had not been scarlet, it would have been emerald, and Delia does not peck at 
emerald. Should we therefore say that the triangle’s being scarlet is a cause of 
Delia’s pecking? Once again, this seems at best strained: intuitively, the precise 
shade of red does not matter – all that matters is that the triangle is some shade 
of red.18  
In the following quotation, I believe that Yablo succeeds in capturing the 
motivation behind these judgements: 
 
‘causes are expected to be commensurate with their effects: roughly, they should 
incorporate a good deal of causally important material but not too much that is 
causally unimportant. […] Although determinables and determinates do not 
compete for causal influence, broadly conceived as encompassing everything 
from causal relevance to causal sufficiency, they do compete for the role of 
cause, with the more commensurate candidate prevailing.’19   
 
                                                
17 This case is closely based on a case presented in Yablo (1992a), p. 257. For similar cases, see 
Yablo (1992b), p. 417, and Sartorio (2010), pp. 264-66. 
18 Cf. Yablo (1992b), p. 417; Sartorio (2010), pp. 264-66. 
19 Yablo (1992a), pp. 273-4; cf. Yablo (1992b). In the literature, the relation between cause and 
effect that Yablo refers to as ‘commensuration’ is often called ‘proportionality’. For discussion, 
see Bernstein (2014); Dowe (2010); McDonnell (forthcoming); Shapiro and Sober (2012); and 
Weslake (2013). 
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In the above cases, Yablo’s suggestion is that the determinate, i.e. the triangle’s 
being scarlet, and the determinable, i.e. the triangle’s being red, compete for the 
role of cause. In Scarlet, the triangle’s being scarlet is the more commensurate 
candidate. Thus, we happily say that the triangle’s being scarlet causes Sophia’s 
pecking, while we are reluctant to say that the triangle’s being red does so. In 
Red, by contrast, the triangle’s being red is the more commensurate candidate. 
And so, we happily say that the triangle’s being red causes Delia’s pecking, 
while we are reluctant to say that the triangle’s being scarlet does so.  
 
1.3.2  Counterexamples to the transitivity of causation  
There is a range of specific cases that present counterexamples to the intuitive 
principle that causation is transitive. The following is a typical and intuitively 
convincing case:  
 
Boulder: ‘A boulder is dislodged and begins rolling ominously toward Hiker. 
Before it reaches him, Hiker sees the boulder and ducks. The boulder sails 
harmlessly over his head with nary a centimetre to spare. Hiker survives his 
ordeal.’20 
 
Intuitively, the boulder’s fall causes Hiker’s duck, and Hiker’s duck in turn 
causes his survival. If causation is transitive, it follows that the boulder’s fall 
causes Hiker’s survival. But intuitively, this is false: the boulder’s fall does not 
cause Hiker’s survival. Rather, Hiker survives in spite of the boulder’s fall. This 
case – and others like it – shows that there is a prima facie tension between our 




                                                
20 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 222. The case is originally due to Hall. For further discussion, see 
e.g. Hall (2004a); Hitchcock (2001); Kvart (1991); Lee (1988); McDermott (1995); Paul (2004a); 
Sartorio (2005); and Schaffer (2005). 
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1.3.3  Counterexamples to the intrinsicness of causation 
Finally, there are specific cases that present counterexamples to the intuitive 
principle that causation is intrinsic to a process. Consider, for example, the 











     
Intuitively, C is here a cause of F. Furthermore, it is clear that on any 
reasonable way of drawing the distinction between events that are and are not 
part of the process leading up to F, the firing of B certainly is not part of that 
process. On any reasonable way of spelling out the intrinsicness principle, the 
process from C to F is therefore exactly the same in Figure 2* below, where 
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By the intrinsicness thesis, it now follows that C is here a cause of F. 
Intuitively, however, this is simply false: as Paul and Hall note, letting B be 
dormant ‘completely reverses the intuitive verdict about C – once we remove 
the threat created by B’s firing, we intuitively judge that C is completely idle 
with respect to [F]’.21 Thus, the present case – and others like it – shows that 
there is a prima facie tension between our intuitions about specific cases and the 
general principle that causation is intrinsic to a process.  
 
1.4  Consequences of the tensions 
The above discussion shows that our intuitions about specific cases come into 
prima facie conflict with the three intuitive principles. This shows that it is 
impossible to find a candidate meaning of ‘cause’ that is perfectly charitable to 
use: any candidate meaning that perfectly respects our intuitions about specific 
cases will be imperfectly charitable to use by rejecting the three intuitive 
principles of causal inference, and vice versa. We must, inevitably, compromise. 
 However, the tensions do not merely lead to this negative conclusion. 
They also point to an important feature of the casual relation: as I shall argue 
in the following section, the best explanation of our conflicting intuitions is 
that the causal relation has a dual nature. This idea allows us to find a candidate 
meaning of ‘cause’ that achieves a very high degree of charity to use: the three 
intuitive principles in their unrestricted form come into conflict with our 
intuitions about specific cases. However, by recognising the dual nature of 
                                                
21 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 197. Paul and Hall are here commenting on a version of the case 
where neuron B is not merely dormant, but has been removed entirely. However, their 
reasoning applies equally well to the case presented in Figure 2*, since letting B be dormant is 
enough to remove the threat created by B’s firing. In the following, I adopt a conception of 
sameness of laws such that two neuron worlds count as being governed by the same laws only 
if they contain the same structure of neurons, with the same patterns of stimulatory and 
inhibitory channels (see Chapter 3 section 4). Such a conception is certainly not mandatory, 
but it makes it much easier to work with neuron diagrams. And given this conception of 
sameness of laws, the case considered by Paul and Hall does not present a counterexample to 
the intrinsicness of causation. By contrast, the case considered above, where B is simply 
dormant, does present a counterexample. 
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causation, we are able to recover restricted versions of all three principles, where 
these restricted principles are fully compatible with our intuitions about 
specific cases.  
 
2.  The beast is a butterfly: the dual nature of causation 
The most detailed development of the idea that causation has a dual nature is 
due to Hall, who has argued that we have two concepts of causation – namely, 
the concepts of production and dependence. I begin by presenting an outline 
of Hall’s account (section 2.1), as well as the challenges for this account 
(section 2.2). Building on this, I then present my own picture of the dual 
nature of causation (section 2.3). And finally, I give a preview of how I will 
develop my account in subsequent chapters (section 2.4).  
 
2.1  Hall’s two concepts of causation: production and dependence 
In his paper, ‘Two concepts of causation’, Hall makes an intriguing suggestion 
as to how we may resolve the tensions between our different intuitions about 
causation. His suggestion is that we have two concepts of causation: the 
concept of production, and the concept of dependence.22 Dependence is simply 
counterfactual dependence. Production is, in Hall’s words, ‘rather more 
difficult to characterize, but we evoke it when we say of an event c that it helps 
to generate or bring about or produce another event e’.23 
In most of the cases that we intuitively recognise as cases of causation, 
the two concepts overlap.24 Sometimes, however, they come apart. And paying 
close attention to the cases where they come apart is a useful first step towards 
characterising the two concepts more fully.  
 Let us begin by considering a case where the cause produces the effect, but 
where the effect does not depend on the cause. Indeed, we have already seen an 
                                                
22 Hall (2004b), pp. 252-4. 
23 Hall (2004b), p. 225. For Hall’s discussion of how to analyse production, see Hall (2004b), 
pp. 257-65. 
24 Hall (2004b), p. 254. 
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example of such a case in section 1.1, namely our standard case of early 
preemption:  
  
Early preemption: Suzy throws a rock at a window and the window shatters. If 
Suzy had not thrown, Billy – who is standing right next to her – would have 
thrown his rock, and the window would still have shattered. 
 













Intuitively, Suzy’s throw (A) is a cause of the window-shattering (E). On Hall’s 
suggestion, Suzy’s throw produces the shattering – we can trace a productive 
process from Suzy’s throw (A), through the flight of her rock (C), to the 
window-shattering (E). However, the shattering does not depend on Suzy’s 
throw: if Suzy had not thrown, the window would still have shattered – 
because of Billy’s readiness to throw (B). Indeed, Hall suggests that production 
and dependence come apart in this way in all cases of redundant causation.25 
 Next, let us consider a case where the effect depends on its cause, but 
where the cause does not produce the effect. Consider, for example, our case of 
double prevention discussed in section 1.3.3 above:  
 
 
                                                
25 Hall (2004b), p. 253. 
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Intuitively, C is here a cause of F. And in this case, F depends on C: if C had not 
occurred, F would not have occurred. However, C does not produce F – for, on 
Hall’s conception, production cannot involve omissions such as E’s failure to 
fire.26  
 Considering these cases gives an approximate understanding of the two 
concepts. We may make this more precise by setting out their general features. 
Firstly, the two concepts differ – as I hinted at above – in their treatment of 
omissions: production cannot involve omissions, whereas dependence can.27 
Furthermore, the two concepts differ in their relation to each of the three 
intuitive principles of causal inference: counterfactual dependence is not 
sufficient for production, but production is both transitive and intrinsic. By 
contrast, counterfactual dependence is, obviously, sufficient for dependence, 
but dependence is neither transitive nor intrinsic.28  
 Hall’s proposal is that c is a cause of e just in case c produces e or e 
depends on c. The figure below gives a visual representation of this proposal, 




                                                
26 Hall (2004b), pp. 253-4. 
27 Hall (2004b), p. 226 and 254. 
28 Hall (2004b), p. 226 and 253. 
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Hall’s two concepts proposal is very attractive: it captures a deep truth about 
our way of thinking about causation as being concerned with, on the one hand, 
productive processes and, on the other hand, relations of dependence. 
Furthermore, it shows an intriguing strategy for accommodating our intuitions 
about both specific cases and general principles: Hall’s proposal succeeds in 
accommodating nearly all of our intuitions about specific cases. Since these 
intuitions conflict with the three intuitive principles, this means that Hall’s 
proposal cannot accommodate these principles as fully general principles about 
causation itself. However, it can accommodate each of the three principles as a 
principle about either production or dependence: counterfactual dependence is 
sufficient (indeed, both necessary and sufficient) for dependence, but not for 
production; and production is transitive and intrinsic, whereas dependence is 
neither. 
 However, problems arise if we try to use Hall’s proposal to determine 
the best candidate meaning of ‘cause’. I turn to these problems in the following 
section. 
 
2.2  Difficulties for the two concepts account 
There is an obvious difference between my project and the project Hall is 
engaged in: the two concepts proposal targets our concept(s) of causation. By 
contrast, my aim is to capture the relation(s) out in the world that provide the 
dependence production 
Figure 3 
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best candidate meaning(s) of ‘cause’. These are two very different projects. 
However, we may still draw on Hall’s proposal in trying to determine the best 
candidate meaning(s) of ‘cause’.  
Directly translating Hall’s proposal yields something like the following: 
there are two relations out in the world – the relation of production and the 
relation of dependence. Dependence is simply counterfactual dependence. 
Production is harder to characterise. However we may at least say the 
following: counterfactual dependence is not sufficient for production, 
production is transitive and intrinsic to a process, and production cannot 
involve omissions.  
Building on this, we now have a choice between the following two 
options: either we may say that there is a single best candidate meaning of 
‘cause’, namely the disjunction of production and dependence:  
 
c is a cause of e if and only if c produces e or e depends on c. 
 
Or, alternatively, we may say that our word ‘cause’ turns out, surprisingly, to be 
ambiguous between two different relations – what we might call ‘production-
causation’ and ‘dependence-causation’, where 
 
 c is a production-cause of e if and only if c produces e, and 
 c is a dependence-cause of e if and only if e depends on c. 
 
Given the aim of finding the best candidate meaning(s) of ‘cause’, the choice 
between these two options presents a dilemma: the first option does well in 
terms of respecting the higher-level intuition that there is a single meaning of 
‘cause’. If we take this option, however, we find that ‘cause’ refers to a 
disjunctive and therefore not very eligible relation. The second option, by 
contrast, goes against the higher-level intuition that there is a single meaning of 
‘cause’ and delivers the surprising result that ‘cause’ is ambiguous between two 
quite different meanings. However, it then has the advantage that the two 
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relations of production-causation and dependence-causation are both more 
eligible than the disjunctive relation of production-or-dependence.  
Whichever way we resolve this dilemma, there is a price to pay. In 
addition, the two concepts account faces a further difficulty: as Hall himself 
recognises, the relations of production and dependence do not capture our 
intuitions about certain specific cases – in some cases, the proposal is too 
permissive, i.e. it admits causes that we do not intuitive recognise as such; in 
other cases, it is not permissive enough, i.e. it rejects causes that we intuitively 
do recognise. 
 
2.2.1  Counterexamples to the sufficiency of the two concepts account 
Let me begin by considering cases in which the two concepts account is too 
permissive. These cases may be divided into two groups:  
 
i) cases where an event e depends on an earlier event c,  
but where we are reluctant to accept c as a cause of e, and  
ii) cases where c produces e,  
but where we are reluctant to accept c as a cause of e.  
 
In section 1.3.1 above, we have already encountered cases belonging to the 
first group – namely, Scarlet and Red, which provide counterexamples to the 
sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation. In the following, I will 
now consider a case belonging to the second group, where c produces e, but 
where we intuitively judge that c does not cause e: 
 
Switch: Suzy is standing by a switch in the railroad tracks. She sees a train 
approaching in the distance, and flips the switch so that the train travels down 
the left-hand track. If she had not flipped the switch, the train would have 
Part I: Introduction 
 44 
travelled down the right-hand track instead. Since the tracks converge a few 
miles later, the train arrives at its destination all the same.29 
 











     
 
 
A here corresponds to the train’s approach, B corresponds to Suzy’s flipping 
the switch, and C’s firing corresponds to the train’s reaching the place where 
the track forks. Importantly, C can fire in two different ways: in stripes and in 
uniform green. These two ways correspond to the different settings of the 
switch: C’s firing in stripes represents the train being directed towards the left-
hand track; C’s firing in uniform green represents the train being directed 
towards the right-hand track. Finally, D represents the train’s journey along the 
left-hand track, E’s failure to fire represents the train’s failure to journey along 
the right-hand track, and F represents the train’s arrival at its destination.  
The conventions governing the neuron diagram are exactly as set out in 
section 1.1 above, with the following important addition to the neuron laws: C 
fires if and only if it receives a stimulatory signal from A. Furthermore, the way 
in which C fires is determined by whether or not B fires: C fires in stripes if 
                                                
29 Switching cases of this kind are discussed e.g. in Hall (2004a), pp. 187-92, (2007a),  
p. 118, and (2007b), pp. 28-32 and 51; Hitchcock (2009), p. 394; Mackie (1992); p. 496-7; Paul 
and Hall (2013), p. 232; and Sartorio (2005), pp. 74-5. 
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and only if A and B both fire, and C fires in uniform green if and only if A 
fires and B does not.  
Intuitively, B (Suzy’s flipping the switch) is not a cause of F (the train’s 
arrival). Rather, B is simply irrelevant to F. However, from the transitivity and 
intrinsicness of production it follows that B produces F. As Hall himself notes, 
his account thus has the undesirable consequence that we ‘must call switches 
producers of the relevant effect, and so in one central sense causes’.30 
 
2.2.2  Counterexample to the necessity of the two concepts account 
As Hall himself shows, the two concepts account is put under further pressure 
by cases indicating that it is not permissive enough. Consider, for example, the 













         
 
Intuitively, there is a clear sense in which C is a cause of J: as Hall writes, ‘[D] 
notwithstanding, it is C that in fact cancels the threat to [J], and cancelling a 
threat is one way to be a cause’.32 On the two concepts account, however, there 
is no sense in which C is a cause of J: C does not produce J, since production on 
                                                
30 Hall (2007b), p. 51. 
31 Figure from Hall (2007b), p. 52. 
32 Hall (2007b), p. 52. 
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Hall’s conception cannot involve omissions. And J does not depend on C, since 
D ensures that J would still have occurred even if C had not occurred, as 













         
 
 
Thus, we find that the two concepts account is not permissive enough: it 
allows no sense in which C is a cause of J, even though it seems intuitively 
correct to say that C causes J.33  
 
2.2.3  Overview of counterexamples to the two concepts account 
Figure 6 sums up the counterexamples we have considered above: the grey 
dots that lie within the circles of production and dependence represent 
counterexamples to the sufficiency of the two concepts account; the black dot 
outside the circles represents a counterexample to the necessity of the two 






                                                
33 Hall (2007b), p. 52. 
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Given the aim of identifying the relation(s) that strike the best balance between 
eligibility and charity to our use of ‘cause’, the above considerations do not 
refute the two concepts account.34 However, the problems do suggest that it 
may be worthwhile to keep searching for an account of causation that can do 
better in terms of satisfying the two criteria of eligibility and charity to use.  
 
2.3  The butterfly account: causation at the intersection of  
process-connection and security-dependence 
The crucial insight underlying Hall’s two concepts account is that we can 
accommodate our conflicting intuitions concerning the sufficiency of 
counterfactual dependence, transitivity, and intrinsicness, by giving an account 
of causation in terms of two different relations: one relation for which 
counterfactual dependence is not sufficient, but which is transitive and intrinsic  
– namely, the relation of production; and one for which counterfactual 
dependence is sufficient, but which is neither transitive nor intrinsic – namely, 
the relation of dependence. 
Hall implements this idea by giving very demanding conditions for 
production and dependence, so that there are clear cases of causation that do 
not satisfy one or the other of the two conditions. In particular, Hall’s 
                                                
34 Cf. Hall (2007b), p. 52. 
dependence production 
Figure 6 
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condition for production is so demanding that it cannot be satisfied in any case 
of omission-involving causation, and Hall’s condition for dependence – 
namely, counterfactual dependence – is so demanding that it cannot be 
satisfied in cases of redundant causation. To accommodate our intuitive 
judgements, Hall must therefore take each condition on its own to be 
sufficient for (a kind of) causation.  
However, there is a different way of implementing Hall’s insight: instead 
of focusing on a relation of production characterised by conditions that are so 
demanding that production must be taken to be sufficient for causation, we may 
focus on a broader relation of production that is merely necessary for causation. 
And similarly, instead of focusing on a relation of dependence characterised by 
conditions that are so demanding that dependence must be taken to be sufficient 
for causation, we may focus on a broader relation of dependence that is merely 
necessary for causation. And we may then take these two relations to be jointly 
sufficient for causation. 
This is exactly the strategy I adopt in my proposed account of causation. 
I here identify a broader relation of production, namely the binary relation of 
process-connection: c is process-connected to e. And I identify a broader relation of 
dependence, namely the ternary relation of security-dependence: e security-depends 
on e within possibility horizon H.  Importantly, both of these broader relations 
can involve omissions. And my suggestion is that these two relations are 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient for causation.  
The new picture and its relation to Hall’s account is presented in the 

























More precisely, my proposed account of causation may be stated as follows: 
 
 
It will, of course, require a great deal of work to set out the conditions 
characterising process-connection and security-dependence. Doing so will keep 
us occupied in the following chapters. However, we may already at this point 
note some crucial features of my proposed account: 
 My proposed account has two individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions. The first condition – the condition of process-
connection – captures the intuitive idea that a cause must be connected to its 
Causation: c is a cause of e within a possibility horizon H   iff 
a) c is process-connected to e, and 
b) e security-depends on c within H. 
dependence production 
    security-dependence process-connection 
causation 
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Part I: Introduction 
 50 
effect via a genuine process; the second condition – the condition of security-
dependence – captures the intuitive idea that a cause must make a difference to 
its effect.  
This allows me to retain the central insight of Hall’s account: that we can 
accommodate our conflicting intuitions concerning the sufficiency of 
counterfactual dependence, transitivity, and intrinsicness, by recognising the 
dual nature of causation. Just like Hall’s account, my account is made up of 
two relations: one relation for which counterfactual dependence is not 
sufficient, but which is transitive and intrinsic – namely, the relation of 
process-connection; and one relation for which counterfactual dependence is 
sufficient, but which is neither transitive nor intrinsic – namely, the relation of 
security-dependence.  
 By recognising the dual nature of causation in this way, my account 
achieves a high degree of charity to use: as we shall see in the following, my 
account accommodates our intuitive judgements on the counterexamples to 
the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence, transitivity, and intrinsicness 
(section 1.3 above). At the same time, however, each of the three principles 
applies to either process-connection or security-dependence. And as I show in 
Chapter 11, this allows us to recover restricted principles of sufficiency of 
counterfactual dependence, transitivity, and intrinsicness, where these 
restricted principles are still strong enough to sanction almost all of our 
ordinary practices of causal inference. 
 
2.4  Preview of the following chapters 
In this section, I give a brief preview of how I will develop my account of 
causation in the following: 
 
Part II: Foundations  
In this part, I lay the foundations for my account of causation. I first set out 
my conception of the laws of nature (Chapter 3), where I follow Maudlin’s 
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proposal that we should understand the fundamental laws of nature as 
describing ‘the evolution of physical states through time’.35 Building on this, I 
present a new conception of the primary causal relata as instantaneous events 
(Chapter 4). And finally, I suggest that the causal relation has a third relatum: 
possibility horizons (Chapter 5).  
 
Part III: Process-connection  
I here set out my first necessary condition for causation – namely, process-
connection. I first define the relation of process-connection, which is a binary 
relation between instantaneous events (Chapter 6). I then consider the central 
applications of the condition. In particular, I show that the condition of 
process-connection allows us to successfully distinguish causation from mere 
correlation, differentiates between genuine causes and preempted backups in 
cases of redundant causation, gives a uniform treatment of ordinary and 
omission-involving causation, and ensures that the cause is at the right level of 
detail relative to its effect (Chapter 7). 
 
Part IV: Security-dependence 
I here set out my second necessary condition for causation – namely, security-
dependence. Security-dependence is a counterfactual-based condition, and the 
relation of security-dependence has three relata: two instantaneous events and 
a possibility horizon. I begin by giving a recipe for evaluating counterfactuals 
within a possibility horizon, and build on that to define the relation of security-
dependence (Chapter 8). In the following two chapters, I then show how the 
condition of security-dependence completes my account of causation, allowing 
it to give intuitively correct verdicts on the counterexamples to the transitivity 
and intrinsicness of causation (Chapter 9), and resolve the problem of 
profligate omissions, handle structurally isomorphic but causally different 
cases, and accommodate contrastive causal claims (Chapter 10). 
                                                
35 Maudlin (2007b), p. 12. 
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Part V: The biconditional 
In this part, I assess my proposed account of causation. I show how my 
account logically entails restricted versions of each of the three intuitive 
principles of causal reasoning – concerning the sufficiency of counterfactual 
dependence, transitivity, and intrinsicness (Chapter 11). And finally, I assess 
how well my proposed account achieves the aim of finding the candidate 
meaning of ‘cause’ that strikes the best balance between eligibility and charity 
to use (Chapter 12). 
 
Appendix 
In the appendices, I offer proofs that the relation of process-connection 
satisfies a restricted principle of sufficiency of counterfactual dependence, that 
process-connection is transitive and intrinsic to a process, and that 
counterfactual dependence is sufficient for security-dependence (Appendix A). 
In addition, I give an overview over the cases discussed in the dissertation 
(Appendix B). These appendices are intended simply as a service to the reader, 
and the dissertation can be read without them. 
 
3.  Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that our use of ‘cause’ suggests that the causal 
relation out in the world has a dual nature: on the one hand, a cause must be 
connected to its effect via a genuine process; on the other hand, a cause must 
somehow make a difference to its effect. Furthermore, I have given a preview 
of how I will develop this idea: by proposing two necessary and jointly 
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Laws of nature 
 
The laws of nature lie at the very heart of causation. In this chapter, I draw on 
work by Maudlin to set out a scientifically informed conception of the laws of 
nature.1 I begin by presenting Maudlin’s conception of the laws of nature as 
describing ‘the evolution of physical states through time’2 (section 1). Next, I 
set out in more detail how we should understand the central notion of a 
complete state (section 2). I then give a precise definition of the class of worlds 
I will be concerned with throughout this dissertation – namely, worlds 
governed by forwards deterministic laws that are time-translation invariant and 
do not permit action at a temporal distance (section 3). And finally, I set out 
how neuron diagrams should be understood within this framework (section 4). 
 
1.  The laws of nature as rules of temporal evolution 
For the purpose of this dissertation, I adopt a minimal, widely accepted, and 
intuitively plausible way of thinking about the laws of nature. This way of 
thinking about the laws of nature has been carefully defended by Maudlin,3 and 
is summed up by Hall as follows:  
 
‘I think of [the fundamental laws that govern what happens] on the model of 
physics: namely, as something like rules that specify how complete physical 
states of the world generate successive physical states.’4 
                                                
1 Maudlin (2007b). 
2 Maudlin (2007b), p. 12. 
3 Maudlin (2007b). Cf. Kutach (2007); Williamson (2016), 472-79; Woodward (2007). 
4 Hall (2002), p. 261. 
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Both Maudlin and Hall talk in terms of complete physical states. However, their 
proposed way of thinking about the laws of nature need not involve a 
commitment to physicalism. In the following, I therefore prefer to state the 
view as being concerned simply with complete states of the world, leaving it 
open whether such complete states can be fully characterised by final physics.   
We may think of a complete state of the world as a complete state of the 
world at a time t, where the time-t slice of the world is defined relative to a 
frame of reference. The relativisation to a frame of reference is needed 
because, as the theory of relativity tells us, there is no absolute simultaneity, 
only simultaneity relative to a frame of reference.5 In the following, however, I 
will leave this relativisation to a frame of reference implicit in order to avoid 
unnecessary repetitions.6  
Based on this, we may now think of the fundamental laws of nature as 
transition rules: as Maudlin writes, the laws determine ‘how specified states of a 
system will or can evolve into other states.’7 To make this picture more precise, 
our next task is to get a better understanding of the crucial notion of a 
complete state. 
 
2.  Complete states 
What are complete states? Complete states behave like properties: different 
worlds can be in the same complete state, and the same world can be in the 
same complete state at several different times.8 Based on this, I suggest that 
                                                
5 Cf. Maudlin (2007b), p. 18. 
6 The relativisation to a frame of reference must, obviously, refer to an allowed reference system 
(t, x, y, z) in the sense of physics. I defer to physics on what it takes for a reference system to 
be allowed. For the purpose of this dissertation, I only need that allowed reference systems do 
exist. One simple example is the almost inertial system wherein our solar system, taken as a 
whole, is at rest. 
7 Maudlin (2007b), p. 14. 
8 Cf. Williamson (2016), p. 474. 
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complete states are properties. More precisely, I suggest that they are properties 
of instantaneous time-slices of worlds.9  
To make this suggestion more precise, we need a way of thinking about 
properties. In the following, I will adopt Lewis’s conception of properties as 
classes.10 On this view, the property of being red, for example, is a class – namely, 
the class of all actual and merely possible red things. And a thing – a tomato, 
say – has the property of being red just in case it belongs to the class of red 
things. 
We may similarly think of complete states as classes of instantaneous 
time-slices of worlds. More precisely, my suggestion is that complete states are 
equivalence classes based on the equivalence relation of being a perfect duplicate 
of.11 Note that this is indeed an equivalence relation, i.e. it is reflexive, 
symmetric, and transitive: any instantaneous time-slice is a perfect duplicate of 
itself; if x is a perfect duplicate of y, then y is a perfect duplicate of x; and if x is 
a perfect duplicate of y, and y is a perfect duplicate of z, then x is a perfect 
duplicate of z. Based on this, we may define complete states as follows:  
 
Complete states: a class s of instantaneous time-slices of worlds corresponds to a 
complete state if and only if s is an equivalence class based on the equivalence 
relation of being a perfect duplicate of.  
 
An instantaneous time-slice of a world is in a complete state s just in case it 
belongs to the corresponding equivalence class. And, by extension, a world w is 
                                                
9 Mathematically, we may make the idealisation of thinking about the time-width of an 
instantaneous time-slice as being an infinitesimal time dt. 
10 See e.g. Lewis (1986a), pp. 50-51. This particular conception of properties is not essential to 
my view. What is essential, however, is a conception of properties on which properties are 
abundant, such that for any class of things, there is a property shared by all and only the things 
in that class. 
11 This suggestion fits with Williamson’s more general suggestion that states correspond to 
equivalence classes of world-time pairs under some relevant equivalence relation (Williamson 
(2016), p. 474). 
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in a complete state s at a time t just in case the instantaneous time-t slice of w 
belongs to the relevant equivalence class.  
As we shall now see, the above definition entails three crucial results 
concerning complete states: that complete states are unique, intrinsic, and (as 
their name implies) complete. Each of these results fits our intuitive 
understanding of what a complete state is, and each brings out a feature of 
complete states that I will be assuming in the following. 
 First, the above definition entails the following principle of uniqueness:  
 
Uniqueness: for every world w and time t, there is exactly one complete state s 
such that w is in the complete state s at time t.   
 
This result follows directly from the above definition of complete states: the 
equivalence relation of being a perfect duplicate of induces a partition on all 
instantaneous time-slices of worlds (this follows from the general result that 
every equivalence relation induces a partition). This means that each 
instantaneous time-slice gets to belong to exactly one equivalence class based 
on this relation – and thus, there is for each instantaneous time-slice exactly 
one complete state that this time-slice is in. By extension, we find that for 
every world w and time t, there is exactly one complete state s such that w is in 
the complete state s at time t.  
 Second, complete states are intrinsic properties of instantaneous time-
slices. The following gives an initial gloss of how I understand intrinsicness:  
 
‘[take] “intrinsic” to mean something like “internal” or “metaphysically 
independent”; intuitively, the way something is intrinsically is the way it is 
independent of how anything else is.’12 
 
                                                
12 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 124. 
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In particular, it is widely recognised that intrinsicness and perfect duplication 
are interdefinable. For example, Lewis defines intrinsic properties of regions as 
follows:  
 
‘We can define an intrinsic property of a region as one such that, whenever two 
possible regions are perfect duplicates, the property belongs to both or 
neither.’13 
 
We may similarly define an intrinsic property of an instantaneous time-slice as 
one such that, whenever two instantaneous time-slices are perfect duplicates, 
the property belongs to both or neither. Based on this, it follows immediately 
that complete states are intrinsic properties of instantaneous time-slices:  
 
 Intrinsicness: complete states are intrinsic properties of instantaneous time-slices. 
 
Third, the interdefinability between intrinsicness and perfect duplication entails 
that perfect duplicates share all of their intrinsic properties. Thus, we find that 
complete states are indeed complete, in the sense that specifying the complete 
state of an instantaneous time-slice is tantamount to specifying all the intrinsic 
properties of that time-slice: complete states are so rich and detailed that each 
complete state entails every intrinsic property of the instantaneous time-slices 
that instantiate it – this is a direct result of the fact that only perfect duplicates 
can be in the same complete state. We may state this principle as follows:  
 
Completeness: two instantaneous time-slices are in the same complete state only if 
they share all their intrinsic properties.   
 
                                                
13 Lewis (1986g), p. 263. Intrinsicness and perfect duplication belong to a small circle of 
interdefinable notions. It is much harder to give a definition of intrinsicness that breaks out of 
this circle. For discussion, see e.g. Langton and Lewis (1998); Marshall and Parsons (2001); 
Sider (2001) and (2003); and Weatherson (2001). 
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We have now seen how the three principles – concerning uniqueness, 
intrinsicness, and completeness – flow from my definition of complete states 
as equivalence classes of instantaneous time-slices of worlds, based on the 
equivalence relation of being a perfect duplicate of. Thus, the three principles all 
flow from a single coherent picture. For my purposes, however, all that matters 
is the general understanding of complete states as properties that satisfy the 
three principles. Any other way of arriving at such an understanding of 
complete states is just as good for my purposes. Indeed, you may if you like 
take complete states themselves as primitive, and impose the principles of 
uniqueness, intrinsicness, and completeness as postulates. All that matters is 
that the three principles are satisfied one way or another.  
Based on this understanding of complete states, I will now give the 
definitions – of determinism, time-translation invariance, etc. – that allow us to 
characterise the worlds I will be concerned with in this dissertation.  
 
3.  Determinism, time-translation invariance,  
and no action at a temporal distance 
As we have seen above, Maudlin characterises the laws of nature simply as 
transition rules describing ‘how specified states of a system will or can evolve 
into other states.’14 As Maudlin shows, this way of thinking about the laws of 
nature may be applied to both deterministic and indeterministic laws: when the 
laws are deterministic, they specify how specified states of a system will evolve 
into other states; when the laws are indeterministic, they specify how specified 
states of a system can evolve into other states (and, typically, such 
indeterministic laws also specify a probability distribution over the different 
states that a system may evolve into).15  
In the following, I will focus on developing an account of causation that 
applies to worlds with forwards deterministic laws that satisfy certain further 
                                                
14 Maudlin (2007b), p. 14. 
15 Maudlin (2007b), p. 14. 
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requirements. Following standard practice, we may give the following simple 
definition of what it takes for a set of laws to be forwards deterministic:  
 
 Forwards deterministic laws: a set of laws L is forwards deterministic iff  
for any two nomologically possible worlds w and w´, it is the case that 
if the history of w and w´ is exactly the same up until time t, then the future 
history of w is exactly the same as the future history of w´.16 
 
In the following, I only consider worlds with forwards deterministic laws. In 
addition, I impose further restrictions on the worlds I consider. First, I follow 
Paul and Hall in considering only worlds where the laws do not permit action 
at a temporal distance.17 Given forwards determinism, the prohibition against 
action at a temporal distance may be stated as follows:  
 
No action at a temporal distance: for any two nomologically possible worlds, w and 
w´, if the complete state of w at t is the same as the complete state of w´ at t, 
then the future history of w is exactly the same as the future history of w´.18 
 
As Paul and Hall note, this prohibition against action at a temporal distance 
amounts to the requirement that ‘the present state of the world renders facts 
about the past irrelevant to what happens in the future’.19  
                                                
16 See Paul and Hall (2013), p. 8 footnote 4. Cf. Lewis (1986d), p. 162. For the definition to 
successfully capture what we mean by saying that a given set of laws is forwards deterministic, 
we need to home in on the right understanding of what is included in the history of a world up 
until time t. The conception of complete states proposed above, according to which complete 
states are unique, intrinsic, and complete, allows us to do just that: based on this conception of 
complete states, we may now say that two worlds w and w´ have the same history up until time 
t iff it is the case that for each time up until time t, w and w´ are in exactly the same complete 
state at that time. 
17 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 8.  
18 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 8 footnote 4. Note that this statement presupposes the above 
characterisation of complete states. 
19 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 8 footnote 4. 
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Finally, I impose the restriction that the laws must be time-translation 
invariant. Given forwards-determinism and the prohibition against action at a 
temporal distance, time-translation invariance may be defined as follows: 
 
Time-translation invariance: if a nomologically possible world w is in the complete 
state s1 at time t, and in the complete state s2 at time t+dt, then for any 
nomologically possible world w´ and any time t´, it is the case that if w´ is in the 
complete state s1 at time t´, then w´ is in the complete state s2 at time t´+dt.20 
 
My hope is that my account of causation may eventually be generalised to 
cover all metaphysically possible worlds. For now, however, my aim is simply 
to develop the account so that it holds within worlds that do satisfy the 
requirement of being governed by forwards deterministic laws that are time-
translation invariant and do not permit action at a temporal distance.   
 
4.  Neuron diagrams and complete states 
As I have mentioned already (cf. Chapter 2 section 1.1), I will often rely on 
neuron diagrams to represent causal structures. In this section, I show how we 
may understand neuron diagrams in a way that fits nicely with my 
characterisation of the laws of nature as rules specifying the temporal evolution 
of complete states. Consider, for example, our standard case of early 








        
 
                                                
20 Note that this definition presupposes the above characterisation of complete states: without 
this, the definition would be either too easy or too hard to satisfy. 
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Figure 1 gives a partial representation of the history of a very simple possible 
world. Treating the world of the example as actual, let us denote this world by 
‘@’.  
We may think of a neuron world as containing a physical structure of 
neurons connected by stimulatory and inhibitory channels. This physical 
structure of neurons, together with the stimulatory and inhibitory channels 
between them, is present at all times. For example, the neuron world @ 
contains at all times exactly five neurons A, B, C, D, and E, connected by 









        
 
 
Furthermore, I will treat this physical structure of neurons, together with the 
stimulatory and inhibitory channels between them, as being nomologically 
necessary.21 From the standpoint of @, for example, the structure of neurons 
represented in Figure 2 is nomologically necessary: every nomologically 
possible world contains at all times exactly five neurons, connected by 
stimulatory and inhibitory channels as illustrated above.  
 We may specify the complete state of @ at any given time t by 
specifying, for each of the five neurons A, B, C, D, and E, whether it does or 
                                                
21 It might seem a bit odd to treat the existence of certain neurons, together with the 
stimulatory and inhibitory channels between them, as nomologically necessary. I do so for the 
sake of simplicity: as we shall see, my account of causation requires us to consider all 
nomologically possible worlds. Treating the physical structure of neurons, together with the 
stimulatory and inhibitory channels between them, as nomologically necessary, makes this task 
much more manageable.    
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does not fire at time t. The pattern of stimulatory and inhibitory channels, 
together with the general neuron laws of Chapter 2 section 1.1, now yields laws 
for the temporal evolution of such complete states. And it is easily verified that 
these laws are forwards deterministic, time-translation invariant, and obey the 
prohibition against action at a temporal distance.  
 Based on the physical structure of neurons illustrated in Figure 2, we can 
distinguish 25 = 32 different possible complete states, corresponding to the 
different combinations of whether A, B, C, D, and E fire or fail to fire: there is 
a complete state such that A, B, C, D, and E all fail to fire; there is a complete 
state such that A fires, but B, C, D, and E fail to fire, etc. A nomologically 
possible world may start out in any of the 32 different complete states. Since 
the laws are forwards deterministic, specifying the initial complete state of a 
world is sufficient to specify the complete history of the world.  
 By contrast, our standard neuron diagram gives only a partial 
representation of the history of a possible world. To see this, consider once 
again Figure 1. First, the neuron diagram in Figure 1 only explicitly shows what 
happens in @ at three times – namely, t1, t2, and t3. Second, the neuron diagram 
only gives a partial specification of the complete state of @ at each of these 
three times. Concerning time t1, it tells us that A and B fire, but it remains 
silent on what C, D, and E are doing. Concerning time t2, it tells us that C fires 
and D does not, but it remains silent on what A, B, and E are doing. And 
concerning time t3, it tells us that E fires, but remains silent on what A, B, C, 
and D are doing. 
 What shall we make of these partial representations, where, for example, 
the neuron diagram in Figure 1 only specifies the state of the two neurons A 
and B at time t1? The answer is simple: we may see this specification 
concerning time t1 as giving a class of complete states, characterised by the 
condition that both A and B fire. This class contains 23 = 8 complete states. 
And the neuron diagram tells us that @ is in one of these complete states at 
time t1, but it does not specify which one. Similarly, the information given by 
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the neuron diagram concerning time t2 specifies a class of complete states 
characterised by the condition that C fires and D does not. This equivalence 
class once again contains 23 = 8 complete states, and the neuron diagram tells 
us that @ is in one of these complete states at time t2, but does not specify 
which one. And finally, the information given by the neuron diagram 
concerning time t3 specifies a class of complete states characterised by the 
condition that E fires. This equivalence class contains 24 = 16 complete states, 
and the neuron diagram tells us that @ is in one of these complete states, but 
does not specify which one.  
Thus, the neuron diagram in Figure 1 tells the history of @ in the 
following way: @ starts out at time t1 in some complete state such that A and B 
both fire; this evolves so that @ is at time t2 in some complete state such that C 
fires and D does not fire; and this finally evolves so that @ is at time t3 in some 
complete state such that E fires.  
Given the neuron laws, the partial specifications that the neuron diagram 
provides of what happens at t2 and t3 are strictly speaking redundant: it is easily 
verified that any nomologically possible world that starts out at time t1 in a 
complete state such that A and B both fire will subsequently evolve so that its 
complete state at t2 is such that C fires and D does not, and so that its 
complete state at t3 is such that E fires. Showing this in the neuron diagram is 
simply a matter of convenience.   
It is worth noting that this redundancy is a general feature of neuron 
diagrams: all complete states that agree on what the neurons explicitly shown 
at a time ti are doing, also agree on what the neurons explicitly shown at time 
ti+1 are doing. If we are only interested in the behaviour of neurons at the times 
when their behaviour is explicitly shown in the neuron diagram – for example, 
if we are only interested in the behaviour of A and B at time t1, the behaviour 
of C and D at time t2, and the behaviour of E at time t3 – this allows us to treat 
the neuron diagram as if it gives the complete history of an even simpler system 
evolving in three stages:  
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In the first stage, at time t1, this system contains exactly two neurons, A 
and B, and we can distinguish just 22 = 4 different complete states at this time, 
corresponding to the different combinations of whether A and B fire or fail to 
fire. In the second stage, at time t2, the system contains exactly two neurons C 
and D, and we can again distinguish just 22 = 4 different complete states at this 
time, corresponding to the different combinations of whether C and D fire. 
And in the third stage, at time t3, the system contains only neuron E, and we 
can distinguish only two complete states – the complete state such that E fires, 
and the complete state such that E does not fire.  
This simplification is entirely harmless, and in the following I will often, 
for the sake of simplicity, speak as if it is correct. However, one should keep in 
mind that the correct interpretation of the neuron diagrams we are working 
with is in fact the more complex interpretation set out above.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
The conception of the laws of nature I have adopted here – where the laws of 
nature are understood simply as transition rules from one complete state to 
another – is all I need to develop my proposed account of causation. This 
allows me to remain neutral on some of the central questions concerning how 
we should understand the laws of nature.  
 First, I remain neutral on the question of whether the fundamental laws 
of nature simply are the individual transition rules, or whether the fundamental 
laws are rather generalisations from which these specific transition rules follow. 
Maudlin’s view on this question seems to be that the fundamental laws are 
generalisations: he considers a case where we know all the specific transition 
rules, but where this still ‘does not settle what the laws are’.22 For my purposes, 
however, nothing hangs on this: my account is equally compatible with both 
answers to the question. 
                                                
22 Maudlin (2004), p. 426. 
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Second, I remain neutral on the question of whether we should adopt a 
Humean conception of the laws of nature. This is, in Hall’s words, the 
question ‘whether facts about the fundamental laws themselves reduce to facts 
about the totality of physical states the world occupies.’23 Maudlin’s position is 
distinctly non-Humean: he argues that status as a fundamental law is primitive 
and suggests a picture on which the laws of nature are in some deep sense 
productive, generating each successive complete state of the world.24 Once again, 
however, nothing in my proposed account of causation hangs on this: my 
account is equally compatible with a Humean picture, such as the one 
developed by David Lewis.25 
By adopting this minimal and widely accepted conception of the laws of 
nature, I hope to ensure that my account of causation is compatible with as 
wide a range of positions on the laws of nature as possible. In the following 
chapter, we shall now see how even this minimal conception of the laws of 













                                                
23 Hall (2007b), p. 3 footnote 6. 
24 Maudlin (2007b), p. 15.  
25 See e.g. Lewis (1986b), pp. xi-xii. 
























The primary causal relata: instantaneous events 
 
Causation is a relation. What are its relata?  
 My suggestion is that causation is a ternary relation: c causes e within a 
possibility horizon H.  The primary causal relata are the cause c and the effect 
e. In this chapter, I present my proposed conception of the primary causal 
relata. In Chapter 5, I then introduce the notion of a possibility horizon. 
 There is a prima facie tension between our ordinary understanding of the 
primary causal relata and the scientifically informed conception of the laws of 
nature set out in Chapter 3. On our ordinary understanding, the primary causal 
relata are events – where these events are understood to be local and temporally 
extended. Examples include Suzy’s throwing a rock, the shattering of a window, 
an icy cavern collapsing in a Greenland glacier, etc.  
On the scientifically informed conception set out in Chapter 3, on the 
other hand, we may think of the laws of nature as transition rules specifying 
how complete states evolve through time. These complete states are properties 
of instantaneous time-slices of worlds, and thus their concrete instantiations 
are global and instantaneous. Thus, there is a tension between our ordinary 
conception of the primary causal relata and a scientifically informed 
understanding of the laws of nature.1  
To bring out this tension more clearly, let us consider the example of 
Suzy throwing a rock towards a window. On our ordinary understanding of the 
primary causal relata, we think of Suzy’s throw as a local and temporally 
extended event: it is located just where Suzy is, and it is temporally extended – 
                                                
1 See e.g. Kutach (2007) and Woodward (2007). 
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lasting (with some fuzziness at the boundaries) from the moment when Suzy 
pulls back her arm to the moment when the rock leaves her hand. To 
determine whether Suzy’s throw causes the window-shattering, it now seems 
reasonable to look towards the laws of nature. However, the laws of nature are 
not concerned with local and temporally extended events such as Suzy’s throw. 
Rather, they are concerned with complete states – such as the complete state 
the world is in at the time t when the rock is just leaving Suzy’s hand. This 
complete state is global – it includes everything that is happening at time t: the 
rock is leaving Suzy’s hand with a certain velocity, a blackbird is singing from a 
tree nearby, a dust storm is raging on a planet in a galaxy far, far away, etc. And 
it is instantaneous – it concerns just the time t, not the extended period of time 
during which Suzy throws.  
This mismatch creates a puzzle about how the primary causal relata 
connect up with the laws of nature. My aim in this chapter is to propose a 
simple, new conception of the causal relata that resolves this puzzle by 
establishing a clear connection between the primary causal relata and the 
complete states that feature in the laws of nature, while allowing us to recover 
the important features of our ordinary understanding of the causal relata.  
My suggestion is that the primary causal relata are instantaneous events. I 
give a precise definition of instantaneous events in section 2. In particular, the 
primary causal relata are actual instantaneous events, where an actual instantaneous 
event is an instantaneous event that occurs in the actual world.  
In brief, an actual instantaneous event has two elements: its realization 
and its modal profile. The realization consists in the actual world being in a 
particular complete state at a particular time. The modal profile specifies what 
is essential and what is merely accidental to the occurrence of the event.  
Consider, for example, Suzy throwing a rock. We may then characterise 
an actual instantaneous event e based on Suzy’s throw as follows: the 
realization of e consists in the actual world being in a particular complete state 
at a time t during Suzy’s throw – say, the complete state such that the rock is 
Chapter 4: The primary causal relata: instantaneous events 
 71 
leaving Suzy’s hand with a certain velocity, a blackbird is singing from a tree 
nearby, a dust storm is raging on a far-away planet, etc. And the modal profile 
of e is such that it is essential to the occurrence of e that Suzy throws, whereas 
it is only accidental to the occurrence of e that a blackbird is singing from a tree 
nearby, or that a dust storm is raging on a far-way planet, etc.  
By paying attention to the modal profiles of instantaneous events, we 
can recover the ordinary sense in which the causal relata are local: although an 
instantaneous event e is realized by the actual world’s being in a complete state 
s, which is of course global, the features of s that are essential to the occurrence 
of e may be exhibited locally. In the case of Suzy’s throw, for example, the 
features that are essential to the occurrence of this event are exhibited locally – 
namely, just where Suzy is when she throws. Furthermore, we can capture 
ordinary causal claims relating temporally extended events by understanding 
such temporally extended events as being built up from a sequence of 
instantaneous events. For example, the temporally extended event of Suzy’s 
throw is built up from a sequence of many instantaneous throwing events. 
The result of this is a conception of the primary causal relata that 
accommodates our ordinary understanding, while fitting perfectly with our 
scientifically informed understanding of the laws of nature. It should perhaps 
not be surprising that such a conception of the causal relata carries additional 
benefits: as we shall see, it allows us to resolve the long-standing puzzles – 
concerning omission-involving causation, causal differences, extensionality, 
and transitivity – that are standardly used to test accounts of the causal relata.2 
Furthermore, the details of this conception of the causal relata turn out to be 
crucial in allowing us to define the relation of process-connection, as we shall 
see in Chapter 6. 
In the following, I begin with a few terminological remarks (section 1), 
and then develop my proposed conception of the primary causal relata as 
instantaneous events (section 2). I then show how my proposed conception of 
                                                
2 For an overview, see Schaffer (2016). 
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the causal relata allows us to recover our usual understanding of the causal 
relata as local and temporally extended events (section 3). In the subsequent 
three sections, I discuss the central applications of this proposal: I show how it 
allows us to accommodate omission-involving causation (section 4), how it 
allows us to respect causal differences and preserve extensionality (section 5), 
and how it allows us to resist a particular kind of counterexample to the 
transitivity of causation (section 6). Finally, I discuss restrictions on the domain 
of instantaneous events (section 7). 
 
1.  A note on terminology 
Causal claims take a variety of different forms – they may feature events, facts, 
agents, etc., in the role of cause and effect.3 It is reasonable to aim for an 
account of causation that can accommodate causal claims of all these different 
forms. To achieve this, however, we need not allow for primary causal relata of 
all the different categories – events, facts, agents, etc. – suggested by the 
surface form of our causal claims. Instead, we may use the widespread strategy 
of taking claims of all these different forms to be true (or false) in virtue of 
relations between a unique kind of primary causal relata – what we might call 
the basic causal relata. This is, for example, the strategy that Paul and Hall 
adopt, taking the basic causal relata to be events (at least for the purposes of 
most of their subsequent discussion):  
 
‘Causation seems, at least in the first instance, to relate events: while Suzy might 
cause a window to break, she does so only in virtue of the way she is involved 
in an event – her throwing of a rock, say – that causes the breaking.’4 
 
In the following, I will adopt the same strategy of taking causal claims to be 
true (or false) in virtue of relations between the basic causal relata. The 
question I aim to answer in this chapter is: what are the basic causal relata? 
                                                
3 Schaffer (2016), pp. 5-6. 
4 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 4. 
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And my proposed answer is that the basic causal relata are instantaneous 
events. In the following, I shall simply refer to the basic causal relata as ‘the 
causal relata’. 
My account of instantaneous events is intended to capture a clean, 
technical notion that is specifically tailored to the role of causal relatum. 
Occasionally, I will need to compare and contrast this with our ordinary, 
everyday notion of events – Suzy’s throwing a rock, the shattering of a 
window, etc., are paradigm examples. To keep a clear distinction between these 
two notions, I will in the following always refer to ordinary events as ‘ordinary 
events’, whereas I may sometimes for convenience use ‘event’ as shorthand for 
‘instantaneous event’.  
 
2.  Instantaneous events 
In this section, I set out my proposed conception of the causal relata as 
instantaneous events (section 2.1). I then discuss how one instantaneous event 
may be a more fragile version of another (section 2.2), and set out conventions 
for talking about neuron firing events (section 2.3).  
  
2.1  Defining instantaneous events 
I suggest that the causal relata are instantaneous events.  
We may characterise an actual instantaneous event by specifying two 
elements: its realization in the actual world and its modal profile. The realization 
specifies how the instantaneous event is realized in the actual world and may 
be characterised by a triple (@, t, s), where @ is the actual world, t is a time, 
and s is the complete state of @ at t.5 The modal profile specifies what is 
                                                
5 There is an intuitive way of thinking about ordinary events according to which they are 
property exemplifications: an ordinary event consists in an object exemplifying a property at a 
time (see Kim (1973) and (1976)). For example, the shattering of a window consists in an 
object, namely the window, exemplifying a property, namely shattering, at a time. The 
realization (@, t, s) of an actual instantaneous event is such a property exemplification, 
although at a global scale: it simply consists in an object, namely the actual world @, 
exemplifying a property, namely a complete state s, at the relevant time t. 
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essential to the occurrence of the event. This may be characterised by a pair (I, 
C ), where I is a closed interval that includes time t, and C is a class of complete 
states that includes s.  
Thus, an actual instantaneous event is characterised by a quintuple (@, t, 
s, I, C) that specifies first the event’s actual realization (@, t, s), and next its 
modal profile (I, C ). By contrast, a merely possible instantaneous event, i.e. an 
instantaneous event that does not occur in @, may be characterised simply by 
its modal profile (I, C), or – in cases where we want to specify that it occurs in 
a world w by virtue of a realization (w, t, s) – by a quintuple (w, t, s, I, C). 
At any given time t, the actual world is in exactly one complete state s. It 
follows from this that all actual instantaneous events that occur at a given time 
t have the same realization – namely, the realization characterised by the triple 
(@, t, s), where s is the complete state of @ at t. This realization is truly global: 
it includes everything that is going on at time t – my drinking a cup of tea, a 
bumblebee finding a clover blossom, a speck of sand being caught by the wind 
in the Sahara, an iceberg larger than the state of Delaware breaking off from an 
ice shelf in Antarctica, an atom undergoing radioactive decay somewhere in the 
Andromeda galaxy, etc.6  
Intuitively, however, the causes and effects of my drinking a cup of tea 
are different from the causes and effects of the bumblebee finding the clover 
                                                
6 It seems plausible that some of the predicates that feature in these descriptions – such as 
‘drinking a cup of tea’, ‘being a bumblebee’, etc. – take time to be satisfied. For example, one 
might suggest that I satisfy the predicate ‘drinking a cup of tea’ only by spending some time 
taking a sip from my cup of tea once in a while. This means that it cannot be intrinsic to an 
instantaneous time-slice that I am drinking a cup of tea. Rather, an instantaneous time-slice is 
such that I am drinking a cup of tea in virtue of two components: the first component 
concerns the intrinsic properties of the instantaneous time-slice – it has to contain an 
instantaneous time-slice of me and an instantaneous time-slice of a cup of tea within suitable 
distance from each other; the second component concerns the relational properties of the 
instantaneous time-slice – it has to be suitably related to earlier and later instantaneous time-
slices, where I continue my tea-drinking (this suggestion is entirely parallel to Hawley’s 
treatment of lingering and historical properties in Hawley (2004), pp. 53-54). By extension, we 
may then say that a complete state is such that I am drinking a cup of tea just in case this 
complete state shares all the intrinsic properties of an instantaneous time-slice such that I am 
drinking a cup of tea. 
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blossom, which are in turn different from the causes and effects of the speck 
of sand being caught by the wind in the Sahara, etc. My suggestion is that while 
all these events have the same realization, they are distinct because they have 
different modal profiles: events are not merely individuated based on their 
realization; it also matters for the identity of an event what is essential to its 
occurrence, and what is merely accidental.7  
This allows us to capture the intuition that my drinking a cup of tea and 
the bumblebee finding the clover blossom are distinct causal relata, although 
they have the same actual realization: it is essential to the event of my drinking 
a cup of tea that the complete state of the world is such that I am drinking a 
cup of tea, whereas it is only accidental that it is such that the bumblebee finds 
the clover blossom. By contrast, it is essential to the event of the bumblebee 
finding the clover blossom that the complete state of the world is such that the 
bumblebee finds the clover blossom, while it is only accidental that it is such 
that I am drinking a cup of tea.  
This is why we need the modal profile (I, C ) in our characterisation of 
an instantaneous event. To see how this works, note that we may specify what 
is essential and what is merely accidental to the occurrence of an event e along 
two dimensions: first, we may specify which properties of the time t are 
essential to the occurrence of e – this is specified by the interval I. And second, 
we may specify which properties of the complete state s are essential to the 
occurrence of e – this is specified by the class of complete states C. In the 
following, I will explain both of these points in more detail. In explaining both 
of these points, I shall adopt a Lewisian conception of properties, according to 
which properties correspond to classes.8  
                                                
7 The suggestion that events should be individuated based on their modal profiles is found e.g. 
in Lewis (1986g) and Yablo (1992a) and (1992b). For recent discussions, see McDonnell 
(forthcoming) and Kaiserman (forthcoming). 
8 See e.g. Lewis (1986a), pp. 50-51. My proposal need not be tied to this particular view of 
properties: it is compatible with other views, provided that properties are treated as abundant, 
so that for every class, there is a property had by all and only entities included in the class.   
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On a Lewisian conception of properties, properties of times correspond 
to classes of times, where a time t has a given property just in case it belongs to 
the corresponding class. There is a clear distinction to be drawn between 
classes of times containing scattered times and classes containing exactly those 
times that together make up a closed interval. In the following, I assume that 
only those properties of times that correspond to closed intervals, such as the 
closed interval [t1, t2], can be essential to the occurrence of events. We may 
thus specify which properties of a time t are essential to the occurrence of an 
event e by specifying the smallest closed interval I, such that it is essential to 
the occurrence of e that t belongs to I. 
We may think of properties of complete states in a similar way: 
properties of complete states are classes of complete states, where a complete 
state s has the property corresponding to class C just in case s belongs to C. We 
may now capture which properties of a complete state s are essential to the 
occurrence of an event e by specifying the smallest class C of complete states, 
such that it is essential to the occurrence of e that s belongs to C. 
So far, I have set out how instantaneous events may be characterised. 
However, I have not said what they are. My suggestion is that an instantaneous 
event is a class of realizations, where an event e occurs in a world w just in case e 
has a realization in w.9 A realization simply consists in a world being in a 
particular complete state at a particular time. Thus, realizations may be 
individuated as follows: 
 
Individuating realizations: a realization (w, t, s) is identical to a realization (w*, t*, s*) 
iff w = w*, t = t*, and s = s*.  
 
Furthermore, a realization (w, t, s) exists just in case world w is in the complete 
state s at time t: 
                                                
9 This proposal is structurally similar to Lewis’s proposal that events are classes of space-time 
regions, where an event occurs in a world w just in case w contains a space-time region that 
belongs to the relevant class. See Lewis (1986g).  
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Realization: a realization characterised by the triple (w, t, s) exists iff  
world w is in the complete state s at time t. 
 
An instantaneous event e consists in a class of such realizations. This 
immediately yields the following principle of individuation for instantaneous 
events: 
 
Individuation of instantaneous events: an instantaneous event e is identical to an 
instantaneous event e* iff e and e* have the same realizations. 
 
Importantly, however, a class of realizations has to satisfy certain constraints in 
order to correspond to an instantaneous event. First, a class of realizations 
corresponds to an instantaneous event only if it contains at most one 
realization in each world. This requirement ensures that instantaneous events 
are non-repeatable, so that an instantaneous event e occurs at most once in any 
given world.10 Second, a class of realizations corresponds to an instantaneous 
event only if it is adequately characterised by a modal profile (I, C). We may 
sum up these requirements as follows: 
 
 Instantaneous event: a class c of realizations corresponds to an instantaneous event iff 
a) c contains at most one realization in each world, and 
b) there is a modal profile (I, C), such that c contains a realization in a world w 
iff there is a realization (w, t, s), such that t belongs to I, and s belongs to C.   
 
It should be clear from this that a modal profile (I, C) does not uniquely 
characterise an instantaneous event. Suppose, for example, that the same world 
w features in two different realizations (w, t1, s1) and (w, t2, s2), that both satisfy 
the same modal profile (I, C). In that case, there is one instantaneous event 
that is characterised by (I, C) and contains (w, t1, s1), but not (w, t2, s2). And 
                                                
10 Cf. Lewis (1986g), p. 243. 
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there is a different instantaneous event that that is also characterised by (I, C) 
and contains (w, t2, s2), but not (w, t1, s1).  
Thus, specifying a modal profile does not uniquely characterise an 
instantaneous event: to uniquely characterise an instantaneous event, we 
should list every realization belonging to the relevant class. I take a step 
towards this by including the actual realization in my specification of actual 
instantaneous events: this resolves the indeterminacy in cases where there are 
two or more realizations in the actual world that all satisfy a particular modal 
profile. Beyond this, however, any indeterminacy that arises from merely 
specifying a modal profile is harmless.  
Finally, we may say that an actual instantaneous event e occurs at time t 
just in case e has a realization at t: 
 
Occurrence: an actual instantaneous event e = (@, t, s, I, C) occurs at time t* iff 
the time t that features in its realization in @ is such that t = t*.  
 
Note that this last principle is formulated from the standpoint of the actual 
world @. However, it is in fact fully general, since any world w can play the 
role of our actual world.11 To arrive at a general statement that applies to an 
arbitrary world w, one must simply replace ‘@’ with ‘w’ and add the needed 
relativisations. For example, the generalised statement of Occurrence is the 
following: 
 
Occurrence – generalised: an instantaneous event e = (w, t, s, I, C) occurs at a time t* 
in world w iff the time t that features in its realization in w is such that t = t*.   
 
In the following, I will be giving all definitions from the standpoint of the 
actual world, since it makes the definitions simpler with no loss of generality.  
                                                
11 As Lewis writes: ‘an arbitrary world w can play the role of our actual world. In speaking of 
our actual world without knowing just which world is ours, I am in effect generalizing over all 
worlds.’ (Lewis (1986d), p. 163.) 
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It follows immediately from the above characterisation of instantaneous 
events that there is a great abundance of actual instantaneous events:  
 
Plenitude: there exists an actual instantaneous event e = (@, t, s, I, C) iff 
a) @ is in the complete state s at time t,  
b)  t belongs to I, and 
c) s belongs to C. 
 
It also immediately follows that at any time t, all actual instantaneous events 
that occur at time t have the same realization:  
 
Same realization: an actual instantaneous event e = (@, t, s, I, C) has the same 
realization as an actual instantaneous event e* = (@, t*, s*, I*, C*) iff t = t*. 
 
Finally, my characterisation of instantaneous events entails the following 
principle, showing that the modal profile (I, C) of an instantaneous event really 
does capture its essential properties: 
 
Modal profile: an instantaneous event with the modal profile (I, C)  
occurs in a world w iff there is a time t and a complete state s such that 
a) w is in the complete state s at time t,  
b) t belongs to I, and 
c) s belongs to C. 
 
In the following section, we shall now see how instantaneous events may stand 
in interesting logical relations to each other.  
 
2.2  Fragility 
As we have just seen, all the actual instantaneous events that occur at a given 
time have the same realization. The difference between them is a difference in 
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essence. To talk about this more precisely, I will rely on Lewis’s concept of 
fragility:  
 
‘Call an event fragile if, or to the extent that, it could not have occurred at a 
different time, or in a different manner. A fragile event has a rich essence; it has 
stringent conditions of occurrence.’12 
 
Following standard usage, I will say that a less fragile event is more robust. 
Based on this concept of fragility, we may now characterise a relation 
that can hold between actual instantaneous events occurring at the same time: 
in some cases, one instantaneous event is a more fragile version of another, in the 
sense that the first event has a richer essence than the second. To capture this, 
the following notation will be useful:  
 
 For any event e, w(e) is the set of possible worlds in which e occurs.13 
 
With this notation in place, we may now define what it takes for one actual 
instantaneous event to be a more fragile version of another:14 
 
More fragile version – definition 1: an event e+ = (@, t+, s+, I+, C+)  
is a more fragile version of an event e = (@, t, s, I, C) iff 
a) e+ and e have the same realization in @, and 
b) w(e+) ⊆ w(e). 
 
                                                
12 Lewis (1986e), p. 196.  
13 Note that this definition requires us to quantify over absolutely all metaphysically possible 
worlds, with no restrictions on our domain of quantification.  
14 It is straightforward to generalise this definition, yielding a definition of what it is for an 
event e+ to be a more fragile version of an event e from the standpoint of any world w. For the 
sake of simplicity, however, I only define the relation from the standpoint of the actual world, 
since this is all we need in the following.   
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Note that this definition includes the limit case where e+ occurs in just the same 
worlds as e. When an event e+ is a more fragile version of an event e, and w(e+) 
is a proper subset of w(e), we may say that e+ is a strictly more fragile version of e.  
It is worth noting that the above definition is equivalent to the following:  
 
More fragile version – definition 2: an event e+ = (@, t+, s+, I+, C+)  
is a more fragile version of an event e = (@, t, s, I, C) iff 
a) e+ and e have the same realization in @, 
b) I+ ⊆ I, and 
c) C+ ⊆ C. 
 
With this understanding of fragility, we can now distinguish different ways in 
which one instantaneous event may be a more fragile version of another. In 
particular, an instantaneous event e+ may be a more fragile version of an 
instantaneous event e by having more stringent conditions concerning its time 
of occurrence, while having exactly the same conditions concerning the 
relevant complete state. In that case, we may say that e+ is a more temporally 
fragile version of e, defined as follows:  
 
 More temporally fragile version: an event e+ = (@, t+, s+, I+, C+)  
is a more temporally fragile version of an event e = (@, t, s, I, C) iff 
a) e+ and e have the same realization in @, 
b) I+ ⊆ I, and 
c) C+ = C. 
 
This notion of a more temporally fragile version will play a crucial role in my 
treatment of late preemption (see Chapter 6 section 3).  
 
2.3  Neuron firing events 
I rely on neuron diagrams to illustrate many of the cases I discuss throughout 
this dissertation (cf. Chapter 2 section 1.1 and Chapter 3 section 4). It will 
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therefore be useful to have conventions for talking about instantaneous events 
based on neuron firings. In this section, I set out these conventions.  









        
 
 
At each of the times t1, t2, and t3, there is a great multitude of instantaneous 
events occurring in the neuron world illustrated here. All of the instantaneous 
events that occur at time t1 have the same realization. Treating the world of the 
example as actual, this realization is given by the triple (@, s, t1), where s is the 
complete state of @ at time t1. And similarly in the case of the events occurring 
at t2 and t3. However, each of the different instantaneous events occurring at a 
given time is characterised by a different modal profile (I, C).  
In the following, we only need to be concerned with a very small subset 
of the events that occur at any given time. First, we only need to be concerned 
with events that are maximally temporally fragile, so that for events that occur 
at time ti, it is essential to their occurrence that they occur within the interval [ti, 
ti + dt].
15 Second, we only need to be concerned with events based on the firing 
or failure to fire of a single neuron. And third, we only need to be concerned 
with the behaviour of a neuron at the time when it is explicitly shown in the 
neuron diagram. Thus, we only need to be concerned with the behaviour of 
                                                
15 As mentioned in Chapter 3, we may make the idealisation of thinking about the time-width 
of an instantaneous time-slice as being an infinitesimal time dt. Using this idealisation, we shall 
refer to the instant ti as the closed interval [ti, ti+dt], and vice versa. 
     A    C 
     E 
     B    D 
  t1        t2     t3      Figure 1 
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neuron A and B at time t1, the behaviour of neuron C and D at time t2, and the 
behaviour of neuron E at time t3.  
To have a convenient way of naming these events, I adopt the following 
convention where the world of the example is treated as actual: 
 
Anticipating my treatment of omissions (see section 4), I adopt a similar 
convention for dealing with events that are essentially a particular neuron’s 
failure to fire:  
 
In later chapters, I use these conventions unless otherwise indicated.  
 
3.  Recovering features of ordinary events 
Instantaneous events differ from ordinary events in two significant ways: first, 
instantaneous events are global in the sense that they are concerned with 
complete states, whereas ordinary events are local. Second, instantaneous 
events are, as their name suggests, instantaneous, whereas ordinary events – 
such as football matches and birthday parties – are extended over time. In this 
For any neuron A, such that A’s firing at time t is explicitly shown  
in the neuron diagram, A is the instantaneous event characterised by  
(@, t, s, IA, CA), where 
   s  = the complete state of @ at t,  
   IA  = the closed interval [t, t + dt], and   
   CA  = the class of complete states such that neuron A fires. 
For any neuron A, such that A’s failure to fire at time t is explicitly shown  
in the neuron diagram, ¬A is the instantaneous event characterised by  
(@, t, s, I¬A, C¬A), where 
   s  = the complete state of @ at t,  
   I¬A  = the closed interval [t, t + dt], and   
   C¬A  = the class of complete states such that neuron A does not fire. 
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section, I show how my account of the causal relata can accommodate these 
features of ordinary events. I begin by showing how there is a derivative sense 
in which instantaneous events have more specific locations, corresponding to 
the way we usually assign locations to ordinary events (section 3.1). I then 
show how my proposed account of the causal relata can accommodate 
temporally extended events and causal relations between them (section 3.2). 
 
3.1  The location of instantaneous events 
We usually think of ordinary events as having quite well-defined spatial 
locations.16 Consider, for example, the event of my being out for a walk on the 
beach: it is natural to think that this event is located where I am – on the beach 
– and that the region within which it occurs does not include remote regions of 
space, thousands of light-years away.  
On the surface, it might seem that my account of the causal relata cannot 
accommodate this intuition: on my account, my being out for a walk on the 
beach at time t corresponds to an instantaneous event Beach walk – namely, the 
instantaneous event characterised by the quintuple (@, t, s, I, C), where s is the 
complete state of @ at time t, I is some appropriately chosen closed interval, 
and C is the class of complete states such that I am out for a walk on the 
beach. The most reasonable and straightforward way to assign a location to 
this instantaneous event is to say that it encompasses all of the actual world at 
time t – it is everywhere where the complete state s is exemplified. In this sense, 
the instantaneous event of my being out for a walk on the beach is truly global. 
There is, however, a derivative sense in which an instantaneous event 
may be located within a smaller region: as we have seen, instantaneous events 
are individuated based on what is essential and what is merely accidental to 
their occurrence. For example, it is essential to the occurrence of Beach walk 
that I am out for a walk on the beach, whereas it is merely accidental that a 
herd of elephants is splashing in the Okavango Delta. We tend to focus on 
                                                
16 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 178. 
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events based on a class C that is easily specifiable – such as the class C of states 
such that I am out for a walk on the beach. And when we are concerned with 
an event based on a particular class C, we tend to associate a unique specification 
with C – such as the specification that I am out for a walk on the beach – even 
though there are of course many different, more or less disjunctive, ways to 
specify any given class of complete states. 
Whether a state s belongs to a class C is simply a matter of the identity of 
s. However, whether a state s satisfies the specification associated with C is often 
a matter of what happens within a relatively small region. For example, the fact 
that a state s is such that I am out for a walk on the beach is grounded in what 
happens within a relatively small spatial region, namely the small region on the 
beach where I am in fact walking. This suggests a derivative sense in which 
instantaneous events have more specific locations: the derivative location of an 
instantaneous event (@, t, s, I, C) is the region such that the fact that s satisfies 
the specification associated with C is grounded in what happens within this 
region.17 
There is nothing metaphysically deep about this notion of derivative 
locations: this should be clear from the fact that the derivative location of an 
event depends on which specification we associate with the relevant class C. The 
point of introducing the notion is simply to show how it allows us to recover 
our ordinary way of thinking about events as having relatively well-defined 
spatial locations. And indeed, derivative locations correspond nicely to the 
locations assigned by common sense. In the case of Beach walk, for example, 
                                                
17 Note that this way of assigning derivative locations is compatible with saying that an event 
has its derivative location contingently: suppose that the complete state s of @ is such that I 
am at the northern end of a particular beach at time t. In that case, the fact that s satisfies the 
relevant specification is grounded in what happens within a small region at the northern end of 
the beach. However, the event Beach walk could have been realized in different ways. For 
example, it could have been realized by the world being in a complete state s* at the relevant 
time t such that I am at the southern end of the beach instead. The fact that s* satisfies the 
specification is grounded in what happens at the southern end of the beach – and a region at 
the southern end of the beach would therefore be the derivative location of Beach walk. In this 
way, Beach walk has its derivative location contingently.  
Part II: Foundations 
 86 
we correctly find that the derivative location of this event is the small region of 
the beach where I am.  
 
3.2  Temporally extended events, instantaneous events,  
and piecemeal causation 
The second important difference between instantaneous events and ordinary 
events is this: instantaneous events are, as their name suggests, instantaneous; 
ordinary events, by contrast, are usually extended over time. Indeed, paradigm 
examples of ordinary events, such as football matches and birthday parties, go 
on for hours.  
My proposed account of the causal relata needs to be able to 
accommodate such temporally extended events because our causal statements 
often relate such extended events. For example, the statement that ‘the 
sunshine melted the snow’ – or, more perspicuously, ‘the sun’s shining caused 
the melting of the snow’ – relates extended events: the extended event of the 
sun’s shining (presumably for several hours), and the extended and temporally 
overlapping event of the melting of the snow (which, again, presumably 
extends for several hours). How can my proposed account handle such cases? 
 My suggested answer comes in two parts. The first part consists in the 
suggestion that temporally extended events are built up from instantaneous 
events. For example, the extended event of the sun’s shining throughout the 
morning is built up from a sequence of (presumably infinitely many) 
instantaneous events – including the instantaneous event of the sun’s shining 
at precisely 10 a.m., the instantaneous event of the sun’s shining at precisely 
10.01 a.m. etc. And the extended event of the melting of the snow is similarly 
built up from a sequence of (presumably infinitely many) instantaneous events 
– including the instantaneous event of snow melting at precisely 10 a.m., the 
instantaneous event of snow melting at precisely 10.01 a.m. etc.  
 The second part of my answer consists in the suggestion that causal 
statements relating extended events are true (when they are true) in virtue of 
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the causal relations between the instantaneous events that make up the relevant 
extended events. For example, the claim that ‘the sun’s shining caused the 
melting of the snow’ is true (if it is true) in virtue of the causal relations 
between instantaneous sunshine events (such as the instantaneous event of the 
sun’s shining at precisely 10 a.m.) and instantaneous melting events (such as 
the instantaneous event of snow melting at precisely 10.01 a.m.). This 
suggestion of how the extended event of the sun’s shining causes the extended 
event of the melting of the snow is very similar to what Lewis calls ‘piecemeal 
causation’, and following Lewis I will adopt this name.18  
 On Lewis’s original analysis of causation, an event c causes an event e just 
in case e depends causally on c, or there is a chain of causal dependence 
connecting the two (where causal dependence is simply counterfactual 
dependence between distinct events).19 Within the context of this analysis, 
Lewis presents the idea of piecemeal causation as follows:  
 
‘Suppose that c and e are large, prolonged processes, each composed of many 
smaller events. Suppose it is not true (or not clearly true) that e, taken as a 
whole, causally depends on c, taken as a whole; suppose even that they are not 
connected by a chain of causal dependence. It may nevertheless be that c and e 
are divisible into parts in such a way that every part of e is causally dependent 
on (or connected by a chain of causal dependence to) some part of c. In that 
case we might well simply speak of c as a cause of e, though it is not so under 
the analysis I gave.’20 
 
It should be clear that this idea is independent of Lewis’s particular analysis of 
causation: it can be applied in the context of any account of causation. On my 
proposed conception of the causal relata, what matters is simply this: when we 
say that an extended event c causes an extended event e, this claim is true (or 
                                                
18 See Lewis (1986e), pp. 172-75. 
19 Lewis (1986d). 
20 Lewis (1986e), p. 172. 
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false) in virtue of the fact that c is made up of instantaneous events and e is 
made up of instantaneous events, such that each instantaneous c-event causes 
some instantaneous e-event, and each instantaneous e-event is caused by some 
instantaneous c-event. 
 At first, it might seem cumbersome that my proposed account of the 
causal relata requires us to understand causal relations between temporally 
extended events as obtaining in virtue of causal relations between 
instantaneous events. On closer inspection, however, I believe that this gives a 
deeper understanding of the causal phenomena. For example, understanding 
causal relations between extended events in this way makes it entirely 
straightforward to see how two extended and temporally overlapping events – 
such as the sun’s shining and the melting of the snow – can stand in the 
relation of cause and effect without any simultaneous or backwards causation.  
Furthermore, there are cases where the notion of piecemeal causation is 
indispensable, even on accounts, such as Lewis’s, that do allow temporally 
extended events to feature among the basic causal relata. Thus, Lewis gives the 
following example: 
  
‘Self-sustaining processes exhibit piecemeal causation. For instance, suppose a 
public address system is turned up until it howls from feedback. The howling, 
from start to finish, is an event. […] it is not true, on my account, that the 
howling taken as a whole causes itself. What is true is that the howling causes 
itself piecemeal. It is divisible into parts in such a way that each part except the 
first is caused by an earlier part, and each part except the last causes a later part. 
This causing of part by part is unproblematic.’21  
 
Once again, thinking about this case in terms of instantaneous events gives a 
deeper understanding of its causal structure. 
 
 
                                                
21 Lewis (1986e), pp. 172-73. 
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4.  Omissions as causal relata 
It seems intuitively clear that omissions can be causes and effects. For example, 
my thinking about this chapter was a cause of my failure to water my potted 
primrose, and my failure to water the primrose was in turn a cause of its 
withering. However, many accounts of the causal relata run into trouble when 
trying to accommodate omissions.22 I therefore take it to be an important 
advantage of my proposal that it can straightforwardly accommodate 
omissions as being no different in kind from ordinary, positive events, such as 
my thinking about this chapter or the withering of the primrose.  
 The trouble with accommodating omissions and absences as causal relata 
is that it seems that there is nothing to accommodate. As Schaffer writes:  
 
 ‘[Absences] are nothings, non-occurrences, and hence are not in the world.’23 
 
My suggestion is that this way of thinking about omissions and absences is a 
misunderstanding: on my proposed conception of the causal relata, omissions 
and absences occur in the world in just the same way as ordinary positive 
events – in fact, there is no deep metaphysical distinction between the two.  
To see this, let us begin by considering a simple case – say, my failure at 
time t to water my potted primrose. Suppose that the actual world is in the 
complete state s at time t. The complete state s has many different properties – 
that is, it belongs to many different classes of complete states. For example, it 
has the property that I’m out for a walk on the beach, that a particular seagull 
is landing on the railing of a boat, that a herd of elephants is splashing in the 
Okavango Delta, etc. It also has the property that I am not watering my 
primrose – that is, it belongs to a class C of complete states such that I do not 
water my primrose.  
                                                
22 See e.g. Beebee (2004); Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 177-83; Schaffer (2016), pp. 8-9.  
23 Schaffer, (2016), p. 8. See also Beebee (2004).  
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My suggestion is that the instantaneous event of my failing to water the 
primrose at t has exactly the same realization as every other instantaneous 
event that actually occurs at t – including the instantaneous event of my being 
out for a walk on the beach, the instantaneous event of the seagull landing on 
the railing of a boat, the instantaneous event of the herd of elephants splashing 
in the Okavango Delta, etc. What distinguishes the instantaneous event of my 
failing to water the primrose from all these other instantaneous events is its 
essence: the instantaneous event of my failing to water the primrose at time t 
consists in the quintuple, (@, t, s, I, C), where I is the closed interval [t, t+dt] 
with dt being an infinitesimal time-interval, and where C is the class of 
complete states such that I do not water the primrose.  
This instantaneous event is not different from other instantaneous 
events in any deep metaphysical sense. The only thing that distinguishes it 
from what we would call positive instantaneous events is the way in which we 
have picked out the relevant class C of complete states – namely, by reference 
to what does not occur in these states, rather than by reference to what does 
occur. However, this is merely a superficial difference in our way of picking 
out the relevant class – C itself is simply a class of complete states, just like any 
other class of complete states.  
So far, we have seen how my account of the causal relata allows us to 
capture a maximally temporally fragile event of my failure to water the 
primrose at exactly time t. However, it is natural to understand the statement 
‘my failure to water the primrose caused it to wither’ as a statement relating 
temporally extended events – namely, the extended event of my failure to 
water the primrose (e.g. my not watering it throughout a week) and the 
extended and temporally overlapping event of the primrose withering. 
 Relying on the idea of piecemeal causation, my suggestion is that the 
statement that ‘my failure to water the primrose caused it to wither’ is true in 
virtue of the causal relations between the instantaneous events that make up 
these temporally extended events: the temporally extended event of my failure 
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to water the primrose is built up from instantaneous events of my failure to 
water it – namely, instantaneous events of omission of the kind discussed 
above. Similarly, the temporally extended event of the primrose withering is 
built up from instantaneous events of flowers and leaves losing turgor 
pressure, wilting and subsequently drying out. And the statement is true in 
virtue of the fact that each instantaneous event of my failure to water the 
primrose – together with the already dry soil in the pot and progressively 
weaker state of the primrose – causes subsequent instantaneous withering 
events, and each instantaneous withering event is caused by an instantaneous 
event of my failure to water it.24 
To bring out the advantages of this way of accommodating omissions, 
we may contrast it with a different view that is sometimes suggested: that cases 
such as the above can be handled by taking omissions to be ‘ordinary events, 
oddly described’.25 On this view one might say that my failure to water my 
primrose at t just is my being out for a walk at t. Lewis considers this option in 
the following passage:  
 
‘Fred omits the precautions, sleeping through the time when he was supposed 
to attend to them. His nap was a genuine event; it is not objectionably 
disjunctive. There are many and varied ways in which he could have omitted 
the precautions, but there is just one way that he did omit them. We could 
plausibly say, then, that his nap was his omission of precautions.’26 
 
There are a number of problems with this view – for example, it comes into 
conflict with the independently plausible principle that causation is an 
extensional relation (for more on extensionality, see section 5).27 Furthermore, 
there are cases in which it is simply not clear which ordinary event the 
                                                
24 Note that the example is fictive. No plants were harmed in the writing of this dissertation. 
25 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 180; cf. Lewis (1986e), p. 192-3. Note that Paul and Hall do not 
endorse this view. 
26 Lewis (1986e), p. 192. 
27 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 180. 
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omission or absence should be identified with. For example, Paul and Hall 
present the following case:  
 
‘suppose that overpopulation of rabbits in a certain region, at a certain time, is 
caused in part by a lack of predators. Are we really to suppose that there are 
some (potential) predators in that region at that time, doing something else 
other than preying on these rabbits – and that it is that something else we are 
referring to by the expression “a lack of predators”? At best, we might claim 
that the region of the rabbits, just as it is, counts as the event described by “the 
lack of predators,” but this again is unsatisfactory.’28 
 
Cases such as the above present a severe challenge for the view that omissions 
and absences should simply be understood as ordinary events oddly 
described.29  
By contrast, my proposed account of the causal relata can 
straightforwardly accommodate the above case: suppose that the world is in 
the complete state s at time t. On my account, then, the instantaneous event 
consisting in the absence of predators at time t has exactly the same realization 
as every other instantaneous event occurring in @ at t – namely, the realization 
given by the triple (@, s, t). What distinguishes the instantaneous event of the 
lack of predators from all the other instantaneous events occurring at the same 
time is its essence: the instantaneous event of the lack of predators at time t 
corresponds to the quintuple (@, t, s, I, C), where I is the closed interval [t, 
t+dt] and C is the class of complete states such that there are no predators in 
the relevant region. 
                                                
28 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 181. 
29 Schaffer’s suggestion that causation is a quaternary, contrastive relation (Schaffer (2005)) 
may be seen as a sophisticated version of this view. On Schaffer’s suggestion, a description 
such as ‘my failure to water the primrose’ is an odd way of describing what I was in fact doing 
at the time, i.e. going for a walk on the beach. This odd description draws attention to a 
particular contrast to my walking on the beach – namely, my watering the primrose. It is not 
entirely clear how Schaffer’s proposal can handle more challenging cases such as the lack-of-
predators case quoted above. 
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Again, what we have characterised here is the maximally temporally 
fragile event of the absence of predators at exactly time t. When we say that the 
lack of predators caused the overpopulation of rabbits, however, it is plausible 
that we are talking about a temporally extended event of there being a lack of 
predators throughout several months or more (after all, an instantaneous 
absence would not have much of an effect on its own). By contrast, we may if 
we like take the overpopulation of rabbits to be an instantaneous event, 
consisting simply in there being too many rabbits in the area at a given time. 
On this interpretation, the statement that ‘the absence of predators caused the 
overpopulation of rabbits’ gets to be true (if it is true) in virtue of the relations 
that hold between instantaneous absence-of-predators events and the 
instantaneous overpopulation event: each instantaneous absence-of-predators 
event is – together with the presence of parent rabbits, litters of baby rabbits, 
ample food, etc. – a cause of a subsequent instantaneous event of parents and 
litters of baby rabbits surviving yet another instant of carefree nibbling. And 
through a long chain this eventually causes the instantaneous event of the 
overpopulation of rabbits. 
As a final example of how my account of the causal relata can 
accommodate omissions and absences, let us consider a case that seems to 
present even greater difficulties – namely, the case of a void. Lewis gives the 
following colourful example: 
 
‘The void is deadly. If you were cast into a void, it would cause you to die in 
just a few minutes. It would suck the air from your lungs. It would boil your 
blood. It would drain the warmth from your body. And it would inflate 
enclosures in your body until they burst.’30 
 
It seems intuitively true, as Lewis says above, that a void can cause things. 
However, a void is nothing at all:  
                                                
30 Lewis (2004b), p. 277. 
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‘if there is a void within these walls, then (even though the walls are some 
distance apart) there is nothing at all between the walls. What? – Not even any 
spacetime? Not even any flat, causally inert spacetime? – No, not even any 
spacetime. Nothing at all.’31   
 
In this way, the above case presents trouble even for a view that identifies 
omissions and absences with spatiotemporal regions. For in the above case, 
there is no spatiotemporal region with which we may identify the void. By 
contrast, my proposed account of the causal relata can accommodate the 
above case just as straightforwardly as the others we have considered: treating 
the world of the example as actual, the first relatum when we say that the void 
causes the test person’s death is an instantaneous event of our usual kind – 
namely, the quintuple (@, t, s, I, C), where s is the complete state of @ at the 
relevant time t, I is the closed interval [t, t+dt], and C is the class of complete 
states such that there is a void within the relevant boundaries.  
 Indeed, as far as I can see, the only kind of case that I cannot 
accommodate is a case in which there is no world at the relevant time t. In that 
case, there can be no instantaneous events occurring at t: when there is no 
world, there is indeed nothing – and there is nothing that can play the role of 
causal relatum. But this is of course just the result we want: causation is 
something that happens within a world – so if there is no world, there can be 
no causation.  
 
5.  Causal differences and extensionality 
A second challenge for accounts of the causal relata arises from the 
observation that our causal judgements seem to be sensitive to very fine 
differences. To take an example from Lewis, suppose that John says “Hello”, 
                                                
31 Lewis (2004b), p. 278. 
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and he says it ‘rather too loudly’.32 In this case, it seems that John’s saying 
“Hello”, and John’s saying “Hello” loudly must be different causal relata, since 
they have different causes and effects: John’s state of tension is a cause of his 
saying “Hello” loudly, but not of his saying “Hello” as such; and John’s saying 
“Hello” is a cause of Fred’s greeting him in return, while John’s saying “Hello” 
loudly is not.33  
On my proposed account of the causal relata, we can easily 
accommodate cases such as this: treating the world of the example as actual, 
my suggestion is that the instantaneous event of John’s saying “Hello” and the 
instantaneous event of John’s saying “Hello” loudly have the same realization 
– characterised by the triple (@, s, t), where s is the complete state of @ at the 
relevant time t. However, the two events have different essences: the 
instantaneous event of John’s saying “Hello” is essentially a saying “Hello”, but 
only accidentally a saying “Hello” loudly; by contrast, the instantaneous event 
of John’s saying “Hello” loudly is essentially a saying “Hello” loudly. This 
solution – taking the difference between the two events to be a difference in 
essence – is exactly what Lewis himself proposes: 
 
‘Arguably there is one event that occurs which is essentially a saying -“Hello” 
and only accidentally loud; it would have occurred even if John had spoken 
softly. Arguably, there is a second event that implies, but is not implied by, the 
first. This event is essentially a saying -“Hello”- loudly, and it would not have 
occurred if John had said “Hello” but said it softly.’34 
 
The desideratum that an account of the causal relata should be able to handle 
cases involving causal differences such as the above is closely related to the 
desideratum that an account should allow us to maintain that causation is an 
extensional relation: 
                                                
32 Lewis (1986g), p. 255. 
33 Lewis (1986g), p. 255. 
34 Lewis (1986g), p. 255. 
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 To say that causation is an extensional relation is to say that if c causes e 
and c = c* and e = e*, then c* causes e*. At the semantic level, this means that 
different descriptions can be substituted for each other without changing the 
truth-value of our causal claims, provided the descriptions refer to the same 
event.35 It seems intuitively plausible to hold that causation is an extensional 
relation. As Strawson writes: 
 
‘causality is a natural relation … that relationship holds however A and B may 
be described.’36  
 
However, maintaining that causation is an extensional relation imposes severe 
constraints on accounts of the causal relata. This is brought out by examples 
such as the following: 
 
‘one might accept that McEnroe’s tension caused his serving awkwardly but 
deny that his tension caused his serving. One wants to say: he was going to 
serve anyway.’37 
 
If we were to say that McEnroe’s serving is the same event as his serving 
awkwardly, the above case would present a counterexample to the 
extensionality of causation: ‘McEnroe’s serving’ cannot be substituted for 
‘McEnroe’s serving awkwardly’ while preserving the truth-value of the claim 
that ‘his tension caused McEnroe’s serving awkwardly’. To maintain that 
causation is an extensional relation – while respecting our intuitive causal 
judgements – we therefore need an account where the causal relata are 
individuated sufficiently finely to ensure that e.g. McEnroe’s serving is 
numerically distinct from McEnroe’s serving awkwardly.  
                                                
35 Schaffer (2005), p. 306. 
36 Strawson (1985), p. 118.  
37 Schaffer (2005), p. 307.  
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 My account of the causal relata easily achieves this: on my account, the 
two instantaneous events of McEnroe’s serving and McEnroe’s serving 
awkwardly have the same realization – namely, the realization given by the 
triple (@, t, s), where s is the complete state of @ at the relevant time t. 
However, the two events differ in their modal profiles: the instantaneous event 
of McEnroe’s serving is essentially a serving, but only accidentally awkward; 
McEnroe’s serving awkwardly is a more fragile version of this event – it is 
essentially McEnroe’s serving awkwardly.  
 In addition to cases such as the above, there is another group of cases 
that seem to present even more challenging counterexamples to the 
extensionality of causation – namely, cases that involve mere focal differences. 
For example, it seems correct to say that Socrates’s drinking hemlock at dusk 
caused his death, whereas it seems false to say that Socrates’s drinking hemlock 
at dusk caused his death.38 As Schaffer notes: ‘One wants to say: when he drank 
the hemlock did not matter.’39  
 My treatment of such cases has two parts. First, we need to note that we 
may use both essential and accidental features of events to pick them out. 
Thus, the precise way in which we describe an instantaneous event gives hints, 
but is not an infallible guide to what is essential and what is merely accidental to 
the event we want to be talking about.40 In particular, describing an 
instantaneous event as ‘Socrates’ drinking hemlock at dusk’ does not by itself 
tell us whether Socrates’ drinking hemlock, or occurring at dusk, is essential to 
the event we want to be talking about.  
This, I suggest, is where mere focal differences can in fact matter in 
specifying which instantaneous event we are referring to: the emphasis on 
‘drinking hemlock’ in ‘Socrates’ drinking hemlock at dusk’ suggests that Socrates’s 
drinking hemlock is essential, whereas the time of occurrence may be merely 
                                                
38 Schaffer (2005), p. 307. The example is originally due to Achinstein (1975). 
39 Schaffer (2005), p. 307. 
40 See e.g. Lewis (1986g), pp. 247-54; Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 102-3; Yablo (1992b), note 28, 
pp. 439-40.  
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accidental. By contrast, the emphasis on ‘at dusk’ in ‘Socrates’ drinking 
hemlock at dusk’ suggests that the time of occurrence is essential. If this is 
correct, then we can see how mere focal differences can indeed make a 
difference as to which instantaneous event we are referring to. 
To fully capture our causal judgements in this case, however, it is 
plausible that we need to adopt Schaffer’s suggestion that focal differences 
should be understood as contrastive differences: 
 
‘the focus effect begs for contrastive explanation. Thus ‘Socrates’ drinking 
hemlock at dusk’ is naturally interpreted as c: Socrates’ drinking hemlock at dusk, 
rather than c*: Socrates’ drinking wine at dusk (or some other salient alternative 
to drinking hemlock); whereas ‘Socrates’ drinking hemlock at dusk’ is naturally 
interpreted as c: Socrates’ drinking hemlock at dusk, rather than c*: Socrates’ 
drinking hemlock at dawn (or some other salient alternative to occurring at 
dusk).’41 
 
In Chapter 10 section 3, I show how my proposed account of causation can 
accommodate such contrastive causal statements. 
 
6.  Transitivity 
As a third and final application of my proposed account of the causal relata, I 
will now show how it gives us the resources to withstand a particular kind of 
counterexample to transitivity.  
At first glance, one might wonder why we should care about this 
application: as we have already seen in Chapter 2 section 1.3.2, there are 
convincing counterexamples to the transitivity of causation. It might therefore 
seem natural to suggest that since, as Schaffer writes, ‘transitivity is lost 
anyway’,42 it simply does not matter whether our account of the causal relata 
allows us to withstand counterexamples to transitivity of this particular kind. 
                                                
41 Schaffer (2005), p. 308. 
42 Schaffer (2016), p. 14. 
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However, this suggestion is too hasty: transitivity plays an important role in 
our causal reasoning. Even though we cannot maintain an unrestricted 
principle of transitivity, it is therefore an important desideratum that we should 
be able to maintain a restricted transitivity principle (see Chapter 11 section 2). 
And to achieve that goal, we should aim for an account of the causal relata that 
limits the range of counterexamples to transitivity as much as possible.  
With this motivation, let us now consider the following example of the 
kind of case that our account of the causal relata should enable us to handle: 
 
Skiing accident: while skiing, Suzy breaks her right wrist. The next day, she writes 
a philosophy paper, which is subsequently accepted for publication. Since 
Suzy’s right wrist is broken, she writes the paper by typing with her left hand. 
And as she is not used to writing this way, she develops a cramp in her left 
hand.43  
 
On an account where the causal relata are not sufficiently finely individuated, 
this case presents a counterexample to transitivity. To see this, consider an 
account on which the event of Suzy’s writing the paper is identical to the event 
of Suzy’s writing the paper by typing with her left hand. Now, it is clear that 
Suzy’s skiing accident causes Suzy’s writing the paper by typing with her left 
hand. From the assumption that the event of Suzy’s writing the paper is 
identical to the event of Suzy’s writing the paper with her left hand, it follows 
by substitution that Suzy’s skiing accident causes Suzy’s writing the paper. This 
is already a bad result, showing how identifying Suzy’s writing the paper with 
Suzy’s writing the paper with her left hand brings us into conflict with the 
principle that causation is an extensional relation. And from here, there is only 
a small step to the full counterexample to transitivity: it is clear that Suzy’s 
writing the paper is a cause of the paper’s being accepted for publication. By 
                                                
43 This case is closely based on a case presented in Paul (2004a). For discussion of similar 
cases, see also Ehring (2009), pp. 403-4; McDonnell (forthcoming); Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 
237-44; Schaffer (2016), pp. 13-14, and Woodward (1984), pp. 234-46. 
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transitivity, we therefore find that Suzy’s skiing accident causes the paper’s 
getting accepted for publication. But that seems false – intuitively, Suzy’s skiing 
accident does not cause the paper’s being accepted for publication. 
 One might try to resist this result by denying that Suzy’s skiing accident 
causes Suzy’s writing the paper by typing with her left hand. However, that 
option is untenable. For it seems intuitively obvious that Suzy’s skiing accident 
is a cause of the cramp in Suzy’s left hand – indeed, if the accident had not 
happened, Suzy would not have had the cramp. And of course, the skiing 
accident does not cause the cramp through some spooky action at a distance – 
it does so with Suzy’s writing with her left hand as an intermediary.44 As long 
as the event of Suzy’s writing the paper is assumed to be identical to the event 
of Suzy’s writing the paper with her left hand, the counterexample to 
transitivity therefore remains. 
 My proposed account of the causal relata easily provides the resources 
needed to handle this purported counterexample to transitivity, since it 
individuates events based on their modal profile. On my account, we therefore 
find that there are two instantaneous writing events occurring at the relevant 
time – a writing that is essentially a writing of the paper, but only accidentally a 
writing by typing with the left hand; and a more fragile version of this event 
that is essentially a writing of the paper by typing with the left hand. These 
instantaneous events have the same realization, but different modal profiles – 
and they are therefore numerically different events. 
 Since my account of the causal relata yields the result that Suzy’s writing 
the paper is not identical to Suzy’s writing the paper by typing with her left 
hand, we now have the resources to resist the counterexample. Here, in brief, 
is what we should say: Suzy’s skiing accident is not a cause of Suzy’s writing her 
paper, though it is a cause of the more fragile event of Suzy’s writing her paper 
by typing with her left hand. In turn, the robust event of Suzy’s writing her 
paper is a cause of the paper’s getting accepted for publication, while the more 
                                                
44 Paul (2004a), pp. 209-10; cf. Paul and Hall (2013), p. 238. 
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fragile event of Suzy’s writing her paper by typing with her left hand is not. 
Thus, transitivity simply does not apply. Indeed, the only legitimate application 
of transitivity in the present case is the following: the more fragile event of 
Suzy’s writing her paper by typing with her left hand is a cause of Suzy’s 
cramp. By transitivity, it follows that Suzy’s skiing accident is a cause of Suzy’s 
cramp. That is exactly the result we want. In this way, my proposed account of 
the causal relata gives us the resources we need to resist the counterexample.  
 It should be clear, however, that what has been shown here is relatively 
limited: all I have shown is that my account of the causal relata gives us the 
resources we need to resist the counterexample, by allowing us to say that the 
event of Suzy’s writing the paper is not identical to the event of Suzy’s writing 
the paper by typing with her left hand. To truly handle the case, however, we 
also need an account of causation that delivers the intuitively correct verdicts –
e.g. that Suzy’s skiing accident is not a cause of Suzy’s writing the paper, though 
it is a cause of the more fragile event of Suzy’s writing the paper by typing with 
her left hand. In Chapter 7 section 4.3, I therefore return to the case and show 
that my proposed account of causation does indeed deliver these verdicts. For 
now, however, we have established what we need – namely, that my account of 
the causal relata provides the needed resources. 
 
7.  Restricting the domain of quantification 
It follows from the principle of Plenitude that there is a great multitude of 
instantaneous events. Common sense accepts some of these events, but rejects 
others. 
Suppose, for example, that Fred is out for a walk on the beach at time t. 
By Plenitude, there is a multitude of instantaneous events that all occur at time t 
and have the same realization – namely, the realization given by the complete 
state of the world at t – but which differ in their modal profiles. Among these 
is the instantaneous event that is essentially Fred’s walking. But in addition, 
there are also instantaneous events based on more gerrymandered properties 
Part II: Foundations 
 102 
of the actual complete state of the world – such as the event that is essentially 
Fred’s walking or a bumblebee landing on a clover blossom. Common sense 
recognises some of these events, but rejects others. For example, it recognises 
the event that is essentially Fred’s walking. But it rejects events based on more 
gerrymandered properties, such as the event that is essentially Fred’s walking or 
a bumblebee landing on a clover blossom.  
When we quantify over events, we typically restrict our domain of 
quantification so as to exclude events with overly disjunctive essences, such as 
the event that is essentially Fred’s walking or a bumblebee landing on a clover 
blossom. However, it may well depend on context exactly what counts as 
‘overly disjunctive’. In some contexts, for example, we may accept the event 
that is essentially someone’s watering my flowers; in other contexts, we may 
reject this as having an overly disjunctive essence, and accept only the less 
disjunctive events of Alex’s watering my flowers, Fenner’s watering my 
flowers, etc.  
It is important to recognise that we restrict our domain of quantification 
in this way: my proposed account of causation requires us to quantify over 
instantaneous events. To apply the account, we therefore need to specify the 
relevant domain of instantaneous events. Indeed, a natural way to capture this 
is to understand the contextually determined domain of instantaneous events 
as a further causal relatum. In the following, however, I will leave this 
relativisation to a domain of instantaneous events implicit: as it turns out, the 
contextually relevant domain of instantaneous events remains remarkably 
stable across a wide range of different contexts. Once we have an 
understanding of the relevant domain, we can therefore let the choice of 
domain recede into the background while we attend to other features of the 
causal relation.  
The following is a brief characterisation of our typical choices of domain 
of quantification, which I will presuppose in the following: 
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When we are dealing with neuron diagrams, the domain of quantification 
contains – except in very special contexts – only instantaneous events that are 
maximally temporally fragile, and based on the behaviour of a single neuron. 
Thus, our domain of quantification when dealing with the case of early 
preemption in Figure 1 contains just the five events A, B, C, ¬D, and E, 









        
 
 
When we are dealing with real life cases, we can expect to find a bit more 
contextual variation in the domain of quantification. In general, however, the 
following seems to hold: we may think of any class C of complete states as 
inducing a partition on all complete states – namely, the partition into C and 
the complement of C. Let us say that a class C is good, just in case it induces a 
reasonably joint-carving partition – i.e. just in case either C or the complement 
of C captures a class of complete states that are genuinely similar to each other. 
Then my suggestion is that we include an event e within our domain of 
quantification just in case e is based on a good class C.  
 This suggestion leaves room for contextual variation: it may well depend 
on context what the relevant standard of goodness is. At the same time, the 
suggestion captures how the standards we apply to omissions and absences 
seem to be a mirror image of the standards we apply to so-called positive 
events: since what matters is the partition induced by a class C, we find that a 
class C is good just in case the complement of C is also good. This correctly 
captures the fact that in any context where we include the event of my 
     A    C 
     E 
     B    D 
  t1        t2     t3      Figure 1 
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watering the primrose within our domain of quantification, we also include the 
event of my failure to water the primrose, and vice versa.  
 Paying attention to the partition induced by a particular class C thus 
allows us to see that there is a principled basis for including omissions and 
absences within our domain of quantification, while excluding events such as 
the event that is essentially Fred’s walking or a bumblebee landing on a clover 
blossom:  
It is indeed true that omissions and absences have highly disjunctive 
essences. As Lewis writes: 
 
‘an event of omission, essentially specifiable as such, is highly disjunctive. Fred 
omits the precautions if he does something else during the period in which he 
was supposed to attend to them. So there are as many different ways for the 
event of omission to occur as there are alternative ways for Fred to spend the 
time. An event essentially specifiable as an omission amounts to an event 
essentially specifiable as a sleeping-or-loafing-or-chatting-or- … with a disjunct 
for everything Fred might do other than attending to the precautions.’45 
  
However, when a class C characterises an omission or absence, then the 
complement of C characterises a class of states that are genuinely similar. For 
example, the class characterising Fred’s failure to attend to the precautions is 
the class of states such that Fred does attend to the precautions – and the 
complete states in this class are genuinely similar. In this way, the class of states 
characterising an omission or absence induces a sensible partition on all the 
complete states. By contrast, the class C characterising the objectionably 
disjunctive event of Fred’s walking or a bumblebee landing on a clover blossom 
does not induce a sensible partition: neither C itself nor the complement of C 
captures a class of complete states that are genuinely similar.  
 
                                                
45 Lewis (1986), ’Causation’, p. 190. 
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8.  Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented an account of the causal relata on which the 
causal relata are actual instantaneous events, characterised by a realization (@, t, s) 
and a modal profile (I, C ). Here @ is the actual world, t is a time, s is the 
complete state of @ at time t, I is a closed interval that includes time t, and C is 
a class of complete states that includes s.  
This account has two important advantages. First, it harmonises our 
ordinary understanding of the causal relata with the conception of the laws of 
nature that one finds in the philosophy of science: instantaneous events are 
built from the very same global and instantaneous complete states whose 
forward evolution is governed by the laws of nature. At the same time, my 
treatment of derivative locations and temporally extended events allows us to 
recover our ordinary understanding of the causal relata as being local and 
temporally extended. 
Second, my proposed account gives us the resources to handle the 
standard test cases for accounts of the causal relata: it allows us to 
accommodate omissions and absences as causal relata, it allows us to respect 
causal differences and preserve extensionality, and it allows us to resist a 
particular kind of counterexample to the transitivity of causation. 
The real test of an account of the causal relata, however, is whether it 
can underlie a successful account of causation.46 Apart from the considerations 
mentioned above, one of my main motivations in developing the account 
presented here has been to develop an account of the primary causal relata 
tailored specifically to my proposed account of causation. Before I get to the 
account of causation itself, however, I first need to introduce a further kind of 




                                                
46 Cf. Stein (2016), p. 482. 














The third relatum: possibility horizons 
 
My suggestion is that causation is a ternary relation: c causes e within possibility 
horizon H.  The notion of a possibility horizon is inspired by the following 
quotation from Mackie: 
 
‘[Causal] statements are commonly made in some context, against a background 
which includes the assumption of some causal field. A causal statement will be 
the answer to a causal question, and the question ‘What caused this explosion?’ 
can be expanded into ‘What made the difference between those times, or those 
cases, within a certain range, in which no such explosion occurred, and this case 
in which an explosion did occur?’ Both causes and effects are seen as 
differences within a field; anything that is part of the assumed (but commonly 
unstated) description of the field itself will, then, be automatically ruled out as a 
candidate for the role of cause.’1 
 
In brief, a possibility horizon is a restricted class of nomologically possible 
worlds – namely, a class consisting in the actual world together with those 
nomologically possible worlds that represent relevant possibilities. My aim in this 
chapter is to develop this notion of a possibility horizon in more detail. 
 By suggesting that causation is a ternary relation, with a possibility 
horizon as its third relatum, I am taking a stand on a rather contentious issue: 
namely, how we should account for the context-dependence of causal claims. 
It is widely recognised that the assertability of causal claims depends on 
                                                
1 Mackie (1974), pp. 34-35. 
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context.2 However, it is debated whether this context-dependence should be 
given a semantic or a merely pragmatic explanation. For a long time, the 
orthodox view has been that the context-dependence of causal claims is a 
rather superficial phenomenon that should be given a merely pragmatic 
explanation. This view is expressed, for example, in the following quotation 
from Lewis:  
 
‘We sometimes single out one among all the causes of some event and call it 
“the” cause, as if there were no others. Or we single out a few as the “causes”, 
calling the rest mere “causal factors” or “causal conditions.” […] We may select 
the abnormal or extraordinary causes, or those under human control, or those 
we deem good or bad, or just those we want to talk about. I have nothing to 
say about these principles of invidious discrimination. I am concerned with the 
prior question of what it is to be one of the causes (unselectively speaking).’3   
 
Against this, Schaffer and others have suggested that the context-dependence 
of causal claims goes deeper, and requires a semantic explanation: merely 
pragmatic considerations cannot account for the ways in which the assertability 
of causal claims depends on context.4  
 My suggestion that causation is a ternary relation, with a possibility 
horizon as its third relatum, sides with Schaffer on the question of how to 
accommodate the context-sensitivity of causal claims: it accommodates the 
context-sensitivity of causal claims by building context-sensitivity into the 
semantics. In brief, my suggestion works as follows: metaphysically, causation 
is a ternary relation. For any two instantaneous events c and e, and any 
                                                
2 See e.g. Maslen (2004), and Schaffer (2012).  
3 Lewis (1986d), p. 162. Cf. Lewis (1986f ), pp. 215-16. 
4 Schaffer (2012), pp. 42-44; see also Maslen (2004); Northcott (2008); Schaffer (2005). 
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possibility horizon H, there is a context-independent fact of the matter as to 
whether c causes e within H .5  
Usually, however, the surface form of our causal claims is binary: the 
standard form of a causal claim is simply ‘c causes e’. The relevant possibility 
horizon is then supplied by context – and this explains the context-sensitivity 
of causal claims: in one context, the causal claim ‘c causes e’ may be completed 
as ‘c causes e within H 1’; in a different context, it may be completed as ‘c 
causes e within H 2’. And these two complete causal claims may obviously have 
different truth-values. 
 In this chapter, I develop the notion of a possibility horizon in more 
detail. I begin by setting out a definition of what a possibility horizon is 
(section 1). From a metaphysical perspective, this is all we need. To evaluate 
ordinary causal claims of the form ‘c causes e’, however, we also need to know 
how the context of a causal inquiry selects a possibility horizon. My answer to 
this question builds on the distinction between default and deviant states. I 
propose a way to give a reductive characterisation of the default-deviant 
distinction (section 2). And based on this, I set out a recipe for how context 
selects a possibility horizon (section 3). Finally, I show how such a contextually 
determined possibility horizon perfectly models the intuitive distinction 




                                                
5 As mentioned in Chapter 4 section 7, context also imposes restrictions on the domain of 
instantaneous events. More precisely, we should therefore say that for any two instantaneous 
events c and e, possibility horizon H , and domain of instantaneous events, there is a context-
independent fact of the matter as to whether c causes e within H, given the relevant domain of 
instantaneous events. This more precise statement makes it explicit that the contextually 
determined domain of instantaneous events functions as a fourth causal relatum. In the 
following, however, I leave the relativisation to a contextually determined domain implicit, 
since there seems to be agreement about the relevant domain of instantaneous events across a 
wide range of contexts.  
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1.  Defining possibility horizons 
Formally, a possibility horizon is simply a class of nomologically possible 
worlds that includes the actual world @.  
 I follow the standard characterisation of nomologically possible worlds, 
where a world is nomologically possible just in case it is governed by the actual 
laws of nature (where the world of the example under consideration is treated 
as actual). Furthermore, I allow that a nomologically possible world can start 
out in any complete state – what is required is simply that it evolves forward 
from then in accordance with the actual laws of nature.6 Based on this, we may 
define a possibility horizon as follows: 
 
Possibility horizon: a set of worlds W characterises a possibility horizon iff 
a) W includes the actual world @, and 
b) W includes only nomologically possible worlds. 
 
A possibility horizon H  characterises a restricted modality: a proposition p is 
possible within H  just in case p is true in at least one world in H,  and a 
proposition p is necessary within H  just in case p is true in all worlds in H.   
We may think of a possibility horizon H  as representing differences 
within a causal field of the kind that Mackie describes in the quote above: the 
worlds included in H  are just those worlds that represent relevant possibilities in 
the given context. Thus, a proposition p is possible within H  just in case it 
expresses a relevant possibility, and a proposition p is necessary within H  just 
in case its truth can be taken for granted in the given context – that is, just in 
case its negation does not express a relevant possibility. 
This fits nicely with the formal characterisation of a possibility horizon 
given above: a possibility horizon must always include the actual world @, 
since @ always represents a relevant possibility. And a possibility horizon must 
never include nomologically impossible worlds, since – for the purposes of 
                                                
6 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 72-73. 
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determining what causes what – these worlds never represent relevant 
possibilities.  
To make the notion of a possibility horizon more concrete, consider the 













Let us treat the world of the example as actual, and denote it by ‘@’. From the 
standpoint of @, there are four nomologically possible worlds, corresponding 
to the different combinations of whether A and B fire or fail to fire at time t1.
7 
These four nomologically possible worlds are: 
 
Complete state at time t1: 
@: A fires, B does not fire 
w1:  A does not fire, B does not fire 
w2: A fires, B fires 
w3: A does not fire, B fires 
 
For each of these four worlds, it follows from the principle of Modal profile (see 
Chapter 4 section 2.1) which of the three events A, ¬B, and C occur (where A 
is essentially A’s firing at t1, ¬B is essentially B’s failure to fire at t1, and C is 
                                                
7 I here adopt the simplified treatment of the case that I outlined in Chapter 3 section 4, where 
I proceed as if the complete state of @ at time t1 can be specified simply by specifying the 
behaviour of A and B. Furthermore, we only need to consider what happens in the worlds 
under consideration at time t1 and t2. Thus, we may safely limit ourselves to considering only 
worlds that start out at time t1 – what happens earlier is irrelevant. I adopt this simplification in 
all the following cases. 
    A 
     C 
    B 
     t1          t2      Figure 1 
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essentially C’s firing at t2, in accordance with the conventions set out in 
Chapter 4 section 2.3). For convenience, I will in the following include a right-
hand column indicating the occurrence or non-occurrence of salient events, 
where events that do not occur are in grey ink: 
 
Complete state at time t1:         Events at t1:    t2: 
@: A fires, B does not fire    A,   ¬ B     C  
w1:   A does not fire, B does not fire             A,   ¬ B     C 
w2: A fires, B fires     A,   ¬ B     C 
w3:   A does not fire, B fires          A,   ¬ B     C 
 
The class of worlds W = {@, w1, w2, w3} characterises a possibility horizon 
according to my above definition, and so does every subset of W that includes 
@. Thus, {@}, {@, w1}, {@, w2}, etc., all characterise possibility horizons.  
 
2.  A non-causal characterisation of the default-deviant distinction 
How does context select a possibility horizon? My suggestion, which I develop 
in section 3, is that it does so on the basis of the default-deviant distinction. 
My aim in this section therefore is to give a non-causal characterisation of the 
distinction. I begin by presenting the distinction as it is standardly characterised 
(section 2.1). I then suggest an alternative way of capturing the distinction that 
does not rely on causal notions (section 2.2).   
 
2.1  The default-deviant distinction as standardly characterised 
It has often been noted that the distinction between default and deviant states 
– or some distinction along those lines – seems to play an important role in 
our thinking about causation.8 Hall characterises the default-deviant distinction 
as follows: 
                                                
8 See e.g. Hall (2007a) and (2007b); Hitchcock (2007); Halpern and Hitchcock (2015); and, for 
related proposals, Maudlin (2004) and Menzies (2004). For critical discussion, see Blanchard 
and Schaffer (forthcoming).  
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‘we very often find, in contemplating various parts of the world, that we have a 
reasonably clear and firm conception of what that part would be doing if 
nothing was happening to it. That is its default state; anything else counts as a 
deviation.’9 
 
Hitchcock gives a very similar characterisation: 
 
‘As the name suggests, the default value of a variable is the one that we would 
expect in the absence of any information about intervening causes. More 
specifically, there are certain states of a system that are self-sustaining, that will 
persist in the absence of any causes other than the presence of the state itself: 
the default assumption is that a system, once it is in such a state, will persist in 
such a state.’10 
 
In addition, Hitchcock characterises the default-deviant distinction through the 
following rules of thumb: 
 
‘Temporary actions or events tend to be regarded as deviant outcomes. In the 
case of human actions, we tend to think of those states requiring voluntary 
bodily motion as deviants and those compatible with lack of motion as defaults. 
In addition, we typically feel that deviant outcomes are in need of explanation, 
whereas default outcomes are not necessarily in need of explanation. 
Frequently, but not always, my deviant values correspond to positive events, 
and defaults correspond to absences or omissions.’11 
 
This, I believe, gives an initial feel for the default-deviant distinction. There 
are, however, two problems that need to be resolved before we can use the 
distinction to characterise how context selects a possibility horizon. 
                                                
9 Hall (2007b), p. 46. 
10 Hitchcock (2007), p. 506.  
11 Hitchcock (2007), p. 507. 
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 The first problem is relatively minor: Hall and Hitchcock characterise the 
default-deviant distinction as it applies, respectively, to states and values of 
variables within a causal modelling framework. To apply the distinction to 
possibility horizons, I need to extend it to actual instantaneous events. However, 
this is easily done as follows: an actual instantaneous event e is a default event 
just in case we would expect it to occur in the absence of any information 
about intervening causes. 
 The second problem is that the standard characterisations of the default-
deviant distinction rely on explicitly causal notions.12 On Hall’s definition, the 
default state is characterised as what the relevant part of the world ‘would be 
doing if nothing was happening to it’.13 On Hitchcock’s definition, the default value 
of a variable is ‘the one that we would expect in the absence of any 
information about intervening causes’.14  
Strictly speaking, my account of how context selects a possibility horizon 
is not part of my account of what causation is out in the world: my suggestion 
is that causation out in the world is a ternary relation between two 
instantaneous events and a possibility horizon. Relying on a causal 
characterisation of how context selects a possibility horizon is therefore 
compatible with may aim of giving an ontological reduction of the ternary 
relation of causation.15  
As we shall see, however, a non-causal characterisation of the default-
deviant distinction – and, by extension, of the way in which context selects a 
possibility horizon – is in fact available. This characterisation of the default-
deviant distinction is revealing in itself. And furthermore, it allows me to give 
                                                
12 See e.g. Hall (2007b), p. 47; Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 51-53 and 200-211. 
13 Hall (2007b), p. 46. My italics. 
14 Hitchcock (2007), p. 506. My italics. 
15 It is, for example, a perfectly acceptable suggestion that when someone makes a binary 
causal claim of the form ‘c causes e’, a principle of charity is at work, and context therefore – if 
possible – selects a possibility horizon H  such that the completed causal claim ‘c causes e 
within H   ’ comes out true. I am grateful to Derek Ball for making me aware of this point. 
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an account of how context selects a possibility horizon that avoids any 
suspicion that we might be smuggling in causal notions where they do not 
belong. 
 
2.2  Extrapolation and the default-deviant distinction 
My suggestion is that the key to giving a non-causal characterisation of the 
default-deviant distinction is to be found in the notion of extrapolation.16  
We may think of extrapolation as a kind of induction: when we 
extrapolate, we recognise a pattern and extend this pattern to cover as yet 
unobserved times, places, etc. Importantly, extrapolation, understood in this 
way, is a non-causal notion: it is simply concerned with the recognition and 
extension of patterns. To reinforce this point, note that extrapolation in this 
sense can be applied in cases where there simply is no underlying causal 
structure: for example, we may use extrapolation to extend a mathematical 
graph, understood as a purely abstract, non-causal pattern.  
 Even so, one might well object that bringing in the notion of 
extrapolation – with its close connection to induction – takes us from the 
frying pan into the fire: it is well known that induction is connected with deep 
and intractable problems. In particular, it is connected with Hume’s problem 
of induction, which amounts to the question of how we can give a non-circular 
justification of our practices of induction.17 And in addition, it is connected 
with Goodman’s so-called new problem of induction, which amounts to the 
question of why certain adjectives – such as ‘green’ – form a suitable basis for 
induction, while others – such as ‘grue’ – do not (an object is ‘grue’ just in case 
it is examined before a certain time t and is green, or it is not examined before 
time t and is blue).18  
However, my proposal for understanding the default-deviant distinction 
                                                
16 I here use ’extrapolation’ in a broad sense, where interpolation is taken to be a subspecies of 
extrapolation.  
17 Hume (2007), pp. 61- 65. (Book I Part III section VI). 
18 Goodman (1954), especially pp. 73-75.  
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in terms of extrapolation does not require us to resolve these problems. 
Instead, all we need is the descriptive fact that we do have well-established 
practices of induction and, in particular, extrapolation. This descriptive fact 
should be relatively uncontroversial: for example, there is little doubt that, as a 
matter of descriptive fact, we recognise ‘green’ as a suitable basis for induction, 
and reject ‘grue’. 
 Relying on such purely descriptive facts about our practices of induction 
and, in particular, extrapolation, we may now think of extrapolation as 
something that yields predictions about which events will occur in a particular 
region from a particular time t onwards. On this basis, we may think of the 
distinctive feature of a default event as being that all our extrapolations are 
compatible with the occurrence of this event. By contrast, the distinctive 
feature of a deviant event is that some of our extrapolations yield predictions 
that are incompatible with its occurrence.  
Suppose, for example, that up until just before time t, Suzy is standing 
and chatting with Billy (without throwing any rocks). In the absence of any 
information about what happens next, extrapolation yields the prediction that 
Suzy keeps standing there, chatting with Billy (without throwing any rocks). If 
Suzy is in fact standing there, chatting with Billy at time t, this is a default 
event. If, by contrast, Suzy does something that is incompatible with the result 
of our extrapolation – say, throws a rock at the window – then this is a deviant 
event. 
 To make this suggestion more precise, we first need to capture what it 
means to say that one event is incompatible with another. To achieve the 
required generality, we need to define this not just for instantaneous events, 
but also for temporally extended events built up from sequences of 
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Incompatibility: the instantaneous or temporally extended events e and e* are 
incompatible iff w(e) ∩ w(e*) = ∅. 
  
In other words, two events e and e* are incompatible just in case there is no 
possible world where both e and e* occur.  
To begin with a simple example, let Suzy-talks be the event that 
essentially occurs within the closed interval [t, t+dt], and that is essentially 
Suzy’s standing and chatting with Billy (without throwing any rocks). And let 
Suzy-throws be the event that essentially occurs within the closed interval [t, 
t+dt], and that is essentially Suzy’s throwing a rock at the window. Then we 
find that Suzy-talks is incompatible with Suzy-throws.  
 Or, to take a more complex example, let Suzy-keeps-talking be the 
temporally extended event built up from a sequence of Suzy-talking-with-Billy 
events spanning the interval from t to t + 60 seconds, and let Suzy-throws be the 
event that essentially occurs within the closed interval [t, t + 60 seconds], and 
that is essentially Suzy’s throwing a rock at the window. In this case, we now 
find that Suzy-keeps-talking is incompatible with Suzy-throws.  
Based on this understanding of incompatibility, we may now give the 
following definition of what it takes for an actual instantaneous event to be a 
deviant event: 
 
Deviant event: an actual instantaneous event e is a deviant event iff there is an 
instantaneous or temporally extended event e*, such that e and e* are 
incompatible, and some suitable extrapolation yields the result that e* occurs. 
 
An actual instantaneous event e is then a default event just in case it is not a 
deviant event.  
To make the definition more informative, we need to say more about 
what counts as a suitable extrapolation. As I said above, extrapolation consists 
in identifying a pattern that we then extend. To capture in more detail what it 
takes for an extrapolation to be suitable, it will be useful to have a name for the 
Part II: Foundations 
 118 
pattern on which a given extrapolation is based – in the following, I will call it 
the extrapolation basis. Once we are presented with a suitable extrapolation basis, 
we usually – as a descriptive fact – find that there is a single appropriate way 
(or a narrow range of appropriate ways) to extend this pattern forwards, given 
the practices of induction that we in fact have. The key question, therefore, is: 
what does it take for something to be a suitable extrapolation basis? 
My suggestion is that this is determined partly by considerations 
concerning what it takes to be an extrapolation basis at all, and partly by the 
context of a particular causal inquiry:  
Regarding what it takes to be an extrapolation basis at all, the following 
criterion needs to be satisfied: an extrapolation basis must contain a pattern 
that can reasonably be extended to the case at hand. In practice, this narrows 
down the range of possible extrapolation bases to just a few options: what is 
happening immediately prior to t, what is happening in the immediate 
surroundings at t, habitual behaviour at earlier times, typical behaviour for 
entities of a particular kind, and perhaps one or two more. In addition, we may 
in some cases take normative considerations – about what persons or entities 
should do in this situation,19 or about what the law requires – as our 
extrapolation basis. But there really is not much else that can satisfy the 
criterion of furnishing a pattern that can reasonably be extended to the case at 
hand.  
 The context of the causal inquiry then comes into play in choosing 
between extrapolation bases that satisfy this basic requirement. Unfortunately, 
I cannot give a full answer to the question of how context determines which of 
these extrapolation bases count as ‘suitable’. Instead, I will limit myself to the 
following observations:  
                                                
19 I include entities here since normative considerations sometimes apply to entities as well. 
For example, it is part of the proper functioning of a fire alarm that it goes off in the event of 
fire – and in some contexts, we may take this normative consideration as our extrapolation 
basis. 
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 First, our purpose in some contexts is the attribution of praise and 
blame, or of legal responsibility. In such contexts, we tend to take normative 
considerations as our extrapolation basis – and to reject extrapolation bases 
that do not incorporate such normative considerations. For example, Schaffer 
notes the legal importance of contrasting what in fact happened with what 
would have happened if the defendant had acted lawfully’20: we here take 
normative considerations as our extrapolation basis and use them to generate 
alternatives to what in fact happened. However, when our causal inquiry is 
naturalistic – i.e., when we are not concerned with praise, blame, etc., but rather 
with the scientific study of what caused what – we tend to reject extrapolation 
bases that incorporate normative considerations, and focus instead on 
extrapolation bases such as what was happening just before t, what is 
happening in the immediate surroundings at t, etc. In the following, I will 
mostly focus on such naturalistic causal inquiries.  
 Second, considering naturalistic causal inquiries, we may in some 
contexts accept only the most salient extrapolation bases. Typically, this means 
that the only extrapolation basis we accept is what was happening just before t. 
In other contexts, however, we may allow less salient extrapolation bases to 
count as suitable, alongside the extrapolation basis consisting in what was 
happening just before t.  
In the following, I will now consider examples of how my 
characterisation of the default-deviant distinction applies in real-life cases. We 
have already seen a case where an event is straightforwardly categorised as a 
deviant event – namely, the case of Suzy’s throwing a rock at the window. 
Next, let us consider a case that illustrates how an event may be 
straightforwardly categorised as a default event: 
 
                                                
20 Schaffer (2010), p. 260. See also Hart and Honoré (1985); Hitchcock and Knobe (2009). 
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The prairie: at time t, a particular little patch of land is covered in prairie grasses. 
All around it, the prairie stretches for miles and miles, and all this land has been 
covered in prairie grasses for hundreds of years. 
 
Let Prairie-grasses be the event that essentially occurs within the interval [t, t+dt], 
and that is essentially this particular little patch of land being covered in prairie 
grasses. By the above definition, we now find that Prairie-grasses is a default 
event: whether we extrapolate from what is happening just before t, or from 
the surroundings, or from any other reasonable extrapolation basis, our 
extrapolation yields a sequence of events from time t onwards, each of which is 
essentially this little patch of land being covered in prairie grasses. In this case, 
then, extrapolation does not yield any alternative to Prairie-grasses – and thus we 
find, as we should, that Prairie-grasses is a default event. 
Finally, whether or not a given event is categorised as default or deviant 
may in some cases depend on how liberal we are regarding what counts as a 
suitable extrapolation basis. This is illustrated by the following case:  
 
Train tracks: at time t, there are train tracks connecting one little town with 
another. The tracks run through an arid landscape, and have been there for the 
past several years.   
 
If we are very strict about what we accept as a suitable extrapolation basis, we 
may count what is happening just before t as the only suitable extrapolation 
basis. In that case, extrapolation yields no alternative to the presence of the 
tracks: when we extrapolate from what is happening just before t, the result of 
our extrapolation is that the train tracks are exactly where they in fact are. In 
this case, then, the event that essentially occurs within the interval [t, t+dt], and 
that is essentially the presence of the tracks, is categorised as a default event. 
 If, on the other hand, we are willing to consider a wider range of 
extrapolation bases, we do find an alternative to the presence of the tracks: 
when we extrapolate from what is happening in the immediate surroundings at 
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t, the result of our extrapolation is that there is nothing but air and dirt where 
the tracks in fact are.21 In this case, then, the presence of the tracks is 
categorised as a deviant event.  
 Finally, it is worth noting how the default-deviant distinction applies in 
the case of neuron diagrams. When a neuron diagram is used to represent the 
causal structure of a particular real-life situation, we should of course defer to 
the real-life situation when determining whether a given neuron firing (or non-
firing) event should be categorised as default or deviant: if it represents a 
default event, it should be categorised as default; if it represents a deviant 
event, it should be categorised as deviant.  
In some cases, however, we consider neuron diagrams just as they are – 
as representations of a physical system of neurons that send stimulatory and 
inhibitory signals to each other. In such cases, we find that neuron firing 
events are always categorised as deviant events: neuron firings are 
instantaneous; when we extrapolate from what was happening earlier, we 
therefore always find the alternative that the neuron in question could have 
remained in dormant.  
By contrast, we may categorise non-firing events either as default or 
deviant: if we only accept what was happening just before the relevant time t as 
a suitable extrapolation basis, we find no alternative to the neuron in question 
remaining dormant. However, if we accept other extrapolation bases – for 
example, the behaviour of other neurons – we may categorise a neuron’s 
failure to fire as a deviant event.  
This fits with the standard treatment of neuron firing events, where 
neuron firings are always categorised as deviant, while failures to fire are 
typically, but not always, categorised as default.22  
 
                                                
21 This fits nicely with the following quotation from Hall, where he asks the reader to ’subtract’ 
the train tracks away, and adds: ’you need not go as far as to replace them by pure void; air and 
dirt will do’ (Hall (2004a), p. 188).  
22 Cf. Hall (2007b), p. 46. 
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3.  How context selects a possibility horizon 
With the above non-causal characterisation of the default-deviant distinction, 
we are now ready to answer the question: how does the context of a causal 
inquiry select a possibility horizon?  
In brief, my answer is that it does so on the basis of the default-deviant 
distinction. In this way, the context-sensitivity of causal claims ultimately 
derives from the fact that it is dependent on context which extrapolation bases 
count as appropriate: the selection of appropriate extrapolation bases underlies 
the categorisation of events as default or deviant; this categorisation in turn 
underlies the selection of a possibility horizon; and finally, the selected 
possibility horizon matters for the truth-value of our causal claims. In the 
remainder of this section, we shall now see in more detail how a possibility 
horizon is selected on the basis of the default-deviant distinction. 
Let us begin by considering a simple causal claim of the form ‘c causes e’, 
where c and e are instantaneous events. Let t be the time at which c occurs. My 
suggestion is that the default-deviant distinction applied to the instantaneous 
events occurring at time t determines the relevant possibility horizon: the 
context of a causal inquiry determines which of the events occurring at t are 
default events, and which of the events occurring at t are deviant events. This 
in turn places restrictions on which nomologically possible worlds may be 
included in the relevant possibility horizon H : 
 If an actual instantaneous event a, which occurs at t, is categorised as 
default, this imposes the following restriction: a world w may be included in H  
only if a occurs in w. To illustrate, consider for example our standard case of 



















The class of worlds below includes all nomologically possible worlds based on 
this case: 
 
Complete state at time t1:         Events at t1:    t2: 
@: A fires, B does not fire    A,   ¬ B     C  
w1:   A does not fire, B does not fire             A,   ¬ B     C 
w2: A fires, B fires     A,   ¬ B     C 
w3:   A does not fire, B fires          A,   ¬ B     C 
 
Suppose that the causal claim under consideration is ‘A is a cause of C’. Thus, 
t1 is selected as the relevant time. And suppose further that the context of our 
causal inquiry categorises ¬B as a default event. In that case, the following 
restriction applies to our possibility horizon: a world w may be included in H  
only if ¬B occurs in w. It is easy to see that there are only two worlds that 
satisfy this restriction, namely:  
 
Complete state at time t1:         Events at t1:    t2: 
@: A fires, B does not fire    A,   ¬ B     C  
w1:   A does not fire, B does not fire             A,   ¬ B     C 
 
If an actual instantaneous event a is categorised as a deviant event, the 
appropriate restriction is slightly more sophisticated. When an actual 
instantaneous event a is categorised as deviant, this is so because extrapolation 
    A 
     C 
    B 
     t1          t2      Figure 1 
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yields at least one instantaneous or temporally extended event a*, such that a 
and a* are incompatible. Intuitively, these instantaneous or temporally 
extended events represent alternatives to a. Let S = {a, a*, a**, …} be the set of 
events containing a together with the instantaneous or temporally extended 
events that extrapolation yields as alternatives to a. Then I suggest that the 
following restriction is appropriate: a world w may be included in H  only if at 
least one event from S = {a, a*, a**, …} occurs in w. 




       
 
In addition to being in a state where it fires, neuron A also has the possibility 
of being in two states in which it does not send any outgoing signals: it may be 




       
 




       
 
 
Considering only maximally temporally fragile events, let A be the event that is 
essentially A’s firing, let A-dormant be the event that is essentially A’s being 
dormant, and let A-waves be the event is essentially A’s firing in waves.  
With no restrictions, we have the following class of nomologically 
possible worlds characterised by their complete state at time t1: 
     A    B 
  t1                t2        Figure 2 
     A    B 
  t1                t2        Figure 2* 
     A    B 
  t1                t2        Figure 2** 
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Complete state at time t1:  Events at t1:    t2: 
@: A fires    A,  A-dormant, A-waves B 
w1: A is dormant   A,  A-dormant, A-waves B 
w2: A fires in waves   A,  A-dormant, A-waves B 
 
Suppose that the causal claim under consideration is ‘A is a cause of B’. Thus, 
the selected time is t1. And suppose further that extrapolation yields the result 
that A is simply dormant at time t1. In that case, A is categorised as a deviant 
event with A-dormant as its alternative. Thus, the appropriate restriction is that 
a world w may be included in H  only if at least one of the events in S = {A, 
A-dormant} occurs in w. This winnows down the relevant class of worlds to: 
 
Complete state at time t1:  Events at t1:    t2: 
@: A fires    A,  A-dormant, A-waves B 
w1: A is dormant   A,  A-dormant, A-waves B 
 
In the case of binary causal claims of the form ‘c causes e’, my suggestion is that 
the possibility horizon selected by context is simply the largest class of 
nomologically possible worlds that satisfies all of these restrictions.  
The surface form of our causal claims is usually binary. In some cases, 
however, we make contrastive causal claims – adding a contrast to the cause, to 
the effect, or both. Such contrastive causal claims take the form ‘c rather than 
c* causes e’, ‘c causes e rather than e*’, or ‘c rather than c* causes e rather than 
e*’. How does context select the relevant possibility horizon in the case of such 
contrastive claims? 
My suggestion is that the selection in this case proceeds in two steps. 
First, context imposes restrictions based on c’s time of occurrence, precisely as 
set out above. Next, the specified contrasts impose further requirements on the 
relevant possibility horizon: the contrastive causal claim ‘c rather than c* is a 
cause of e’ imposes the requirements that our possibility horizon must contain 
at least one world in which c occurs, at least one world in which c* occurs, and 
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no world in which neither c nor c* occurs. Similarly, the contrastive causal 
claim ‘c causes e rather than e*’ imposes the requirements that our possibility 
horizon must contain at least one world in which e occurs, at least one world in 
which e* occurs, and no world in which neither e nor e* occurs. And a 
quaternary contrastive claim, ‘c rather than c* is a cause of e rather than e*’ 
obviously imposes both of these sets of requirements at once. 
In some cases, there may be a conflict between the restrictions imposed 
by context and the requirements imposed by a particular specification of 
contrasts. Consider, for example, the contrastive causal claim ‘the queen’s 
reigning on her throne rather than watering Suzy’s flowers caused them to die’. 
And suppose that context treats the queen’s failure to water Suzy’s flowers as a 
default event. This imposes the restriction that a world w may belong to H  
only if the queen does not water Suzy’s flowers in w. In that case, one of the 
requirements imposed by the contrastive claim – namely, that our possibility 
horizon must contain at least one world in which the queen waters Suzy’s 
flowers – conflicts with the contextually imposed restrictions. When this 
happens, the contrastive causal claim misfires: the selected contrast is 
irrelevant. As Schaffer writes: 
 
‘We resist taking such an unrealistic supposition as a contrast. The queen’s 
watering my flowers is not easily swallowed as a relevant alternative. At c* sits an 
irrelevance.’23  
 
I return to the issue of contrastive causal claims in Chapter 10 section 3.  
In the following, we shall now see how a possibility horizon selected in 
this way perfectly models the intuitive distinction between candidate causes 
and background conditions. 
 
 
                                                
23 Schaffer (2005), p. 302. 
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4.  Candidate causes and background conditions 
In our ordinary thinking about causation, we tend to distinguish between 
genuine causes and mere background conditions. As Hart and Honoré note: 
 
‘In most cases where a fire has broken out the lawyer, the historian, and the 
plain man would refuse to say that the cause of the fire was the presence of 
oxygen, though no fire would have occurred without it: they would reserve the 
title of cause for something of the order of a short-circuit, the dropping of a 
lighted cigarette, or lightning.’24 
 
This distinction between causes and background conditions is clearly context-
dependent, as Hart and Honoré go on to note: 
 
‘Yet there are contexts where it would be natural to say that the presence of the 
oxygen was the cause of the fire. We have only to consider a factory where 
delicate manufacturing processes are carried on, requiring the exclusion of 
oxygen, to make it perfectly sensible to identify as the cause of a fire the 
presence of oxygen introduced by someone’s mistake.’25  
 
Perhaps because of this context-dependence, the distinction between causes 
and background conditions has often been dismissed. For example, Mill wrote:  
 
‘Nothing can better show the absence of any scientific ground for the 
distinction between the cause of a phenomenon and its conditions, than the 
capricious manner in which we select from among the conditions that which 
we choose to denominate the cause.’26 
 
And we find the same sentiment in the quotation from Lewis cited at the 
beginning of this chapter. As Hart and Honoré point out, however, we miss 
                                                
24 Hart and Honoré (1985), p. 11.  
25 Hart and Honoré (1985), p. 11. 
26 Mill (1973), p. 329. (Book III Chapter V section III). 
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something important if we dismiss the distinction between causes and 
background conditions. As they note: 
 
‘it is plain that our choice, though responsive to the varying context of the 
particular occasions, is not arbitrary or haphazard.’27 
 
In support of this, Schaffer notes that our way of drawing the distinction 
between causes and background conditions is remarkably predictable. As he 
writes, this is ‘the sort of stable intuition that philosophers normally treat as 
data rather than rubbish.’28 Based on this, I believe that it would be an 
important advantage of the notion of a possibility horizon if it could illuminate 
the distinction between causes and background conditions. It can do just that: 
 As we have seen above, my recipe for how context selects the relevant 
possibility horizon ensures that whenever an event is categorised as a default 
event, its occurrence is held fixed throughout the relevant possibility horizon. 













If ¬B is categorised as a default event, we have already seen in section 3 that 
we get the following class of worlds characterised by their complete state at 
time t1: 
 
                                                
27 Hart and Honoré (1985), p. 11.  
28 Schaffer (2005), p. 313. See also Menzies (2004), pp. 142-45. 
    A 
     C 
    B 
     t1          t2      Figure 1 
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Complete state at time t1:         Events at t1:    t2: 
@: A fires, B does not fire    A,   ¬B     C  
w1:   A does not fire, B does not fire             A,   ¬B       C 
 
The occurrence of ¬B is thus held fixed throughout our possibility horizon. In 
this way, we are essentially treating default events as background conditions.  
On the other hand, deviant events – that are contrasted with their 
corresponding alternatives – are treated as candidate causes (of course, they 
then have to satisfy the conditions for causation in order to count as genuine 
causes). For example, A is treated as a candidate cause: it occurs in some 
worlds within our possibility horizon (namely in @), but fails to occur in 
others (namely in w1).  
The suggestion that a possibility horizon models the distinction between 
candidate causes and background conditions by holding the occurrence of 
default events fixed corresponds closely to Schaffer’s characterisation of the 
distinction, where he suggests that: 
 
‘the setting of the background may be confirmed by what lacks relevant 
alternatives. The background is what is held fixed.’29 
To illustrate the proposal, I will now show how this way of modelling the 
distinction correctly separates candidate causes from background conditions in 
the two kinds of cases discussed by Hart and Honoré. 
 As an example of a case where we would ‘refuse to say that the cause of 
the fire was the presence of oxygen’,30 suppose that there is a lightning strike in 
a forest at time t1, and a forest fire at time t2. To simplify, let us consider just 
two maximally temporally fragile events occurring at time t1 – namely, O and L, 
where it is essential to the occurrence of O that oxygen is present, and essential 
to the occurrence of L that there is a lightning strike. On any reasonable 
                                                
29 Schaffer (2005), p. 319. 
30 Hart and Honoré (1985), p. 11. 
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extrapolation, we do not find an alternative to O – whether we extrapolate 
from what was happening just before t1, or from the immediate surroundings 
at t1, we find that oxygen is present at t1 just as it actually is.
31 Thus, O should 
be categorised as a default event. By contrast, we straightforwardly find an 
alternative to L – namely, the absence of abnormal electrical currents in the 
area in question. Thus, L should be categorised as a deviant event.  
Based on this, we find that the relevant possibility horizon includes just 
the following two worlds, characterised by their complete state at time t1:  
 
Complete state at time t1:    Events at t1:       t2: 
@:  presence of oxygen, lightning strike  O,   L       Forest fire 
w1: presence of oxygen, no lightning strike  O,   L        Forest fire 
  
Within this possibility horizon, the presence of oxygen is thus treated as a 
background condition, whereas the lightning strike is treated as a candidate 
cause – yielding the intuitively correct way of drawing the distinction.  
 Next, consider Hart and Honoré’s second case: a factory where delicate 
manufacturing processes are carried out that require the exclusion of oxygen, 
and where oxygen is introduced at time t1 by someone’s mistake. To simplify, 
we may once again consider just two maximally temporally fragile events 
occurring at time t1 – namely, O and S, where it is essential to the occurrence 
of O that oxygen is present, and where it is essential to the occurrence of S that 
a spark is present. Extrapolation straightforwardly yields an alternative to the 
occurrence of O: extrapolating from what was the case just before t1 (or from 
the typical conditions of the relevant area, or from normative considerations 
concerning the function of the manufacturing area), we find that there is no 
oxygen in the relevant area at time t1 (or, more realistically, that the 
                                                
31 In very special contexts, however, we might extrapolate from the conditions in outer space, 
yielding an alternative to the presence of oxygen – namely, that earth’s atmosphere is absent. 
This explains how the claim that ’the presence of oxygen caused the forest fire’ could be 
appropriate in a conversation among visitors from Venus (the example comes from Schaffer 
(2012), p. 37). 
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concentration of oxygen is below some very low threshold). Thus, O is 
categorised as a deviant event, with the alternative being that there is an 
appropriately low concentration of oxygen. 
Regarding the presence of the spark, we may – depending on so far 
unspecified details of the case – either find that every reasonable extrapolation 
yields the result that there is a spark, or that some extrapolation yields an 
alternative. Assume that some reasonable extrapolation yields an alternative – 
for example, that all elements involved in the manufacturing process are below 
some threshold temperature at t1. Thus, S is also treated as a deviant event, 
with all elements being below the threshold temperature as its alternative.  
We thus find that our possibility horizon includes the following four 
worlds, characterised by their complete state at time t1: 
 
Complete state at time t1:     Events at t1:     t2: 
@:  oxygen present, spark     O,   S      Fire 
w1: oxygen present, below threshold temperature  O,   S      Fire 
w2: no oxygen, spark      O,   S      Fire 
w3: no oxygen, below threshold temperature  O,   S      Fire 
 
In this case, then, we find – as we should – that the presence of oxygen is not 
treated as a mere background condition. Instead, both the spark and the 
presence of oxygen are treated as candidate causes. 
 In this way, the notion of a possibility horizon successfully models the 
intuitive distinction between causes and background conditions. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have introduced the notion of a possibility horizon and 
shown how the context of a causal inquiry selects a possibility horizon. To 
capture this, I have first given a non-causal characterisation of the default-
deviant distinction. I have then shown how context selects a possibility 
horizon based on this distinction. And finally I have shown how such a 
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contextually selected possibility horizon captures the intuitive distinction 
between candidate causes and background conditions. 
 With this understanding of the causal relata, we are now ready to define 
the two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for causation – namely, 
process-connection and security-dependence. It is important to note that the 
relation of process-connection is a binary relation: c is process-connected to e. 
This relation only involves the primary causal relata c and e. Thus, our choice 
of possibility horizon has no bearing on whether an event c is process-
connected to a later event e. Since process-connection is a necessary condition 
for causation, this means that there are certain causal claims that are true 
independently of context: if c is not process-connected to e, then the claim that 
‘c does not cause e’ is true entirely independently of our contextually 
determined choice of possibility horizon.  
Among the events that do satisfy the condition of process-connection, 
however, our choice of possibility horizon does matter: to count as causes, 
these events have to satisfy the further necessary condition of security-
dependence. Security-dependence is a ternary relation: e security-depends on c 
within possibility horizon H.  Thus, an event c may satisfy the necessary 
condition of security-dependence within one possibility horizon H 1, but fail to 
satisfy it within a different possibility horizon H 2. And since security-
dependence is a necessary condition for causation, this accounts for the 
context-dependence of our causal claims, since different contexts may select 
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A cause must be connected to its effect via the right kind of process. Consider, 
for example, a standard case of late preemption: 
 
Late preemption: Suzy and Billy both throw rocks at a window. Suzy’s rock hits 
the window a moment before Billy’s and the window shatters. 
 
Intuitively, Suzy’s throw is a cause of the shattering, while Billy’s is not: Suzy’s 
throw is a preempting cause; Billy’s throw is a preempted backup. What 
distinguishes Suzy’s throw from Billy’s in relation to the window-shattering? 
My suggestion is that the crucial difference between them is this: Suzy’s throw 
is – via the flight of her rock and its impact on the window-pane – connected 
to the window-shattering by the right kind of process. By contrast, Billy’s 
throw is not connected to the window-shattering by the right kind of process – 
indeed, his rock has not even reached the window when it begins to shatter.  
 To develop this suggestion we need to spell out, in a suitably reductive 
way, what it takes for one event to be connected to another by the right kind of 
process. Doing so will be the focus of this chapter, leading up to a definition of 
the relation of process-connection, where an event c is process-connected to a later 
event e just in case there is a genuine process from c to e. My suggestion is that this 
relation captures a necessary condition for causation: an event c is a cause of a 
later event e only if c is process-connected to e. 
In the following, I build up towards a reductive definition of process-
connection. I begin by outlining the form that the characterisation of a process 
must take (section 1). Based on this, our question becomes: what does it take 
Part III: Process-connection 
 136 
for a characterisation of this form to characterise a genuine process? To 
answer this question, I first define the relations of sufficiency and minimal 
sufficiency (section 2). I then build on these definitions to define the relation 
of time-sensitive sufficiency, which allows us to handle simple cases of late 
preemption (section 3). And finally, I define the notions of an apparent 
process and a genuine process, and set out the resulting condition of process-
connection (section 4).  
It is important to note that this whole discussion is conducted at the 
level of representations: rather than asking what conditions something must 
satisfy in order to be a genuine process, I ask instead what conditions a 
characterisation must satisfy in order to characterise a genuine process. In section 5, 
I discuss the advantages of ascending to the level of representations in this 
way.  
In the following, I focus, for the sake of simplicity, on defining what it 
takes for something to characterise an actual genuine process. Since any world 
w may play the role of the actual world, this in fact provides a fully general 
definition of what it takes to characterise a genuine process occurring in an 
arbitrary world w.1 However, focusing on the actual world gives a simpler 
statement of the definition. Note that I will in the following be talking 
exclusively about actual instantaneous events. For the sake of simplicity, I use 
‘event’ as shorthand for ‘actual instantaneous event’. 
 
1.  Characterising a process 
How may we characterise a process? My suggestion is that we may do so 
simply by specifying a series of events. To illustrate this, consider our standard 




                                                
1 Cf. Lewis (1986d), p. 163. 









        
 
 
It is here intuitively clear that there is a process from A to E. We may 






There is a clear sense in which such a characterisation is based on a particular 
time-series T given by the set of times {t1, t2, t3}, since these are the times at 
which the events in the characterisation occur. The times t1, t2, and t3 satisfy the 
ordering t1 < t2 < t3, and I shall use the convention of simply writing such a 
time series on the form: 
 
T:  t1 < t2 < t3    
 
In the following, I usually make the time associated with each event explicit, as 
illustrated below:  
 
 t1: A 
 t2: C 
 t3: E 
 
Strictly speaking, however, this is redundant, since the relevant time can simply 
be read off from the quintuple characterising each event. For example, our 
     A    C 
     E 
     B    D 
  t1        t2     t3      Figure 1 
Part III: Process-connection 
 138 
event A is based on the quintuple (@, t1, s1, IA, CA), according to our 
conventions for neuron events (see Chapter 4 section 2.3). From this, it is 
immediately clear that A occurs at time t1. For this reason, the characterisation 
proper of a process should be thought of simply as a series of events. When I 
add a left-hand column with the relevant times, this is simply for convenience.  
Obviously, not every series of events characterises a genuine process. 
For example, the series,  
 
 t1: B 
 t2: C 
 t3: E 
 
does not represent stages in anything we would intuitively recognise as a 
genuine process. Our task in the following is to answer the question: what does 
it take for a series of events to characterise a genuine process?  
 Looking at the above example, we get a hint as to how we should answer 
this question: the reason why we judge that there is no genuine process 
characterised by the series B, C, E, is that B does not stand in the right relation 
to C. Our first task therefore is to capture the relation that has to hold, in a 
genuine process, from one event to the next. To capture this relation, I will 
take what might look like a detour and look at the relation that has to hold 
between a set S1 of contemporaneous events and a later event e2. Once we 
capture this relation, I will then propose that an event e1 stands in the right 
relation to a later event e2 just in case there is a set S1 of contemporaneous 
events, such that e1 belongs to S1 and S1 stands in the right relation to e2. In the 
following two sections, I therefore focus on the relation that has to hold 
between a set S1 of contemporaneous events and a later event e2. 
 
2.  Sufficiency and minimal sufficiency 
As a first step towards capturing the relation that has to hold between a set S1 
of contemporaneous events and a later event e2, I define what it takes for a set 
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S1 of contemporaneous events to be sufficient for an event e2. This relation 
makes the following two requirements:  
The first requirement concerns the temporal order of occurrence of the 
events in S1 and the event e2. Since S1 is a set of contemporaneous events, all the 
events in S1 occur at the same time.
2 Letting t1 be the time at which all the 
events in S1 occur, we may – with a slight abuse of language – say that ‘S1 
occurs at time t1’. Based on this, the first requirement is that it must be the case 
that S1 occurs strictly earlier than the event e2.
3  
The second requirement is that the occurrence of all the events in S1 
must in some sense guarantee the occurrence of e2. More precisely, it must be 
nomologically necessary that if all the events in S1 occur, then e2 also occurs.  
Drawing these requirements together yields the following definition of 
sufficiency:   
 
Sufficiency: a set S1 of contemporaneous events is sufficient  
for an event e2 iff 
a) S1 occurs strictly earlier than e2, and 
b) for every nomologically possible world w, it is the case that  
if every event in S1 occurs in w, then e2 occurs in w. 
 
The above definition of sufficiency is a good starting point for characterising 
the relation that has to hold between a set S1 of contemporaneous events and a 
subsequent event e2. However, sufficiency does not give us exactly what we 
need, since the above definition of sufficiency may be satisfied even when the 
set S1 includes entirely irrelevant events.  
To see this, suppose that the set S1 of contemporaneous events is 
sufficient for a subsequent event e2. And suppose further that the set S1
+ 
                                                
2 Whenever I talk about simultaneity, this is relative to a frame of reference. For the sake of 
simplicity, I leave relativisation to a frame of reference implicit in what follows.  
3 As mentioned in Chapter 1, my account is only intended to apply to cases where the 
candidate cause c occurs strictly earlier than the effect e (within an appropriately chosen frame 
of reference). In such cases, this requirement is unproblematic. 
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includes all the events in S1, plus one or more events that occur at the same 
time as the events in S1, but which are entirely irrelevant to the occurrence of 
e2. In that case, it follows from the above definition that S1
+ is also sufficient 
for e2. By hypothesis, however, S1
+ contains one or more events that are 
entirely irrelevant to the occurrence of e2. We do not want to say that these 
entirely irrelevant events stand in the right relation to e2. For this reason, we 
need to introduce the more demanding relation of minimal sufficiency. 
Minimal sufficiency is standardly defined in terms of subset relations. 
For example, Paul and Hall take a set S of contemporaneous events to be 
minimally sufficient for a later event e just in case S is sufficient for e and no 
proper subset of S is sufficient for e.4 Given my conception of the causal relata, 
however, merely looking at subset relations is not enough to capture what we 
need: suppose, for example, that c+ is a strictly more fragile version of c. In that 
case, the set {c} is obviously not a proper subset of the set {c+}. However, we 
may nevertheless want to say that although both {c} and {c+} are sufficient for 
a later event e, only {c} is minimally sufficient, whereas {c+} includes irrelevant 
details. To capture what is needed, I therefore give a slightly more complex 
definition of minimal sufficiency. 
The first step is to ensure that our sets of contemporaneous events 
contain no redundancies. So far, we have done nothing to rule out sets of 
contemporaneous events that repeat the same event multiple times, or that 
contain several more and less fragile versions of the same event. To exclude 
sets of this kind, we may introduce the same notation for sets that we have 
already introduced for events:   
 
For any set S of events, w(S) is the set of possible worlds in which  
all the events in S occur.5 
                                                
4 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 16. 
5 Note that this definition requires us to quantify over absolutely all metaphysically possible 
worlds, with no restrictions on our domain of quantification. It does not merely require us to 
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Based on this, we may now capture what it takes for a set of contemporaneous 
events to be clean in the required sense:  
 
Clean set: a set S of events is clean iff  
there is no set S* such that 
a) S* is a proper subset of S, and 
b) w(S*) = w(S).  
 
This excludes redundancies of the kind mentioned above: a set of 
contemporaneous events that repeats the same event multiple times or 
contains more and less fragile versions of the same event cannot satisfy the 
above definition. In the following, I will be concerned exclusively with clean 
sets. Whenever I talk of a ‘set’, this should therefore be understood to mean a 
‘clean set’ according to the above definition. 
The second step in capturing the notion of minimal sufficiency is to 
ensure that every event in our set is indeed relevant to the effect we are 
interested in. To do this, we need to capture the idea that one set of events can 
be a more or less fragile version of another. In Chapter 4 section 2.2, we have 
already seen how one event can be a more fragile version of another. For ease of 
reference, I repeat the definition here:  
 
More fragile version – definition 1: an event e+ = (@, t+, s+, I+, C+)  
is a more fragile version of an event e = (@, t, s, I, C) iff 
a) e+ and e have the same realization in @, and 
b) w(e+) ⊆ w(e). 
 
We may now extend this to also cover sets of contemporaneous events: it 
follows from my account of the causal relata that any two events that occur at 
the same time have the same realization. This means that all the events in a set 
                                                                                                                       
quantify over nomologically possible worlds, or worlds that are included in the contextually 
relevant possibility horizon. 
Part III: Process-connection 
 142 
of contemporaneous events have the same realization. Because of this, we may 
simply take the realization of a set of contemporaneous events to be the 
realization that all its members share. Building on this, we may now define 
what it takes for one set of contemporaneous events to be a more fragile 
version of another as follows:  
 
More fragile version of a set: a set S+ of contemporaneous events is a  
more fragile version of a set S of contemporaneous events iff  
a) S+ and S have the same realization in @, and 
b) w(S+) ⊆ w(S). 
 
This definition includes the limit case where S+ is identical to S as a case where 
S+ is a more fragile version of S. When a set S+ is a more fragile version of a 
set S, and w(S+) ⊂ w(S), we may say that S+ is a strictly more fragile version of 
S.6 
The above definition gives us exactly what we need in order to capture 
the relation of minimal sufficiency: 
 
Minimal sufficiency: a set S1 of contemporaneous events  
is minimally sufficient for an event e2 iff 
a) S1 is sufficient for e2, and 
b) there is no set S1´ of contemporaneous events, such that  
i) S1 is a strictly more fragile version of S1´, and 
ii) S1´ is sufficient for e2. 
 
This definition of minimal sufficiency brings us a step closer to capturing the 
relation we are after. In the following section, I will now build on this to 
capture a relation that can differentiate between genuine causes and preempted 
backups in simple cases of late preemption. 
                                                
6 I sometimes refer to a less fragile set as being more robust. 
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3.  Time-sensitive sufficiency 
The above definition of minimal sufficiency cannot differentiate between 
genuine causes and preempted backups in cases of late preemption. To see 
this, consider our standard case of late preemption: 
 
Late preemption: Suzy and Billy both throw rocks at a window. Suzy’s rock hits 
the window a moment before Billy’s and the window shatters. 
 
Intuitively, Suzy’s throw is a cause of the window-shattering, while Billy’s is 
not. Correspondingly, we want to say that there is a genuine process from 
Suzy’s throw to the window-shattering, while there is no genuine process from 
Billy’s throw to the window-shattering. 
 The above notion of minimal sufficiency, however, does not allow us to 
draw this distinction. To see this, let us consider a more detailed specification 
of the case: suppose that Suzy and Billy are both standing 7 meters away from 
the window, and both throw their rocks 0.5 second before 12 noon. Suzy 
throws her rock at a speed of 14 m/s; Billy throws his rock at a speed of 10 
m/s; and the window begins to shatter at precisely 12 noon. Finally, suppose 
that we are interested in the following window-shattering event:7 
 
Window-shattering: the event characterised by (@, t2, s2, Iw, Cw), where 
t2 = 12 noon,  
s2 = the complete state of @ at time t2, 
Iw = ]–∞, 12.01 p.m.], 
Cw = the class of complete states such that the window begins to shatter. 
 
                                                
7 Note that this event is based on the interval ]–∞, 12.01 p.m.], i.e. it is essential to it that it 
occurs at some time before 12.01 p.m. (on a particular day, which I have left unspecified for the 
sake of simplicity). Also note that the interval ]–∞, 12.01 p.m.] is indeed a closed interval; the 
reason that it does not include –∞ is that, obviously, there is no such time as –∞. 
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Half a second before 12 noon, the following two events both occur:8  
 
 Suzy’s throw: the event characterised by (@, t1, s1, IS, CS), where 
 t1 = 0.5 second before 12 noon, 
s1 = the complete state of @ at time t1, 
 IS = ]–∞, 0.5 second before 12.01 p.m.], 
CS = the class of complete states such that the window is intact, and Suzy,  
standing 7 meters from the window, throws her rock towards it with a 
speed of 14 m/s. 
 
 Billy’s throw: the event characterised by (@, t1, s1, IB, CB), where 
 t1 = 0.5 second before 12 noon, 
s1 = the complete state of @ at time t1,  
 IB = ]–∞, 0.7 second before 12.01 p.m.], 
CB = the class of complete states such that the window is intact, and Billy,  
standing 7 meters from the window, throws his rock towards it with a 
speed of 10 m/s. 
 
By our definition of minimal sufficiency, we now find that both of the 
following claims are true:  
 
 {Suzy’s throw} is minimally sufficient for Window-shattering. 
 {Billy’s throw} is minimally sufficient for Window-shattering. 
 
Thus, our definition of minimal sufficiency does not capture the important 
difference between the way in which Suzy’s throw is related to Window-shattering, 
and the way in which Billy’s throw is related to Window-shattering. How can we 
strengthen the definition of minimal sufficiency in a way that allows us to 
capture this difference? 
                                                
8 For the sake of simplicity, I give a somewhat incomplete characterisation of these two events 
– for example, I leave out that there are no objects blocking the path towards the window, etc. 
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 Intuitively, the crucial difference between Suzy’s throw and Billy’s throw 
has to do with the timing of the window-shattering: Billy’s rock arrives too late to 
be a cause of the shattering. Within the context of counterfactual theories of 
causation, there have been several proposals attempting to leverage this 
intuition into an account that can handle late preemption.9 However, it is now 
recognised that these proposals all face serious problems.10  
In the following, I propose a new way to leverage this intuition into a 
strengthened definition of minimal sufficiency. To do this, I will rely on my 
definition of what it takes for one event to be a more temporally fragile version 
of another (see Chapter 4 section 2.2). For ease of reference, I repeat the 
definition here: 
 
 More temporally fragile version: an event e+ = (@, t+, s+, I+, C+)  
is a more temporally fragile version of an event e = (@, t, s, I, C) iff 
a) e+ and e have the same realization in @, 
b) I+ ⊆ I, and 
c) C+ = C. 
 
Based on this definition, it is clear that there is a maximally temporally fragile 
version of the window-shattering, namely: 
 
Precise window-shattering: the event characterised by (@, t2, s2, Ip, Cw), where 
t2 = 12 noon,  
s2 = the complete state of @ at time t2, 
Ip = [12 noon, 12 noon + dt]. 
Cw = the class of complete states such that the window begins to shatter. 
 
A natural first suggestion is that, in order to distinguish the relation between 
Suzy’s throw and the window-shattering from the relation between Billy’s 
                                                
9 See, in particular, Paul (1998a) and Lewis (2004a).  
10 See e.g. Hall and Paul (2003), pp. 112-14 and Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 102-110. 
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throw and the window-shattering, we need to pay attention to this maximally 
temporally fragile version of the window-shattering.  
However, this first suggestion does not in fact succeed in capturing the 
difference between the two relations: it may well be the case – indeed, it almost 
certainly is the case – that Billy’s throw has some tiny effect on the time at 
which the window begins to shatter.11 Thus, we may well find that a minimally 
sufficient set for Precise window-shattering needs to include both Suzy’s throw and 
Billy’s throw. Looking at Precise window-shattering therefore does not help us to 
capture how the relation between Suzy’s throw and the shattering differs from 
the relation between Billy’s throw and the shattering. 
 Rather than merely paying attention to the maximally temporally fragile 
version of the window-shattering, my suggestion therefore is that we need to 
pay attention to all the intermediate more temporally fragile versions of 
Window-shattering: it is exactly by paying attention to intermediate levels of detail 
that we may capture what distinguishes the relation between Suzy’s throw and 
the window-shattering from the relation between Billy’s throw and the 
window-shattering.  
More precisely, I suggest that we need the following strengthened 
version of minimal sufficiency, which I call time-sensitive sufficiency: 
 
Time-sensitive sufficiency: a set S1 of contemporaneous events  
is time-sensitively sufficient for an event e2 iff 
a) S1 is minimally sufficient for e2, and 
b) for every more temporally fragile version e2+ of e2,  
there is a set S1+ of contemporaneous events, such that  
i) S1+ is a more fragile version of S1, and  
ii) S1+ is minimally sufficient for e2+. 
 
                                                
11 See e.g. Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 105-6. 
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This definition captures the intuition that when there really is a process out in 
the world, we can take a closer look, and there will still be a process: when we 
consider a more temporally precise specification e2
+ of e2, we can find a 
correspondingly more precise specification S1
+ of S1, such that the right 
relation still holds between S1
+ and e2
+. 
This strengthened definition now allows us to distinguish the relation 
between Suzy’s throw and the window-shattering from the relation between 
Billy’s throw and the window-shattering: {Suzy’s throw} is time-sensitively 
sufficient for Window-shattering, whereas {Billy’s throw} is not.  
To see this, consider for example the following event, which is a more 
temporally fragile – but not maximally temporally fragile – version of Window-
shattering:   
 
 Window-shattering+: the event characterised by (@, t2, s2, Iw+, Cw), where 
t2 = 12 noon,  
s2 = the complete state of @ at time t2,  
Iw+ = ]–∞, 0.1 second after 12 noon], 
Cw = the class of complete states such that the window begins to shatter. 
 
We can here easily find a corresponding more fragile version, {Suzy’s throw}+, 
of {Suzy’s throw}, such that {Suzy’s throw}+ is minimally sufficient for Window-
shattering+, namely the singleton set containing:  
 
 Suzy’s throw+: the event characterised by (@, t1, s1, IS+, CS), where 
t1 = 0.5 second before 12 noon,  
s1 = the complete state of @ at time t1,  
IS+ = ]–∞, 0.4 second before 12 noon], and 
CS = the class of complete states such that the window is intact, and Suzy,  
standing 7 meters from the window, throws her rock towards it with a 
speed of 14 m/s. 
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And although I cannot explicitly test every case, it is clear that we can go on to 
do the same for any more temporally fragile version of Window-shattering.  
 In the case of Billy’s throw, on the other hand, consideration of Window-
shattering+ shows that {Billy’s throw} is not time-sensitively sufficient for Window-
shattering: the only set of contemporaneous events occurring at time t1 that is 
minimally sufficient for Window-shattering+ is {Suzy’s throw+}. But clearly, {Suzy’s 
throw+} is not a more fragile version of {Billy’s throw}. Thus we find, as we 
should, that {Billy’s throw} is not time-sensitively sufficient for Window-shattering.  
I suggest that Time-sensitive sufficiency characterises the relation that has to 
hold from a set of contemporaneous events to a subsequent event.  
It is worth noting that when we are dealing with neuron events 
(including non-firing events) defined in accordance with the conventions set 
out in Chapter 4 section 2.3, the relations of minimal sufficiency and time-
sensitive sufficiency are co-extensive. The reason is that, according to our 
conventions, the neuron events we consider are already maximally temporally 
fragile. Thus, it follows that for any neuron event E it is the case that if a set S1 
of contemporaneous events is minimally sufficient for E, then S1 is also time-
sensitively sufficient for E. 
 
4.  Apparent processes, genuine processes, and process-connection 
In sections 2 and 3 we have focused on the relation that has to hold between a 
set S1 of contemporaneous events and a later event e2, and this has led us to the 
relation of Time-sensitive sufficiency. Building on this, we may now define what it 
takes for a series of events to characterise a genuine process. 
It will be useful to have a name for a series of events where each event 
belongs to a set of contemporaneous events that is time-sensitively sufficient 
for the next. Let us say that such a series characterises an apparent process, 
defined as follows:  
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Apparent process: a series of events e1, e2, …, en, based on  
the time-series T: t1 < t2 < … < tn, characterises an apparent process iff 
for all i < n, there is a set Si of contemporaneous events, such that 
a) ei belongs to Si, and 
b) Si is time-sensitively sufficient for ei+1. 
 
This notion of an apparent process comes very close to capturing what we 
intuitively understand to be a genuine process.12 However, there is still 
something left that we need to address: so far, I have not imposed any 
conditions on the time-series on which our characterisation of a process is 
based. As I will now show, however, our choice of time-series sometimes 
makes a crucial difference. To see this, let us return to our standard case of 








        
 
 
As we have seen, it here seems intuitively correct to say that there is a genuine 
process from A to E, but not from B to E. However, not all time-series allow 
us to draw this distinction. To see this, consider the following time-series: 
 
 T: t1 < t3 
 
Based on T, we find that there is a series of events that characterises an 
apparent process from A to E, namely:  
 
                                                
12 Note that my definition of an apparent process is structurally similar to the much simpler 
definition found in McDermott (1995), pp. 535-36. 
     A    C 
     B    D 
     E 
  t1        t2     t3      Figure 1 
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 P1: 
 t1: A 
 t3: E 
 
And we similarly find that there is a series of events that characterises an 
apparent process from B to E, namely:   
 
 P2: 
 t1: B 
 t3: E 
 
Thus, our definition of an apparent process does not differentiate between the 
genuine cause and the preempted backup. How can we strengthen our 
definition in a way that allows us to draw this distinction?  
My suggestion is that we need to pay attention to what happens when we 
add more times to the time-series under consideration. To motivate this 
suggestion, consider what happens when we add one more time, namely time 
t2, to the time-series under consideration, yielding the time-series: 
 
 T+: t1 < t2 < t3  
 
Based on this new time-series, we still find that there is a series of events P1
+, 
characterising an apparent process from A to E, namely the following:   
  
P1+: 
 t1:  A 
 t2:  C 
 t3:  E 
 
By contrast, there is no series of events based on T+ that characterises an 
apparent process from B to E, since it is impossible to find an event occurring 
at time t2 that allows us to satisfy the definition of an apparent process:  
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 P2+: 
 t1:  B 
 t2: ? 
 t3: E 
 
This hints at the crucial difference between P1 and P2. In the case of P1, we find 
that our original characterisation of the process from A to E remains stable 
when we add more times to the time-series under consideration: when we add 
more times – in this case, when we add t2 – yielding an augmented time-series 
T+, there is a corresponding new series of events, namely P1
+, based on T+, 
such that i) P1
+ characterises an apparent process, and ii) for every time t in our 
original time-series T, P1 and P1
+ associate exactly the same event with t. In the 
case of P2, on the other hand, we find that when we consider the augmented 
time-series T+, there is no series of events P2
+ based on T+, such that i) P2
+ 
characterises an apparent process, and ii) for every time t in our original time-
series T, P2 and P2
+ associate exactly the same event with t.  
 To leverage this observation into a definition of what it takes for a series 
of events to characterise a genuine process, we first need a definition of when 
one time-series is an augmented version of another:  
 
Augmented version: a time-series T+ is an augmented version of a time-series T,  
where T starts from time t1 and ends with time tn, iff 
a) T+ starts from time t1 and ends with time tn, and 
b) the times in T are a (proper or improper) subset of the times in T+. 
 
Note that it follows from this definition that in the limit case where T+ is 
identical with T, T+ is an augmented version of T.  
Based on this, we may now introduce the notion of a master-set for a 
particular time-series:  
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Master-set: a set T of time-series is the master-set for a time-series T iff: 
a time-series T+ belongs to T iff T+ is an augmented version of T.  
 
More perspicuously, the master-set T for a given time-series T is the set 
containing every augmented version of T.  
Based on this, we may now finally define what it takes for a series of 
events to characterise a genuine process: 
 
Genuine process: a series of events P based on a time-series T characterises a 
genuine process iff P belongs to a set P of series of events, such that 
a) there is a one-one mapping between P and the master-set T for T  
that maps a series of events Pi from P to a time-series Ti in T  
iff Pi is based on Ti,  
b) each series of events in P characterises an apparent process, and 
c) for any time t, all series of events in P that associate an event with t 
associate the same event with t. 
 
This definition of a genuine process is quite demanding: it requires us to 
consider every augmented version of our time-series T.13  
It is worth noting, however, that in the case of neuron diagrams this 
turns out to be a very simple task. To see this, recall our convention of treating 
the information contained in a neuron diagram as complete (see Chapter 2 
section 1.1). This convention makes it very easy to reach conclusions about 
when an apparent process is also a genuine process: neuron diagrams only 
contain explicit information about what happens at a few specific times. For 
example, the neuron diagram illustrating our early preemption case in Figure 1 
                                                
13 However, it should be noted that this very demanding condition seems to accurately reflect 
the strategy we use when we are trying to verify that a series of events really represents a 
genuine process out in the world. This strategy is invariably: take a closer look. If by taking a 
closer look we find that what happens at some intermediate time does not fit with our 
hypothesis that there is a genuine process from one event to another, then we have to reject 
the hypothesis. 
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above only contains explicit information about what happens at time t1, t2, and 
t3. This means that when we have a series of events characterising an apparent 
process based on the time-series T: t1 < t2 < t3, this characterisation will remain 
stable as we add more times to the time-series under consideration – for the 
simple reason that the neuron diagram contains no additional information 
about what is happening at these intermediate times. We therefore have the 
following general result:  
 
Based on this, it is easy to see that our definition of genuine processes yields 
the correct results when applied to our case of early preemption in Figure 1: 
considering the time-series,  
 
 T:  t1 < t2 < t3 
 
we find that there is a genuine process from A to E, whereas there is no 
genuine process from B to E. 
 With this understanding of genuine processes, I am now ready to define 
the relation of process-connection: 
 
Process-connection: an event c is process-connected to an event e iff  
there is a genuine process from c to e. 
 
I propose that this relation captures a necessary condition for causation: 
For any series of actual events P based on a time-series T, it is the case that if 
a) P characterises an apparent process, and 
b) T includes exactly those times at which the neuron diagram shows explicitly 
what the neurons do,  
then P characterises a genuine process.  
The first condition – process-connection:  
c is a cause of e only if c is process-connected to e.  
Part III: Process-connection 
 154 
In Appendix A, I show that this relation has three important properties. First, 
counterfactual dependence is not sufficient for process-connection. However, 
given a very plausible assumption, we can prove a restricted principle of 
sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for process-connection (Appendix A 
section 1). Second, process-connection is a transitive relation (Appendix A 
section 2). And third, the relation of process-connection is intrinsic to a 
process (Appendix A section 3).   
I believe that the necessary condition of process-connection correctly 
captures what distinguishes genuine causes from preempted backups. In our 
late preemption case above, for example, we judge that Billy’s throw is not a 
cause of the window-shattering – and I suggest that we make this judgement 
precisely because there is no genuine process from Billy’s throw to the 
shattering. Similarly, in our early preemption case above, we judge that B is not 
a cause of E – and again, I suggest that we make this judgement precisely 
because there is no genuine process from B to E. 
 
5.  Ascending to the level of representations 
The definition of a genuine process that I have given above operates at the 
level of representations: rather than saying directly what it takes for something 
to be a genuine process, it tells us what it takes for a series of events – i.e., a 
characterisation of a process – to characterise a genuine process. This still tells us 
about what is out there in the world: if we find that a series P of events 
characterises a genuine process, then this tells us that there is a genuine process 
out in the world, which is truly (albeit incompletely) characterised by P. Even 
so, one might well ask: why ascend to the level of representations in this way? 
Why not define directly what it takes for something to be a genuine process, 
rather than what it takes for a series of events to characterise a genuine 
process? 
 In this section I set out my motivation for ascending to the level of 
representations. Surprisingly, perhaps, my motivation derives from questions 
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about the structure of time: at present, we do not know whether time is 
discrete (with a structure corresponding to the natural numbers), dense (with a 
structure corresponding to the rational numbers), or continuous (with a 
structure corresponding to the real numbers) – though there are important 
arguments for holding that time is either dense or continuous.14 Furthermore, 
it is an open question whether the structure of time is metaphysically necessary 
or contingent15 – and thus, even discovering that time in the actual world is 
discrete would still leave it open whether there are other metaphysically 
possible worlds in which time is dense or continuous. In order to ensure that 
my proposed account of causation is applicable in any metaphysically possible 
world governed by deterministic laws (that satisfy the further requirements set 
out in Chapter 3), I therefore need to ensure that the application of my 
account is independent of whether time is discrete, dense, or continuous.  
This, however, creates a challenge: a central feature of our intuitive 
understanding of what it takes for something to be a genuine process concerns 
the relation that has to hold between one event in a process and the next. 
Making sense of this notion of ‘the next event’ is simple if the structure of time 
is discrete: in this case, time itself consists in a series of discrete times 
(moments or instants) – t1, t2, t3, . . . – and the next event in a process is simply 
the event associated with the next time (i.e. the immediate successor) in the 
series. If time is dense or continuous, however, the notion of ‘the next event’ 
runs into trouble: the only principled way to understand the notion of ‘the next 
event’ is as ‘the immediately following event’. If time is dense or continuous, 
however, there simply is no immediately following event: for any two times t 
and t´, there is always a further time t*, such that t* lies between t and t´ – 
thereby defeating any claim that the event associated with time t´ follows 
immediately after the event associated with t. 
                                                
14 See e.g. Hawley (2004), p. 51. 
15 See e.g. Forrest (1995); Le Poidevin (1990), p. 420; Newton-Smith (1980), pp. 112-126; 
Traynor (2014), pp. 183-84. 
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 It is precisely to solve this problem that I have chosen to ascend to the 
level of representations: the great weakness of representations – namely the 
fact that, even when true, they may be incomplete – is in this case also their great 
strength. For, by ascending to the level of representations, we may characterise 
any process – whether time is in fact discrete, dense or continuous – based on 
a series of discrete times. This is exactly what I have done here, thereby giving 
a straightforward interpretation to the intuitive notion of ‘the next event’ – 
namely, as the event associated with the next time within the time-series chosen in 
the representation. In this way, the definition I have given works exactly by taking 
advantage of the fact that ascending to the level of representations allows for 
incompleteness.  
 At the same time, however, it is of course crucial to guard against the 
weakness of representations: the fact that even a true representation, precisely 
because of its incompleteness, may create the appearance that something is the 
case, when in fact it is not. This is what motivates my final step of moving 
from the definition of an apparent process to the definition of a genuine 
process: this final step is precisely designed to ensure that the conclusions we 
draw on the basis of an incomplete representation – incomplete, because based 
on an incomplete time-series – remain stable as we gradually move closer to a 
complete representation by adding more and more times to the time-series 
under consideration. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
Intuitively, the difference between a genuine cause and a preempted backup is 
that a genuine cause is connected to its effect via the right kind of process, 
whereas a preempted backup is not. My aim in this chapter has been to 
leverage this intuition into a necessary condition for causation, namely the 
condition of process-connection. The challenge in developing this condition has 
been to give a suitably reductive characterisation of the notion of a genuine 
process. This then immediately leads to the condition of process-connection. 
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This condition, I believe, captures the intuitive thought that a cause must 
be connected to its effect via a genuine process. In the following chapter, we shall see 
how this condition allows us to arrive at intuitively correct verdicts in a wide 










































Applications of process-connection 
 
My aim in this chapter is to give an overview over the main applications of the 
condition of process-connection. I begin with a short section showing how the 
condition of process-connection allows us to distinguish causation from mere 
correlation (section 1). I next show how the condition of process-connection 
allows us to deal with three important groups of cases: cases of redundant 
causation (section 2), cases of omission-involving causation, including cases of 
omission-involving redundant causation (section 3), and cases that require 
commensuration between cause and effect (section 4). In all these cases, we 
find that an event c is a cause of a later event e just in case c is process-
connected to e.  
 
1.  Correlation without causation 
Let us begin by considering a case of correlation without causation. It is a 
common misconception that we need a counterfactual account of causation in 
order to handle cases of this kind. As Paul and Hall have pointed out, this 
misconception is due to a conflation between two different rivals to 
counterfactual accounts of causation: regularity accounts, which do have 
trouble with cases of correlation without causation, and minimal sufficiency 
accounts, which do not.1  
 In the following, I show how the condition of process-connection, 
which at its core is a minimal sufficiency condition, can easily distinguish 
between genuine causation and mere correlation. To see this, consider for 
example the case illustrated below: 
                                                
1 Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 72-73. 













Within this system of neurons, D is correlated with C: whenever C occurs, so 
does D, since C and D have a common cause, namely A. However, C is not a 
cause of D: among the events occurring at time t2, B is the only cause of D. 
Correspondingly, we find that B is process-connected to D, while C is not.  
 To see this, consider the time-series T: t2 < t3. Based on this time-series, 
we find that there is an apparent process from B to D, namely: 
 
 t2: B 
 t3: D 
 
Since the time-series T: t2 < t3 includes all the times between t2 and t3 that are 
explicitly represented in the neuron diagram, this series of events characterises 
a genuine process (cf. the result on neuron diagrams presented at the end of 
Chapter 6 section 4). Thus, B is process-connected to D. 
By contrast, there is no genuine process from C to D, since C does not 
belong to a minimally sufficient set for D: the set {C} is not sufficient for D, 
since there is a nomologically possible world where C occurs and D does not – 
for example, a world that starts out at time t2 in a complete state where C fires 
and B does not.2 And the set {B, C} is sufficient, but not minimally sufficient, 
since {B, C} is a strictly more fragile version of {B}, which is already sufficient 
for D. Thus, we find – as we should – that C is not process-connected to D.  
                                                
2 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 72-73. 
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2.  Redundant causation 
In this section, I show how the condition of process-connection enables us to 
successfully distinguish between genuine causes and preempted backups in 
standard cases of early preemption (section 2.1), late preemption (section 2.2), 
trumping preemption (section 2.3), and symmetric overdetermination (section 
2.4).  
 
2.1  Early preemption 









        
 
Intuitively, A is a cause of E, while B is not. The results of applying the 
condition of process-connection fit perfectly with these intuitive data:  
The only time-series we need to consider is T: t1 < t2 < t3. And the only 
series of events based on T that characterises an apparent process is the 
following: 
 
 t1: A 
 t2: C 
 t3: E 
 
Since T includes all the times that are explicitly represented in the neuron 
diagram, this is a genuine process. I have illustrated this process here, by 
putting a halo around the neurons that are part of the process: 
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From this, it is clear that A is process-connected to E, while B is not. Thus, the 
condition of process-connection successfully distinguishes between the 
genuine cause and the preempted backup in the present case.3 
 
2.2  Late preemption 
Let us next turn to our standard case of late preemption: 
 
Late preemption: Suzy and Billy both throw rocks at a window. Suzy’s rock hits 
the window a moment before Billy’s and the window shatters. 
 
Intuitively, Suzy’s throw is a cause of the window-shattering, while Billy’s is 
not: Suzy’s throw is a preempting cause; Billy’s is a preempted backup.  
This intuitive judgement fits perfectly with what we find when we apply 
the condition of process-connection: suppose that the details of the case are as 
specified in Chapter 6 section 3 and that the effect we are interested in is: 
 
Window-shattering: the event characterised by (@, t2, s2, Iw, Cw), where 
t2 = 12 noon,  
s2 = the complete state of @ at time t2, 
Iw = ]–∞, 12.01 p.m.], 
Cw = the class of complete states such that the window begins to shatter. 
                                                
3 For my treatment of a variant of early preemption, see Appendix B case 3. 
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As we have seen in Chapter 6 section 3, there is at the earlier time t1 = 0.5 
second before 12 noon, only one set of contemporaneous events that is time-
sensitively sufficient for Window-shattering, namely the set {Suzy’s throw}, where: 
 
 Suzy’s throw: the event characterised by (@, t1, s1, IS, CS), where 
 t1 = 0.5 second before 12 noon, 
s1 = the complete state of @ at time t1, 
 IS = ]–∞, 0.5 second before 12.01 p.m.], 
CS = the class of complete states such that the window is intact, and Suzy,  
standing 7 meters from the window, throws her rock towards it with a 
speed of 14 m/s. 
 
This means that there is only one apparent process leading to Window-shattering, 
based on the time-series T: t1 < t2, namely:  
 
 t1: Suzy’s throw 
 t2: Window-shattering 
 
It should be obvious that this apparent process is indeed a genuine process: to 
any intermediate time, we can easily associate an appropriate event, specifying 
the relevant position and speed of Suzy’s rock as it flies towards the still intact 
window. This yields the intuitively correct result: Suzy’s throw is process-
connected to Window-shattering. By contrast, let us now consider Billy’s throw: 
 
Billy’s throw: the event characterised by (@, t1, s1, IB, CB), where 
 t1 = 0.5 second before 12 noon, 
s1 = the complete state of @ at time t1,  
 IB = ]–∞, 0.7 second before 12.01 p.m.], 
CB = the class of complete states such that the window is intact, and Billy,  
standing 7 meters from the window, throws his rock towards it with a 
speed of 10 m/s. 
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    t1          t2       Figure 3 
Clearly, {Billy’s throw} is minimally sufficient for Window-shattering. However, as 
we have already seen in Chapter 6 section 3, {Billy’s throw} is not time-
sensitively sufficient for Window-shattering. Thus, the series of events, 
 
 t1: Billy’s throw 
 t2: Window-shattering 
 
does not characterise an apparent process. Nor can it be brought to 
characterise an apparent process by adding intermediate times between t1 and 
t2. And so, we find – as we should – that Billy’s throw is not process-connected 
to Window-shattering.  
This shows how the condition of process-connection distinguishes 
between genuine causes and preempted backups in cases of late preemption.4 
 
2.3  A variant of trumping preemption 
As a final example of how the condition of process-connection deals with 
preemption, let us consider a variant of trumping preemption. Schaffer’s 
original case of trumping preemption5 involves action at a temporal distance 
and thus lies outside the scope of this dissertation. However, the following 







           
 
 
                                                
4 For my treatment of a different variant of late preemption, see Appendix B case 5. 
5 See Schaffer (2004). For discussion, see also Lewis (2004a) and Bernstein (2015). 
6 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 26. 
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Neuron A can here fire in different shades and in different intensities: it can 
fire in blue or green, and it can fire with intensity I or with some other 
intensity. Neuron B, on the other hand, either fires or does not fire – with no 
distinctions between different shades or intensities. The nomological 
relationships are summarised in the table below:7  
 
 B fires B doesn’t fire 
A doesn’t fire C fires C doesn’t fire 
A fires in blue C fires C fires 
A fires with intensity I,  
and not in blue 
C doesn’t fire C doesn’t fire 
A fires without intensity I,  
and not in blue 
C fires C doesn’t fire 
 
The case we are interested in – and which is illustrated in Figure 3 above – is 
the case where A and B both fire, and where A fires in blue and with intensity 
I. On a reasonable interpretation of the case, which is also the interpretation 
that Paul and Hall favour, the intuitively correct verdict is that A’s firing in blue 
is a cause of C’s firing, and that B’s firing is not a cause of C’s firing.8  
In support of this, note that this verdict is simply a generalisation of the 
patterns we can observe in other scenarios: as can be seen from the table 
above, A’s firing in blue is followed by C’s firing, even when B does not fire – 
making the name ‘triggering’ blue appropriate. And furthermore, when A fires 
with intensity I, C does not fire – even when B fires – making the name 
‘inhibiting’ intensity appropriate. This lends support to the suggested 
interpretation of the case. As Paul and Hall note:  
 
‘What would seem most natural […] is to project the causal structures 
appropriate for describing the cases in general onto the test case. If so, we 
                                                
7 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), p. 136. 
8 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 137.  
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should insist that the right interpretation of the test case tells us (i) that the A-
signal prevents the B-signal from causing C (because the A-signal has the 
inhibiting intensity I); and (ii) that the A-signal itself causes C (because it is in 
the triggering shade […]). Hence, in this neuron world, it is A and not B that 
causes E.’9  
 
As Paul and Hall note, the structure of this case comes very close to the 
structure of Schaffer’s original case of trumping preemption. Can my condition 
of process-connection deliver the intuitively correct result in this case?  
 I believe it can. Let the effect we are interested in be C’s firing – i.e., the 
event C. We now find that there is exactly one set of events occurring at time t1 
that is minimally sufficient for C, namely the set {A-blue}, where the 
instantaneous event A-blue is defined as follows: 
 
 A-blue: the instantaneous event based on (@, t1, s1, IA, CA), where  
IA = [t1, t1 + dt], and 
 CA = the class of states such that neuron A fires in blue.  
 
From the fact that {A-blue} is minimally sufficient for C, it immediately follows 
that there is a genuine process from A-blue to C, namely:  
 
 t1: A-blue 
 t2: C 
 
Thus, we find – exactly as we should – that A-blue is process-connected to C.  
We similarly find – again, exactly as we should – that B is not process-
connected to C, since B does not belong to a set of contemporaneous events 
that is minimally sufficient for C. To see this, note that {B} is not sufficient for 
C, since there is a nomologically possible world in which B occurs and C does 
not occur – namely, a world in which A fires with intensity I, without firing in 
                                                
9 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 137.  
Chapter 7: Applications of process-connection 
 167 
blue. And the set {B, A-blue}, though sufficient, is not minimally sufficient, 
since {B, A-blue} is a strictly more fragile version of {A-blue}, which is itself 
sufficient for C. Thus, we find that B is not process-connected to C. 
 
2.4  Symmetric overdetermination 
I turn next to cases of symmetric overdetermination. Like preemption cases, 
such cases have created a good deal of trouble for counterfactual accounts of 
causation, since the effect in a case of symmetric overdetermination does not 
depend counterfactually on either of its causes. However, the causes in a case 
of symmetric overdetermination easily satisfy the condition of process-











Here, neuron C fires if and only if it receives at least one stimulatory signal. 
Furthermore, C fires at exactly the same time and in exactly the same manner 
no matter whether it receives one or two stimulatory signals.  
 Intuitively, A is a cause of C, and by symmetry, so is B. Correspondingly, 
we find that both satisfy the necessary condition of process-connection. To see 
this, we simply need to consider the time-series T: t1 < t2. We now find that 
there is a genuine process from A to C, namely: 
 
 t1:  A     
 t2:  C     
                                                
10 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 11. 
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And we similarly find that there is a genuine process from B to C, namely: 
 
 t1:  B 
 t2:  C 
 












Thus, we find – as desired – that both A and B satisfy the condition of 
process-connection.  
 
3.  Omission-involving causation 
In this section, I show how the condition of process-connection is able to deal 
successfully with omission-involving causation. I begin by considering the 
three standard kinds of omission-involving causation: causation by omission 
(section 3.1), prevention (section 3.2), and double prevention (section 3.3). 
Next, I consider corresponding cases of redundant omission-involving 
causation: redundant causation by omission (section 3.4), redundant 
prevention (section 3.5), and redundant double prevention (section 3.6). 
Finally, I revisit Hall’s case of preemptive prevention (section 3.7).  
 It has sometimes been suggested that causation involving omissions 
should be given a separate treatment from causation involving only positive 
events. For example, this suggestion is part of Hall’s two concepts account of 
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causation.11 Cases of redundant omission-involving causation provide an 
important argument against this approach: they show that the cases of 
redundant causation that present challenges for an account of causation 
involving only positive events have analogues involving omissions. Once we 
recognise this, it is sensible to look for an account that can give a unified 
treatment of redundant causation, whether it involves omissions or not. As I 
hope to show, the condition of process-connection allows us to do just that. 
 
3.1  Causation by omission 
As a first illustration of how the condition of process-connection applies to 














It is intuitively clear that C has two causes: A and ¬B. Indeed, C depends 
counterfactually on A and on ¬B: if A had not fired, C would not have fired; 
and if B had not failed to fire, C would not have fired.13  
Correspondingly, we find that A and ¬B both satisfy the condition of 
process-connection. To see this, note that based on the time-series T: t1 < t2, 
there is a genuine process from A to C, namely: 
 
                                                
11 See Hall (2004b).  
12 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 3. 
13 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), p. 174. 
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 t1:  A  (together with ¬B) 
 t2: C 
 
And there is a genuine process from ¬B to C, namely: 
 
 t1:  ¬B  (together with A) 
 t2: C 
 
Thus, A and ¬B both satisfy the condition of process-connection. In this way, 
the condition easily yields the intuitively correct result. 
 
3.2  Prevention 
Next, let us consider a case of causation of omission, i.e. prevention. Such a 












Intuitively, B is a cause of ¬C. Indeed, C’s failure to fire depends 
counterfactually on B’s firing: if B had not fired, C would not have failed to 
fire.15  
Correspondingly, we find that there is a genuine process from B to ¬C 
based on the time-series T: t1 < t2, namely:   
 
 
                                                
14 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 22. 
15 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 174. 
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 t1:  B 
 t2:  ¬C 
 
Thus we find – as we should – that B is process-connected to ¬C.  
 
3.3  Double prevention 
The third standard kind of omission-involving causation is double prevention. 












     
Intuitively C, together with A, is a cause of F.17 Indeed, F depends 
counterfactually on C: if C had not occurred, F would not have occurred. The 
case earns its title as a case of omission-involving causation because an 
omission, namely ¬E, acts as an intermediary between C and F: embedded in 
the figure, we find a standard case of prevention, where C causes ¬E (cf. 
Figure 6 above), and a standard case of causation by omission, where ¬E is a 
cause of F (cf. Figure 5 above).18 
Correspondingly, we find that there is a genuine process from C to F 
based on the time-series T: t1 < t2 < t3, namely: 
 
                                                
16 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 29. 
17 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 175. 
18 Schaffer (2000a) gives several examples of real life cases with exactly this structure. 
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 t1:  C 
 t2:  ¬E  (together with D) 
 t3:  F 
 











          
 
We thus get the intuitively correct result that C is process-connected to F.  
 
3.4  Redundant causation by omission 
I now turn to more complex cases that combine redundant causation with 
omission-involving causation. My first example is a case of redundant 











     
                                                
19 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 38. 
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Embedded within the figure, there is a standard case of causation by omission: 
¬A is a cause of D. And there is also, embedded within the figure, a standard 
case of early preemption: D is a preempting cause of H, whereas E is a 
preempted backup. Based on this, it seems intuitively correct to say that ¬A is 
a preempting cause of H, and that C is merely a preempted backup.20  
 The condition of process-connection easily accommodates these 
intuitive judgements. To see this, note that there is a genuine process from ¬A 
to H based on the time-series T: t1 < t2 < t3 < t4, namely: 
 
 t1:  ¬A  (together with B) 
 t2:  D 
 t3: F 
 t4: H 
 












    
Thus, we find that ¬A is process-connected to H. Furthermore, we find that C 




                                                
20 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 187 and 214. 
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3.5  Redundant prevention 












       
 
To see that this is indeed a case of redundant prevention, note that there is, 
embedded within the figure, a standard case of early preemption: B is a 
preempting cause of H, while C is a preempted backup. And note that there is 
also, embedded within the figure, a standard case of prevention where H is a 
cause of ¬I. Intuitively, it therefore seems right to say that B is a preempting 
cause of ¬I, whereas C is merely a preempted backup.22  
This fits exactly with the results we get when we apply the condition of 
process-connection. To see this, note that there is a genuine process from B to 
¬I, based on the time-series T: t1 < t2 < t3 < t4, namely: 
 
 t1:  B 
 t2:  E 
 t3:  H 
 t4: ¬I 
 
                                                
21 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 43. 
22 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 213-14. 
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We thus find that B is process-connected to ¬I. Furthermore, we find that C is 
not process-connected to ¬I, since there is no genuine process from C to ¬I.  
 
3.6  Redundant double prevention 













       
 
                                                
23 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 44. 
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This figure combines a case of early preemption with a case of double 
prevention: C is a preempting cause of K, while D is a preempted backup. And 
K in turn causes N via double prevention. On this basis, it seems intuitively 
clear that C is a preempting cause of N, whereas D is a preempted backup.24  
 This fits exactly with what we find when we apply the condition of 
process-connection: we here find that there is a genuine process from C to N, 
namely: 
 
 t1: C 
 t2: G 
 t3: K 
 t4: ¬M  (together with L) 
 t5: N 
 













       
 
                                                
24 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), p. 220. 
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Thus, we find that C is process-connected to N. By contrast, there is no 
genuine process from D to N, and so D does not satisfy the condition of 
process-connection. 
 
3.7  Hall’s case 
As a final example of how the condition of process-connection allows us to 
handle cases of omission-involving redundant causation, let us revisit the case 
of redundant omission-involving causation discussed in Chapter 2 section 














         
 
As we have seen, the intuitively correct verdict on this case is that C is a cause 
of J. As Hall writes:  
 
‘[D] notwithstanding, it is C that in fact cancels the threat to [J], and canceling a 
threat is one way to be a cause.’26  
 
                                                
25 Figure from Hall (2007b), p. 52. 
26 Hall (2007b), p. 52. 
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The condition of process-connection easily accommodates this verdict: there is 
a genuine process from C to J, namely: 
 
 t1: C 
 t2: ¬F 
 t3: ¬I  (together with H) 
 t4: J 
 













         
 
Hence, we find – exactly as we should – that C is process-connected to J.  
 However, one might suggest that the present case puts pressure on my 
claim that the condition of process-connection allows us to distinguish 
preempting causes from preempted backups: one might well judge that C is a 
preempting cause of J, while D is merely a preempted backup. As I have 
presented the case, however, there is also a genuine process from D to J, 
namely:  
 
 t1: D 
 t2: G 
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 t3: ¬I  (together with H) 
 t4: J 
 













         
 
Thus, we find that D is also process-connected to J.  
 My response has two parts. First, I believe that as it is presented here, 
this is a case of overdetermination rather than preemption: ¬I is in fact 
overdetermined by ¬F and G, which are caused, respectively, by C and D.  
Second, I suggest that the intuition that D is merely a preempted backup 
is based on an intuitive distinction between two different ways in which a 
neuron can fail to fire: it can fail to fire because it receives no stimulatory 
signals, or it can fail to fire because a stimulatory signal is blocked by an 
inhibitory signal. This distinction is not in fact present in the figure above. 
However, we can easily adapt the case so that it reflects this distinction, by 
making the following additions to our usual conventions for neuron diagrams: 
let a neuron be blank just in case it receives no stimulatory signals, and let it 
fire in waves just in case it receives at least one stimulatory signal together with 
an inhibitory signal. Furthermore, add to the neuron laws that a neuron that 
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fires in waves sends no outgoing signals. With these additions, we now get the 













           
 
This is indeed a case of preemption, where C is a preempting cause of J, while 
D is a preempted backup. Correspondingly, we find that there is a genuine 
process from C to J, namely: 
 
 t1: C  (together with B) 
 t2: F-waves 
 t3: ¬I  (together with H) 
 t4: J 
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Thus, C is process-connected to J. But in this case, there is no genuine process 
from D to J, and so we find – as we should – that D is not process-connected 
to J. Thus, the condition of process-connection successfully distinguishes the 
preempting cause from the preempted backup. 
 
4.  Commensuration between cause and effect 
As a final application of the condition of process-connection, I will consider a 
group of cases that demonstrate the need to ensure commensuration between 
cause and effect. I begin by considering two counterexamples to the 
sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation (section 4.1 and 4.2). 
And finally, I consider an apparent counterexample to the transitivity of 
causation (section 4.3).  
 
4.1  Scarlet 
Let us begin by considering our first counterexample to the sufficiency of 
counterfactual dependence for causation – namely Scarlet (see Chapter 2 
section 1.3.1). For ease of reference, I repeat the case here:  
 
     A      E       H    J 
 B            F           I    
    C      G 
    D 
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Scarlet: The pigeon Sophia has been conditioned to peck at scarlet to the 
exclusion of all other colours. She is presented with a scarlet triangle and pecks 
at it.27  
 




        
 
Neuron A can here fire in two different ways: in stripes or in uniform green. 
As shown in the figure, it in fact fires in stripes. Let A be the event that is 
essentially A’s firing (but where it is not essential whether A fires in stripes or 
uniform green), and let A-stripes be the event that is essentially A’s firing in 
stripes. Furthermore, suppose that the neuron laws are such that B fires if and 
only if A fires in stripes.  
The structure of this case corresponds perfectly to the structure of 
Scarlet: A represents the triangle’s being red, A-stripes represents the triangle’s 
being scarlet, and B represents Sophia’s pecking.  
As we have seen, this case presents a counterexample to the sufficiency 
of counterfactual dependence for causation: B (Sophia’s pecking) depends 
counterfactually on A-stripes (the triangle’s being scarlet). Correspondingly, we 
judge that A-stripes is a cause of B. So far, no counterexample. But B also 
depends counterfactually on A (the triangle’s being red). However, we are 
reluctant to say that A is a cause of B.  
The condition of process-connection accommodates these intuitive 
verdicts – and thereby goes against the principle that counterfactual 
dependence is sufficient for causation: A-stripes is process-connected to B, 
                                                
27 This case is closely based on a case presented in Yablo (1992a), p. 257. For similar cases, see 
Yablo (1992b), p. 415, and Sartorio (2010), pp. 266-69. 
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whereas A is not. To see this, note that there is a genuine process from A-





By contrast, there is no genuine process from A to B: the only minimally 
sufficient set for B is {A-stripes}, and A does not belong to A-stripes. 
In this way, the condition of process-connection respects the intuitive verdict 
that A-stripes is a cause of B, while A is not.  
 
4.2  Red 
The condition of process-connection similarly respects our intuitive verdict on 
the second counterexample to the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence 
(see Chapter 2 section 1.3.1). This example goes as follows: 
 
 Red: The pigeon Delia has been conditioned to peck at red to the exclusion of 
all other colours. She is presented with a scarlet triangle and pecks at it. In the 
lab where she is, the researchers use just two colours – scarlet and emerald. If 
Delia had not been presented with a scarlet triangle, she would have been 
presented with an emerald triangle.28  
 
We may use the same neuron diagram as above to represent the structure of 
this case:  
 
 
        
                                                
28 This case is closely based on a case presented in Yablo (1992a), p. 257. For similar cases, see 
Yablo (1992b), p. 417, and Sartorio (2010), pp. 264-66. 
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The difference between this case and the previous is that the neuron laws are 
different: in the present case, the laws are such that B fires just in case A fires 
(whether A fires in stripes or in uniform green). Furthermore, in the closest 
world(s) where A-stripes does not occur, A does not occur either. Thus, the 
neuron diagram below represents what would have happened if A-stripes had 
not occurred:  
 
 
        
This case presents another counterexample to the sufficiency of counterfactual 
dependence for causation: B (Delia’s pecking) depends counterfactually on A-
stripes (the triangle’s being scarlet). Intuitively, however, we are reluctant to say 
that A-stripes is a cause of B – intuitively, the cause is simply A (the triangle’s 
being red); it does not matter that A fires in stripes (that the triangle is scarlet). 
 The condition of process-connection respects this intuitive verdict: A is 
process-connected to B, whereas A-stripes is not. To see this, note that there is 
exactly one minimally sufficient set for B, namely {A}. It follows from this 
that there is a genuine process from A to B, namely: 
 
 t1: A 
 t2: B 
 
And it also follows that there is no genuine process from A-stripes to B. Thus, 
we find that A is process-connected to B, whereas A-stripes is not.  
 
4.3  Apparent counterexample to the transitivity of causation 
Finally, let us now turn to the apparent counterexample to the transitivity of 
causation discussed in Chapter 4 section 6. For ease of reference, I repeat the 
case here: 
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Skiing accident: while skiing, Suzy breaks her right wrist. The next day, she writes 
a philosophy paper, which is subsequently accepted for publication. Since 
Suzy’s right wrist is broken, she writes the paper by typing with her left hand. 
And as she is not used to writing this way, she develops a cramp in her left 
hand.29  
 












A here represents Suzy’s having the idea for her paper, B represents her 
breaking her right wrist in the skiing accident, C represents her writing the 
paper, D represents the paper’s being accepted for publication and E 
represents Suzy getting a cramp in her left hand. Note that C can fire in two 
different ways: in uniform green and in stripes. C’s firing in uniform green 
represents Suzy’s writing her paper as she normally would – by typing with 
both hands; C’s firing in stripes represents Suzy’s writing the paper by typing 
only with her left hand.  
The neuron laws are such that C fires in uniform green if and only if it 
receives a stimulatory signal from A and no stimulatory signal from B; and C 
                                                
29 This case is closely based on a case presented in Paul (2004a). For discussion of similar 
cases, see also Ehring (2009), pp. 403-4; McDonnell (forthcoming); Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 
237-44; Schaffer (2016), pp. 13-14, and Woodward (1984), pp. 234-46. 
30 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 48. 
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fires in stripes if and only if it receives stimulatory signals from both A and B. 
Furthermore, D fires if and only if C fires. By contrast, E is sensitive to the 
way in which C fires – and so, E fires if and only if C fires in stripes.  
Finally, let C be the event that is essentially C’s firing (Suzy’s writing the 
paper), but only accidentally C’s firing in stripes; and let C-stripes be the event 
that is essentially C’s firing in stripes (Suzy’s writing the paper by typing with 
her left hand). 
As we have seen in Chapter 4 section 6, this case presents an apparent 
counterexample to the transitivity of causation. As we have also seen, the first 
step in resisting this counterexample is to adopt a conception of the causal 
relata that allows us to hold that C (Suzy’s writing the paper) is not identical to 
C-stripes (Suzy’s writing the paper by typing with her left hand). This is exactly 
what my proposed conception of the causal relata allows us to do.  
To resist the counterexample, we also need an account of causation that 
delivers the following verdicts: B is not a cause of C, though it is a cause of the 
more fragile C-stripes. And in turn C is a cause of D, while C-stripes is not.31 The 
condition of process-connection delivers exactly these results:  
B does not belong to a minimally sufficient set for C, since the only 
minimally sufficient set for C is {A}. Thus, B is not process-connected to C. By 
contrast, B is process-connected to C-stripes via the following process: 
 
t1: B  (together with A) 
t2: C-stripes 
 
Furthermore, we find that C is process-connected to D via the following 
process: 
 
 t2: C 
 t3: D 
                                                
31 For discussion, see McDonnell (forthcoming). 
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By contrast, C-stripes is not process-connected to D: though sufficient, the set 
{C-stripes} is not minimally sufficient for D, since it is a strictly more fragile 
version of {C}, which is already sufficient. Thus, C-stripes does not belong to a 
minimally sufficient set for D.   
Given these results, transitivity simply does not apply. In this way, the 
condition of process-connection allows us to resist the apparent 
counterexample. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have seen the main applications of the condition of 
process-connection. First, we have seen how the condition enables us to 
distinguish mere correlation from causation. Second, we have seen how it 
enables us to distinguish genuine causes from preempted backups in the four 
main kinds of redundant causation – early preemption, late preemption, 
trumping preemption, and symmetric overdetermination: in all of these cases, 
the condition of process-connection is satisfied by the genuine cause(s), but 
fails to be satisfied by their preempted backups.  
Third, we have seen how process-connection can effortlessly 
accommodate omission-involving causation, delivering intuitively correct 
results in cases of causation by omission, prevention, and double prevention, 
as well as in cases of omission-involving redundant causation. And finally, we 
have seen how the condition of process-connection delivers intuitively correct 
results in cases where we need commensuration between cause and effect. 
Based on the cases considered so far, one might indeed be tempted to 
suggest that process-connection is both necessary and sufficient for causation. 
That, however, would be a mistake: there are clear cases where an event c is 
process-connected to a later event e, but where we intuitively judge that c is not 
a cause of e. Indeed, the counterexamples to the transitivity and intrinsicness of 
causation considered in Chapter 2 section 1.3.2 and 1.3.3 are cases of just this 
kind. To accommodate our intuitive judgements in such cases, we need to 
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supplement the necessary condition of process-connection with a further 
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A cause must somehow make a difference to its effect. Indeed, this was the 
guiding idea behind Lewis’s counterfactual theory of causation:  
 
‘We think of a cause as something that makes a difference, and the difference it 
makes must be a difference from what would have happened without it.’1 
 
In this chapter, I set out my second necessary condition for causation – the 
condition of security-dependence – which is intended to capture this idea. 
The condition of security-dependence is a counterfactual-based 
condition. Thus, the first step in setting out this condition is to give a recipe 
for evaluating the relevant counterfactuals – what we may call causal 
counterfactuals. These counterfactuals have antecedents of the form ‘if c had not 
occurred, then . . .’, or, more generally, ‘if c1, c2, . . . , cn had not occurred,  
then . . .’, where c1, c2, . . . , cn are contemporaneous events. And, importantly, 
they require a non-backtracking reading. 
Maudlin, Hall, and Paul have developed a recipe for evaluating 
counterfactuals that is specifically tailored to causal counterfactuals.2 The 
recipe for evaluating causal counterfactuals that I present here is closely based 
on their proposal. However, I suggest an important modification: it is usually 
assumed that counterfactuals should be evaluated relative to the entire space of 
possible worlds. By contrast, I suggest that causal counterfactuals should be 
evaluated relative to a restricted space of nomologically possible worlds – 
                                                
1 Lewis (1986d), pp. 160-62. 
2 Hall (2007b), pp. 18-21; Maudlin (2007b); Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 43-53. 
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namely, a contextually determined possibility horizon of the kind presented in 
Chapter 5. 
Based on my proposed recipe for evaluating causal counterfactuals 
within a possibility horizon, I next set out two relations that I suggest are both 
crucial for understanding causation: the ternary relation of counterfactual 
dependence within a possibility horizon, and the ternary relation of security-
dependence within a possibility horizon.  
In paradigm cases of difference-making, the effect depends 
counterfactually on its cause within the contextually relevant possibility 
horizon H : in such cases, it is true within H  that the effect simply would not 
have occurred, if the cause had not occurred. In cases of redundant causation, 
on the other hand, the effect would still have occurred – sometimes at exactly 
the same time and in exactly the same manner – even if the cause had not 
occurred. Such cases demonstrate that counterfactual dependence within a 
possibility horizon is not a necessary condition for causation.  
To find a necessary condition for causation that captures the idea that a 
cause is something that makes a difference, we therefore need to find a 
difference-making relation that is entailed by counterfactual dependence, but 
which also holds in just the right selection of further cases. To do this, my 
suggestion is that we need to pay attention to the modal features of the effect: 
we need to pay attention to how easily the effect could have failed to happen.  
My proposal is that a cause must make a difference to how easily its 
effect could have failed to happen. More precisely, it must make the right kind 
of difference: it must be the case that if the cause had not occurred, the effect 
could more easily have failed to happen.3 When this relationship holds between 
two events within a possibility horizon H – roughly, when it is true within H  
that e could more easily have failed to happen if an earlier event c had not 
occurred – I will say that e security-depends on c within possibility horizon H.   
                                                
3 For different ways to develop this idea, see Sartorio (2005) and (2006), and Yablo (2004). See 
also Woodward (2006). 
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As we shall see, counterfactual dependence within a possibility horizon 
entails security-dependence within that same possibility horizon. Thus, the 
condition of security-dependence is automatically satisfied in all our paradigm 
cases of difference-making, where the effect depends counterfactually on its 
cause(s) within the counterfactually determined possibility horizon. In addition, 
we shall see in Chapter 9 and 10 that the condition of security-dependence is 
satisfied in just the right selection of further cases: it is satisfied in cases of 
redundant causation, but not in cases where transitivity and intrinsicness fail, 
etc. 
In the following, I proceed in four steps. First, I set out my general 
recipe for evaluating causal counterfactuals (section 1). Building on this, I 
define the relations of counterfactual dependence within a possibility horizon 
(section 2), and security-dependence within a possibility horizon (section 3).  
 
1.  Evaluating causal counterfactuals within a possibility horizon 
In this section, I present my recipe for evaluating causal counterfactuals within 
a possibility horizon. This recipe is closely based on the recipe developed by 
Maudlin, Hall, and Paul.4 I set out my general recipe in section 1.1. I then 
illustrate two features of this recipe: that it ensures that our causal 
counterfactuals receive a non-backtracking reading (section 1.2), and that it 
resolves what we may call the problem of excision (section 1.3).  
 
1.1  The recipe 
The Maudlin-Hall-Paul recipe for evaluating causal counterfactuals makes a 
crucial departure from e.g. Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals: Lewis’s 
semantics is concerned with similarity between entire worlds.5 By contrast, the 
Maudlin-Hall-Paul proposal focuses on similarity between states of worlds at 
times: 
                                                
4 Hall (2007b), pp. 18-21; Maudlin (2007b); Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 43-53. 
5 See e.g. Lewis (1973) and (1986c). 
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‘Similarity enters in not as a relation between entire worlds, but as a relation 
between states of worlds at times.’6 
 
This innovation has important advantages. In particular, it ensures that our 
causal counterfactuals receive a non-backtracking reading.7 I therefore follow 
Maudlin, Hall, and Paul in focusing on relations of similarity between complete 
states of worlds at times. We may think of this in terms of closeness-at-a-time: two 
worlds wi and wj are close-at-time-t to the extent that the complete state of wi at 
t is similar to the complete state of wj at t.  
 There is, however, another respect in which the Maudlin-Hall-Paul 
recipe does follow Lewis: by assuming that causal counterfactuals should be 
evaluated relative to the entire space of possible worlds. By contrast, I suggest 
that causal counterfactuals should be evaluated within a contextually 
determined possibility horizon (see Chapter 5). Thus, I propose the following 
definition:8 
 
Causal counterfactuals: let c1, c2, . . . , cn be instantaneous events occurring at time t. 
Then the causal counterfactual ‘if none of the events c1, c2, . . . , cn had occurred, 
then it would have been the case that p’ is true within possibility horizon H  iff 
a) there is at least one world in H   where none of c1, c2, . . . , cn occur, and 
b) in the closest-at-t world(s) in H   where none of c1, c2, . . . , cn occur,  
it is the case that p. 
 
An important feature of the above definition is the way in which it treats causal 
counterfactuals with antecedents that are not satisfied in any world in the 
                                                
6 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 48.  
7 See e.g. Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 48-49. 
8 Note that this and the following definitions are made from the standpoint of the actual 
world. However, any world w can play the role of our actual world, and so the definitions are 
fully general, and can be used to evaluate causal counterfactuals from the standpoint of any 
world w. Cf. Lewis (1986d), p. 163. 
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relevant possibility horizon H.  To appreciate this point, it will be useful to 
compare my proposal with Lewis’s: 
On Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals, a counterfactual with a 
necessarily false antecedent counts as vacuously true.9 However, Lewis ensures 
that such vacuously true counterfactuals never play a role in his account of 
causation: he builds into his account of events that events occur contingently, 
so that for any event c, there is a possible world where c does not occur – and 
this ensures that counterfactuals of the form ‘if c had not occurred, . . .’ never 
have necessarily false antecedents.10  
By contrast, my notion of a possibility horizon allows for cases where an 
event c occurs in every world within the contextually relevant possibility 
horizon. Indeed, my proposal on how context selects a possibility horizon 
ensures that whenever an event c is categorised as a default event, c occurs in 
every world within the contextually relevant possibility horizon. In such cases, 
the antecedent of the causal counterfactual ‘if c had not occurred, . . .’ is not 
satisfied in any world within the relevant possibility horizon H.  My suggestion 
is that we should count such a counterfactual as not being true on the reading 
that is required for an account of causation, for the reason that it is concerned 
with a possibility that is deemed irrelevant within the contextually determined 
possibility horizon. This suggestion departs from Lewis’s treatment of 
counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents. However, it keeps what is 
important, namely the idea that only non-vacuously true counterfactuals can 
support causal claims.  
To make the above recipe for evaluating counterfactuals more precise, I 
now need to say more about distance-at-a-time. I adopt the following 
definition of what it takes for a world to be among the closest-at-t worlds 
where none of the events c1, c2, . . . , cn occur, leaving open the possibility that 
                                                
9 Lewis (1973), pp. 24-26. 
10 Lewis (1986g), p. 243. 
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there may be more than one closest-at-t world where none of these events 
occur:11 
 
Closest-at-t: from the standpoint of @, a world w is among the closest-at-t  
worlds in H  where none of the events c1, c2, . . . , cn occur iff 
a) w belongs to H  and none of c1, c2, . . . , cn occur in w, and 
b) there is no world w* such that  
i) w* belongs to H  and none of c1, c2, . . . , cn occur in w*, and 
ii) the distance-at-t between @ and w* is strictly shorter than  
the distance-at-t between @ and w*. 
 
The distance-at-a-time between worlds is a matter of overall similarity between 
complete states. To some degree, I will in the following rely on our intuitive 
ability to make the required judgements of overall similarity. Furthermore, I 
suggest two principles that we may use as rules of thumb.12 To set out these 
principles, it will be useful to have the following notion of a difference:  
 
Difference: let c be an event that occurs at t in wi, but does not occur at t in wj. 
Then c is a difference from the state-at-t of wi to the state-at-t of wj. 
 
The first rule of thumb is encapsulated in the following principle:  
 
Principle I: if the set of differences from the state-at-t of wi to the state-at-t of wj 
is the same as the set of differences from the state-at-t of wk to the state-at-t of wl, 
then the distance-at-t from wi to wj = the distance-at-t from wk to wl. 
                                                
11 The proposed definition does not allow for cases where there is an infinite series of closer 
and closer worlds, but no closest world(s). With a bit of added complexity, however, the 
definition can easily be modified to accommodate such cases. For discussion, see Lewis (1973), 
pp. 19-21, and Collins, Hall, and Paul (2004b), p. 4.   
12 Both of these principles require us to quantify over events. If we do not include enough 
events within our domain of quantification, the principles yield intuitively false results. If we 
include too many events, we rarely if ever find circumstances where the principles can be 
applied. Given our usual restrictions on the domain of instantaneous events, however, the 
principles are applicable in many cases, and yield intuitively correct results.    
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And consider possibility horizon H, with the following four possible worlds: 
  
Complete state at time t1:         Events at t1:      t2: 
@: A fires, B does not fire    A,    ¬B,       C  
w1:   A does not fire, B does not fire             A,    ¬B,       C 
w2: A fires, B fires     A,    ¬B,       C 
w3:   A does not fire, B fires          A,    ¬B,       C 
 
Let us, for example, compare the distance-at-t1 from @ to w1 with the distance-
at-t1 from w2 to w3. In keeping with our usual practice when working with 
neuron diagrams (cf. Chapter 4 section 2.3), we restrict our quantifiers to 
maximally temporally fragile events based on the firing or failure to fire of a 
single neuron. Based on this restriction, we find that the set of differences 
from the state-at-t1 of @ to the state-at-t1 of w1 is {A}: A is the only event that 
occurs at t1 in @, and does not occur at t1 in w1. The set of differences from the 
state-at-t1 of w2 to the state-at-t1 of w3 is exactly the same, namely {A}. By 
Principle I, it therefore follows that the distance-at-t1 from @ to w1 is exactly the 
same as the distance-at-t1 from w2 to w3.  
The second rule of thumb is encapsulated by the following principle: 
 
    A 
     C 
    B 
     t1          t2      Figure 1 
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Principle II: if the set of differences from the state-at-t of wi to the state-at-t of wj 
is a proper subset of the set of differences from the state-at-t of wk to the state-at-t 
of wl, then the distance-at-t from wi to wj < the distance-at-t from wk to wl.  
 
As an illustration of how this principle applies, let us again consider the four 
worlds listed above. In particular, let us now compare the distance-at-t1 from 
@ to w1 with the distance-at-t1 from @ to w3. We have already seen that the set 
of differences from the state-at-t1 of @ to the state-at-t1 of w1 is {A}. 
Furthermore, the set of differences from the state-at-t1 of @ to the state-at-t1 
of w3 is {A, ¬B}: A and ¬B are the only events that occur in @ at t1, and do 
not occur in w3 at t1. Clearly, {A} is a proper subset of {A, ¬B}. Thus, it 
follows from Principle II that the distance-at-t1 from @ to w1 is strictly shorter 
than the distance-at-t1 from @ to w3. 
Together, the two principles give a great deal of information about 
comparative distance-at-a-time. This is illustrated in the figure below, which 










         
  
 
When two worlds wi and wj in this figure are connected by a line with the same 
typography as the line connecting two worlds wk and wl, this means that the 
@: A fires,  
     B does not fire 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B does not fire 
w2:  A fires,  
      B fires 
w3: A does not fire 
     B fires 
 Figure 2 
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distance-at-t1 between wi and wj is exactly the same as the distance-at-t1 between 
wk and wl. And when the shortest route from a world wi to a world wk goes via a 
world wj, this means that the distance-at-t1 from wi to wj is strictly shorter than 
the distance-at-t1 from wi to wk. 
Although the two principles help us settle many questions about 
comparative distance-at-a-time, however, they do not settle all such questions: 
for example, they leave it unresolved how the distance-at-t1 from @ to w1 
compares to the distance-at-t1 from @ to w2. Such questions are determined 
directly by the relevant relation of overall similarity, and in making judgements 
about such cases, we must rely on our intuitive understanding of this relation 
of overall similarity. 
 In the following two sections, I will now illustrate two advantages of my 
proposed recipe for evaluating causal counterfactuals: that it ensures that our 
causal counterfactuals receive a non-backtracking reading, and that it resolves 
what we may call the problem of excision.  
 
1.2  Ensuring a non-backtracking reading 
It is an important advantage of the Maudlin-Hall-Paul recipe that it ensures 
that our causal counterfactuals receive a non-backtracking reading.13 To 













                                                
13 See e.g. Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 48-49. 
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In particular, consider the counterfactual claim: 
 
(P) If C had not occurred, D would not have occurred.  
 
On a backtracking reading, we would reason as follows: in order for C not to 
occur, it would have to have been the case that A did not occur. So if C had not 
occurred, D would not have occurred. If we want to maintain that 
counterfactual dependence is sufficient (or near enough) for causation, then it 
is important to avoid such a backtracking reading: otherwise, we are left with 
the obviously unacceptable result that C is a cause of D.14 
 The Maudlin-Hall-Paul recipe avoids such a backtracking reading by 
focusing on similarity between states of worlds at times, rather than similarity 
between entire worlds.15 By taking over this innovation, my proposed recipe 
retains this advantage of the Maudlin-Hall-Paul approach. To see this, let us 
consider how to evaluate (P) on my proposed account: 
Taking as our starting point what happens at time t2 when C occurs, we 
arrive at a possibility horizon that includes the following four worlds, 
characterised by their complete state at time t2 (in the right-hand column I also 
indicate how they evolve forward with respect to the occurrence of D): 
 
Complete state at time t2:    Events at t2:      t3: 
@: B fires, C fires     B,    C       D 
w1: B does not fire, C fires    B,    C       D 
w2: B fires, C does not fire    B,    C       D 
w3: B does not fire, C does not fire   B,    C       D 
 
Call this possibility horizon H.  By applying the two principles set out above, 
we arrive at the following facts about the comparative distance-at-t2 between 
these four worlds: 
                                                
14 Lewis (1986d), pp. 170-71; Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 71-73; see also Woodward (2003), p. 14. 
15 Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 48-49. 











         
  
 
The worlds in which D occurs – namely, @ and w2 – are here coloured white, 
while the worlds in which D fails to occur – namely, w1 and w3 – are coloured 
grey. 
We now find that the closest-at-t2 world in H  where C does not occur is 
world w2. D occurs in world w2. Thus, we get the intuitively correct result, 
namely that (P) is false: if C had not occurred, D would still have occurred. In 
this way, my proposed recipe avoids a backtracking reading. 
 
1.3 Resolving the problem of excision 
A second advantage of my proposed recipe for evaluating causal 
counterfactuals is that it resolves what we may call the problem of excision. 
Lewis gives a nice statement of this problem as follows: 
 
‘What is the closest way to actuality for C not to occur? – It is for C to be 
replaced by a very similar event, one which is almost but not quite C, one that 
is just barely over the border that divides versions of C itself from its nearest 
alternatives. But if C itself is taken to be fairly fragile, then if C had not 
occurred and almost-C had occurred instead, very likely the effects of almost-C 
would have been much the same as the actual effects of C. So our causal 
@: B fires,  
     C fires 
w1: B does not fire,  
     C fires 
w2:  B fires,  
      C does not fire 
w3: B does not fire 
     C does not fire 
 Figure 4 
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counterfactual will not mean what we thought it meant, and it may well not 
have the truth value we thought it had.’16 
  
Lewis then goes on to suggest the following solution:  
 
‘When asked to suppose counterfactually that C does not occur, we don’t really 
look for the very closest possible world where C’s conditions of occurrence are 
not quite satisfied. Rather, we imagine that C is completely and cleanly excised 
from history, leaving behind no fragment or approximation of itself.’17 
 
Unfortunately, this suggestion is unsatisfactory for two reasons: first, it is not 
at all clear what it means that C should be ‘completely and cleanly excised from 
history’.18 Second, the solution seems ad hoc: why should we consider what 
happens in the worlds where C has been completely and cleanly excised from 
history (whatever exactly that means), when there are closer worlds where C 
does not occur?19  
My proposal that causal counterfactuals should be evaluated within a 
contextually determined possibility horizon provides a simple solution to this 
problem: when an event c is categorised as a deviant event, this implies that 
extrapolation yields one or more alternatives c*, c**, . . . , to the occurrence of c. 
In that case, one of the restrictions that determines the contextually relevant 
possibility horizon H   is that a world w belongs to H   only if c or one of its 
alternatives c*, c**, . . . , occurs in w. This immediately yields the result that in 
the closest-at-t world(s) in H  where c does not occur, c is replaced by one of 
its alternatives. When we evaluate causal counterfactuals within a possibility 
                                                
16 Lewis (2004a), p. 90. 
17 Lewis (2004a), p. 90. 
18 Cf. Hall (2007b), p. 20; Paul and Hall (2013), p. 51. 
19 This second problem also arises for the suggestion that we should consider the closest-at-t 
world(s) where the region where C occurs is returned to its default state (see Paul and Hall 
(2013), p. 51; Hall (2007b), p. 20): why should we consider these worlds when there are closer-
at-t worlds where C does not occur?   
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horizon, then, the problem simply does not arise: within our contextually 
determined possibility horizon H,  the closest-at-t not-c-worlds just are worlds 
where c is replaced by one of its alternatives.  
 
2.  Counterfactual dependence 
Based on our general recipe for evaluating causal counterfactuals within a 
possibility horizon, we may now capture the ternary relation of counterfactual 
dependence within a possibility horizon: e depends counterfactually on c within 
possibility horizon H.  I define this relation as follows:  
 
Counterfactual dependence: an event e depends counterfactually on an event c  
within possibility horizon H  iff: 
a) c occurs at a time t strictly earlier than e, 
b) there is at least one not-c-world in H,  and 
c) in the closest-at-t not-c-world(s) in H,  e does not occur. 
 
Note that condition b) and c) simply specify the conditions that have to be 
satisfied in order for the causal counterfactual ‘if c had not occurred, then e 
would not have occurred’ to be true within possibility horizon H.  
Definitions of counterfactual dependence standardly add a requirement 
that c and e must be distinct.20 This is to exclude cases of logical rather than 
causal dependence, as when e+ is a more fragile version of e, and the 
occurrence of e+ therefore in some sense depends on the occurrence of e. In 
the above definition, I have left out this requirement because it is not needed: 
since c and e are instantaneous events, the requirement that c occurs strictly 
earlier than e automatically ensures that c and e are distinct.  
In paradigm cases of difference-making, we find that the effect depends 
counterfactually on its cause within the contextually relevant possibility 
horizon. As demonstrated by cases of redundant causation, however, 
                                                
20 See e.g. Lewis (1986g), p. 259; Sartorio (2010), p. 261. 
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counterfactual dependence is not a necessary condition for causation. To find a 
necessary condition that captures the sense in which a cause must make a 
difference to its effect, we therefore need a weaker version of counterfactual 
dependence: as I propose in the following, we need the doubly modal relation 
of security-dependence.  
 
3.  Security-dependence 
My aim in this section is to define the relation of security-dependence. I begin 
by defining the modal notion of security within a possibility horizon (section 3.1). 
Building on this, I then define the doubly modal relation of security-dependence 
within a possibility horizon (section 3.2). 
 
3.1  Security 
There is a range of expressions that convey the idea that an event could very 
easily have failed to occur. We may say, for example, that we came through 
something ‘by the skin of our teeth’, that an outcome ‘was hanging by a 
thread’, that we came ‘within a hair’s breadth’ of another outcome, etc. Such 
cases may be contrasted with cases where an event could not easily have failed 
to occur – though we do not have quite so colourful expressions to describe 
these cases. My aim in introducing the notion of security is to capture this 
intuitive sense in which an event could more or less easily have failed to occur.  
 Let e be an instantaneous event that occurs at time t´ in @, and let t be a 
time that is strictly earlier than time t´. Intuitively, we may say that the 
circumstances at time t were such that e could easily have failed to occur, when 
even slight changes to the circumstances at time t would be sufficient to 
prevent e’s occurrence. And we may say that the circumstances at time t were 
such that e could not easily have failed to occur, when only major changes to 
the circumstances at time t could have prevented e’s occurrence.  
Our task now is to make this precise in a way that does not draw on 
implicitly or explicitly causal notions. To do so, I will rely on the notion of a 
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possibility horizon. Thus, my aim is to define the notion of security within a 
possibility horizon.  
 A first suggestion is that e’s security at an earlier time t and within a 
possibility horizon H  is given by the distance-at-t from @ to the closest-at-t 
world(s) in H  where e does not occur. When there is only a short distance-at-t 
from @ to the closest-at-t world(s) in H  where e does not occur, e has a very 
low degree of security at t within H : just a slight change to the circumstances 
at time t takes us from @ to a world within H  where e does not occur. By 
contrast, when the closest-at-t world(s) in H  where e does not occur are very 
distant-at-t, e has a high degree of security at t within H : it would require 
major changes to the circumstances at time t to take us from @ to a world 
within H  where e does not occur.  
 This first suggestion goes a long way towards capturing our intuitive 
notion of how easily an event could have failed to occur, and in many of the 
cases we shall consider in the following, it is fully adequate. In some cases, 
however, there are several different possible changes to the circumstances at 
time t, each of which would be sufficient to prevent the later occurrence of e. 













Let us treat the world of the example as actual, and suppose that the 
contextually relevant possibility horizon H  includes the following four 
possible worlds (cf. section 1.1): 
    A 
     C 
    B 
     t1          t2      Figure 1 
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Complete state at time t1:         Events at t1:      t2: 
@: A fires, B does not fire    A,    ¬B,       C  
w1:   A does not fire, B does not fire             A,    ¬B,       C 
w2: A fires, B fires     A,    ¬B,       C 
w3:   A does not fire, B fires          A,    ¬B,       C 
 
In this case, there are two different possible changes to the circumstances at 
time t1, both of which would prevent the occurrence of C: if A had not 
occurred, C would not have occurred; and if ¬B had not occurred, C would 
not have occurred.  
 Intuitively, both of these threats should play a role in our evaluation of 
C’s security at time t1. However, the simple suggestion presented above can 
only take account of one of them – namely, the threat that is realized in the 
closest-at-t1 world where C does not occur. To see this, suppose for example 
that the closest-at-t1 world in H   where C does not occur is w1. In that case, the 
simple suggestion presented above yields the result that C’s security at time t1 
and within possibility horizon H  is given by the distance-at-t1 from @ to w1. 
However, this does not at all take into account that there is also a second 
change to the circumstances at time t1, which would prevent C’s occurrence – 
namely, the change consisting in letting neuron B fire.  
 To take account of multiple threats, as in the case illustrated here, we 
need a slightly more complex notion of security. In brief, my suggestion is that 
we should evaluate the security of an event e at an earlier time t and within a 
possibility horizon H  as follows: first, we determine all the ways in which 
circumstances could have been different at time t within possibility horizon H, 
such that, had they been different in that way, e would not have occurred. 
Second, we assess the distance-at-t to each of the closest-at-t world(s) where 
things are different in one of these ways (and where e therefore does not 
occur). Thus, the security of an event is a measure of the totality of these 
distances. 
Chapter 8: Defining security-dependence 
 207 
 To make this suggestion precise, I will rely on the notion of a minimal 
dependence set.21 Let us first define the more basic notion of a dependence set: 
 
Dependence set: a set S of contemporaneous events is a dependence set for e  
within possibility horizon H   iff: 
a) S occurs at a time t strictly earlier than e, 
b) there is at least one world in H  where none of the events in S occur, and 
c) in the closest-at-t worlds in H  where none of the events in S occur,  
e does not occur.  
 
Note that this notion of a dependence set simply generalises my above 
definition of counterfactual dependence to sets of contemporaneous events.  
In the example above, we find that {A}, {¬B}, and {A, ¬B} are all 
dependence sets for C at t1 within possibility horizon H.  There is a clear sense 
in which these dependence sets point to possible threats to C: if A had failed 
to occur, C would not have occurred; if ¬B had failed to occur, C would not 
have occurred; and if A and ¬B had both failed to occur, C would not have 
occurred. However, these threats are not properly independent of each other: 
once we have taken account of the threat that A fails to occur, and the threat 
that ¬B fails to occur, we do not need to also take account of the threat that A 
and ¬B both fail to occur.  
To address this problem, we need the notion of a minimal dependence 
set. To define this, the following notation will be useful:  
 
For any set S of events, w(—S) is the set of worlds such that  
none of the events in S occur.22   
                                                
21 A similar notion of a minimal dependence set was introduced by Ramachandran (1997), p. 
270, who aimed to use it to handle cases of preemption. 
22 Note that this definition requires us to quantify over all metaphysically possible worlds, with 
absolutely no restrictions on our domain of quantification. It does not merely require us to 
quantify over nomologically possible worlds, or worlds that are included in the contextually 
relevant possibility horizon. 
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Note that this definition concerns all possible worlds, not just nomologically 
possible worlds or worlds that are included in the relevant possibility horizon. 
On this basis, we may now define a minimal dependence set as follows, drawing 
on a notion of minimality that is clearly parallel to the notion of minimality 
that I used in my definition of minimal sufficiency. 
 
Minimal dependence set: a set S of contemporaneous events is a  
minimal dependence set for e within possibility horizon H   iff: 
a) S is a dependence set for e within H, and 
b) there is no set of contemporaneous events S*, such that  
i) S* is a dependence set for e within H,  
ii) S and S* have the same realization in @, and 
iii) w(—S) ⊂ w(—S*).  
 
Note that in the special case of an event e that occurs in every world within a 
possibility H, there are no dependence sets, and hence no minimal dependence 
sets either. This corresponds nicely to the intuition that in this special case 
there are no possible threats to e within the possibility horizon H.  
In our case of causation by omission, we now find that C has two 
minimal dependence sets at t1 within H  – namely, {A} and {¬B}. By contrast, 
{A, ¬B} is not a minimal dependence set for C within H,  since the set of 
worlds where both A and ¬B fail to occur is a proper subset of the set of 
worlds where A does not occur. These minimal dependence sets capture the 
threats to C without unwanted redundancy. 
The closest-at-t1 world in H  where A fails to occur is w1, and the 
closest-at-t1 world in H  where ¬B fails to occur is w2. My suggestion therefore 
is that C’s security at t1 within H   is given by the distance-at-t1 from @ to w1 
together with the distance-at-t1 from @ to w2.  
More generally, we may define security within a possibility horizon as 
follows: 
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Security: let e be an instantaneous event that occurs at time t´, and let t be a time 
that is strictly earlier than t´. Let S1, S2, …, Sn be sets of contemporaneous 
events occurring at t, such that S1, S2, …, Sn are the minimal dependence sets 
for e within possibility horizon H.  
Then the security of e at t within H   is given by the distance-at-t, for 
each set Si, between @ and the closest-at-t world(s) in H   where none of the 
events in Si occur.  
 
Note that so far we have only been concerned with the security of actual 
events. However, the definition of security may be straightforwardly extended 
to merely possible events, i.e. events that do not occur in the actual world @. 
Suppose that e is a merely possible event. On our first simple understanding of 
security, e’s security at a time t in @ is given by the distance-at-t from @ to the 
closest-at-t world where e does not occur. But the closest-at-t world where e 
does not occur is @ itself, and so the relevant distance is zero.  
The definition in terms of minimal dependence sets may be extended to 
give the same result: we may say that a merely possible event e has just one 
minimal dependence set – namely, the empty set Ø. From the standpoint of 
@, the closest-at-t world where none of the events in Ø occur is @ itself. And, 
once again, the distance from @ to itself is zero. Thus we may extend the 
definition of security as follows: 
 
Minimal security: an event e has minimal security at t within a possibility horizon H  
iff e does not occur in @.    
 
At the other extreme, we shall say that an event e has maximal security within a 
possibility horizon H   just in case e occurs in every world within H : 
 
Maximal security: an event e has maximal security within a possibility horizon H   
iff e occurs in every world in H. 
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In the intermediate cases, where an event e occurs, but does not occur in every 
world within the relevant possibility horizon H,  the security of e within H   is 
neither minimal nor maximal, but somewhere in between.  
In the following, all we need are facts about comparative security. In 
making judgements about comparative security, we may rely on the following 
two ceteris paribus rules when making judgements of comparative security:  
The first is that, ceteris paribus, an event is more secure when there is a 
greater distance-at-t to the closest-at-t world(s) where none of the events in its 
minimal dependence set(s) occur. To take a simple example, suppose that the 
security of e at t within H   is given by the distance-at-t between @ and w1, and 
suppose that the security of e* at t within H   is given by the distance-at-t 
between @ and w2. In that case, we can settle the question of comparative 
security simply by comparing distances: e is more secure at t than e* just in case 
the distance-at-t from @ to w1 is strictly greater than the distance-at-t from @ 
to w2, and e is just as secure at t as e* just in case the distance-at-t from @ to w1 
is exactly the same as the distance-at-t from @ to w2.  
The second rule is that, ceteris paribus, an event is more secure when it has 
fewer minimal dependence sets. Suppose, for example, that the security of e at t 
within H   is given by the distance-at-t from @ to w1, and that the security of e* 
at t within H   is given by the distance-at-t from @ to w1 together with the 
distance-at-t from @ to w2. In that case, e is more secure at t than e*.  
This notion of security within a possibility horizon gives a deterministic 
interpretation of our intuitive judgements about how easily an event could 
have failed to occur, based on the circumstances at some earlier time: saying 
that an event e has a high degree of security at a time t captures the idea that e 
could not easily have failed to occur, based on the circumstances at t. And 
saying that an event e has a low degree of security at an earlier time t captures 
the idea that e could easily have failed to occur, based on the circumstances at t. 
In the following, I will now build on this to define the relation of security-
dependence.  
Chapter 8: Defining security-dependence 
 211 
3.2  Security-dependence 
Given the notion of an event’s security within a possibility horizon, we may 
now go on to consider how an event c influences the security of a later event e, 
where we shall understand influence in counterfactual terms. In particular, 
considering the time t at which c occurs, we may ask: how would e’s security at 
t have been different, if c had not occurred? 
 We may distinguish several possible answers to this question. First, we 
need to distinguish between cases where the relevant possibility horizon H  is 
such that c occurs in every world within H, and cases where H  contains at 
least one world where c does not occur.  
If c occurs in every world in H, then any counterfactual claim with the 
antecedent ‘if c had not occurred, then . . .’ is false within H, since H  contains 
no world in which the antecedent is satisfied.  
If H  does contain at least one not-c-world, we may, by contrast, get true 
counterfactuals with the antecedent ‘if c had not occurred, then . . .’. In 
particular, we may get true counterfactuals comparing e’s actual security at time 
t with the security at t that e would have had, if c had not occurred. Such 
counterfactuals require us to evaluate the security of e in the closest-at-t not-c-
worlds in H.  For any such world w, this is done exactly as described in section 
3.1, by taking the standpoint of world w (cf. footnote 8). And we may then 
compare e’s security at t in the actual world @ with the security at t that e 
would have had, if c had not occurred. In this comparison, we may distinguish 
several possibilities.  
In some cases, the closest-at-t not-c-world(s) within a possibility horizon 
H  do not agree on whether e is less secure at t, just as secure at t, or more secure at t. 
In such cases, we typically resort to contrastive causal claims, which artificially 
restrict the possibility horizon under consideration.23 I discuss such cases in 
more detail in Chapter 10 section 3.  
                                                
23 Cf. Northcott (2008), p. 120. 
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In most cases, however, all the closest-at-t not-c-worlds in H   do agree 
on whether e is less secure at t, just as secure at t, or more secure at t. In such uniform 
cases, we may distinguish the following three relations: 
 
Security-dependence: an actual event e security-depends on  
an actual event c within possibility horizon H  iff 
a) c occurs at a time t strictly earlier than e, 
b) there is at least one not-c-world in H,  and 
c) in the closest-at-t not-c-world(s) in H,  e is less secure at t. 
 
Security-independence: an actual event e is security-independent from  
an actual event c within possibility horizon H  iff 
a) c occurs at a time t strictly earlier than e, 
b) there is at least one not-c-world in H,  and 
c) in the closest-at-t not-c-world(s) in H,  e is just as secure at t. 
 
Negative security-dependence: an actual event e security-depends negatively on  
an actual event c within possibility horizon H  iff 
a) c occurs at a time t strictly earlier than e, 
b) there is at least one not-c-world in H, and 
c) in the closest-at-t not-c-world(s) in H, e is more secure at t. 
 
It is important to note that these three relations are doubly modal: the notion 
of security is itself a modal notion – to evaluate an event e’s security at a time t, 
we need to consider the minimal dependence sets for e within the relevant 
possibility horizon H  and the distance-at-t, for each of these sets, to the 
closest-at-t world(s) in H   where all events in this set fail to occur. To evaluate 
which of the three relations holds between an event c, occurring at t, and a later 
event e, we then need to compare e’s actual security at t with the security e would 
have had at t, if c had not occurred.  
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My suggestion is that the distinction between these three different 
relations of security-dependence, security-independence, and negative security-
dependence is metaphysically significant. In particular, I suggest that security-
dependence within a possibility horizon is a necessary condition for causation: 
 
 
In Appendix A section 4, I prove the important result that counterfactual 
dependence within a possibility horizon is sufficient for security-dependence 
within that same possibility horizon. Thus, we find that the condition of 
security-dependence correctly captures all paradigm cases of difference-
making: in all paradigm cases of difference-making, where the effect depends 
counterfactually on its cause(s) within the contextually relevant possibility 
horizon, we also find that the effect security-depends on its cause(s) within the 
contextually relevant possibility horizon.  
In Chapter 9 section 1, we shall see that the effect also security-depends 
on its cause(s) in cases of redundant causation, showing that security-
dependence is a strictly weaker version of counterfactual dependence. In this 
way, security-dependence captures the sense in which a cause must make a 
difference to its effect. 
Furthermore, I suggest that the distinction between the three relations of 
security-dependence, security-independence, and negative security-dependence 
allows us to capture an important distinction between different kinds of causal 
relevance. The notion of causal relevance is most easily understood within an 
indeterministic framework. Within such a framework, we may say that the 
occurrence of c has positive causal relevance for the occurrence of e just in case c’s 
occurrence raises the probability of e’s occurrence; the occurrence of c is 
causally irrelevant for the occurrence of e just in case c’s occurrence leaves the 
The second condition – security-dependence: 
c is a cause of e within a possibility horizon H    
only if e security-depends on c within H. 
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probability of e’s occurrence unchanged; and the occurrence of c has negative 
causal relevance for the occurrence of e just in case c’s occurrence lowers the 
probability of e’s occurrence. As further elucidation, we tend to say that c is 
irrelevant to e when c’s occurrence is causally irrelevant to e’s occurrence, and we 
tend to say that e occurs in spite of c when c’s occurrence has negative causal 
relevance for the occurrence of e.  
Relying on the distinction between security-dependence, security-
independence, and negative security-dependence, we may now capture the 





4.  Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented a second necessary condition for causation – 
the condition of security-dependence. The motivation for this condition is the 
intuition that a cause must somehow make a difference to its effect. The 
condition of security-dependence, which is strictly weaker than counterfactual 
dependence, formulates a necessary condition for causation that captures this 
intuition.  
In the following two chapters, we shall see how accepting security-
dependence as a necessary condition for causation yields intuitively correct 
Positive causal relevance: c has positive causal relevance to e within H   iff  
e security-depends positively on c within H. 
 
Causal irrelevance: c is causally irrelevant to e within H   iff  
e is security-independent of c within H. 
 
Negative causal relevance: c has negative causal relevance to e within H   iff  
e security-depends negatively on c within H. 
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results in a wide variety of cases. We shall furthermore see how recognising the 
two relations of security-independence and negative security-dependence 
allows us to capture the nuances of our intuitive judgements in cases where we 
judge that an event c is not a cause of a later event e: in these cases, the relations 
of security-independence and negative security-dependence correctly capture 




































Applications of security-dependence  
 
In this chapter, we shall see some of the central applications of my proposal 
that security-dependence is a necessary condition for causation. I first show 
that the effect security-depends on its cause(s) in cases of redundant causation 
(section 1). Next, I show how security-dependence allows my account of 
causation to accommodate our intuitive judgements on the counterexamples to 
the transitivity and intrinsicness of causation (section 2 and 3). 
 
1.  Redundant causation 
In this section, I apply the condition of security-dependence to cases of 
redundant causation. The characteristic feature of these cases is that the effect 
does not depend counterfactually on its cause(s). For this reason, cases of 
redundant causation present a challenge when we are trying to spell out the 
sense in which a cause must make a difference to its effect. As we shall see in 
the following, the condition of security-dependence allows us to overcome this 
challenge: it captures a sense in which the cause makes a difference to its 
effect, even in cases where the effect does not depend counterfactually on its 
cause(s). 
To show this, I first show that the effect security-depends on its cause in 
our standard case of early preemption, and note that precisely the same 
reasoning applies to our standard cases of late preemption and symmetric 
overdetermination (section 1.1). I next discuss our slightly more complex case 
of trumping preemption, showing that the effect security-depends on its cause 
within each of the two possibility horizons that can reasonably be used to 
judge this case (section 1.2). 
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1.1  Early preemption, late preemption, and symmetric 
overdetermination 
Let us begin by considering our standard case of early preemption, illustrated 








        
 
 
Intuitively, A is a cause of E. Does E security-depend on A within the 
contextually relevant possibility horizon?  
It does. To show this, our first task is to identify the relevant possibility 
horizon. Considering the time at which A occurs, and following the standard 
practice of treating neuron firings as deviant events, we arrive at a possibility 
horizon containing the following four worlds, characterised by their complete 
state at time t1: 
 
Complete state at time t1:    Events at t1:     t3: 
@: A fires, B fires     A,   B          E 
w1: A does not fire, B fires    A,   B      E 
w2: A fires, B does not fire    A,   B      E 
w3: A does not fire, B does not fire   A,   B      E 
 
Call this possibility horizon H.  The relevant relations of comparative distance-
at-t1 are represented in Figure 2 below. Note that the worlds where E occurs – 
namely, @, w1, and w2 – are white, while the world where E does not occur – 
namely, w3 – is coloured grey: 
 
     A    C 
     E 
     B    D 
  t1        t2     t3      Figure 1 











         
  
 
To evaluate whether E security-depends on A within H, we now proceed in 
the following three steps. Note that I leave out relativisations to the possibility 
horizon H  in order to avoid clutter:  
 Step 1: the first step is to evaluate E’s security at t1 in @. From the 
standpoint of @, there is just one minimal dependence set for E at time t1 – 
namely, {A, B}. The closest-at-t1 world where both A and B fail to occur is w3. 
Thus, E’s security at t1 in @ is given by the distance-at-t1 from @ to w3.  
 Step 2: the second step is to evaluate E’s security at t1 in the closest-at-t1 
world(s) where A does not occur. From the standpoint of @, the closest-at-t1 
world where A does not occur is w1. From the standpoint of w1, there is one 
minimal dependence set for E at time t1 – namely, {B}; and the closest-at-t1 
world where B fails to occur is w3. Thus, E’s security at t1 in w1 is given by the 
distance-at-t1 from w1 to w3.  
 Step 3: the final step is to compare E’s security at t1 in @ with E’s 
security at t1 in w1. Since the distance-at-t1 from w1 to w3 is strictly smaller than 
the distance-at-t1 from @ to w3, we find that E is less secure at t1 in w1 than it is at 
t1 in @. 
@: A fires,  
     B fires 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B fires 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire 
w3: A does not fire 
     B does not fire 
 Figure 2 
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Thus we find that E security-depends on A within our possibility 
horizon H.  Even though E does not depend counterfactually on A, the 
condition of security-dependence is thus satisfied.1 We can – by applying 
exactly the same three-step procedure – verify that the effect also security-
depends on its cause(s) in standard cases of late preemption and symmetric 
overdetermination.  
Our case of trumping preemption is slightly more complex. For the sake 
of illustration, I therefore go through this case in the following section. 
 
1.2  A variant of trumping preemption 
In this section, I show that the effect also security-depends on its cause in our 
case of trumping preemption. For ease of reference, I repeat the neuron 







          
 
 
Intuitively, A-blue causes C. Correspondingly, we find that C security-depends 
on A-blue within any reasonable choice of possibility horizon. To see this, note 
that there are two reasonable choices of possibility horizon in the present case. 
                                                
1 Note that an application of the three steps also yields the result that E security-depends on B. 
Thus, the condition of security-dependence cannot distinguish between genuine causes and 
preempted backups. This result presents no threat to my claim that security-dependence is a 
necessary condition for causation. It simply shows that security-dependence is not sufficient for 
causation – we need the additional condition of process-connection to distinguish genuine 
causes from preempted backups. 
2 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 26. 
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Let us begin by considering the larger possibility horizon H 1, which includes 
all of the following worlds: 
 
Complete state at time t1:      Events at t1:     t2: 
@:  A fires in blue, with intensity I; B fires    A-blue,   B     C 
w1: A fires not in blue, with intensity I; B fires   A-blue,   B     C 
w2: A fires in blue, without intensity I; B fires   A-blue,   B     C 
w3: A fires not in blue, without intensity I; B fires   A-blue,   B     C 
w4: A does not fire; B fires      A-blue,   B     C 
w5:  A fires in blue, with intensity I; B does not fire  A-blue,   B     C 
w6: A fires not in blue, with intensity I; B does not fire  A-blue,   B     C 
w7: A fires in blue, without intensity I; B does not fire  A-blue,   B     C 
w8: A fires not in blue, without intensity I; B does not fire A-blue,   B     C 
w9: A does not fire; B does not fire     A-blue,   B     C 
 
Within this possibility horizon, we simply find that C depends counterfactually 
on A-blue: from the standpoint of @, the closest-at-t1 world where A-blue does 
not occur is world w1, where A still fires with intensity I, but not in blue. C 
does not occur in w1. Since counterfactual dependence within a possibility 
horizon entails security-dependence within that same possibility horizon, we 
thus straightforwardly find that C security-depends on A-blue within possibility 
horizon H 1.  
 The second reasonable choice of possibility horizon derives from a 
context where the only alternative to A’s firing in blue and with intensity I is 
that A does not fire at all. This yields the following more restricted possibility 
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Complete state at time t1:      Events at t1:     t2: 
@:  A fires in blue, with intensity I; B fires    A-blue,   B     C 
w4: A does not fire; B fires      A-blue,   B     C 
w5:  A fires in blue, with intensity I; B does not fire  A-blue,   B     C 
w9: A does not fire; B does not fire     A-blue,   B     C 
 
It is within this more restricted possibility horizon that the case earns its title as 
a case of redundant causation: within this more restricted possibility horizon, 
we find that C does not depend counterfactually on A-blue: from the 
standpoint of @, the closest-at-t1 world where A-blue does not occur is w4. And 
C still occurs in w4 – because of B.  
 However, we still find that C security-depends on A-blue within H 2. 
Indeed, the argument to show this is entirely parallel to the argument showing 
that the effect security-depends on its cause in our standard case of early 
preemption considered above. To bring out this parallel, I illustrate the 
comparative distances-at-t1 in the figure below, where the world where C does 











            
           Figure 4 
 
 
@: A fires in blue, 
     with intensity I,  
     B fires 
w4: A does not fire,  
     B fires 
w5:  A fires in blue,  
      with intensity I, 
      B does not fire 
w9: A does not fire 
     B does not fire 
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By exactly the same argument as above, we now find – as we should – that C 
security-depends on A-blue within H 2. 
 In this way, the condition of security-dependence captures how a cause 
makes a difference to its effect even in cases of redundant causation, where the 
effect does not depend counterfactually on its cause(s).  
 
2.  The non-transitivity of causation 
In this section, I show how accepting security-dependence as a necessary 
condition for causation allows my account to accommodate our intuitive 
judgements on counterexamples to the transitivity of causation. I begin by 
outlining how transitivity fails in these cases (section 2.1). I then turn to the 
counterexamples themselves.  
Counterexamples to the transitivity of causation are standardly divided 
into two groups: counterexamples that do not involve omissions, and 
counterexamples that do.3 We have already seen examples of both kinds: Switch 
(discussed in Chapter 2 section 2.2.1) does not involve omissions, while Boulder 
(discussed in Chapter 2 section 1.3.2) does involve omissions. In the following, 
I show how the condition of security-dependence secures the intuitively 
correct verdict on both Switch (section 2.2) and Boulder (section 2.3). In section 
2.4, I argue that – in keeping with my general claim that there is no deep 
metaphysical distinction between omissions and ordinary events – 
counterexamples to the transitivity of causation should not be categorised by 
whether or not they involve omissions; rather, they should be categorised by 
how the condition of security-dependence fails to be satisfied.  
In the two final sections, I discuss how security-dependence may be 
understood as drawing a line between preemption cases and transitivity failure 
cases (section 2.5), and I consider an apparent counterexample to my claim 
that security-dependence allows us to handle all transitivity failure cases 
(section 2.6). 
                                                
3 See e.g. Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 215-237. 
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2.1  How transitivity fails 
The intuitive principle that causation is a transitive relation may be stated as 
follows (the asterisk signifies that I do not endorse this principle): 
 
        * Transitivity of causation: if there is a set of events {d1, d2, . . . , dn},  
such that c causes d1, d1 causes d2, . . . , and dn causes e, then c causes e. 
 
We have already seen that Transitivity of causation faces counterexamples: there 
are cases where causation fails to behave transitively, i.e. cases where c does not 
cause e, even though there is a set of events {d1, d2, . . . , dn}, such that c causes 
d1, d1 causes d2, . . . , and dn causes e.  
The condition of process-connection cannot on its own accommodate 
our intuitive verdicts in these cases: as I prove in Appendix A section 2, the 
relation of process-connection is transitive. To accommodate our intuitive 
verdicts and explain why causation fails to behave transitively in these cases, 
we therefore need to supplement the condition of process-connection with a 
further necessary condition, which is not transitive.  
This is where the condition of security-dependence comes in: security-
dependence is not a transitive relation. Let us say that security-dependence fails to 
behave transitively whenever e does not security-depend on c, even though there is 
a set of events {d1, d2, . . . , dn}, such that d1 security-depends on c, d2 security-
depends on d1, . . . , and e security-depends on dn. My suggestion is that 
causation fails to behave transitively in exactly those cases where security-
dependence fails to behave transitively. And the fact that security-dependence 
fails to behave transitively in these cases explains why causation fails to behave 
transitively: in the relevant cases, there is a set of events {d1, d2, . . . , dn}, such 
that c causes d1 (and correspondingly, d1 security-depends on c), d1 causes d2 
(and correspondingly, d2 security-depends on d1), . . . , and dn causes e (and 
correspondingly, e security-depends on dn), but e does not security-depend on c 
– and for this reason, c is not a cause of e.  
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2.2  Switch 
Let us begin by considering a counterexample to Transitivity of causation that 
does not involve omissions, namely Switch: 
 
Switch: Suzy is standing by a switch in the railroad tracks. She sees a train 
approaching in the distance, and flips the switch so that the train travels down 
the left-hand track. If she had not flipped the switch, the train would have 
travelled down the right-hand track instead. Since the tracks converge a few 
miles later, the train arrives at its destination all the same.4 
 
The structure of Switch is represented in the neuron diagram below (for details, 











    
 
 
Switch presents a counterexample to Transitivity of causation as follows: B (Suzy’s 
flipping the switch) causes D (the train’s journey down the left-hand track), and 
D in turn causes F (the train’s arrival at its destination). By transitivity, it 
follows that B causes F. But, intuitively, this is false: intuitively, B (Suzy’s 
                                                
4 Switching cases of this kind are discussed e.g. in Hall (2004a), pp. 187-92, (2007a),  
p. 118, and (2007b), pp. 28-32 and 51; Hitchcock (2009), p. 394; Mackie (1992); p. 496-7; Paul 
and Hall (2013), p. 232; and Sartorio (2005), pp. 74-5. 
5 The figure is adapted from Paul and Hall (2013), p. 232. 
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t1          t2        t3    t4 
flipping the switch) does not cause F (the train’s arrival at its destination) – 
rather, B is simply irrelevant to F.6  
 The condition of process-connection cannot on its own accommodate 
this verdict: as is easily verified, B is process-connected to D, and D is in turn 
process-connected to F. By the transitivity of process-connection (cf. 
Appendix A section 2), it follows that B is process-connected to F – as indeed 
it is, via the following process:  
 
t1: B  (together with A) 
 t2: C-stripes 
 t3: D 
 t4: F 
 
This process is illustrated in the figure below, where I have put a halo around 











      
           Figure 5*
  
Thus, the condition of process-connection cannot on its own accommodate 
our intuitive verdict that B does not cause F. To accommodate this verdict – 
and to explain why causation fails to behave transitively in Switch – we need the 
                                                
6 For this judgement, see e.g. Hall (2007b), pp. 28-29; Hitchcock (2009), p. 394; and Paul and 
Hall (2013), p. 232. 
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condition of security-dependence: as we shall now see, the reason why 
causation fails to behave transitively in Switch is that security-dependence fails 
to behave transitively. In brief, F security-depends on D, and D security-
depends on B, but F does not security-depend on B – and this is the reason 
why B is not a cause of F. 
It is easy to see that F security-depends on D: within any possibility 
horizon that treats D as a candidate cause, F depends counterfactually on D.7 
Since counterfactual dependence within a possibility horizon implies security-
dependence within that same possibility horizon, this shows that F security-
depends on D. It is similarly easy to see that D security-depends on B: once 
again, D depends counterfactually on B within any possibility horizon that 
treats B as a candidate cause. 
I will now show that F does not security-depend on B within the 
contextually relevant possibility horizon. Note that our possibility horizon 
should include the following four possible worlds, characterised by their 
complete state at time t1: 
 
Complete state at time t1:    Events at t1:     t4: 
@: A fires, B fires     A,   B          F 
w1: A does not fire, B fires    A,   B      F 
w2: A fires, B does not fire    A,   B      F 
w3: A does not fire, B does not fire   A,   B      F 
 
Call this possibility horizon H.  We may represent the comparative distances-
at-t1 between these four worlds as follows, where the worlds in which F does 




                                                
7 Remember that my proposed recipe for evaluating counterfactuals ensures that the relevant 
counterfactuals receive a non-backtracking reading. 











          Figure 6 
 
To see that F does not security-depend on B within H, we proceed as follows: 
 Step 1: our first step is to evaluate F’s security at t1 in @. From the 
standpoint of @, there is just one minimal dependence set for F at t1  – namely, 
{A}; and the closest-at-t1 world where A fails to occur is w1. Thus, F’s security 
at t1 in @ is given by the distance-at-t1 from @ to w1. 
 Step 2: our second step is to evaluate F’s security at t1 in the closest-at-t1 
world(s) where B does not occur. From the standpoint of @, the closest-at-t1 
world where B does not occur is w2. From the standpoint of w2, there is just 
one minimal dependence set for F at t1 – namely, {A}; and the closest-at-t1 
world where A fails to occur is world w3. Thus, F’s security at t1 in w2 is given 
by the distance-at-t1 from w2 to w3.  
 Step 3: our final step is to compare F’s security at t1 in @ with F’s security 
at t1 in w2. As indicated in the figure, the distance-at-t1 from @ to w1 is exactly 
the same as the distance-at-t1 from w2 to w3. This shows that F is just as secure at 
t1 in w2 as it is in @.  
Thus, F does not security-depend on B within H.  8 And for this reason, 
B is not a cause of F: the condition of security-dependence fails to be satisfied.  
                                                
8 Within the smaller possibility horizon where A is treated as a background condition, while B 
is treated as a candidate cause, we similarly find that F is security-independent from B.    
@: A fires,  
     B fires 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B fires 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire 
w3: A does not fire 
     B does not fire 
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2.3  Boulder 
The condition of security-dependence similarly yields intuitively correct results 
when applied to the following omission-involving case (cf. Chapter 2 section 
1.3.2): 
 
Boulder: ‘A boulder is dislodged and begins rolling ominously toward Hiker. 
Before it reaches him, Hiker sees the boulder and ducks. The boulder sails 
harmlessly over his head with nary a centimetre to spare. Hiker survives his 
ordeal.’9 
 














       
         
 
A here represents the physiological processes that keep Hiker alive, B 
represents the boulder’s fall, and C represents Hiker’s being attentive. E 
represents the boulder’s flying through the air, F represents Hiker’s duck, ¬H 
represents Hiker’s not being hit by the boulder, and I represents Hiker’s 
survival. Note that F is a stubborn neuron (marked by its thicker perimeter), 
                                                
9 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 222. The case is originally due to Hall. 
10 This is a modified version of Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 10. 
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requiring two stimulatory signals to fire. This reflects the fact that Hiker will 
duck just in case the boulder falls and he is attentive. 
 Boulder presents a counterexample to Transitivity of causation as follows: B 
(the boulder’s fall) causes F (Hiker’s duck), and F in turn causes I (Hiker’s 
survival). By transitivity, it follows that B causes I. But this is false: B (the 
boulder’s fall) does not cause I (Hiker’s survival) – rather, Hiker survives in spite 
of the boulder’s fall.  
 As in Switch, process-connection cannot on its own accommodate our 
intuitive judgement in this case: B is process-connected to F, and F is process-
connected to I. By the transitivity of process-connection, it follows that B is 
process-connected to I – and indeed it is, via the process: 
 
 t1: B  (together with C) 
 t2: F 
 t3: ¬H  (together with G) 
 t4: I 
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This shows that the condition of process-connection cannot explain why 
causation fails to behave transitively in this case. To explain this – and to 
accommodate the intuitive verdict that B does not cause I – we need the 
further condition of security-dependence: as we shall now see, the fact that 
causation fails to behave transitively in Boulder is explained, as in Switch, by the 
fact that security-dependence fails to behave transitively – I security-depends 
on F, and F security-depends on B, but I does not security-depend on B.  
This is seen as follows: I security-depends on F, since I depends 
counterfactually on F within any possibility horizon that treats F as a candidate 
cause. And F security-depends on B, since there is once again counterfactual 
dependence within any possibility horizon that treats B as a candidate cause. 
However, I does not security-depend on B within the contextually relevant 
possibility horizon. 
To see this, note that it is natural to treat A (the physiological processes 
that keep Hiker alive) as a default event. Thus, our possibility horizon should 
include the following four worlds, characterised by their complete states at 
time t1:  
 
Complete state at time t1:     Events at t1:  t4: 
@: A fires, B fires, C fires     A,   B,   C  I 
w1: A fires, B does not fire, C fires    A,   B,   C  I 
w2: A fires, B fires, C does not fire    A,   B,   C  I 
w3: A fires, B does not fire, C does not fire   A,   B,   C  I 
 
Call this possibility horizon H.  We may represent the relations of comparative 
distance-at-t1 between these worlds as follows, where the worlds in which I 

















 Figure 8 
 
To see that I does not security-depend on B within H, we now proceed in the 
usual three steps: 
 Step 1: our first step is to evaluate I’s security at t1 in @. From the 
standpoint of @, there is one minimal dependence set for I at t1 – namely, {C}; 
and the closest-at-t1 world where C fails to occur is w2. Thus, I’s security at t1 in 
@ is given by the distance-at-t1 from @ to w2.  
 Step 2: our second step is to evaluate I’s security at t1 in the closest-at-t1 
world(s) in which B does not occur. From the standpoint of @, the closest-at-
t1 world where B does not occur is w1. From the standpoint of w1, there is one 
minimal dependence set for I at t1 – namely, {¬B, C}; and the closest-at-t1 
world in which ¬B and C both fail to occur is w2. Thus, I’s security at t1 in w1 is 
given by the distance-at-t1 from w1 to w2. 
 Step 3: our final step is to compare I’s security at t1 in @ with I’s security 
at t1 in w1. As indicated in the figure, the distance-at-t1 from @ to w2 is strictly 
shorter than the distance-at-t1 from w1 to w2. Thus, we find that I is more secure at 
t1 in w1 than it is in @.  
@: A fires,  
     B fires, 
     C fires 
w2: A fires,  
     B fires, 
     C does not fire 
w1: A fires,  
     B does not fire, 
     C fires 
w3: A fires,  
     B does not fire 
     C does not fire 
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 This yields the result that I does not security-depend on B within H. 11  
And for this reason, B is not a cause of I, since the necessary condition of 
security-dependence fails to be satisfied. 
 
2.4  Two kinds of counterexamples to transitivity 
On my proposed account of causation, the two conditions of process-
connection and security-dependence are individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient for causation. This commits me to the following generalisation: in all 
counterexamples to Transitivity of causation, causation fails to behave transitively 
because security-dependence fails to behave transitively. In all these cases, 
then, the non-transitivity of security-dependence allows us to understand why 
causation fails to behave transitively. 
If this is correct, it holds an additional lesson. As I mentioned above, 
counterexamples to Transitivity of causation are standardly divided into two 
groups: counterexamples that do not involve omissions, and counterexamples 
that do.12 In keeping with my general suggestion that there is no deep 
metaphysical distinction between so-called positive events and omissions, this 
distinction plays no role in my proposed treatment of the counterexamples. 
Instead, my treatment of these cases draws attention to another way of 
categorising the counterexamples to Transitivity of causation: based on how the 
effect fails to security-depend on the candidate cause. 
There are two ways in which a later event e may fail to security-depend 
on an earlier event c, when the relevant possibility horizon includes a world 
where c does not occur: it may be the case that e is security-independent from c, 
or it may be the case that e security-depends negatively on c. In cases of 
security-independence, c is causally irrelevant to e; in cases of negative security-
                                                
11 Within the larger possibility horizon where A is also treated as a candidate cause, we 
similarly find that I security-depends negatively on B. Within the smaller possibility horizon 
where C is treated as a background condition, we find that I is security-independent from B 
(this corresponds to the variation of Boulder discussed in section 2.4 below). In both cases, the 
condition of security-dependence fails to be satisfied. 
12 Hall (2000), Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 215-37. 
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dependence, c has negative causal relevance to e and, correspondingly, it seems 
intuitively correct to say that e occurs in spite of c (cf. Chapter 8 section 3.2).13 
The two cases we have considered above illustrate the two ways in which 
one event can fail to security-depend on another: in Switch, we found that F 
would have been just as secure at t1 if B had not occurred. In Switch, then, B is 
causally irrelevant to F. This fits nicely with our intuitive judgement: intuitively, 
we want to say that B (Suzy’s flipping the switch) is entirely irrelevant to F (the 
train’s arrival). In Boulder, on the other hand, we found that I would have been 
more secure at t1 if B had not occurred. In this case, then, B has negative causal 
relevance to I. Once again, this fits nicely with our intuitive judgement: 
intuitively, we want to say that I (Hiker’s survival) occurs in spite of B (the 
boulder’s fall). 
On this basis, we may divide counterexamples to Transitivity of causation 
into two groups: i) cases where transitivity fails because the candidate cause is 
causally irrelevant to the effect, and ii) cases where transitivity fails because the 
candidate cause has negative causal relevance to the effect.  
It is important to note that this distinction cuts across the distinction 
between counterexamples to Transitivity of causation based on whether or not 
they involve omissions. Above, we have considered one case that does not 
involve omissions, namely Switch, where Suzy’s flipping the switch is simply 
irrelevant to the train’s arrival. And we have considered one omission-
involving case, namely Boulder, where Hiker survives in spite of the boulder’s 
fall. However, we may easily tinker with these cases so as to get a version of 
Switch where the train arrives in spite of Suzy’s flipping the switch, and a 
                                                
13 In addition, it may also be the case that the possibility horizon under consideration contains 
two or more closest-at-t not-c-worlds, where these worlds do not agree on whether e is less 
secure, just as secure or more secure at t. Such cases require a contrastive treatment, where we restrict 
the possibility horizon under consideration until it yields uniform results (cf. Northcott (2008), 
p. 120). If e still fails to security-depend on c within a restricted possibility horizon H   that 
yields uniform results, this is either because e is security-independent from c within H  or 
because e security-depends negatively on c within H.  For more on cases that require a 
contrastive treatment, see Chapter 10 section 3.  
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version of Boulder where the boulder’s fall is simply irrelevant to Hiker’s 
survival.  
We may get a version of Switch where the train arrives in spite of Suzy’s 
flipping the switch by making the following addition:  
 
Addition to Switch: When the train is approaching, the left track is in fact 
disconnected. Just as Suzy flips the switch, Sally comes by and reconnects the 
track. If Sally had not reconnected the track, the train would have been 
derailed.14 
 











    
 
 
G here represents Sally’s reconnecting the tracks. Furthermore, D is a stubborn 
neuron representing the fact that the train’s journey down the left-hand track 
occurs just in case Suzy flips the switch and Sally reconnects the tracks. 
 The relevant possibility horizon H  for determining whether F security-
depends on B includes the following eight worlds: 
 
                                                
14 This case is based on a case presented by Sartorio. Comparing this case with Switch, Sartorio 
notes that ‘[i]f anything, we feel even more reluctant to say that [Suzy’s] flipping the switch is a 
cause […] in this case’ (Sartorio (2005), p. 82). This comment supports my claim that the train 
here arrives in spite of Suzy’s flipping the switch. 
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Complete state at time t1:     Events at t1:     t4: 
@: A fires, B fires, G fires     A,   B,   G     F 
w1: A does not fire, B fires, G fires    A,   B,   G     F 
w2: A fires, B does not fire, G fires    A,   B,   G     F 
w3: A does not fire, B does not fire, G fires   A,   B,   G     F 
w4: A fires, B fires, G does not fire    A,   B,   G     F 
w5: A does not fire, B fires, G does not fire   A,   B,   G     F 
w6: A fires, B does not fire, G does not fire   A,   B,   G     F 
w7: A does not fire, B does not fire, G does not fire A,   B,   G     F 
 
We may represent the comparative distance-at-t1 between these eight worlds as 















Following our usual three-step procedure, we now find that F (the train’s 
arrival) security-depends negatively on B (Suzy’s flipping the switch) within H : 
if B had not occurred, F would have been more secure at t1.  
 Step 1: our first step is to evaluate F’s security at t1 in @. From the 
standpoint of @, there are two minimal dependence sets for F at t1 – namely, 
@:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      G fires 
w4:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      G does not fire 
w1:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      G fires 
w5:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      G does not fire 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      G fires 
w6:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      G does not fire 
w3:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      G fires 
w7:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      G does not fire 
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{A} and {G}. The closest-at-t1 world where A fails to occur is w1, and the 
closest-at-t1 world where G fails to occur is w4. Thus, F’s security at t1 in @ is 
given by the distance-at-t1 from @ to w1 together with the distance-at-t1 from 
@ to w4.  
 Step 2: our second step is to evaluate F’s security at t1 in the closest-at-t1 
world(s) where B does not occur. From the standpoint of @, the closest-at-t1 
world where B does not occur is w2. From the standpoint of w2, F has two 
minimal dependence sets at t1 – namely, {A} and {¬B, G}; the closest-at-t1 
world where A fails to occur is w3, and the closest-at-t1 world where both ¬B, 
and G fail to occur is w4. Thus, F’s security at t1 in w2 is given by the distance-
at-t1 from w2 to w3 together with the distance-at-t1 from w2 to w4.  
 Step 3: our third and final step is to compare F’s security at t1 in @ with 
F’s security at t1 in w2. As indicated in the figure, the distance-at-t1 from @ to 
w1 is exactly the same as the distance-at-t1 from w2 to w3. Furthermore, the 
distanc-at-t1 from @ to w4 is strictly shorter than the distance-at-t1 from w2 to 
w4. From this, it follows that F is more secure at t1 in w2 than it is at t1 in @. 
 In the present case, F thus security-depends negatively on B – fitting 
nicely with the intuitive verdict that F (the train’s arrival) here occurs in spite of 
B (Suzy’s flipping the switch).15  
 We may similarly tinker with Boulder to get a version of the case where 
the boulder’s fall is simply irrelevant to Hiker’s survival: to get this, we simply 
need to ensure that Hiker will automatically duck if the boulder falls, irrespective 





                                                
15 Within the smaller possibility horizon where G is treated as a background condition, the case 
behaves like the original version of Switch, and we here find that F is security-independent from 
B. 
16 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 10. 












In this case, the relevant possibility horizon H  for determining whether I 
security-depends on B includes just two worlds, namely:  
 
Complete state at time t1:    Events at t1:     t4: 
@: A fires, B fires     A,   B      I 
w2: A fires, B does not fire    A,   B      I 
 
Since I occurs in both of these worlds, we find that I is maximally secure at t1 
in both @ and w2. And thus we find that I would have been just as secure at t1 if 
B had not occurred, fitting nicely with the intuitive judgement that B (the 
boulder’s fall) is here simply irrelevant to I (Hiker’s survival).17 
Together, these two cases show that my classification of transitivity-
failure cases based on how the effect fails to security-depend on the candidate 
cause cuts across the distinction between cases that do and do not involve 
omissions. And while it makes no difference to my proposed way of handling 
these cases whether or not they involve omissions, it does make a difference 
how the effect fails to security-depend on the candidate cause: the distinction 
between the two ways in which the effect may fail to security-depend on its 
candidate cause captures the distinction between cases where the candidate 
cause is causally irrelevant and cases where it has negative causal relevance.   
                                                
17 When we consider a larger possibility horizon, which includes worlds where A does not 
occur, we similarly find that I is security-independent of B.  
   A    D   G   I 
     E      H    
   B      F 
   t1    t2    t3    t4    Figure 11 
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2.5  Borderline cases 
The structure of early preemption cases is remarkably similar to the structure 












In standard preemption cases, a candidate cause c is connected to an effect e by 
a chain of counterfactual dependence, even though e does not depend 
counterfactually on c. In the case above, for example, E depends 
counterfactually on C, and C depends counterfactually on A, but E does not 
depend counterfactually on A. Switch and Boulder exhibit just these structural 
features as well.  
In light of these structural similarities, we may think of the condition of 
security-dependence as a way of drawing a line separating early preemption cases 
from transitivity failure cases: what separates our case of early preemption 
from the counterexamples to transitivity is that the effect security-depends on 
the candidate cause in the case of early preemption, while the effect fails to 
security-depend on the candidate cause in the counterexamples to transitivity.  
Once we recognise the similarities between the two kinds of cases, 
however, we should also expect to find borderline cases: cases we may easily 
classify as curious variants of early preemption, even though they are in fact 
transitivity failure cases, or vice versa. In the following, I give an example of such 
a case, and two more examples of such cases may be found in Appendix B 
(case 23 and 24): 
     A    C 
     B    D 
     E 
 t1         t2   t3      Figure 12 
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Window-shattering: Suzy throws a rock at the window. Her aim is slightly off, but 
a strong gust of wind brings her rock back on course. It hits the window and 
the window shatters. If Suzy had not thrown, Billy would have thrown a larger 
rock and hit the window, independently of whether there was wind or not.18 
 














A here represents the strong gust of wind, B represents Suzy’s throw, C 
represents Billy’s readiness to throw, and D represents Suzy’s rock being on 
target to hit the window. Note that D is a stubborn neuron that requires two 
stimulatory signals in order to fire.  
 The present case has the structural features shared by preemption cases 
and transitivity failure cases: F depends counterfactually on D, and D depends 
counterfactually on B, but F does not depend counterfactually on B. We may 
now ask: is B a cause of F? It seems to me that we are to some extent 
ambivalent about how to answer this question. I take it to be an advantage of 
my condition of security-dependence that it can capture this ambivalence, as 
we shall now see.  
                                                
18 Note that this case is similar to cases of alleged chance-lowering causation. For discussion, 
see e.g. Dowe (2000), pp. 33-40; Hitchcock (2004); Lewis (1986e), pp. 179-80; Mellor (1995), 
pp. 67-68. 
     B    D 
     C    E 
     F 
 t1         t2   t3      Figure 13 
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First, note that B is process-connected to F via the following process: 
 

















       
Thus, the condition of process-connection cannot on its own capture why we 
hesitate about whether to count B as a cause of F. To capture this, we need the 
condition of security-dependence. To see this, let us consider the most natural 
choice of possibility horizon, namely the possibility horizon H  containing the 
following eight worlds: 
 
Complete state at time t1:     Events at t1:     t3: 
@: A fires, B fires, C fires     A,   B,   C     F 
w1: A does not fire, B fires, C fires    A,   B,   C     F 
w2: A fires, B does not fire, C fires    A,   B,   C     F 
w3: A does not fire, B does not fire, C fires   A,   B,   C     F 
w4: A fires, B fires, C does not fire    A,   B,   C     F 
w5: A does not fire, B fires, C does not fire   A,   B,   C     F 
     B    D 
     C    E 
     F 
 t1         t2   t3     Figure 13* 
     A 
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w6: A fires, B does not fire, C does not fire   A,   B,   C     F 
w7: A does not fire, B does not fire, C does not fire A,   B,   C     F 
 















Call this possibility horizon H.  Within this possibility horizon, we now find 
that it comes down to a subtle judgement of comparative security whether or 
not F security-depends on B within H.  To bring this out, let us go through 
our usual three steps. 
 Step 1: the first step is to evaluate F’s security at t1 in @. From the 
standpoint of @, there are two minimal dependence sets for F at t1 – namely, 
{A} and {B, C}. The closest-at-t1 world where A does not occur is w1, and the 
closest-at-t1 world where both B and C do not occur is w6. Thus, F’s security at 
t1 in @ is given by the distance-at-t1 between @ and w1 together with the 
distance-at-t1 between @ and w6. 
 Step 2: the second step is to evaluate F’s security at t1 in the closest-at-t1 
world(s) where B does not occur. From the standpoint of @, the closest-at-t1 
@:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w4:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
w1:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w5:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w6:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
w3:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w7:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
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world where B does not occur is w2. From the standpoint of w2, F has one 
minimal dependence set at t1 – namely, {C}; and the closest-at-t1 world where 
C does not occur is w6. Thus, F’s security at t1 in w2 is given by the distance-at-t1 
between w2 and w6.  
 Step 3: the third step is to compare F’s security at t1 in @ with F’s 
security at t1 in w2. We here find that it depends on very specific details of the 
case how we should make this comparison.  
If there is a sufficiently long distance-at-t1 from @ to w1, which is the 
closest-at-t1 world where A (the strong gust of wind) does not occur, then we 
find that F security-depends on B – and if so, the case should be classified as a 
curious variant of early preemption. If, on the other hand, the distance-at-t1 
from @ to w1 is relatively short, we find that F is just as secure or more secure at t1 
in w2. This implies that B is not a cause of F – and the case should be classified 
as a transitivity failure case. I believe that these results correctly reflect our 
intuitive judgements about the case.19  
 
2.6  Does security-dependence capture all transitivity failure cases? 
So far, we have seen a number of cases where causation fails to behave 
transitively, and where this is explained by the fact that security-dependence 
                                                
19 Even when the situation is such that the strong gust of wind could very easily have been 
absent, we may still judge that there is a sense in which Suzy’s throw is a cause of the window-
shattering. My account of causation can capture this judgement as being about a restricted 
possibility horizon: the strong gust of wind (A’s firing) is clearly a deviant event. Our 
contextually determined possibility horizon should therefore include worlds where there is no 
gust of wind (A does not fire). However, we may wish to draw attention to the fact that while 
Suzy’s throw puts the window-shattering at risk in one way – since it makes it dependent on 
the strong gust of wind – there is another threat that Suzy’s throw makes more remote, namely 
the threat that no one throws a rock at the window. To capture this, we may artificially restrict 
our possibility horizon to only include worlds where the strong gust of wind occurs (where A 
fires). In fact, we have a ready-made linguistic mechanism for making this restriction: by using 
phrases such as ‘given that . . .’, as in ‘given that the strong gust of wind was there, Suzy’s 
throw caused the window-shattering’. Within such a restricted possibility horizon, where the 
strong gust of wind occurs in all worlds (A occurs in all worlds), we straightforwardly find that 
the window-shattering (F) security-depends on Suzy’s throw (B). Thus, the hedged claims – 
‘given that the strong gust of wind was there, Suzy’s throw caused the window-shattering’, and 
‘given that A occurred, B caused F’ – come out true. 
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fails to behave transitively. However, my suggestion that process-connection 
and security-dependence are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for 
causation commits me to a bolder claim: namely, that all cases where causation 
fails to behave transitively are cases where security-dependence fails to behave 
transitively.  
 By building together transitivity-failure cases and preemption cases, we 
can arrive at apparent counterexamples to this claim.20 Consider, for example, 














The structure of neurons comprising A, B, C, E, F, and H corresponds to one 
of our standard transitivity-failure cases, namely Switch. Furthermore, the 
structure of neurons comprising H, I, J, K, and L corresponds to a standard 
case of early preemption. Combining our intuitive judgements about these two 
cases, it seems intuitively plausible to hold that B is not a cause of L, although B 
causes E, E causes H, and H causes L.  
As is easily verified, however, B satisfies the two conditions of process-
connection and security-dependence: B is process-connected to L, and L 
security-depends on B within the contextually relevant possibility horizon. 
Thus, the case presents an apparent counterexample my proposed account of 
                                                
20 I am grateful to Derek Ball for making me aware of such cases. 
B       D    G        I     K 
A       C     F        H      J         L 
  E 
t1       t2    t3         t4     t5       t6 
 Figure 15 
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causation and, in particular, to my claim that my condition of security-
dependence can account for all transitivity-failure cases. My response has two 
parts:  
First, it is not so clear that we are able to simultaneously pay attention to 
all the relevant features of the case when we reach our intuitive judgement that 
B is not a cause of L. It is obviously true that when a candidate cause merely 
functions as a switch, then it is not a cause – since it makes no difference. If 
we focus on the features of Figure 15 where B merely functions as a switch, we 
therefore reach the judgement that B is not a cause of L. Similarly, it is 
obviously true that when a candidate cause merely functions as a preempted 
backup, it is not a cause – since it is not part of a process leading up to the 
effect. If we focus on the features of Figure 15 where B merely functions as a 
preempted backup, we therefore also reach the judgement that B is not a cause 
of L. But in reaching both of these judgements, we focus on certain features of 
the case, while neglecting others. And it is not clear to me that we are able to 
reach a firm and direct intuitive judgement that is based on an appreciation of 
the case as a whole. This suggests that we should not put too much weight on 
our intuitive judgement on this case. 
Secondly, it is important to keep in mind that my project is to find the 
candidate meaning of ‘cause’ that strikes the best balance between eligibility 
and charity to use. Given this project, intuitions about specific cases sometimes 
have to be overridden, if accommodating them would be too costly. I believe 
this is the case here: as we shall see in Chapter 11, my claim that security-
dependence can account for all transitivity failure cases supports a restricted 
principle of transitivity, which legitimises all or almost all of our ordinary 
practices of appealing to transitivity in our causal reasoning. Accommodating 
our intuition in the present case would force us to give up on that restricted 
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3.  The non-intrinsicness of causation  
There is a close connection between counterexamples to the transitivity of 
causation and counterexamples to the intrinsicness of causation. Indeed, slight 
modifications of the very same case – namely, Switch – provide 
counterexamples to both transitivity and intrinsicness. For this reason, it 
should perhaps not come as a surprise that the condition of security-
dependence can also accommodate our intuitive verdicts in counterexamples 
to the intrinsicness of causation. My aim in this section is to demonstrate this 
result.  
I begin with a general explanation of how causation fails to be intrinsic 
to a process (section 3.1). I then consider two counterexamples to the 
intrinsicness of causation: in parallel with counterexamples to transitivity, 
counterexamples to intrinsicness may be divided into two groups – 
counterexamples that do not involve omissions, and counterexamples that do. 
A small modification of Switch provides a counterexample to intrinsicness that 
does not involve omissions. And our standard case of double prevention 
provides an omission-involving counterexample to intrinsicness (considered in 
Chapter 2 section 1.3.3). In section 3.2 and 3.3, I show how the condition of 
security-dependence yields intuitively correct verdicts on both of these cases, 
irrespective of whether they involve omissions or not. 
 
3.1  How intrinsicness fails 
The intuitive principle that causation is intrinsic to a process may be given a 
preliminary statement as follows (the asterisk indicates that I do not endorse 
this principle): 
 
        * Intrinsicness of causation: if c causes e, and a structure of events S, including all the 
events that are involved in a process connecting c to e, is governed by the same 
laws and exactly matches a structure of events S *, then the counterpart c* of c 
in S * is a cause of the counterpart e* of e in S *. 
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As we have already seen, there are counterexamples to Intrinsicness of causation 
on any reasonable way of spelling out exactly which events are involved in the 
process from one event to another. The condition of process-connection 
cannot on its own accommodate or explain our intuitive verdicts on these 
counterexamples. For, as I show in Appendix A section 3, the relation of 
process-connection is itself intrinsic to a process (on this, see also Chapter 11 
section 3). 
 To accommodate and explain our intuitive judgements, we therefore 
need the condition of security-dependence: as we shall see in the following, the 
relation of security-dependence is not intrinsic to a process. Let us say that 
causation fails to behave intrinsically when c is a cause of e, and the process 
connecting c to e is just like the process connecting c* to e*, but c* does not 
cause e*. And let us say that security-dependence fails to behave intrinsically 
when e security-depends on c, and the process connecting c to e is just like the 
process connecting c* to e*, but e* does not security-depend on c*. Then my 
suggestion is that causation fails to behave intrinsically in just those cases 
where security-dependence fails to behave intrinsically, and the failure of 
security-dependence to behave intrinsically explains why causation fails to 
behave intrinsically in these cases.21  
 
3.2  Switch 
Let us begin by considering Switch once again – this time, as a counterexample 
to Intrinsicness of causation. Consider first the following modified version of 
Switch: everything is as in the original case, except that there is a fallen tree lying 
across the right-hand track, such that the train would have been derailed if 
Suzy had not flipped the switch. The structure of this case is illustrated below, 
with G representing the presence of the fallen tree: 
                                                
21 Note that security-dependence may fail to behave intrinsically for two reasons: i) merely 
because the change in setting means that a different world within a given possibility horizon is 
the actual world, or ii) because the change in setting induces a shift in which worlds are 
included in the contextually relevant possibility horizon.   
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     B 
    G    H 
     B 
















Intuitively, B is here a cause of F. Correspondingly, we find that B is process-
connected to F via the following process: 
 




















    A   C 
     E 
     F 
  D 
t1        t2             t3        t4  Figure 16 
  
    A   C 
     E 
     F 
  D 
t1        t2             t3         t4 Figure 16* 
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     B 
    G    H 
On any reasonable way of spelling out which events are involved in the 
process from B to F, it is surely the case that G (the presence of the fallen tree) 
is not involved. Removing the fallen tree – letting G be dormant instead of 
firing – therefore counts as a change that is entirely extrinsic to the process 
connecting B to F. But by carrying out this change, we now get back to a case 
that is essentially equivalent to the version of Switch we have already 
considered: for in this case, there is no fallen tree on the right-hand track, and 

















Together, these two cases present a counterexample to Intrinsicness of causation: B 
causes F in Figure 16, and the structure of events S = {A, B, C-stripes, D, F} in 
Figure 16 includes all the events involved in the process from B to F, and is 
governed by the same laws and exactly matches the structure of events  
S * = {A, B, C-stripes, D, F} in Figure 17. By intrinsicness, it therefore follows 
that B is a cause of F in Figure 17. But intuitively, this is false: B is not a cause 
of F in Figure 17 – rather, B is simply irrelevant to F. 
 The condition of process-connection cannot on its own accommodate 
this intuitive verdict or explain why causation fails to be intrinsic in this case, 
  
    A   C 
     E 
     F 
  D 
t1        t2            t3         t4 Figure 17 
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since process-connection is itself intrinsic to a process (cf. Appendix A section 
3). Thus, we find that B is also process-connected to F in Figure 17 – as indeed 
it is, via the process: 
 





To get the intuitively correct verdict, we therefore need the further condition 
of security-dependence. The condition of security-dependence allows us to 
accommodate our intuitive judgement for the simple reason that security-
dependence is not intrinsic to a process: in Figure 16, F depends 
counterfactually on B within any possibility horizon that treats B as a candidate 
cause, and from this it immediately follows that F security-depends on B within 
any such possibility horizon. In Figure 17, by contrast, we find that F does not 
security-depend on B within the contextually relevant possibility horizon – 
rather, F would have been just as secure at t1 if B had not occurred.  
To see this, note that it is natural to treat ¬G, i.e. the absence of a fallen 
tree, as a background condition. Thus, the contextually relevant possibility 
horizon includes just the following four possible worlds: 
 
Complete state at time t1:     Events at t1:        t4: 
@: A fires, B fires, G does not fire    A,   B,   ¬G        F 
w1: A does not fire, B fires, G does not fire   A,   B,   ¬G        F 
w2: A fires, B does not fire, G does not fire   A,   B,   ¬G        F 
w3: A does not fire, B does not fire, G does not fire A,   B,   ¬G        F 
 
We may represent the distance-at-t1 between these worlds as follows: 
 
 













 Figure 18 
 
By exactly the same arguments as in the original version of Switch, we now find 
that F would have been just as secure at t1 if B had not occurred.
22 
In this way, the condition of security-dependence allows us to maintain 
the intuitively correct verdict: B is a cause of F in Figure 16, since B here 
satisfies the two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of process-
connection and security-dependence. By contrast, B is not a cause of F in 
Figure 17: for although B is still process-connected to F, F does not security-
depend on B. 
 
 
                                                
22 Note that this result is dependent on our particular choice of possibility horizon: within a 
larger possibility horizon, which includes worlds where G fires, F does security-depend on B. 
More generally, then, the difference between the case where G fires (Figure 16) and the case 
where G does not fire (Figure 17) is the following: in the case where G fires, any possibility 
horizon that treats B as a candidate cause yields the result that F security-depends on B. By 
contrast, in the case where G does not fire, the verdict on whether F security-depends on B is 
much more sensitive to our choice of possibility horizon: within the larger possibility horizon, 
which includes worlds where G fires, F still security-depends on B; but within the smaller and 
more natural choice of possibility horizon, where G’s failure to fire is treated as a background 
condition, we find that B is simply irrelevant to F.  
@: A fires,  
     B fires, 
     G does not fire 
w2: A fires,  
     B does not fire, 
     G does not fire 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B fires, 
     G does not fire 
w3: A does not fire,  
     B does not fire, 
     G does not fire 
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3.3  Double prevention 
Next, let us consider an omission-involving counterexample to Intrinsicness of 
causation. In particular, let us consider the following case of double prevention 












     
It here seems intuitively correct to say that C is a cause of F. Correspondingly, 
we find that C is process-connected to F via the following process:  
 
 t1: C 
 t2: ¬E  (together with D) 
 t3: F 
 












     B             E    
     C 
     A      D      F 
 t1   t2  t3      Figure 19 
     B             E    
     C 
     A      D      F 
 t1   t2  t3      Figure 19* 
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On any reasonable way of spelling out what it takes for an event to be involved 
in the process connecting C to F, this process does not involve B. Thus, letting 
B be dormant instead of firing is a change that is entirely extrinsic to the 











      
Together, these two cases provide a counterexample to Intrinsicness of causation: 
C is a cause of F in Figure 19, and the structure of events S = {C, D, ¬E, F} 
in Figure 19 includes all the events involved in the process from C to F, and is 
governed by the same laws and exactly matches the structure of events S * = 
{C, D, ¬E, F} in Figure 20. By intrinsicness, it therefore follows that C is a 
cause of F in Figure 20. Intuitively, however, this is false: as Paul and Hall 
note, letting B be dormant ‘completely reverses the intuitive verdict about C – 
once we remove the threat created by B’s firing, we intuitively judge that C is 
completely idle with respect to [F]’.23 
 The condition of process-connection cannot on its own secure this 
verdict. For, as mentioned above, the relation of process-connection is itself 
intrinsic to a process. Thus, we find that C is also process-connected to F in 
Figure 20, via the following process:  
                                                
23 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 197. Paul and Hall are here commenting on a version of the case 
where neuron B is not merely dormant, but has been removed entirely. However, their 
reasoning applies equally well to the case presented in Figure 20, since letting B be dormant is 
enough to remove the threat created by B’s firing. 
     B             E    
     C 
     A      D      F 
 t1   t2  t3      Figure 20 
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 t1: C 
 t2: ¬E  (together with D) 
 t3: F 
 











      
 
As this shows, the condition of process-connection cannot on its own yield the 
intuitively correct verdict on this case. We need the further condition of 
security-dependence: as I will now show, F security-depends on C within the 
contextually relevant possibility horizon in Figure 19, whereas F does not 
security-depend on C within the contextually relevant possibility horizon in 
Figure 20.  
 It is easy to see that F security-depends on C in Figure 19: within any 
possibility horizon that treats C as a candidate cause, F depends 
counterfactually on C in Figure 19, and it follows immediately from this that F 
security-depends on C. In the case of Figure 20, it is natural to treat ¬B as a 
background condition. This yields the following possibility horizon H :  
 
Complete state at time t1:     Events at t1:        t3: 
@: A fires, B does not fire, C fires    A,   ¬B,   C        F 
w1: A does not fire, B does not fire,  C fires  A,   ¬B,   C        F 
w2: A fires, B does not fire, C does not fire   A,   ¬B,   C         F 
     B             E    
     C 
     A      D      F 
 t1   t2  t3      Figure 20* 
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w3: A does not fire, B does not fire, C does not fire A,   ¬B,   C         F 
 
Call this possibility horizon H.  We may represent the comparative distances-













 Figure 21 
 
By exactly the same arguments as in Switch, we now find that F would have 
been just as secure at t1 if C had not occurred. Thus, F is security-independent of 
C within possibility horizon H. This result fits nicely with the nuances of our 
intuitive judgement: it seems intuitively correct to say that C is causally irrelevant 
to F – as Paul and Hall write, ‘C is completely idle with respect to [F]’24 – and 
this is exactly what we have found.25 
                                                
24 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 197. 
25 Note that this result depends on our particular choice of possibility horizon: within a larger 
possibility horizon, which includes worlds where B fires, we find that F does security-depend 
on C. In parallel with what we found in section 3.2, then, the difference between the case 
where B fires (Figure 19) and the case where B does not fire (Figure 20) is the following: in the 
case where B fires, any possibility horizon that treats C as a candidate cause yields the result 
that F security-depends on C. By contrast, in the case where B does not fire, the verdict on 
whether F security-depends on C is much more sensitive to our choice of possibility horizon: 
within the larger possibility horizon, which includes worlds where B fires, F still security-
@: A fires,  
     B does not fire, 
     C fires 
w2: A fires,  
     B does not fire, 
     C does not fire 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B does not fire, 
     C fires 
w3: A does not fire,  
     B does not fire, 
     C does not fire 
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 These results allow my account of causation to accommodate and 
explain our intuitive verdicts on Figure 19 and 20: in Figure 19, C is a cause of 
F, since C is process-connected to F and F security-depends on C within the 
relevant possibility horizon. In Figure 20, the intrinsicness of process-
connection ensures that C is still process-connected to F. However, as we have 
just seen, F does not security-depend on C within the relevant possibility 
horizon H – and for this reason, C is not a cause of F within H, since the 
necessary condition of security-dependence fails to be satisfied. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have seen how the condition of security-dependence allows 
my account to handle three groups of puzzling cases: firstly, it captures the 
sense in which a cause makes a difference to its effect even in cases of 
redundant causation. Secondly, it accommodates our intuitive judgements in 
the counterexamples to the transitivity of causation, and provides a principled 
way of drawing the line between transitivity-failure cases and early preemption 
cases. And thirdly, it accommodates and explains our intuitive judgements in 
the counterexamples to the intrinsicness of causation. In the following chapter, 
we shall see further examples of how the condition of security-dependence 
allows us to handle otherwise puzzling cases. 
                                                                                                                       
depends on C; but within the smaller and more natural choice of possibility horizon, where B’s 
failure to fire is treated as a background condition, we find that F does not security-depend on 
C – instead, C is simply irrelevant to F.     




More applications of security-dependence 
 
In this chapter, I show how the condition of security-dependence allows us to 
handle three further kinds of cases. First, I show how it resolves the so-called 
problem of profligate omissions (section 1). Second, I show how it allows my 
account to deliver intuitively correct verdicts on structurally isomorphic but 
causally different cases (section 2). And finally, I show how the condition of 
security-dependence allows my account to handle contrastive causal claims 
(section 3).  
 
1.  The problem of profligate omissions 
In this section, I show how the condition of security-dependence allows my 
account to handle the following puzzling case (previously discussed in Chapter 
2 section 1.3.1): 
 
The flowers: Suzy goes on holiday and Billy promises to water her flowers while 
she is away. However, Billy does not water the flowers and the flowers die.  
 
Intuitively, Billy’s failure to water the flowers is a cause of their death. 
However, it is also the case that the queen does not water the flowers. And it 
seems that the relation between the queen’s failure to water the flowers and 
their death is just the same as the relation between Billy’s failure to water the 
flowers and their death. But intuitively, we do not count the queen’s failure to 
water the flowers as a cause of their death. In this section, I show how my 
proposed account of causation can accommodate this verdict.  
 The structure of the case is illustrated below: 














A represents the dry soil in the pot, ¬B represents Billy’s failure to water the 
flowers, ¬C represents the queen’s failure to water the flowers, and D 
represents the death of the flowers. Structurally, the queen’s failure to water 
the flowers is related to their death in exactly the same way as Billy’s failure to 
water them. So why do we count one as a cause, but not the other? 
 The condition of process-connection cannot on its own capture the 
difference between Billy’s failure to water the flowers and the queen’s failure to 
water the flowers: we find that ¬B (Billy’s failure to water the flowers) is 
process-connected to D via the following process:  
 
 t1: ¬B  (together with A and ¬C) 
 t2: D  
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     B 
     t1          t2      Figure 1 
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And we similarly find that ¬C is process-connected to D, via the following 
process: 
 
 t1: ¬C  (together with A and ¬B) 
 t2: D  
 













Thus, the condition of process-connection gives a parallel treatment to Billy’s 
failure to water the flowers and the queen’s failure to water the flowers.  
To capture the difference, we need the condition of security-
dependence: in ordinary contexts, it is natural to treat Billy’s failure to water 
the flowers as a deviant event, but treat the queen’s failure to water the flowers 
     C 
     B 
     t1          t2      Figure 1* 
     A 
      D 
     C 
     B 
     t1          t2      Figure 1** 
     A 
      D 
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as default. This yields a possibility horizon containing just the following four 
possible worlds: 
 
Complete state at time t1:     Events at t1:  t2: 
@: A fires, B does not fire, C does not fire   A,   ¬B,   ¬C D 
w1: A does not fire, B does not fire, C does not fire A,   ¬B,   ¬C  D 
w2: A fires, B fires, C does not fire    A,   ¬B,   ¬C D 
w3: A does not fire, B fires, C does not fire   A,   ¬B,   ¬C  D 
 
Call this possibility horizon H.  Within this possibility horizon, ¬B, i.e. Billy’s 
failure to water the flowers, is treated as a candidate cause: there are some 
worlds in H  where ¬B does not occur. By contrast, ¬C, i.e. the queen’s failure 
to water the flowers, is treated as a background condition: it is held fixed 
throughout our possibility horizon. This difference accounts for the fact that 
¬B counts as a cause of D within H, while ¬C does not count as a cause of D 
within H.   
First, we find that D depends counterfactually on ¬B within H : from 
the standpoint of @, the closest-at-t1 world in H  where ¬B does not occur is 
w2. D does not occur in w2. Thus, D depends counterfactually on ¬B within H. 
And it follows immediately from this that D security-depends on ¬B within H. 
Thus, we get the intuitively correct verdict that ¬B is indeed a cause of D 
within the contextually relevant possibility horizon.  
By contrast, we find that D does not depend counterfactually on ¬C 
within H,  for the simple reason that there is no world within H  where ¬C 
does not occur. This already shows that the case presents no counterexample 
to the principle that counterfactual dependence within a possibility horizon is 
sufficient for causation within that same possibility horizon.  
To reject ¬C as a cause of D, however, we need the stronger result that 
D does not security-depend on ¬C within H. And we get this result too, for 
the very same reason – namely, because there is no world within H  where ¬C 
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does not occur. Thus, we get the intuitively correct verdict that ¬C is not a 
cause of D within the contextually relevant possibility horizon, because this 
possibility horizon simply does not treat it as a relevant possibility that ¬C 
could fail to occur. 
This treatment of the case fits nicely with the nuances of our intuitive 
judgement that the queen’s failure to water the flowers is not a cause of their 
death: intuitively, we reject the queen’s failure to water the flowers as a cause 
because we do not take seriously the possibility that the queen could have 
watered the flowers. As Schaffer suggests: 
 
‘Perhaps the reason it sounds wrong to say that the queen’s not watering [the] 
flowers causes them to wilt is that we never supposed that the queen would 
deign to water [the] flowers. […] We resist taking such an unrealistic 
supposition as a contrast.’1 
 
Schaffer’s suggestion fits precisely with the suggestion I make here: we reject 
the queen’s not watering the flowers as a cause because there is no world in 
our possibility horizon in which the queen does water the flowers. And thus, the 
queen’s failure to water the flowers is treated simply as a background 
condition, rather than a candidate cause. 
 The problem discussed here is often understood as a problem about 
omissions, and is sometimes referred to as the problem of profligate omissions.2 
However, the distinction between omissions and so-called positive events does 
not in fact play any role in generating the problem: essentially the same 
problem may arise in cases that involve only positive events. Suppose, for 
example, that there is a lightning strike in a forest and a forest fire starts 
immediately thereafter. In that case, we would normally count the lightning 
                                                
1 Schaffer (2005), p. 302. 
2 See e.g. Bernstein (2014), p. 429. For discussion, see also Beebee (2004); McGrath (2005); 
Sartorio (2010), pp. 262-3.  
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strike, but not the presence of oxygen, as a cause of the fire (see Chapter 5 
section 4). Thus, a better name would be the problem of background conditions.3  
 Correspondingly, the distinction between omissions and positive events 
plays no role in my proposed solution. Rather, my proposed solution is based 
on the way in which a possibility horizon encodes the distinction between 
candidate causes and background conditions: Billy’s failure to water the flowers 
is a candidate cause; the queen’s failure to water the flowers is a mere 
background condition. And similarly in the case of the forest fire: the lightning 
strike is a candidate cause; the presence of oxygen is a mere background 
condition. 
 
2.  Structurally isomorphic but causally different cases 
An important advantage of the condition of security-dependence is that it 
allows us to accommodate causally different but structurally isomorphic cases. 
To illustrate this, I will now consider an intriguing case originally presented by 
McDermott. We may set out this case as follows: 
 
Wall and window: Suzy throws a ball towards a window. Before the ball reaches 
the window, Billy leaps up and catches the ball. If Billy had not caught the ball, 
it still would not have hit the window – for between Billy and the window, 
there is a sturdy brick wall.4 
 
The most natural verdict on this case is that Billy’s catch is not a cause of the 
window remaining intact, since the window was not in any danger of being 
broken either way. As Collins writes: 
 
                                                
3 Cf. Menzies (2004), pp. 142-45. 
4 Cf. McDermott (1995), p. 525. For discussion, see also Collins (2004); Hall (2007b), pp.  
60-61; Halpern and Pearl (2005), pp. 876-77; Lewis (2004a), pp. 102-3; Maudlin (2004), pp. 
435-38; and Woodward (2003), pp. 86-91. 
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‘I am very reluctant to say in this case that [Billy’s] catch prevented the ball 
from breaking the window. Given that the wall was there, the window was 
never in any danger of being broken.’5 
 
Against this, McDermott makes the following argument: if Billy had not caught 
the ball and the wall had not been there, the window would have broken. So 
between them, Billy and the wall prevented the window from breaking. Clearly, 
however, the wall contributed nothing. So the credit should go to Billy. 
McDermott reports that on hearing this argument, most people retract their 
initial judgement and accept Billy’s catch as a cause of the window remaining 
intact.6  
 These conflicting verdicts already make the case quite interesting. It 
becomes even more interesting once we note that our initial intuitive verdict is 
reversed when a second catcher replaces the wall, as in the following case:  
 
 Catcher and window: Suzy throws a ball towards a window. Before the ball reaches 
the window, Billy leaps up and catches the ball. If Billy had not caught the ball, 
it still would not have hit the window – for between Billy and the window 
stands Sally, who would have caught the ball if Billy had failed to do so.7 
 
In this case, it seems intuitively clear that Billy’s catch does cause the window to 
remain intact. 
The two cases – Wall and window and Catcher and window – are structurally 
isomorphic. Indeed, the following neuron diagram, which we have already 
considered in Chapter 7 section 3.7 (Figure 12), represents the structure of 
both cases:  
 
 
                                                
5 Collins (2004), p. 108. 
6 McDermott (1995), p. 525. 
7 See e.g. Collins (2004), p. 107. 














       
  
A here represents the presence of the intact window, B represents Suzy’s 
throw, C represents Billy being ready to catch the ball, and D represents the 
presence of the wall (or Sally’s being ready to catch the ball). F-waves represents 
Billy’s stopping the ball, ¬I represents the absence of a ball moving towards 
the window, and J represents the window’s being intact. Given that Wall and 
window and Catcher and window are structurally isomorphic, how should we 
explain the causal difference between them? 
 The condition of process-connection cannot on its own accommodate 
the causal difference between the two cases: in either case, we find (as we have 
seen in Chapter 7 section 3.7) that C is process-connected to J via the process:8 
 
 t1: C  (together with B) 
 t2: F-waves 
 t3: ¬I  (together with H) 
 t4: J 
 
This process is illustrated below: 
                                                
8 As we have also seen, we find – as we should – that D is not process-connected to J. This fits 
the intuitive verdict that D is merely a preempted backup.  
     A      E       H    J 
 B            F           I    
    C      G 
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  t1  t2  t3  t4    Figure 2 














       
   
To explain and accommodate our intuitive verdicts on these cases, we need the 
condition of security-dependence. As we shall see, this condition can – because 
it brings in the contextually relevant possibility horizon as a third relatum – 
explain and accommodate both of our conflicting verdicts on the original case 
of Wall and window as well as our verdict on Catcher and window.  
 In Wall and window, it is – at least in normal contexts – reasonable to 
categorise A (the presence of the intact window) and D (the presence of the 
sturdy brick wall) as default events: when we extrapolate from what was the 
case just before t1, the result of our extrapolation is that the wall and the 
window are both there. Thus, our possibility horizon should include just the 
following four worlds, characterised by their complete state at time t1: 
 
Complete state at time t1:     Events at t1:  t4: 
@: A fires, B fires, C fires, D fires    A,   B,   C,   D      J 
w1: A fires, B does not fire, C fires, D fires   A,   B,   C,   D      J 
w2: A fires, B fires, C does not fire, D fires   A,   B,   C,   D      J 
w3: A fires, B does not fire, C does not fire, D fires  A,   B,   C,   D      J 
 
     A      E       H    J 
 B            F          I    
    C      G 
     D 
  t1  t2  t3  t4    Figure 2* 
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Call this possibility horizon H 1.  Note that A (the presence of the intact 
window) and D (the presence of the wall) are here treated as background 
conditions, and are held fixed throughout H 1. Note further that it follows 
from the neuron laws that J (the window’s remaining intact) occurs in every 
world in H 1  – our possibility horizon does not include any world in which J 
fails to occur.  
This means that J is maximally secure in every world in H 1. Thus, J (the 
window’s remaining intact) does not security-depend on anything within H 1. In 
particular, J does not security-depend on C (Billy’s being ready to catch the 
ball): J would have been just as secure at t1 if C had not occurred. Thus, we find 
that C (Billy’s being ready to catch the ball) is not a cause of J (the window’s 
remaining intact): while C is process-connected to J, we find that J does not 
security-depend on C within H 1  – and so, C is not a cause of J within H 1, 
since it fails to satisfy the necessary condition of security-dependence.  
Furthermore, this correctly captures the nuances of our intuitive 
judgement: as we have seen, J (the window’s remaining intact) would have 
been just as secure at t1 if C (Billy’s being ready to catch the ball) had not 
occurred. Correspondingly, we intuitively judge that C (Billy’s being ready to 
catch the ball) is simply irrelevant to J (the window’s remaining intact).  
Our possibility horizon H 1  fits with a way of viewing the case – implicit 
in Collins’ comment that ‘[g]iven that the wall was there, the window was 
never in any danger of being broken’9 – where the window’s remaining intact is 
not in need of causal explanation: J does not security-depend on anything within 
H 1. Since security-dependence is a necessary condition for causation, this 
means that J does not have any causes within H 1. Rather, the breaking of the 
window is simply treated as impossible within H 1, in the sense that H 1 does not 
contain any world in which the window breaks. This means that the window’s 
remaining intact is not in need of causes: within H 1, the correct response to 
                                                
9 Collins (2004), p. 108. 
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the question of what caused the window to remain intact is a rejection of the 
question itself – for example, by pointing out that the window was protected 
by a sturdy brick wall, and so, the window was not in danger in the first place.  
 To the extent that it is successful, McDermott’s argument for saying that 
Billy’s catch caused the window to remain intact shifts the context by forcing 
us to find a cause of the window’s remaining intact. To find such a cause, we 
need to widen our possibility horizon by categorizing the presence of the wall 
as a deviant event. For example, extrapolation from the surroundings yields the 
result that there is just thin air where the wall in fact is. If we accept this as an 
alternative to the presence of the wall, we now need to include the following 
eight possible worlds in our possibility horizon: 
 
Complete state at time t1:             Events at t1:            t4: 
@: A fires, B fires, C fires, D fires            A,   B,   C,   D       J 
w1: A fires, B does not fire, C fires, D fires           A,   B,   C,   D       J 
w2: A fires, B fires, C does not fire, D fires           A,   B,   C,   D       J 
w3: A fires, B does not fire, C does not fire, D fires          A,   B,   C,   D       J 
w4: A fires, B fires, C fires, D does not fire           A,   B,   C,   D       J 
w5: A fires, B does not fire, C fires, D does not fire         A,   B,   C,   D       J 
w6: A fires, B fires, C does not fire, D does not fire         A,   B,   C,   D       J 
w7: A fires, B does not fire, C does not fire, D does not fire    A,   B,   C,   D       J 
 
Call this possibility horizon H 2. Note that H 2 contains all the same worlds as 
H 1, but in addition it contains worlds in which D does not occur (i.e. worlds 
where the wall is replaced with thin air). Within this more inclusive possibility 
horizon, we find that there is a world in which J (the window’s remaining 
intact) does not occur – namely, world w6.  
 We may represent the comparative distances-at-t1 between the worlds in 
H 2 as follows, where the world in which J does not occur is coloured grey: 
 

















We now find that J (the window’s remaining intact) security-depends on C 
(Billy’s being ready to catch the ball) within H 2. To see this, let us go through 
our usual three steps: 
 Step 1: our first step is to evaluate J’s security at t1 in @. From the 
standpoint of @, there is one minimal dependence set for J at t1 – namely  
{C, D}. The closest-at-t1 world where both C and D fail to occur is w6. Thus, 
J’s security at t1 in @ is given by the distance-at-t1 from @ to w6.  
 Step 2: our second step is to evaluate J’s security at t1 in the closest-at-t1 
world(s) where C does not occur. From the standpoint of @, the closest-at-t1 
world where C does not occur is w2. From the standpoint of w2, J has one 
minimal dependence set, namely {D}, and the closest-at-t1 world where D does 
not occur is w6. Thus, J’s security at t1 in w2 is given by the distance-at-t1 from 
w2 to w6.  
 Step 3: our final step is to compare J’s security at t1 in @ with J’s security 
at t1 in w2. As shown in the figure, the distance-at-t1 from w2 to w6 is strictly 
@:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C fires, 
      D fires 
w4:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C fires, 
      D does not fire 
w1:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires, 
      D fires 
w5:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires, 
      D does not fire 
w2:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire, 
      D fires 
w6:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire, 
      D does not fire 
w3:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire, 
      D fires 
w7:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire, 
      D does not fire 
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shorter than the distance-at-t1 from @ to w6. Thus, we find that J would have 
been less secure at t1 if C had not occurred.  
 Within H 2, then, we find that J (the window’s remaining intact) does 
security-depend on C (Billy’s being ready to catch the ball). Since C is also 
process-connected to J, as we have seen above, my account yields the verdict 
that C is a cause of J within H 2 – thereby accommodating the verdict elicited 
by McDermott’s argument. Thus, we may think of McDermott’s argument as 
bringing about a shift in the contextually relevant possibility horizon, such that 
it becomes relevant to consider worlds where the wall is absent. This fits nicely 
with Hall’s diagnosis of the case: 
 
‘what McDermott’s argument does, for those inclined to treat it charitably, is to 
introduce a context where the contrast between a wall-present situation and a 
wall-absent situation becomes salient.’10 
 
As Hall also points out, however, it is most natural to simply treat the wall’s 
presence as default – and this explains ‘why the McDermott argument has a 
whiff of sophistry about it’.11  
 We may now compare this with the structurally isomorphic case where 
the wall is replaced by Sally, who is ready to catch the ball in case Billy should 
fail. Whereas it is somewhat strained to treat the presence of the wall as 
deviant, it is perfectly natural to categorise Sally’s readiness to catch the ball as 
deviant. As Hall writes:  
 
‘In the actual situation, Sally is alert, poised to intercept if Billy doesn’t. We 
might focus on the contrast between that psychological state, and a state she 
                                                
10 Hall (2007b), p. 61. 
11 Hall (2007b), pp. 60-61. 
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easily could have been in, in which she not only is idle but is disposed to remain 
so, perceived threats to the window notwithstanding.’12 
 
In the case where Sally replaces the wall, the contextually relevant possibility 
horizon is therefore the more inclusive H 2, in which D (Sally’s being ready to 
catch the ball) is categorised as a deviant event, with ¬D (Sally’s being disposed 
to remain idle) as its corresponding alternative. Within this more inclusive 
possibility horizon, we find – as we have just seen – that J (the window’s 
remaining intact) security-depends on C (Billy’s readiness to catch the ball). In 
the case where Sally replaces the wall, then, we find that C is a cause of J within 
the contextually relevant possibility horizon H 2, since C satisfies both of the 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of process-connection and security-
dependence.13  
 
3.  Contrastive causal claims 
The surface form of our causal claims is usually binary. In some cases, 
however, we make contrastive causal claims – adding a contrast to the cause, to 
the effect, or both. Such contrastive causal claims take the form ‘c rather than 
c* causes e’, ‘c causes e rather than e*’, or ‘c rather than c* causes e rather than 
e*’. In this section, I show how the condition of security-dependence, where 
security-dependence is understood as a ternary relation between two 
instantaneous events and a possibility horizon, allows a straightforward 
interpretation of such contrastive causal claims.   
Let us begin by considering the following case, where it seems that we 
can only capture the relevant causal facts by means of contrastive claims: 
 
Switch - variation: Suzy is standing by a switch in the railroad tracks. She sees a 
train approaching in the distance, and flips the switch so that the train travels 
                                                
12 Hall (2007b), p. 61. 
13 For my treatment of two other structurally isomorphic but causally different cases, see 
Appendix B case 31 and 32. 
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down the local track. She could also have flipped the switch so that the train 
had travelled down the express track, or the broken track. If she had chosen the 
express track, the train would have arrived at its destination more quickly. If 
she had chosen the broken track, the train would have derailed.14  
 











     
 
 
Neuron B can here be in three different states: it can fire in green, yellow, or 
red (it cannot be dormant). Neuron C can be in four different states: it can fire 
in green, yellow, or red, or it can be dormant. C fires in green if and only if A 
fires and B fires in green; C fires in yellow if and only if A fires and B fires in 
yellow; and C fires in red if and only if A fires and B fires in red. Finally, C is 
dormant if and only if A does not fire. The neuron laws are such that when C 
fires in green, it sends a stimulatory signal to D (and no signal to E or F); when 
C fires in yellow, it sends a stimulatory signal to E (and no signal to D or F); 
and when C fires in red, it sends a stimulatory signal to F (and no signal to D 
or E). Finally, G can fire in green or yellow or remain dormant. G fires in 
green if and only if it receives a stimulatory signal from D; G fires in yellow if 
and only if it receives a stimulatory signal from E; and otherwise it remains 
                                                
14 Schaffer (2012), pp. 38-40. For discussion of this case, see also Steglich-Petersen (2012), pp. 
131-32. For discussion of the role of contrasts in causation, see in addition Hitchcock (1996); 
Maslen (2004); and Northcott (2008).  
  
 A  C 
     B      F 
     G 
  D 
 t1  t2        t3    t4  Figure 4 
     E 
Part IV: Security-dependence 
 272 
dormant. A here corresponds to the approach of the train, and B’s firing in 
green, yellow, or red corresponds to Suzy’s flipping the switch to express, local, 
or broken, respectively.  
 The figure below shows what would have happened if B had fired in 











     
 
 
And finally, the figure below shows what would have happened if B had fired 











     
 
 
Let B-green be the event that is essentially B’s firing in green, let B-yellow be the 
event that is essentially B’s firing in yellow, and let B-red be the event that is 
essentially B’s firing in red. Furthermore, let G be the event that is essentially 
G’s firing (whether in green or yellow), let G-green be the event that is 
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 t1  t2        t3    t4  Figure 4* 
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essentially G’s firing in green, and let G-yellow be the event that is essentially G’s 
firing in yellow.  
We may now ask: is B-yellow (Suzy’s flipping the switch to local) a cause 
of G (the train’s arrival)? Intuitively, we can only answer this question correctly 
by specifying a contrast: B-yellow (Suzy’s flipping the switch to local) rather than 
B-green (Suzy’s flipping the switch to express) is not a cause of G (the train’s 
arrival); but B-yellow (Suzy’s flipping the switch to local) rather than B-red 
(Suzy’s flipping the switch to broken) is a cause of G (the train’s arrival). Thus 
we find that, in order to answer the question correctly, we need to make a 
contrastive causal claim that explicitly mentions a particular contrast to the cause. 
The condition of security-dependence allows us to understand why we 
need to turn to contrastive claims in this case. To see this, let us begin by 
considering the following possibility horizon, which includes all nomologically 
possible worlds: 
 
       Complete state at time t1:        Events at t1:   t4:  
@:   A fires, B fires yellow        A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
w1:   A fires, B fires green                 A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
w2:   A fires, B fires red        A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
w3:   A does not fire, B fires yellow    A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
w4:   A does not fire, B fires green     A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
w5:   A does not fire, B fires red         A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
 
Suppose that the distance-at-t1 between @ and w1 is exactly the same as the 
distance-at-t1 between @ and w2, which is exactly the same as the distance-at-t1 
between w1 and w2. In that case, we may represent the comparative distance-at-
t1 between these six worlds as follows, where the worlds in which G does not 


















From the standpoint of @, we here find that there are two closest-at-t1 worlds 
where B-yellow does not occur – namely, w1 and w2. Importantly, these two 
worlds deliver conflicting verdicts on whether G would have been less secure, just 
as secure or more secure at t1 if B-yellow had not occurred. To see this, let us go 
through our usual three steps:  
 Step 1: evaluating G’s security at t1 in @. From the standpoint of @, 
there are two minimal dependence sets for G at t1 – namely, {¬B-red} and {A}. 
The closest-at-t1 world where ¬B-red does not occur is w2, and the closest-at-t1 
world where A does not occur is w3. Thus, G’s security at t1 in @ is given by 
the distance-at-t1 between @ and w2 together with the distance-at-t1 between @ 
and w3.  
 Step 2: evaluating G’s security at t1 in the closest-at-t1 world(s) where B-
yellow does not occur. We already know that these worlds are w1 and w2. 
  From the standpoint of w1, there are again two minimal dependence sets 
for G at t1 – namely, {¬B-red} and {A}. The closest-at-t1 world where ¬B-red 
does not occur is w2, and the closest-at-t1 world where A does not occur is w4. 
Thus, G’s security at t1 in w1 is given by the distance-at-t1 from w1 to w2 together 
with the distance-at-t1 from w1 to w4. 
@: A fires,  
      B fires yellow 
w1: A fires,  
      B fires green 
w2: A fires,  
      B fires red 
       
w3: A does not fire,  
      B fires yellow 
w4: A does not fire,  
      B fires green 
w5: A does not fire,  
      B fires red 
Figure 5 
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 From the standpoint of w2, there is one minimal dependence set for G at 
t1 – namely, the empty set Ø. Thus, G has minimal security at t1 in w2.  
 Step 3: comparing G’s security at t1 in @ with G’s security at t1 in w1 and 
w2. We here find that G is just as secure at t1 in w1 as it is in @, since the distance-
at-t1 between @ and w2 is exactly the same as the distance-at-t1 between w1 and 
w2, and the distance-at-t1 between @ and w3 is exactly the same as the distance-
at-t1 between w1 and w4. By contrast, we find that G is less secure at t1 in w2 than it 
is in @, since G has minimal security at t1 in w2.  
Thus, our possibility horizon does not yield a uniform verdict on the 
question of whether G would have been less secure, just as secure or more secure at t1 
if B-yellow had not occurred. To get a uniform verdict, we need to restrict the 
possibility horizon under consideration. This is precisely what we can do by 
making contrastive claims:15 as we have already seen (Chapter 5 section 3), the 
explicit specification of contrasts imposes certain requirements on the 
possibility horizon under consideration. To recapitulate: the contrastive causal 
claim ‘c rather than c* is a cause of e’ imposes the requirement that our 
possibility horizon must contain at least one world in which c occurs, at least 
one world in which c* occurs, and no world in which neither c nor c* occurs. 
The contrastive claim ‘c causes e rather than e*’ imposes the requirement that 
our possibility horizon must contain at least one world in which e occurs, at 
least one world in which e* occurs, and no world in which neither e nor e* 
occurs. And a quaternary contrastive claim, ‘c rather than c* is a cause of e 
rather than e*’, imposes both of these requirements at once.  
 My suggestion is that we explicitly mention contrasts in just those cases 
where we need to artificially narrow down the possibility horizon under 
consideration in order to get uniform results.16 The role of the contrasts is to 
specify the relevant possibility horizon. In this way, contrastive causal claims 
express a ternary causal relation – c causes e within possibility horizon H – in 
                                                
15 For a very similar suggestion, see Northcott (2008), pp. 119-20. 
16 Cf. Northcott (2008), pp. 119-20. 
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exactly the same way as ordinary, binary causal claims. And my account of 
causation thus straightforwardly applies to contrastive causal claims as well. 
 In the following, I will consider a number of cases that demonstrate how 
my account of causation yields intuitively correct verdicts when applied to 
contrastive causal claims. We may begin by noting that process-connection is a 
binary relation: c is process-connected to e. This means that our choice of 
possibility horizon – and, by extension, our choice of contrasts – has no 
bearing on whether the condition of process-connection is satisfied. For 
example, we find that B-yellow is process-connected to G via the following 
process – regardless of whether B-yellow is contrasted with B-green or with B-red:  
 
 t1: B-yellow  (together with A) 
 t2: C-yellow  
 t3: E 
 t4: G 
 
To explain why our choice of contrasts matters for the truth-value of our 
causal claims, we need the condition of security-dependence: security-
dependence is a ternary relation between two instantaneous events and a 
possibility horizon. And thus, it may easily happen that e security-depends on c 
within a possibility horizon H 1, selected by one choice of contrasts, while e 
does not security-depend on c within a different possibility horizon H 2, 
selected by a different choice of contrasts. This is precisely what happens in 
the case of B-yellow:  
 Consider first the claim that ‘B-yellow rather than B-green is a cause of G’. 
To evaluate this claim, we need to restrict our possibility horizon, so that it 
contains at least one world where B-yellow occurs, at least one world where  
B-green occurs, and no world where neither B-yellow nor B-green occurs. The 
largest possibility horizon that satisfies these requirements contains the 
following four worlds: 
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       Complete state at time t1:        Events at t1:   t4:  
@:   A fires, B fires yellow        A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
w1:   A fires, B fires green                 A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
w3:   A does not fire, B fires yellow    A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
w4:   A does not fire, B fires green     A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
 
Within this restricted possibility horizon, we now find that G does not 
security-depend on B-yellow. Rather, B-yellow is simply irrelevant to G: G would 
have been just as secure at t1 if B-yellow had not occurred.
17   
 By contrast, the causal claim ‘B-yellow rather than B-red is a cause of G’ 
imposes the following requirement on our possibility horizon: it must contain 
at least one world in which B-yellow occurs, at least one world in which B-red 
occurs, and no world in which neither B-yellow nor B-red occurs. The largest 
possibility horizon that satisfies these requirements is the following: 
 
       Complete state at time t1:        Events at t1:   t4:  
@:   A fires, B fires yellow        A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
w2:   A fires, B fires red        A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
w3:   A does not fire, B fires yellow    A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
w5:   A does not fire, B fires red         A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
 
Within this possibility horizon, we find that G does security-depend on B-
yellow. Indeed, G depends counterfactually on B-yellow: if B-yellow had not 
occurred, B-red would have occurred instead – and in that case, G would not 
have occurred.  
 In this way, the condition of security-dependence allows us to capture 
why our choice of contrasts matters: regardless of our choice of contrasts, we 
find that B-yellow is process-connected to G. However, our choice of contrasts 
plays a role in determining the relevant possibility horizon: when B-yellow is 
                                                
17 Note that we get the same result when we consider an even more restricted possibility 
horizon that contains only @ and w1.  
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contrasted with B-green, this selects a possibility horizon in which G does not 
security-depend on B-yellow, and for this reason the causal claim ‘B-yellow rather 
than B-green causes G’ comes out false. But when B-yellow is contrasted with B-
red, this selects a possibility horizon in which G does security-depend on B-
yellow, and thus the causal claim ‘B-yellow rather than B-red causes G’ comes out 
true. 
We may treat causal claims that explicitly mention contrasts to the effect 
in a similar way: these too may be understood as specifications of the relevant 
possibility horizon. As an example, consider the contrastive claim: ‘A caused 
G-yellow rather than G-green’. This claim imposes the requirement that our 
possibility horizon must contain at least one world in which G-yellow occurs, at 
least one world in which G-green occurs, and no world in which neither G-yellow 
nor G-green occurs. This yields the following possibility horizon: 
 
       Complete state at time t1:        Events at t1:   t4:  
@:   A fires, B fires yellow        A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
w1:   A fires, B fires green                 A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
 
Within this possibility horizon, A is simply treated as a background condition. 
Thus, we find that G-yellow does not security-depend on A for the simple 
reason that the relevant possibility horizon contains no worlds where A does 
not occur. And so, we find – as we should – that the contrastive claim ‘A 
caused G-yellow rather than G-green’ is false. 
 By contrast, we find that the causal claim ‘B-yellow caused G-yellow rather 
than B-green’ is true: to evaluate this claim, we need to consider just the same 
possibility horizon as above. Here, however, we find that G-yellow does 
security-depend on B-yellow. Indeed, G-yellow depends counterfactually on B-
yellow: if B-yellow had not occurred, G-yellow would not have occurred. Once 
again, this is the intuitively correct result.  
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 Finally, we may now consider quaternary contrastive claims that 
explicitly mention contrasts on both the cause-side and the effect-side. My 
suggestion is that these claims should be treated in exactly the same way as the 
claims we have considered above: to evaluate the quaternary contrastive claim 
‘c rather than c* causes e rather than e*’, we need to identify a possibility 
horizon that contains at least one world where c occurs, at least one world 
where c* occurs, at least one world where e occurs, and at least one world 
where e* occurs, and that contains no world in which neither c nor c* occurs, 
and no world in which neither e nor e* occurs.  
 It is easy to see that for some choices of c, c*, e, and e*, it may simply be 
impossible to find a possibility horizon that satisfies all these requirements. In 
such cases, we intuitively register that the chosen contrasts are in some way 
mismatched, and the contrastive claim misfires. An example of this is the 
quaternary contrastive claim ‘B-yellow rather than B-red caused G-yellow rather 
than G-green’. For ease of reference, I repeat the complete list of nomologically 
possible worlds here: 
 
       Complete state at time t1:        Events at t1:   t4:  
@:   A fires, B fires yellow        A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
w1:   A fires, B fires green                 A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
w2:   A fires, B fires red        A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
w3:   A does not fire, B fires yellow    A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
w4:   A does not fire, B fires green     A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
w5:   A does not fire, B fires red         A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
 
The cause-contrast requires us to choose a possibility horizon that excludes w1 
and w4, since neither B-yellow nor B-red occurs in these worlds. However, the 
effect-contrast requires us to choose a possibility horizon that includes world 
w1, since this is the only world in which G-green occurs. Thus, it is simply 
impossible to find a possibility horizon that accommodates both the cause-
contrast and the effect-contrast. This fits nicely with the intuition that there is 
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something off about the causal claim that ‘B-yellow rather than B-red caused G-
yellow rather than G-green’: intuitively, this claim simply cannot be evaluated, 
since it suffers from a mismatch of contrasts.  
 When the contrasts are appropriately matched, however, it is 
straightforward to evaluate quaternary contrastive claims. Consider for 
example the claim ‘B-yellow rather than B-red caused G-yellow rather than ¬G’. 
The cause-contrast here requires us to include at least one of @ and w3; include 
at least one of w2 and w5; and exclude w1 and w4; while the effect-contrast 
requires us to include @; include at least one of w2, w3, w4, and w5; and exclude 
w1. These demands are fully compatible. The largest possibility horizon that 
satisfies them contains the following four worlds: 
 
       Complete state at time t1:        Events at t1:   t4:  
@:   A fires, B fires yellow        A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
w2:   A fires, B fires red        A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
w3:   A does not fire, B fires yellow    A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
w5:   A does not fire, B fires red         A,  B-green,  B-yellow,  B-red   G, G-green, G-yellow 
 
And within this possibility horizon, we find – as we should – that G-yellow 
security-depends on B-yellow. Indeed, G-yellow depends counterfactually on B-
yellow: if B-yellow had not occurred, G-yellow would not have occurred. And thus, 
the claim comes out true. 
 As these examples show, the condition of security-dependence – 
understood as a ternary relation between two events and a possibility horizon – 
has the resources to straightforwardly accommodate contrastive causal claims.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have seen further examples of how the condition of 
security-dependence allows us to accommodate our intuitive verdicts in 
puzzling cases. In particular, we have seen how the condition of security-
dependence resolves the so-called problem of profligate omissions, captures 
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our intuitive verdicts in McDermott’s puzzling case of redundant prevention, 
and allows my account to straightforwardly accommodate contrastive causal 
claims. These applications provide further reason for accepting security-
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Principles of causal inference 
 
My proposal is that the two conditions of process-connection and security-
dependence are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for causation. 
Thus, my proposed account of causation may be stated as follows: 
 
So far, we have seen how this account of causation delivers intuitively correct 
verdicts on a wide range of specific cases. There is, however, an important 
further component to our use of ‘cause’: our practices of causal reasoning. In 
this chapter, we shall consider how my completed account of causation 
accommodates our core practices of causal reasoning.  
In particular, we shall consider the three intuitive principles of causal 
inference mentioned in Chapter 2, concerning the sufficiency of counterfactual 
dependence for causation, and the transitivity and intrinsicness of causation. A 
preliminary statement of these three principles goes as follows (the asterisks 
indicate that I do not endorse the principles): 
 
        * Sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation:  
if e depends counterfactually on c, then c causes e.  
 
        * Transitivity of causation: if there is a set of events {d1, d2, . . . , dn},  
such that c causes d1, d1 causes d2, . . . , and dn causes e, then c causes e.  
 
 Causation: c is a cause of e within a possibility horizon H  iff 
a) c is process-connected to e, and 
b) e security-depends on c within H.  
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        * Intrinsicness of causation: if c causes e, and a structure of events S, including all the 
events that are involved in a process connecting c to e, is governed by the same 
laws and exactly matches a structure of events S *, then the counterpart c* of c 
in S * is a cause of the counterpart e* of e in S *. 
 
We have already seen that there are counterexamples to each of these three 
intuitive principles (Chapter 2 section 1.3). My account of causation sides with 
our intuitive judgements on these counterexamples. Thus, my account cannot 
sanction the above principles of causal inference in their unrestricted form. As 
we shall see, however, my account of causation does sanction restricted versions 
of the three principles:  
Each of the above three principles applies to one (but not the other) of 
the two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for causation: counterfactual 
dependence within a possibility horizon is sufficient for security-dependence 
within that same possibility horizon, but is not sufficient for process-
connection; and process-connection is transitive and intrinsic to a process, 
while security-dependence is not. As a result, my account of causation entails 
restricted versions of the three principles. And although these restricted 
versions are of course less powerful than their unrestricted cousins, we shall 
see that they are still powerful enough to legitimise most of our usual practices 
of causal reasoning.  
It is important to note that the three principles play a very different role 
in my account compared with other accounts of causation: typically, one or 
more of the three unrestricted principles is brought in, as an independently 
motivated principle, to extend the reach of an account of causation, allowing it to 
recognise causes that it otherwise would not. In Lewis’s original account of 
causation, for example, the starting point is that counterfactual dependence is 
sufficient for causation. The principle that causation is transitive is then 
brought in, as an independently motivated principle, to extend the reach of the 
account: by relying on the transitivity of causation, Lewis’s account is able to 
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accommodate our intuitive judgements in cases of early preemption, even 
though the effect does not depend counterfactually on its cause in such cases.1 
By contrast, the three restricted principles are logical consequences of my 
account. This means that the three restricted principles do not extend the 
reach of my account: any result that can be obtained by applying one or more 
of the three restricted principles can also be obtained through a direct 
application of the two conditions of process-connection and security-
dependence. The principles simply work as shortcuts in the application of the 
account.    
In the following, I present the three restricted principles in detail, and 
show how they support our ordinary practices of causal reasoning. In section 
1, I discuss the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation; in 
section 2, I discuss the transitivity of causation; and in section 3, I discuss the 
intrinsicness of causation. 
 
1.  Counterfactual dependence 
In this section, I show how my account of causation supports a restricted 
principle of sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation (section 
1.1). I then show how this principle yields the result that counterfactual 
dependence is straightforwardly sufficient for causation when we are dealing 
with simple neuron diagrams, where each neuron can be in one of two states – 
either firing or dormant (section 1.2). 
 
1.1  A restricted principle of sufficiency of counterfactual dependence 
The intuitive principle that counterfactual dependence is sufficient for 
causation licenses us to make a particular kind of inference. This is brought out 
in the following statement of the principle (the asterisk indicates that I do not 
endorse the principle):  
 
                                                
1 Lewis (1986d). 
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        * Sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation:  
if e depends counterfactually on c, then c causes e.  
 
We have already seen that there are counterexamples to this principle. For 
example, the following case (discussed in Chapter 2 section 1.3.1) presents a 
counterexample: 
 
Scarlet: The pigeon Sophia has been conditioned to peck at scarlet to the 
exclusion of all other colours. She is presented with a scarlet triangle and pecks 
at it.2  
 
In this case, Sophia’s pecking depends counterfactually on the triangle’s being 
red: if the triangle had not been red, she would not have pecked at it. But 
intuitively, the triangle’s being red is not a cause of Sophia’s pecking. Rather, 
the cause is the more fragile event of the triangle’s being scarlet.  
The condition of process-connection allows my account to side with our 
intuitive verdict on this case: the triangle’s being red is not process-connected 
to Sophia’s pecking (see Chapter 7 section 4.1). And since process-connection 
is a necessary condition for causation, it follows that the triangle’s being red is 
not a cause of Sophia’s pecking. However, this also means that my proposed 
account of causation yields the result that counterfactual dependence is not 
sufficient for causation. On my proposed account, therefore, the unrestricted 
principle of Sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation is false. 
 However, we cannot simply leave it at that: the principle that 
counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causation plays a central role in our 
ordinary practices of causal reasoning. And in recognition of this, the principle 
is often given a central role in philosophical accounts of causation. As Paul and 
Hall write:  
 
                                                
2 This case is closely based on a case presented in Yablo (1992a), p. 257. For similar cases, see 
Yablo (1992b), p. 415, and Sartorio (2010), pp. 266-69. 
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‘as a sufficient condition on causation, it [counterfactual dependence] has struck 
many philosophers as exactly right – and therefore as an excellent starting point 
for a full-blown analysis of causation.’3  
 
It would thus be a significant departure from our normal use of ‘cause’ if we 
had to reject all inferences relying on the sufficiency of counterfactual 
dependence for causation.  
Fortunately, we do not need to reject these inferences across the board: 
as I will now show, my account of causation supports a restricted principle of 
sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation, which allows us to 
maintain many of our ordinary practices of causal reasoning. 
 As I prove in Appendix A section 4, counterfactual dependence within a 
possibility horizon entails security-dependence within that same possibility 
horizon: 
 
 Sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for security-dependence:  
if e depends counterfactually on c within a possibility horizon H,  
then e security-depends on c within H.  
 
This immediately shows that process-connection together with counterfactual 
dependence within a possibility horizon H   is sufficient for causation within 
H.   
However, one might well hope for an even closer connection between 
counterfactual dependence and causation. I believe that there is indeed such a 
connection, although it will take a bit of work to bring it out. To motivate what 
I am about to propose, it will be useful to consider the following case: 
 
 
         
                                                
3 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 16. 
     A            B 
 t1      t2      Figure 1 
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Neuron A can here fire in four different ways: i) in blue stripes, ii) in uniform 
blue, iii) in green stripes, and iv) in uniform green. In fact, it fires in blue 
stripes. Furthermore, the neuron laws are such that B fires if and only if A fires 
in either blue stripes or green stripes.  
Let A be the event that is essentially A’s firing (in any of the four ways), 
let A-blue be the event that is essentially A’s firing in blue (whether uniform or 
striped), let A-stripes be the event that is essentially A’s firing in stripes (whether 
blue or green), and let A-blue-stripes be the event that is essentially A’s firing in 
blue stripes. We then find that there is exactly one process leading up to B, 





However, if we choose a suitably impoverished possibility horizon, we find 
that B depends counterfactually on each of the four events that occur at time 
t1. To see this, consider the following possibility horizon that includes just two 
worlds: 
 
Complete state at time t1:  Events at t1:     t2: 
@: A fires in blue stripes  A,  A-blue,  A-stripes,  A-blue-stripes B 
w1: A does not fire   A,  A-blue,  A-stripes,  A-blue-stripes     B 
 
Call this possibility horizon H 1. We now find that B depends counterfactually 
on A, on A-blue, on A-stripes, and on A-blue-stripes within H 1. Thus, B depends 
counterfactually on an event – namely, A-blue – that does not even stand in any 
interesting logical relationship to A-stripes, even though A-stripes is the only 
event at t1 that is process-connected to B.  
 This shows that there is not much of a connection between process-
connection and counterfactual dependence within a possibility horizon. And 
on closer inspection, this should perhaps not come as a surprise: according to 
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my definition, any class of nomologically possible worlds that includes the 
actual world counts as a possibility horizon. It is therefore to be expected that 
we cannot gain much information about process-connection from the fact that 
e depends counterfactually on c within some possibility horizon.  
To establish a closer connection between counterfactual dependence and 
process-connection, we need to ensure that the possibility horizon under 
consideration satisfies more demanding requirements. In particular, the 
possibility horizon under consideration needs to be discriminating at the time 
when the candidate cause occurs: 
 
Discriminating: a possibility horizon H  is discriminating at a time t iff  
for any event c occurring in @ at t, it is the case that either 
a) c occurs in every world in H, or 
b) c and more or less fragile versions of c are the only events that  
occur in @ at t, but do not occur in the closest-at-t not-c-world(s) in H. 
 
This requirement rules out impoverished possibility horizons such as H 1 
above. To see that H 1 is not discriminating at time t1, consider for example the 
event A-stripes, which occurs in @ at t1. The closest-at-t1 world in H 1 where  
A-stripes does not occur is w1. The events that occur in @ at t1 and do not occur 
in w1 are A, A-blue, A-stripes, and A-blue-stripes. Obviously, A-blue is not a more 
or less fragile version of A-stripes. And so we find that H 1 is not discriminating 
at time t1. 
By contrast, the following larger possibility horizon is discriminating at t1:  
 
Complete state at time t1:  Events at t1:     t2: 
@: A fires in blue stripes  A,  A-blue,  A-stripes,  A-blue-stripes    B 
w1: A does not fire   A,  A-blue,  A-stripes,  A-blue-stripes    B 
w2: A fires in uniform blue  A,  A-blue,  A-stripes,  A-blue-stripes    B 
w3: A fires in green stripes  A,  A-blue,  A-stripes,  A-blue-stripes    B 
w4: A fires in uniform green  A,  A-blue,  A-stripes,  A-blue-stripes    B 
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Call this possibility horizon H 2. We now find that counterfactual dependence 
within a discriminating possibility horizon, such as H 2, is more revealing: 
suppose that the distance-at-t1 between @ and w2 is strictly shorter than the 
distance-at-t1 between @ and w3. In that case, we find that within H 2, B 
depends counterfactually on three events occurring at time t1 – namely, A,  
A-stripes, and A-blue-stripes. Of these, A-stripes is process-connected to B, and A 
and A-blue-stripes stand in an interesting logical relationship to A-stripes: A-stripes 
is a less fragile version of A-blue-stripes, and A-stripes is a more fragile version of 
A. This suggests the following restricted principle of sufficiency of 
counterfactual dependence for process-connection:  
 
Restricted sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for process-connection:  
if e depends counterfactually on c within a possibility horizon H,   
such that H   is discriminating at c’s time of occurrence,  
then c or a more or less fragile version of c is process-connected to e. 
 
I give a proof of this result in Appendix A section 1, given an auxiliary 
assumption that is satisfied in all ordinary cases, including all neuron diagrams. 
Given this, we immediately get the following restricted principle of sufficiency 
of counterfactual dependence for causation:  
 
In the following section, I show how this principle entails that counterfactual 
dependence is straightforwardly sufficient for causation when we are dealing 
with simple neuron diagrams. 
 
 Restricted sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation:  
if e depends counterfactually on c within a possibility horizon H,  
such that H   is discriminating at c’s time of occurrence,  
then c or a more or less fragile version of c is a cause of e within H. 
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1.2  Applications 
The above principle is particularly easy to apply when we are dealing with 
simple neuron diagrams, such as the neuron diagram below, which shows a 












     
In simple neuron diagrams such as this, each neuron can be in just one of two 
states – firing or dormant, and we typically restrict the range of our quantifiers 
to include only maximally temporally fragile events based on the behaviour of 
a single neuron – i.e., events such as A, B, C, D, ¬E, etc. This ensures that any 
way of categorising our neuron events as either default or deviant events, with 
corresponding alternatives, yields a discriminating possibility horizon. And 
since our domain of neuron events only includes events at a single level of 
detail, this means that, in dealing with neuron diagrams such as these, 
counterfactual dependence within a possibility horizon is straightforwardly 
sufficient for causation within that same possibility horizon.  
 Considering the case in Figure 2, for example, we find that F depends 
counterfactually on C within any possibility horizon that treats C as a candidate 
cause. The figure below illustrates what happens in the closest-at-t1 not-C-
world within any such possibility horizon: 
 
 
     B             E    
     C 
     A      D      F 
 t1   t2  t3      Figure 2 














We thus immediately get the result that C is a cause of F. This is how we should 
reason in accordance with my proposed account of causation. And it is also 
how we in fact do reason when faced with cases of this kind.  
 
2.  Transitivity 
The second of the three general principles cited in the introduction is that 
causation is transitive. I begin by showing how my account of causation entails 
a restricted principle of transitivity (section 2.1). I then illustrate the 
applications of this principle (section 2.2).  
 
2.1  A restricted principle of transitivity 
We may understand the principle that causation is transitive as licensing a 
particular kind of inference. To bring this out, we may state the principle as 
follows (the asterisk indicates that I do not endorse the principle): 
 
        * Transitivity of causation: if there is a set of events, {d1, d2, . . . , dn},  
such that c causes d1, d1 causes d2, . . . , and dn causes e, then c causes e.4  
 
                                                
4 For the sake of simplicity, I do not explicitly mention possibility horizons in this statement.  
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We have already seen that there are counterexamples to Transitivity of causation 
(Chapter 2 section 1.3.2). We have also seen that my proposed account of 
causation sides with our intuitive judgements about these counterexamples – 
and thus goes against Transitivity of causation (Chapter 9 section 2). On my 
proposed account of causation, then, Transitivity of causation is false.  
 However, we cannot simply leave it at that, since appeals to transitivity 
play a crucial role in our ordinary causal reasoning. As Paul and Hall write: 
 
‘it often seems perfectly appropriate to justify a claim that C causes E by tracing 
a causal chain from the first event to the second’5 
 
Indeed, the role of transitivity in our causal reasoning has often been taken as 
the main argument in favour of holding that causation itself is transitive. For 
example, Hall has given the following argument: 
 
‘rejecting transitivity seems intuitively wrong: it certainly goes against one of the 
ways in which we commonly justify causal claims. That is, we often claim that 
one event is a cause of another precisely because it causes an intermediate, which 
then causes another intermediate, . . . which then causes the effect in question. 
Are we to believe that any such justification is fundamentally misguided?’6 
 
We find a particularly striking illustration of the role that transitivity can play in 
our causal reasoning when we consider the role of transitivity in accounts of 
causation. Consider, for example, Lewis’s original account of causation.7 Lewis 
here takes counterfactual dependence to be sufficient for causation. By 
bringing in the principle that causation is transitive, he is then able to extend 
the reach of his analysis, so that it can handle cases of early preemption: 
                                                
5 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 219. 
6 Hall, in an earlier draft of Hall (2004). The passage is quoted in Maslen (2004), p. 349. See 
also Schaffer (2005), p. 309, who notes that ‘[t]he transitive inference feels virtually analytic.’ 
7 Lewis (1986d). 













Lewis’s theory handles this case as follows: C depends counterfactually on A, 
and so A is a cause of C. Furthermore, E depends counterfactually on C, and 
so C is a cause of E. By transitivity, it then follows – as desired – that A is a 
cause of E.  
 On my proposed account of causation we do not need to appeal to 
transitivity to get this result: we can simply apply the conditions of process-
connection and security-dependence directly. However, the above reasoning 
still seems to provide a persuasive argument for holding that A is a cause of E. 
If we reject Transitivity of causation without providing a substitute, this argument 
turns out to be entirely unfounded. That will not do. What we need, rather, is a 
restricted principle of transitivity, showing when appeals to transitivity are 
legitimate and when they are not. As Paul and Hall write:  
 
 ‘What’s needed is a more developed story, according to which the inference 
from “C causes D” and “D causes E” to “C causes E” is safe, provided  
such-and-such conditions obtain’8 
 
As I will now show, my account of causation supports just such a restricted 
principle of transitivity. The key to this restricted principle is to note that the 
relation of process-connection is transitive, as I prove in Appendix A section 2: 
 
                                                
8 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 219 
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Transitivity of process-connection: if there is a set of events, {d1, d2, . . . , dn},  
such that c is process-connected to d1, d1 is process-connected to d2, . . . ,  
and dn is process-connected to e, then c is process-connected to e.  
 
From this, it immediately follows that my account of causation supports the 
following restricted principle of transitivity: 
 
It is easy to verify that my account of causation entails this principle: from the 
fact that c causes d1, it follows that c is process-connected to d1; from the fact 
that d1 causes d2, it follows that d1 is process-connected to d2, . . . , and from the 
fact that dn causes e, it follows that dn is process-connected to e. From the 
Transitivity of process-connection, it now follows that c is process-connected to e. 
This shows that c causes e within a possibility horizon H,  provided that e 
security-depends on c within H. 
 This restricted principle of transitivity licenses us to appeal to transitivity 
in exactly those cases where such an appeal does not lead us astray – that is, in 
exactly those cases where the relation of security-dependence behaves 
transitively. And as we shall now see, this still allows transitivity to play a 
central role in our causal reasoning.  
 
2.2  Applications 
To illustrate how the restricted principle of transitivity works, I begin by 
considering our standard case of early preemption. I then turn to a much more 
complicated case that illustrates the power of our restricted transitivity 
principle. Consider our standard case of early preemption:  
 
 
 Restricted transitivity of causation: if there is a set of events, {d1, d2, . . . , dn},  
such that c causes d1, d1 causes d2, . . . , and dn causes e, then c causes e  
within a possibility horizon H,  provided that e security-depends on c within H. 









        
 
 
As we have already seen (Chapter 9 section 1.1), E security-depends on A (and 
also on B) within the contextually relevant possibility horizon. Thus, the 
restriction on our principle of transitivity is satisfied – and we are now free to 
appeal to transitivity to show that A causes E: C depends counterfactually on 
A. By our restricted principle of sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for 
causation, it follows that A causes C. And E depends counterfactually on C. So 
by the same principle, we find that C causes E. By the restricted transitivity of 
causation, we now straightforwardly get the desired result that A causes E. 
Our restricted transitivity principle thus licenses us to appeal to transitivity in 
this case, in precisely the way in which we saw Lewis doing so above.  













       
                                                
9 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 44. 
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Is C a cause of N? We begin by noting that N security-depends on C (and also 
on D) within the possibility horizon H   that treats A, B, C, and D as candidate 
causes (we get the same result when we consider smaller possibility horizons, 
provided C and D are treated as candidate causes). Thus, the restriction on our 
principle is satisfied, and we are free to proceed: by applying the restricted 
principle of sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation, we find 
that C causes G, G causes K, K causes ¬M, and ¬M causes N. By our restricted 
transitivity principle, it now follows that C causes N within our possibility 
horizon H.  
In this way, our restricted transitivity principle – together with our 
restricted principle of sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation – 
allows us to arrive at the correct result in a straightforward way, even though 
we are here faced with a relatively complex case. 
 
3.  Intrinsicness 
In this section, I turn to the final intuitive principle mentioned in the 
introduction, namely the principle that causation is intrinsic to a process. I 
begin by setting out in more detail how we should understand this principle 
(section 3.1). Next, I show how we may arrive at a restricted intrinsicness 
principle (section 3.2). And finally, I discuss applications of the restricted 
principle (section 3.3) and the close connection between idealisation and the 
restricted intrinsicness principle (section 3.4). 
 
3.1  Understanding the intrinsicness principle 
We may give the following preliminary statement of the principle that 
causation is intrinsic to a process (the asterisk indicates that I do not endorse 
the principle): 
 
        * Intrinsicness of causation: if c causes e, and a structure of events S, including all the 
events that are involved in a process connecting c to e, is governed by the same 
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laws and exactly matches a structure of events S *, then the counterpart c* of c 
in S * is a cause of the counterpart e* of e in S *. 
 
There are counterexamples to this principle, on any reasonable way of spelling 
out what it takes for a structure of events to include all the events involved in a 
process connecting c to e (see Chapter 2 section 1.3.3). My account of 
causation sides with our intuitive judgements on these counterexamples – and 
thereby goes against Intrinsicness of causation. However, as we shall see, my 
account supports a restricted principle of intrinsicness. Before we can get to 
this, however, we first need to get a more precise understanding of the 
intrinsicness principle itself. 
Lewis gives the intuitive motivation for the intrinsicness principle as 
follows:  
 
‘Suppose we have processes – courses of events, which may or may not be 
causally connected – going on in two distinct spatiotemporal regions, regions of 
the same or of different possible worlds. Disregarding the surroundings of the 
two regions, and disregarding any irrelevant events that may be occurring in 
either region without being part of the process in question, what goes on in the 
two regions is exactly alike. Suppose further that the laws of nature that govern 
the two regions are exactly the same. Then can it be that we have a causal 
process in one of the regions but not in the other? It seems not. Intuitively, 
whether a process going on in a region is causal depends only on the intrinsic 
character of the process itself, and on the relevant laws. The surroundings, and 
even other events in the region, are irrelevant.’10 
 
What Lewis makes here is in fact a supervenience claim: namely, the claim that 
the obtaining of a causal relation supervenes on the laws together with the 
intrinsic nature of the cause, the effect, and the intermediate events that make 
up the process connecting the cause to the effect.  
                                                
10 Lewis (1986e), p. 205.  
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However, Lewis’s statement is objectionably vague: in particular, he 
leaves it unspecified exactly what he means by a ‘process’11 – and thereby, he 
leaves it unspecified exactly what should be included in the supervenience base. 
Before we proceed, we therefore need a more precise statement of the 
intrinsicness principle. In the following, I begin by defining the relevant notion 
of matching. I next define what must be included in a structure of events S  in 
order for S  to include all the events that are involved in a process from c to e. 
And finally, I present my more precise statement of the intrinsicness principle. 
 To capture what it takes for one event or structure of events to match 
another, it will be useful to introduce the notion of an image, where one event 
or structure of events may be the image of another under a particular 
structure-preserving mapping. The kind of structure-preserving mapping I am 
interested in here is a mapping from time-slices in a world w to time-slices in a 
world w* (where w and w* may be the same or different worlds), which 
preserves before-after relations, etc. We may now define what it takes for one 
event to be the image of another as follows: 
 
The image of an event e: let M be a structure-preserving mapping  
from time-slices in a world w to time-slices in a world w*.  
Then e* = (w*, t*, s*, I*, C*) is the image of e = (w, t, s, I, C) under M, iff  
a) t* = the image of t under M, 
b) I* = the image of I under M, and 
c) C* = C. 
 
Note that this notion of an image does not explicitly mention intrinsicness. 
However, it is still implicitly concerned with intrinsic character: as we have 
seen, complete states are intrinsic properties of time-slices of worlds (Chapter 
3 section 2). By extension, classes of complete states are also intrinsic 
properties of time-slices of worlds. When an event e* = (w*, t*, s*, I*, C*) is the 
                                                
11 Hall (2004b), p. 239; Paul and Hall (2013), p. 126. 
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image of an event e = (w, t, s, I, C), this therefore tells us that the time-t* slice 
of w* shares certain intrinsic properties with the time-t slice of w: both time-
slices are in a complete state that belongs to the class of complete states C = 
C*. For example, both time-slices are in a complete state such that Suzy is 
throwing a rock at the window.  
At the same time, the definition allows that the two time-slices need not 
be perfectly intrinsically alike: the complete state s* that features in the 
realization of e* may be different from the complete state s that features in the 
realization of e. Thus, it may for example be the case that the complete state 
that features in the realization of e is such that Suzy is throwing a rock at the 
window and a blackbird is singing from a tree, while the complete state that 
features in the realization of e* is such that Suzy is throwing a rock at the 
window, and there are no birds in the tree. This is as it should be, since it 
would trivialise the intrinsicness principle if we required perfect match of 
complete states. 
Since we are only concerned with structure-preserving mappings, it never 
happens that two different time-slices in w are mapped onto the same time-
slice in w*, and thus, it never happens that a single event in w* is the image of 
two different events in w. Hence every image-event e* has a well-defined pre-
image e. Building on this, we may now define what it takes for one structure of 
events to be the image of another:  
 
The image of a structure of events: let M be a structure-preserving mapping  
from time-slices in a world w to time-slices in a world w*.  
Then a structure S * of events occurring in w* is the image under M  
of a structure S  of events occurring in w iff:  
an event e belongs to S  just in case the image e* of e under M belongs to S *. 
 
Next, we need to answer the question of what it takes for a structure of events 
to include all the events that are involved in a process from c to e. Giving a 
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fully general answer to this question is a relatively complex matter. I take up 
this task in Appendix A section 3.1. For our present purposes, however, we 
may limit ourselves to neuron diagrams – and here, the general proposal 
presented in Appendix A section 3.1 entails a simple and intuitively correct 
answer to our question: 
 When we are considering a neuron diagram, we may identify a time-
series that includes all those times at which the neuron diagram explicitly 
shows what happens. We may then give a characterisation of a process based 










        
 
 
In this case, the time-series T: t1 < t2 < t3 includes all those times at which the 
neuron diagram explicitly shows what happens. And based on this time-series, 
we may characterise the process from A to E as follows: 
 
 t1: A 
 t2: C 
 t3: E 
 
To include all the events that are involved in a process from c to e, a structure 
of events S  must include all the events that feature in such a characterisation 
of a process from c to e. In the present case, for example, our structure of 
events needs to include the three events A, C, and E. 
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Furthermore, when one event stands in the right relation to another, this 
is sometimes so in virtue of other events. To bring this out, consider the 













In this case, D fires if and only if it receives signals from both A and B, or 
from C. We here find that there is a process from A to D, namely:  
 
 t1: A  (together with B) 
 t2: D 
 
A here stands in the right relation to D in virtue of the fact that A belongs to 
the set {A, B}, which is minimally sufficient for D. Consider now the 
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In Figure 5*, A and D still occur. However, A is not process-connected to D. 
To have a credible version of the intrinsicness principle, we therefore need to 
count the events with which A combines – in this case, B – as also being 
involved in the process from A to D.12 
 My suggestion is that a structure of events S  includes all the events that 
are involved in a process from c to e just in case it satisfies the conditions 
outlined above. This may be summed up as follows: 
 
Including all events involved in a genuine process – applied to neuron diagrams:  
a structure of events S  includes all the events in a genuine process from c to e 
iff there is a series of events P, based on a time-series that includes all those 
times at which the neuron diagram explicitly represents what happens, such that 
a) P characterises a genuine process from c to e,  
b) if an event belongs to P, then it belongs to S, and 
c) for any two events ei and ei+1, where ei is followed immediately by ei+1 in P,  
ei belongs to a set Si of contemporaneous events, such that  
i) Si is minimally sufficient for ei+1, and 
ii) Si is a subset of S.  
 
I suggest that we should understand the intrinsicness principle as saying that 
when c causes e, then any structure of events that satisfies the above definition 
constitutes a supervenience base for the fact c causes e. In our case of early 
preemption, for example, the intrinsicness principle says that the fact that A 
causes E supervenes on the laws together with the structure of events S = {A, 
C, E}. And in our case of overdetermined joint causation illustrated in Figure 
5, the principle says that the fact that A causes D supervenes on the laws 
together with the structure of events S = {A, B, D}. 
                                                
12 Cf. Hall (2002), pp. 264-65; Paul and Hall (2013), p. 126. 
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Based on this, we may now give the following more precise statement of 
the principle that causation is intrinsic to a process (the asterisk indicates that I 
do not endorse the principle): 
 
        * Intrinsicness of causation: let c and e be events occurring in world w.  
Let c be a cause of e, and let S  be a structure of events occurring in w, 
including all the events involved in a genuine process from c to e.  
Let S * be a structure of events occurring in w*, such that 
a) w and w* are governed by the same laws, and  
b) S * is the image of S  under a structure-preserving mapping M.  
Then the image c* of c under M is a cause of the image e* of e under M.  
 
In the following section, I will now show how this more precise understanding 
of the intrinsicness principle allows us to recover a restricted intrinsicness 
principle. 
 
3.2  A restricted principle of intrinsicness 
On my proposed account of causation, Intrinsicness of causation is false. However, 
as I prove in Appendix A section 3, process-connection is intrinsic to a 
process:  
Intrinsicness of process-connection: let c and e be events occurring in world w.  
Let c be process-connected to e, and let S  be a structure of events occurring in 
w, including all the events involved in a genuine process from c to e.  
Let S * be a structure of events occurring in w*, such that 
a) w and w* are governed by the same laws, and  
b) S * is the image of S  under a structure-preserving mapping M.  
Then the image c* of c under M is process-connected to the image e* of e under M.  
 
Thus, we find that my account of causation entails the following restricted 
intrinsicness principle: 
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As we shall now see, this is – in spite of the restriction – a powerful principle 
of causal reasoning. 
 
3.3  Applications 
The principle of Restricted intrinsicness of causation allows us to transfer results 
from one case to another – in particular, it allows us to transfer results from 
simple environments to more complex environments. In this way, the Restricted 
intrinsicness of causation allows us to ‘discover causal structure embedded within a 
complex system of events’13 – without having to come to grips with the whole 
complex system all at once.  
This makes the Restricted intrinsicness of causation a powerful tool in our 
causal reasoning. Indeed, it seems plausible that the assumption of some kind 
of intrinsicness principle underlies much of our scientific practice, where our 
method precisely is to study various phenomena under controlled conditions, 
and then subsequently transfer our conclusions to more complex 
environments. 
 The power of the Restricted intrinsicness of causation as a tool for reasoning 
about causation is especially clear when we are dealing with cases of redundant 
causation. To illustrate this, I first consider our standard case of early 
                                                
13 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 127. 
Restricted intrinsicness of causation: let c and e be events occurring in world w.  
Let c be a cause of e, and let S  be a structure of events occurring in w, 
including all the events involved in a genuine process from c to e.  
Let S * be a structure of events occurring in w*, such that 
a) w and w* are governed by the same laws, and  
b) S * is the image of S  under a structure-preserving mapping M.  
Then the image c* of c under M is a cause of the image e* of e under M  
within a possibility horizon H , provided that e* security-depends on c* within H.  
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preemption, and next a more complex case of redundant omission-involving 









        
 
 
It is easy to see that A here causes E. Indeed, E depends counterfactually on A 
within any possibility horizon that treats A as a candidate cause. 
Correspondingly, we find that A is process-connected to E via the process:  
 
 t1: A 
 t2: C 
 t3: E 
 
By the above definition, we now find that the structure of events S  = {A, C, 
E} includes all the events that are involved in the process from A to E.  








        
 
 
It is clear that the Figure 6 and Figure 6* are governed by the same laws. 
Furthermore, the structure of events S * = {A*, C*, E*} is the image of the 
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structure of events S = {A, C, E} under the structure-preserving mapping 
that maps t1 to t1*, t2 to t2*, etc. Finally, we have already seen that E* security-
depends on A* (cf. Chapter 9 section 1.1), within the possibility horizon H  
that treats both A* and B* as candidate causes. Based on this, the Restricted 
intrinsicness of causation yields the desired result – namely, that A* causes E* 
within possibility horizon H. 
 As a further example, let us consider how the principle applies in a case 











     
In this case, it is clear that ¬A is a cause of H. Indeed, H depends 
counterfactually on ¬A within any possibility horizon that treats ¬A as a 
candidate cause. Correspondingly, we find that ¬A is process-connected to H 
via the following process:  
 
 t1: ¬A  (together with B) 
 t2: D 
 t3: F 
 t4: H 
 
                                                
14 Note that the Restricted intrinsicness of causation applies equally well to omission-involving 
causation, in keeping with my general suggestion that there is no deep metaphysical distinction 
between omissions and absences and so-called positive events. By contrast, the intrinsicness 
principle proposed in Hall (2004b) and Paul and Hall (2013) does not apply to omission-
involving causation (see Hall (2004b) and Paul and Hall (2013), pp. 196-97).  
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By the above definition, we thus find that the structure of events S = {¬A, B, 
D, F, H} includes all the events involved in the process from ¬A to H.  











     
 
It is clear that Figure 7 and Figure 7* are governed by the same laws. 
Furthermore, the structure of events S * = {¬A*, B*, D*, F*, H*} is the 
image of the structure of events S = {¬A, B, D, F, H}, under the structure-
preserving mapping that maps t1 to t1*, t2 to t2*, etc. And finally, it is easy to 
verify that H* security-depends on ¬A* within any possibility horizon that 
treats ¬A* and C* as candidate causes. On this basis, the Restricted intrinsicness of 
causation delivers the desired result – namely, that ¬A* is a cause of H* within 
any such possibility horizon H.  
 As these cases illustrate, the Restricted intrinsicness of causation allows us to 
easily handle cases of redundant causation by considering the relevant causal 
process in a simpler environment, where there is no redundancy, and then 
transferring our results to the case at hand. Although we do not need the 
intrinsicness principle – any result that can be obtained by applying the 
Restricted intrinsicness of causation can also be obtained by applying the two 
conditions of process-connection and security-dependence directly – the 
principle thus provides a useful shortcut in our causal reasoning. It is, however, 
 B*            D*           F*             H* 
    C*      E*      G* 
    A* 
  t1*   t2*   t3*   t4*    Figure 7* 
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important to be aware of the limitations of the principle. I discuss those 
limitations in the following section.  
 
 3.4  Limitations: idealisations and real-life cases 
The hope that motivated Lewis’s original suggestion that causation is intrinsic 
to a process, as well as Hall’s later development of the idea, is that some kind 
of intrinsicness principle can provide a solution to the problem of late 
preemption.15  
 In support of this idea, Paul and Hall suggest that it would provide an 
attractive explanation of how we arrive at our intuitive judgements about cases 
of late preemption: 
 
‘consider a plausible claim about late preemption cases: we can arrive at a case 
of late preemption by beginning with a case of perfectly ordinary, garden 
variety causation involving a structure of events S, and then adding details to it 
that concern matters extrinsic to S. […] In this way, we can arrive at the case of 
Billy, Suzy, and the [window] by starting with a situation in which Suzy alone 
throws a rock at the [window], and then adding extrinsic details (Billy and his 
throw), and so on. If, as our intrinsicness thesis states, such extrinsic changes 
make no difference to the causal structure of the process we begin with, then it 
is no surprise that cases of late preemption evoke such clear and firm intuitive 
judgements: we “see” embedded in them, as it were, perfectly ordinary cases of 
causation.’16 
 
There are several problems with relying on intrinsicness to handle late 
preemption, not least that there are convincing counterexamples to the 
unrestricted intrinsicness principle.17 As we have seen, however, my account of 
                                                
15 See Hall (2002) and (2004b), pp. 258-65; Lewis (1986e), pp. 205-7. 
16 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 128. 
17 In recognition of these counterexamples, Lewis retracts his endorsement of the intrinsicness 
principle (Lewis (2004a), pp. 83-85, while Hall limits the principle to one of his two concepts 
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causation entails a restricted intrinsicness principle. To what extent can the 
Restricted intrinsicness of causation fulfil Lewis’s and Hall’s ambitions of using some 
form of intrinsicness principle to handle cases of late preemption?  
Of course, the Restricted intrinsicness of causation does not need to fulfil these 
ambitions: we already have a way to distinguish genuine causes from 
preempted backups – namely by applying the condition of process-connection 
directly, as illustrated in Chapter 7. However, it will nevertheless be 
illuminating to see how the Restricted intrinsicness of causation relates to cases of 
late preemption: as we shall see, the Restricted intrinsicness of causation does fulfil 
Lewis’s and Hall’s ambitions in simple and idealised cases of late preemption, 
but fails to do so in complex real-life cases. This result in turn points to an 
interesting observation concerning the role of idealisation. 
 Let us begin by seeing how the Restricted intrinsicness of causation applies to 





         
 
         
 
Suppose that the speed of the stimulatory signal from A* to C* is independent 
of whether or not B* fires. Suppose further that the stimulatory signal from 
A* reaches C* exactly at time t2*, whereupon C* immediately fires. By 
contrast, the stimulatory signal from B* reaches C* at some slightly later time 
– say, at time t3*. Suppose finally that the effect we are interested in is – against 
our usual practices when dealing with neuron diagrams – a temporally robust 
event, namely the event C* based on the interval I* = [t2*, t3*], and the class of 
states such that C* fires. Based on this, we find that the case has the standard 
                                                                                                                       
of causation, namely the concept of production (Hall (2004b)). For discussion, see also Paul 
(1998b). 
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characteristics of a late preemption case: intuitively, A* is a cause of C*, while 
B* is not – but if A* had not occurred, C* would still have occurred because of 
B* (it would simply have occurred slightly later – namely, at t3* instead of t2*).  
 To see how the Restricted intrinsicness of causation allows us to handle this 





         
 
         
 
In this simple case, it is clear that A causes C. Indeed, C depends 
counterfactually on A within any possibility horizon that treats A as a 
candidate cause. Correspondingly, we find that there is a genuine process from 
A to C, namely:  
 
 t1: A 
 t2: C 
 
Thus, the structure of events S = {A, C} includes all the events involved in 
the process from A to C.  
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It is clear that Figure 8 and Figure 8* are governed by the same laws. It is also 
clear that the structure of events S * = {A*, C*} is the image of the structure 
of events S = {A, C} under the structure-preserving mapping that maps time 
t1 to t1*, etc. Finally, it is easily seen that C* security-depends on A* within the 
possibility horizon H  that treats both A* and B* as candidate causes. Thus, 
the Restricted intrinsicness of causation allows us to conclude that A* causes C* 
within possibility horizon H.  
So far, then, the Restricted intrinsicness of causation satisfies Lewis’s and 
Hall’s ambitions: it provides a straightforward way to transfer conclusions 
about what causes what in simple environments to cases of late preemption, 
and it allows us to explain our intuitions about such cases as a result of how 
‘we “see” embedded in them […] perfectly ordinary cases of causation.’18 
 Once we attempt to apply the Restricted intrinsicness of causation to real-life 
cases, such as the case of Suzy, Billy, and the window, however, the limitations 
of the principle become apparent. This should hardly be a surprise – the 
difficulty in applying any kind of intrinsicness principle to real life cases such as 
this one has long been recognised by Lewis and Hall.19 The problem is that the 
process from Suzy’s throw to the window-shattering in the simple case where 
Billy is absent does not perfectly match the process from Suzy’s throw to the 
window-shattering in the case where Billy is there and throws a rock too:  
 
‘because of Billy’s absence, there will, of nomological necessity, be ever so 
slight intrinsic differences in the structure of events consisting of the flight of 
Suzy’s rock towards the [window].’20 
 
This places a strain on the formulation of the intrinsicness principle. As Paul 
and Hall write: 
                                                
18 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 128. 
19 See e.g. Hall (2002), p. 287 and (2004b), p. 259; Lewis (2004a), p. 82. 
20 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 131. See also Hall (2002), p. 287; Hall (2004b), p. 259; Lewis 
(2004a), p. 82. 
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‘an application of [the intrinsicness thesis] to the problem posed by late 
preemption requires some delicacy when laying out the relevant notion of 
“matching”: perfect match of intrinsic character makes for a more readily 
defensible thesis, but at the cost of rendering that thesis useless as a cure for the 
late preemption disease.’21 
 
To address this problem, Hall has an interesting discussion of how we might 
distinguish between relevant and irrelevant respects of similarity.22 On my 
account of causation, however, we do not need any kind of intrinsicness 
principle to handle problems of late preemption: we can handle them by 
applying my account directly. I am therefore content to only satisfy part of 
Lewis’s and Hall’s ambitions: as I set out in more detail in Appendix A section 
3.1, a sufficiently comprehensive structure of events must include all those 
events that influence the timing of the events in our target process. As a result, 
the Restricted intrinsicness of causation can only be used when reasoning about 
simple cases of late preemption, such as the one illustrated in Figure 8* above; 
it simply does not apply in complex real life cases such as the case of Suzy, 
Billy, and the window. 
 However, this does not mean that the Restricted intrinsicness of causation has 
no relevance for understanding how we think about such real life cases: at least 
in our scientific practice – and plausibly in our everyday reasoning too – we do 
in fact make use of exactly this kind of intrinsicness principle in thinking about 
complex real life cases. To see how, we first need to look more closely at the 
role of idealisations.  
Making idealisations is an important part of our scientific practice. When 
calculating the trajectory of a rock, for example, we usually focus only on 
significant contributions such as the rock’s momentum, the gravitational field 
from the earth, etc. – while disregarding the comparatively much smaller 
                                                
21 Paul and Hall (2013), p. 196. 
22 See Hall (2002), pp. 286-290. 
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contributions from air resistance, air currents, gravitational fields from small 
objects in the vicinity, etc. This yields a much cleaner and more manageable – 
though not entirely truthful – picture of the situation at hand. 
 If we allow ourselves to make such idealisations, we can apply the 
Restricted intrinsicness of causation – we can apply it to the idealised version of the 
case at hand. We may, for example, consider an idealised version of our late 
preemption case with Suzy, Billy, and the window, where we disregard small 
contributions such as air resistance, air currents, gravitational fields from small 
objects in the vicinity etc. When we are considering such an idealised version 
of the case, the process from Suzy’s throw to the window-shattering in the case 
where Billy is absent does perfectly match the process from Suzy’s throw to the 
window-shattering in the case where Billy is there and throws a rock too – and 
this allows us to apply the Restricted intrinsicness of causation in the idealised case.  
It is important to note, however, that bringing in idealisations like this 
does not allow the Restricted intrinsicness of causation to solve the problem of late 
preemption: for that, we still need the direct application of my account of 
causation, and in particular the condition of process-connection. The reason 
for this is that the idealisations are prior to the application of the Restricted 
intrinsicness of causation; that principle in itself does nothing to tell us which 
idealisations are permissible and which idealisations will lead us astray. To 
distinguish the good idealisations from the bad, we thus need to fall back on 
the results delivered by applying my account of causation directly.23  
 
4.  Conclusion 
What I hope to have shown in this chapter is that, while my proposed account 
of causation cannot accommodate the three intuitive principles of causal 
                                                
23 This has clear parallels in the case of science, where the art of making good approximations 
and idealisations – namely, approximations and idealisations that make the cases manageable, 
while delivering an appropriate degree of accuracy in the final results – is in the same way 
something that comes before the application of the theories themselves, and is constrained 
instead by experiments and experience with more detailed applications of the theories. 
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inference – concerning the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence, 
transitivity, and intrinsicness – in their unrestricted form, it can accommodate 
restricted versions of all three principles. These restricted versions are 
compatible with our intuitive verdicts on counterexamples to the unrestricted 
principles. But at the same time, they allow us to preserve our core practices of 
causal reasoning. In this way, my account of causation shows charity to use not 
just in accommodating our intuitive judgements about specific cases, but also 






































I started with the question: what is causation? I am now in a position to 
present my answer in the form of the following biconditional: 
 
This biconditional captures the dual nature of causation: a cause must be 
connected to its effect via a genuine process, and it must make a difference to 
its effect.  
 The first condition – namely, the condition of process-connection –  
captures the sense in which a cause must be connected to its effect via a 
genuine process. As we have seen, this condition allows my account to 
separate causation from mere correlation, distinguish genuine causes from 
preempted backups, and capture the sense in which a cause must be at the 
right level of detail relative to its effect (Chapter 7).  
 The second condition – namely, the condition of security-dependence – 
captures the sense in which a cause must make a difference to its effect. As we 
have seen, this condition allows my account to deliver intuitively correct 
verdicts on the counterexamples to the transitivity and intrinsicness of 
causation, resolve the problem of profligate omissions, accommodate 
structurally isomorphic but causally different cases, and handle contrastive 
causal claims (Chapter 9 and 10). 
Causation: c is a cause of e within a possibility horizon H   iff  
a) c is process-connected to e, and 
b) e security-depends on c within H. 
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 Recognising the dual nature of causation also allows my account to 
support restricted versions of the three intuitive principles concerning the 
sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation, and the transitivity and 
intrinsicness of causation. The reason for this is that each of the three intuitive 
principles is satisfied by one, but not the other, of the two relations of process-
connection and security-dependence: counterfactual dependence within a 
possibility horizon is sufficient for security-dependence within that same 
possibility horizon, but is not sufficient for process-connection; and process-
connection is transitive and intrinsic to a process, while security-dependence is 
not. As a result, we find that the following three restricted principles are logical 
consequences of my account of causation (Chapter 11): 
 
 Restricted sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation:  
if e depends counterfactually on c within a possibility horizon H,  
such that H   is discriminating at c’s time of occurrence,  
then c or a more or less fragile version of c is a cause of e within H. 
 
 Restricted transitivity of causation: if there is a set of events, {d1, d2, . . . , dn},  
such that c causes d1, d1 causes d2, . . . , and dn causes e, then c causes e  
within a possibility horizon H, provided that e security-depends on c within H. 
 
Restricted intrinsicness of causation: let c and e be events occurring in world w.  
Let c be a cause of e, and let S  be a structure of events occurring in w, 
including all the events involved in a genuine process from c to e.  
Let S * be a structure of events occurring in w*, such that 
a) w and w* are governed by the same laws, and  
b) S * is the image of S  under a structure-preserving mapping M.  
Then the image c* of c under M is a cause of the image e* of e under M  
within a possibility horizon H , provided that e* security-depends on c* within H.  
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Finally, treating causation as a ternary relation with a possibility horizon as its 
third relatum allows my account to accommodate the context-sensitivity of our 
causal claims: metaphysically, causation is a ternary relation – c causes e within 
possibility horizon H.  It is an entirely context-independent matter whether 
this ternary relation holds. Usually, however, the surface form of our causal 
claims is binary – as in ‘c causes e’ – and we rely on context to supply the 
relevant possibility horizon. And this accounts for the fact that the truth-value 
of our binary causal claims depends on context: one context may select a 
possibility horizon H 1, such that it is true that c causes e within H 1; a different 
context may select a different possibility horizon H 2, such that it is false that c 
causes e within H 2. 
 It is, however, important to note that the context-sensitivity of causal 
claims is limited: process-connection is a binary relation between instantaneous 
events. Since process-connection is a necessary condition for causation, this 
means that whenever an event c is not process-connected to an event e, the 
causal claim that ‘c does not cause e’ is true independently of our choice of 
possibility horizon. For example, if c is merely a preempted backup in relation 
to e, it is true independently of context that c does not cause e. Context only 
plays a role in the selection among those events that are process-connected to 
the effect: security-dependence is a ternary relation between two instantaneous 
events and a possibility horizon, and thus, we may find that e security-depends 
on c within one possibility horizon H 1, but does not security-depend on c 
within a different possibility horizon H 2.  
 How well does this account of causation satisfy the criteria of success set 
out in Chapter 1?  
 First, my account provides an ontological reduction of causation: my 
account is based on four basic ingredients – complete states, laws of nature 
understood as rules specifying the temporal evolution of complete states, 
relations of overall similarity between complete states, and the space of 
metaphysically possible worlds. On the basis of these four ingredients, I define 
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the two kinds of causal relata – namely, instantaneous events (Chapter 4) and 
possibility horizons (Chapter 5) – and the two relations of process-connection 
(Chapter 6) and security-dependence (Chapter 8). These are the only ingredients 
that go into my definition of the ternary relation of causation within a 
possibility horizon. Thus, they are the only ingredients that go into my account 
of what causation is out in the world.  
 My account of how context selects a possibility horizon is not, strictly 
speaking, part of my account of what causation is out in the world: it simply 
captures how we take an interest in some ways of completing the statement ‘c 
causes e’, but not others. To verify that my account of causation yields 
intuitively correct results when applied to our ordinary causal statements, 
however, it is indispensable to have an account of how we should select the 
third relatum when we are evaluating a binary causal claim of the form ‘c causes 
e’. To capture this, I bring in a further ingredient – namely, the descriptive fact 
that we accept certain extrapolations as appropriate and reject others. This 
notion of extrapolation is non-causal, and thus we can capture – in a non-
causal way – how context selects the relevant possibility horizon.  
On this basis, I believe that my proposed account succeeds in providing 
an ontological reduction of causation.  
Second, I will now argue that my account achieves a high degree of 
eligibility and charity to use:  
In developing my account of causation, I have been guided by 
considerations of eligibility in two important ways. Firstly, there is a close 
connection between eligibility and ontological reduction: an ontological 
reduction shows how the causal relation is built up from fundamental features 
of the world – complete states, laws of nature, etc. And other things being 
equal, a relation that has a relatively simple definition in terms of these 
fundamental features of the world is more eligible than a relation that does not. 
The fact that I propose an ontological reduction therefore speaks in favour of 
the eligibility of my proposed candidate meaning of ‘cause’. 
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The second way in which I have been guided by considerations of 
eligibility is in my search for relations with beautiful formal properties. I 
believe that it speaks in favour of the eligibility of the relation of process-
connection that it is transitive and intrinsic to a process. I similarly believe that 
it speaks in favour of the eligibility of the relation of security-dependence that 
counterfactual dependence within a possibility horizon entails security-
dependence within that same possibility horizon. And by extension, I believe 
that it speaks in favour of the eligibility of my proposed candidate meaning of 
‘cause’ that it can be defined in terms of these two relations. 
Furthermore, I believe that my proposed account of causation achieves a 
high degree of charity to use. Indeed, as far as I am aware, the only cases where 
my proposed account goes against our intuitive judgements are cases where 
those intuitive judgements come into conflict with each other: in 
counterexamples to the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence, and to the 
transitivity and intrinsicness of causation, my account sides with our intuitive 
judgements about specific cases, against the intuitive principles in their 
unrestricted form. On the other hand, there are certain more complex cases 
where my account goes against our intuitive judgements about specific cases, 
because our intuitive judgements about these cases conflict with the 
independently plausible restricted principles of sufficiency of counterfactual 
dependence, transitivity, and intrinsicness. 
By striking this balance between our intuitive judgements about specific 
cases and our intuitive acceptance of the three general principles concerning 
the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation, and the transitivity 
and intrinsicness of causation, I believe that my proposed account achieves a 
high degree of charity to use: it yields intuitively correct verdicts on almost all 
the specific cases we have considered (for an overview, see Appendix B), and 
at the same time, it legitimises our core practices of appealing to counterfactual 
dependence, transitivity, and intrinsicness in our causal reasoning. 
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In this Appendix, I prove four important results concerning the relations of 
process-connection and security-dependence. First, I show that process-
connection satisfies a restricted principle of sufficiency of counterfactual 
dependence (section 1). Second, I show that process-connection is a transitive 
relation (section 2). Third, I show that process-connection is intrinsic to a 
process (section 3). And finally, I show that counterfactual dependence within 
a possibility horizon entails security-dependence within that same possibility 
horizon (section 4). 
 
1. The restricted sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for  
process-connection 
In this section, I show that although counterfactual dependence is not 
sufficient for process-connection (cf. Chapter 7 section 4), we can recover a 
restricted principle of sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for process-
connection (section 1.1). My proof rests on a particular assumption, which I 
argue is satisfied in all ordinary cases (section 1.2). 
 
1.1 The proof 
My aim in this section is to show that the following restricted principle holds: 
 
Restricted sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for process-connection:  
if e depends counterfactually on c within a possibility horizon H,   
such that H   is discriminating at c’s time of occurrence,  
then c or a more or less fragile version of c is process-connected to e. 
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For ease of reference, I repeat the definition of what it takes for a possibility 
horizon to be discriminating (cf. Chapter 11 section 1): 
 
Discriminating: a possibility horizon H  is discriminating at a time t iff  
for any event c occurring in @ at t, it is the case that either 
a) c occurs in every world in H, or 
b) c and more or less fragile versions of c are the only events that  
occur in @ at t, but do not occur in the closest-at-t not-c-world(s) in H. 
 
Note that this definition is implicitly relativized to the contextually relevant 
restriction on the domain of instantaneous events, since the definition requires 
us to quantify over instantaneous events. Note further that the definition is 
trivially satisfied when we restrict our domain of instantaneous events to 
contain only maximally fragile instantaneous events. When we include further 
instantaneous events within our domain of quantification, the definition 
becomes correspondingly more demanding.  
 My proof of Restricted sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for process-connection 
will rely on the following assumption: 
 
Assumption of sufficiency: let e be an instantaneous event that occurs in @ at t´,  
let t be some time strictly earlier than t´, and let T   be the set of all those events 
that occur in @ at t and are process-connected to e. Then T   is sufficient for e. 
 
In section 1.2, I argue that this assumption is satisfied in all ordinary cases, 
including all neuron diagrams. In the following, I will now prove the Restricted 
sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for process-connection, given this assumption: 
Suppose that c occurs at time t, and that e depends counterfactually on c 
within a possibility horizon H,  i.e. e occurs in @ (at some time strictly later 
than t), and does not occur in the closest-at-t not-c-world(s) in H.  Assuming 
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that H  is discriminating at time t, we know that c and more or less fragile 
versions of c are the only events that occur in @ at t, but do not occur in the  
closest-at-t not-c-world(s) in H. 
 We want to prove that c or a more or less fragile version of c is process-
connected to e. To see this, let S (for sufficient) be any set of events satisfying 
the following two conditions: 
i) all the events in S occur in @ at t, and 
ii) S is a sufficient set for e. 
We first prove that c or a more or less fragile version of c belongs to S. To see 
this, let w be an arbitrary world among the closest-at-t not-c-worlds in H.  
Suppose for reductio that all the events in S occur in w. Since S is a sufficient set 
for e, it follows that e occurs in w. But since e depends counterfactually on c 
within H, we already know that e does not occur in w. Thus, the supposition 
leads to a contradiction. And so we conclude that at least one event in S does 
not occur in w. Since c and more or less fragile versions of c are the only events 
that occur in @ at t, but do not occur in w, it follows that c, or a more or less 
fragile version of c, belongs to S. 
 The above argument applies to any set S of events satisfying the two 
conditions i) and ii) above. Now, let T   (for total) be the set of all those events 
that occur in @ at t and are process-connected to e. To prove that c, or a more 
or less fragile version of c, is process-connected to e, it is enough to prove that 
T   satisfies conditions i) and ii).  
 To see this, we note that our definition of T   – as the set of all those 
events that occur in @ at t and are process-connected to e – ensures that 
condition i) is satisfied. And, given the Assumption of sufficiency, condition ii) is 
also satisfied. Hence c, or a more or less fragile version of c, is process-
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1.2 The assumption of sufficiency 
The above proof rests on the Assumption of sufficiency, stated at the beginning of 
section 1.1. For ease of reference, I repeat the assumption here:  
 
Assumption of sufficiency: let e be an instantaneous event that occurs in @ at t´,  
let t be some time strictly earlier than t´, and let T   be the set of all those events 
that occur in @ at t and are process-connected to e. Then T   is sufficient for e. 
 
I cannot offer a general proof of this assumption. In the following, however, I 
will show that the assumption is true for all neuron diagrams, given our 
standard restriction on the domain of neuron events to include only maximally 
temporally fragile events (cf. Chapter 4 section 2.3). This makes it plausible 
that the assumption is satisfied in most or all ordinary cases.  
 
To see that the Assumption of sufficiency holds in the case of neuron diagrams, let 
the time-series T: t1 < t2 < . . . < tn be a time-series that includes all those times 
at which it is explicitly represented what the neurons are doing. Let en be the 
effect we are interested in, and suppose that en occurs at time tn. Let T 1  be the 
set containing all those events that occur at time t1 and are process-connected 
to en. Then we must prove that T 1  is sufficient for en. To do this, we shall work 
our way back stepwise from tn to t1.   
For the first step, let Sn–1 be the set of all the neuron events occurring at 
time tn–1. Together, these events fully characterise the complete state of our 
neuron world at time tn–1. Given forwards determinism, it follows that Sn–1 is 
sufficient for en. From the definition of minimal sufficiency, it now follows that 
there exists at least one set Sn–1 of contemporaneous events that occurs at tn–1 
and is minimally sufficient for en (where Sn–1 is either identical to Sn–1, or a 
strictly more fragile version of Sn–1). And since en is already maximally 
temporally fragile, it immediately follows that Sn–1 is time-sensitively sufficient 
for en. From this, it follows that for every event en–1 in Sn–1, there is an apparent 
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process from en–1 to en. And since the time-series T includes all those times at 
which it is explicitly represented what the neurons are doing, it immediately 
follows that there is a genuine process from en–1 to en. Thus, en–1 is process-
connected to en.  
Let T n–1 be the set of all those neuron events that occur at time tn–1 and 
are process-connected to en. It follows that Sn–1 is a (proper or improper) subset 
of T n–1. And since Sn–1 is sufficient for en, it follows that T n–1 is sufficient for en.  
We may now apply exactly the same argument to every event en–1 that 
belongs to T n–1. Let Sn–2 be the set of all those events that belong to a time-
sensitively sufficient set for some event in Sn–1. By the same arguments as 
above, it follows that each event in Sn–2 is process-connected to some event in 
Sn–1. By the transitivity of process-connection, which I prove in section 2 
below, it follows that each event in Sn–2 is process-connected to en.  
Let T n–2 be the set of all those neuron events that occur at time tn–2 and 
are process-connected to en. It follows that Sn–2 is a (proper or improper) subset 
of T n–2. By the same arguments as above, we find that T n–2 is sufficient for 
each event in T n–1. From this, it follows that T n–2 is sufficient for en. To see 
this, simply note that sufficiency is transitive: if every nomologically possible 
world where all the events in T n–2 occur is such that all the events in T n–1 
occur, and every nomologically possible world where all the events in T n–1 
occur is such that en occurs, then every nomologically possible world where all 
the events in T n–2 occur is such that en occurs. Thus, T n–2 is sufficient for en. 
By iterating the above argument, we now find that T 1 is sufficient for en. 
This shows that, given our usual restriction on the domain of neuron events, 
the Assumption of sufficiency is true in the case of neuron diagrams. 
 
Since there is in principle no limitation on the number of neurons and the 
number of time steps that a neuron diagram may involve, neuron diagrams 
may accurately represent a wide range of real-life cases. This makes it highly 
plausible – though I cannot offer a direct proof – that the Assumption of 
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sufficiency is satisfied in all ordinary cases, given our ordinary restrictions on the 
domain of instantaneous events. By extension, this means that we can apply 
the principle of Restricted sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for process-connection in 
such ordinary cases.  
 
2. The transitivity of process-connection 
In this section, I show that the definition of process-connection implies that 
process-connection is a transitive relation: 
 
Transitivity of process-connection: if there is a set of events {d1, d2, . . . , dn},  
such that c is process-connected to d1, d1 is process-connected to d2, . . . ,  
and dn is process-connected to e, then c is process-connected to e. 
 
To show this, I show that for any three events c, d, and e, it is the case that if c 
is process-connected to d, and d is process-connected to e, then c is process-
connected to e. The above statement of the transitivity of process-connection 
follows immediately from this result.  
Let c, d, and e be three events, such that c is process-connected to d, and d 
is process-connected to e. This implies that there is a series of events P(c, d) 
characterising a genuine process from c to d, and a series of events P(d, e) 
characterising a genuine process from d to e. Let T(c, d) be the time-series on 
which P(c, d) is based, and let T(d, e) be the time-series on which P(d, e) is 
based. Finally, let P(c, e) be the series of events that results from letting P(c, d) 
continue into P(d, e), removing the repetition of d. And let T(c, e) be the time-
series that results from letting T(c, d) continue into T(d, e), removing the 
repetition of d ’s time of occurrence.  
 I will now show that P(c, e) characterises a genuine process from c to e. 
To see this, note first that it follows from the fact that P(c, d) is based on  
T(c, d), and P(d, e) is based on T(d, e), that P(c, e) is based on T(c, e). 
Furthermore, it is clear that P(c, e) characterises an apparent process: each non-
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final event in P(c, e) belongs to a set of events that is time-sensitively sufficient 
for the next event in P(c, e). The remaining question is: does P(c, e) also 
characterise a genuine process? 
For ease of reference, I repeat the definition of a genuine process here 
(cf. Chapter 6 section 4):  
 
Genuine process: a series of events P based on a time-series T characterises a 
genuine process iff P belongs to a set P of series of events, such that 
a) there is a one-one mapping between P and the master-set T for T  
that maps a series of events Pi from P to a time-series Ti in T  
iff Pi is based on Ti,  
b) each series of events in P characterises an apparent process, and 
c) for any time t, all series of events in P that associate an event with t 
associate the same event with t. 
 
Let P(c, d) be the set of series of events in virtue of which P(c, d) characterises a 
genuine process. And let P(d, e) be the set of series of events in virtue of which 
P(d, e) characterises a genuine process. It follows from the definition of a 
genuine process that for each augmented version T(c, d)+ of T(c, d), the set  
P(c, d) includes exactly one series of events based on T(c, d)+. Similarly, for each 
augmented version T(d, e)+ of T(d, e), the set P(d, e) includes exactly one series 
of events based on T(d, e)+.  
We may now construct a set of series of events, P(c, e), such that P(c, e) 
includes a series of events just in case this series of events is the result of 
letting a series of events that belongs to P(c, d) continue into a series of events 
that belongs to P(d, e), removing the repetition of d. I will now show that P(c, e) 
characterises a genuine process in virtue of the set P(c, e): 
 First, it is obvious that P(c, e) itself belongs to P(c, e), since P(c, e) is the 
result of letting P(c, d), which belongs to P(c, d), continue into P(d, e), which 
belongs to P(d, e), removing the repetition of d. In addition, we find that the 
three conditions a), b), and c), are satisfied:  
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Condition a)  
Let T(c, e) be the master-set for T(c, e). By the definition of a master-set, a time-
series T(c, e)+ belongs to T(c, e) just in case T(c, e)+ is an augmented version of 
T(c, e). It is now crucial to note that any augmented version, T(c, e)+, of T(c, e) 
may be obtained by letting an augmented version T(c, d)+ of T(c, d) continue 
into an augmented version T(d, e)+ of T(d, e), removing the repetition of d ’s 
time of occurrence. For each such time-series T(c, e)+, the set P(c, e) contains 
exactly one series of events based on T(c, e)+ – namely, the series of events that 
is the result of letting the unique series of events associated with the 
corresponding augmented version T(c, d)+ of T(c, d) in P(c, d) continue into the 
unique series of events associated with the corresponding augmented version 




It is clear that each series of events in P(c, e) characterises an apparent process. 
 
Condition c) 
From the fact that P(c, d) characterises a genuine process, it follows that for any 
time t, all series of events in P(c, d) that associate an event with t associate the 
same event with t. From the fact that P(d, e) characterises a genuine process, it 
similarly follows that for any time t, all series of events in P(d, e) that associate 
an event with t associate the same event with t. Given our construction of P(c, 
e), it follows from this that for any time t, all series of events in P(c, e) that 
associate an event with t associate the same event with t. 
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3. The intrinsicness of process-connection 
In this section, I show that process-connection is intrinsic to a process:1 
 
Intrinsicness of process-connection: let c and e be events occurring in world w.  
Let c be process-connected to e, and let S  be a structure of events occurring in 
w, including all the events involved in a genuine process from c to e.  
Let S * be a structure of events occurring in w*, such that 
a) w and w* are governed by the same laws, and  
b) S * is the image of S  under a structure-preserving mapping M.  
Then the image c* of c under M is process-connected to the image e* of e under M.  
 
For ease of reference, I repeat the definitions of what it is for an event to be 
the image of another, and what it is for a structure of events to be the image of 
another (cf. Chapter 11 section 3.1):  
 
The image of an event e: let M be a structure-preserving mapping  
from time-slices in a world w to time-slices in a world w*.  
Then e* = (w*, t*, s*, I*, C*) is the image of e = (w, t, s, I, C) under M, iff  
a) t* = the image of t under M, 
b) I* = the image of I under M, and 
c) C* = C. 
 
The image of a structure of events: let M be a structure-preserving mapping  
from time-slices in a world w to time-slices in a world w*.  
Then a structure S * of events occurring in w* is the image under M  
of a structure S  of events occurring in w iff:  
an event e belongs to S  just in case the image e* of e under M belongs to S *. 
 
                                                
1 Note that I have stated my definitions of process-connection, etc., from the standpoint of 
the actual world. To apply them to the worlds w and w*, as the intrinsicness principle requires 
us to do, we may simply let w or w*, as appropriate, play the role of the actual world (cf. Lewis 
(1986d), p. 163).  
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To establish the intrinsicness of process-connection, the first step is to set out 
precisely what it takes for a structure of events to include all the events 
involved in a genuine process from c to e, as applied to real-life cases as well as 
neuron diagrams (section 3.1). Next, I prove two auxiliary results (section 3.2). 
And finally, I give my proof of the Intrinsicness of process-connection (section 3.3). 
 
3.1 Including all events involved in a genuine process 
A structure of events is simply a set of events. Which events must be included 
in a structure of events S  in order for S  to include all the events that are 
involved in a genuine process from c to e? 
As we have seen (in Chapter 11 section 3.1), we may think of the 
intrinsicness principle as a supervenience claim. In the case of process-
connection, this amounts to the claim that the relation of process-connection 
between c and e supervenes on any structure of events S  that includes all 
events involved in a genuine process from c to e. In spelling out which events 
must be included in such a structure of events, we of course need to respect 
our intuitive judgement that certain events are not at all involved in a genuine 
process from c to e. Within these (somewhat flexible) boundaries, however, we 
may now do some reverse engineering in order to arrive at a definition that 
makes the supervenience claim come out true. 
Suppose there is a genuine process from c to e. Then it is clear that our 
structure of events S  needs to include all the events that belong to some 
characterisation P of a genuine process from c to e.2 To ensure that the 
supervenience claim comes out true, however, our structure of events 
sometimes needs to include more events than just the events belonging to some 
such characterisation P.  
First, P may characterise a genuine process from c to e on the basis of a 
time-series that includes just a few times. However, our structure of events S  
                                                
2 In some cases, there may be more than one genuine process from c to e. For this reason, I do 
not say the genuine process from c to e.  
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needs to include the relevant events at every time from the occurrence of c to 
the occurrence of e. Second, it may be the case that the events in P combine with 
other events to satisfy the definition of characterising a genuine process. In 
that case, these other events need to be included in S  as well.3 In the 
following, I define what it takes for a structure of events S  to include all the 
events that are involved, in this wider sense, in a process from c to e. 
When a series of events P characterises a genuine process, it does so in 
virtue of the fact that P belongs to a set of series of events P of a certain kind 
(cf. Chapter 6 section 4): 
 
Genuine process: a series of events P based on a time-series T characterises a 
genuine process iff P belongs to a set P of series of events, such that 
a) there is a one-one mapping between P and the master-set T for T  
that maps a series of events Pi from P to a time-series Ti in T  
iff Pi is based on Ti,  
b) each series of events in P characterises an apparent process, and 
c) for any time t, all series of events in P that associate an event with t 
associate the same event with t. 
 
This yields a first requirement on our structure of events S : given that c is 
process-connected to e, there is a series of events P characterising a genuine 
process from c to e. By the above definition, this means that there is a set of 
series of events P in virtue of which P characterises a genuine process. Our 
requirement now is that S  must be such that, for some set of series of events 
P in virtue of which P characterises a genuine process, it is the case that any 
event belonging to a series of events P+ in P also belongs to S. This ensures 
that all the times between c’s time of occurrence and e’s time of occurrence are 
accounted for. 
In addition, S  needs to include the events in virtue of which each series  
                                                
3 Cf. Hall (2002), pp. 264-65; Paul and Hall (2013), p. 126. 
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of events P+ in P characterises an apparent process. To illustrate, consider two 
events, ei and ei+1, such that ei is followed immediately by ei+1 in a series of 
events P+. From the definition of an apparent process (see Chapter 6 section 
4), it follows that ei belongs to a set of contemporaneous events Si, such that Si 
is time-sensitively sufficient for ei+1. This means that Si is minimally sufficient 
for ei+1 and for every temporally more fragile version ei+1
+ of ei+1, there is a more 
fragile version Si
+ of Si, such that Si
+ is minimally sufficient for ei+1
+. It is in 
virtue of Si and these more fragile versions of Si that ei satisfies the requirement 
of belonging to a time-sensitively sufficient set for ei+1.  
 To ensure that S  is sufficiently comprehensive to support the 
supervenience claim, we therefore need to impose a second requirement. To 
capture this requirement, it will be useful to begin with the following 
definition: 
 
Basis for time-sensitive sufficiency: a set Si of contemporaneous events is a basis for 
the fact that an event ei belongs to a time-sensitively sufficient set for a later 
event ei+1, iff there is a set Si such that  
a) ei belongs to Si, and 
b) for every temporally more fragile version ei+1+ of ei+1,  
there is a more fragile version Si+ of Si, such that  
i) Si+ is minimally sufficient for ei+1+, and 
ii) Si+ is a subset of Si. 
 
In the case of neuron diagrams, any set Si that is minimally sufficient for an 
event ei+1 is ipso facto time-sensitively sufficient for ei+1, since the neuron events 
we consider are already maximally temporally fragile. In the case of neuron 
diagrams, we therefore find that whenever an event ei belongs to a set Si that is 
minimally sufficient for ei+1, then Si is also a basis for the fact that ei belongs to 
a time-sensitively sufficient set for ei+1.  
In real-life cases, however, there are usually many events that matter for 
the precise timing of ei+1, even though they do not belong to a time-sensitively 
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sufficient set for ei+1. In our standard late preemption case where Suzy and Billy 
both throw rocks at the window, for example, we find that {Suzy’s throw} is 
time-sensitively sufficient for Window-shattering. However, the basis for this fact 
is a much larger set of events that includes both a more fragile version of 
Suzy’s throw, and a fragile version of Billy’s throw, since the air currents and 
gravitational effects from Billy’s rock also have some minuscule effect on the 
timing of the window-shattering.  
To ensure that a structure S  includes all the events involved in a 
genuine process from c to e, we may now use the above definition to impose 
the following further requirement: for any two events, ei and ei+1, such that ei is 
followed immediately by ei+1 in a series of events P
+ in P, it must be the case 
that some basis Si for the fact that ei belongs to a time-sensitively sufficient set 
for ei+1 is a subset of S.  
Based on these requirements, we may now define what it takes for a 
structure of events S  to include all events involved in a genuine process from 
c to e: 
 
Including all events involved in a genuine process:  
a structure of events S  includes all the events in a genuine process from c to e 
iff there is a set of series of events P, such that 
a) some series of events P characterises a genuine process from c to e  
in virtue of belonging to P, 
b) if an event belongs to a series of events P+ in P, then it belongs to S, and 
c) for any two events, ei and ei+1, such that ei is followed immediately by ei+1 in 
a series of events P+ in P, it is the case that some basis Si for the fact that ei 
belongs to a time-sensitively sufficient set for ei+1 is a subset of S. 
 
As we shall prove in section 3.3, any structure of events satisfying this 
definition is sufficiently comprehensive to make the intrinsicness of process-
connection come out true.  
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Of course, some structures that satisfy the above definition may be 
much more comprehensive than others: the above definition does not include 
any kind of minimality requirement. In practice, we may often prefer to work 
with structures that are also minimal, i.e. that do not include a structure 
satisfying the definition as a proper subset. However, such a minimality 
requirement is not needed as part of the definition of what it takes for a 
structure of events to include all the events involved in a genuine process from 
c to e. 
 Finally, the above definition is equivalent to the following much simpler 
definition in the case of neuron diagrams:  
 
Including all events involved in a genuine process – applied to neuron diagrams:  
a structure of events S  includes all the events in a genuine process from c to e 
iff there is a series of events P, based on a time-series that includes all those 
times at which the neuron diagram explicitly represents what happens, such that 
a) P characterises a genuine process from c to e,  
b) if an event belongs to P, then it belongs to S, and 
c) for any two events ei and ei+1, where ei is followed immediately by ei+1 in P,  
ei belongs to a set Si of contemporaneous events, such that  
i) Si is minimally sufficient for ei+1, and 
ii) Si is a subset of S.  
 
This result is based on two features of neuron diagrams that we have already 
encountered: first, if a series of events P characterises an apparent process and 
is based on a time-series that includes all those times at which the neuron 
diagram explicitly represents what happens, then P characterises a genuine 
process (cf. Chapter 6 section 4). And second, if a set Si of events is minimally 
sufficient for a later event ei+1, then Si is time-sensitively sufficient for ei+1, since 
our neuron events are already maximally temporally fragile. 
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In the case of neuron diagrams, it is therefore reasonably simple to 
identify a structure of events that includes all the events involved in a genuine 
process from c to e. 
 
3.2 Two auxiliary results 
In this section, I prove two auxiliary results that will be useful in the proof of 
the Intrinsicness of process-connection. The first result is:4  
 
Auxiliary result I: a set S1 of contemporaneous events is sufficient for a later 
event e2 iff the image S1* of S1 is sufficient for the image e2* of e2.  
 
For ease of reference, I repeat the definition of sufficiency here (cf. Chapter 6 
section 2):  
 
Sufficiency: a set S1 of contemporaneous events is sufficient  
for an event e2 iff 
a) S1 occurs strictly earlier than e2, and 
b) for every nomologically possible world w, it is the case that  
if every event in S1 occurs in w, then e2 occurs in w. 
 
Note that we obtain the image e* of an event e under M simply by shifting the 
time t and interval I on which e is based, according to the structure-preserving 
mapping M. Importantly, the class of complete states C on which e is based is 
held fixed. Similarly, we obtain the image S* of a set S of contemporaneous 
events by finding the image e* of each event e in S. Thus, the image S1* of a set 
of contemporaneous events S1 is itself a set of contemporaneous events, and 
                                                
4 Here, and in the following, I shall avoid repeated relativisations to world w and w*, with the 
understanding that events (and sets of events) denoted without an asterisk occur in world w, 
while events (and sets of events) denoted with an asterisk occur in w*, and are images, under a 
given structure-preserving mapping M, of the corresponding events (and sets of events) in w. 
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the only difference between S1 and S1* is that the relevant time and intervals 
have been shifted, according to the structure-preserving mapping. 
 To show the first direction, suppose that S1 is sufficient for e2. We must 
now show that S1* is sufficient for e2*. Since S1 is a set of contemporaneous 
events, it immediately follows that the image S1* of S1 is also a set of 
contemporaneous events. Since S1 occurs strictly earlier than e2, it follows – 
given that M is a structure-preserving mapping – that S1* occurs strictly earlier 
than e2*. Finally, it follows from the fact that S1 is sufficient for e2 that for every 
nomologically possible world w, it is the case that if every event in S1 occurs in 
w, then e2 occurs in w. From this together with the time-translation invariance 
of the laws, it follows that for every nomologically possible world w, it is the 
case that if every event in S1* occurs in w, then e2* occurs in w. Thus, we find 
that S1* is sufficient for e2*.  
 To show the other direction, suppose that S1* is sufficient for e2*. We 
must now show that S1 is sufficient for e2. From the fact that M is a structure-
preserving mapping, it follows that no two time-slices from w are mapped into 
the same time-slice in w*. This means that we can define the inverse mapping 
M– from time-slices in w* to time-slices in w, such that M– maps the time-t* 
slice from w* into the time-t slice in w just in case M maps the time-t slice in w 
into the time-t* slice in w*. This means that S1 is the image of S1* under M
–, 
and e2 is the image of e2* under M
–. By the same arguments as above, it 
therefore follows that S1 is sufficient for e2.  
 This establishes our Auxiliary result I. I will now move on to our second 
auxiliary result:  
 
Auxiliary result II: a set S+ of contemporaneous events is a strictly more fragile 
version of a set S iff the image S+* of S+ is a strictly more fragile version of the 
image S* of S. 
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For ease of reference, I repeat the definition of what it takes for one set of 
events to be a more fragile version of another (cf. Chapter 6 section 2):  
 
More fragile version of a set: a set S+ of contemporaneous events is a  
more fragile version of a set S of contemporaneous events iff  
a) S+ and S have the same realization in @, and 
b) w(S+) ⊆ w(S). 
 
Note that, as mentioned in Chapter 6 section 2, a set S+ of contemporaneous 
events is a strictly more fragile version of a set S of contemporaneous events 
just in case S+ is a more fragile version of S, and w(S+) ⊂ w(S). 
To show the first direction, suppose that S+ is a strictly more fragile 
version of S. Applied to world w, this implies that S+ and S have the same 
realization in w. And as is easily verified, two sets of contemporaneous events 
have the same realization in a given world just in case they occur at the same 
time in that world. Thus, S+ and S occur at the same time. This means that S+* 
and S* occur at the same time in w*, which means that S+* and S* have the 
same realization in w*. Furthermore, we know that w(S+) ⊆ w(S). Surely, what is 
metaphysically possible at one time is exactly the same as what is 
metaphysically possible at another time. Thus, shifting the time makes no 
difference to the relevant subset relations. And so we find that w(S+*) ⊆ w(S*). 
This shows that S+* is a strictly more fragile version of S*. 
 To show the other direction, suppose that S+* is a strictly more fragile 
version of S*. Under the inverse mapping M–, we now find that S+ is the image 
of S+* under M–, and S is the image of S* under M–. By the same arguments as 
above, we now find that S+ is a strictly more fragile version of S. 
 This establishes our Auxiliary result II. Given these two auxiliary results, 
we are now ready to prove the Intrinsicness of process-connection.  
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3.3  The proof 
In this section I prove the Intrinsicness of process-connection. For ease of reference, I 
repeat the statement here: 
 
Intrinsicness of process-connection: let c and e be events occurring in world w.  
Let c be process-connected to e, and let S  be a structure of events occurring in 
w, including all the events involved in a genuine process from c to e.  
Let S * be a structure of events occurring in w*, such that 
a) w and w* are governed by the same laws, and  
b) S * is the image of S  under a structure-preserving mapping M.  
Then the image c* of c under M is process-connected to the image e* of e under M.  
 
Suppose that c and e occur in w, c is process-connected to e, and S is a structure 
of events occurring in w, including all the events involved in a genuine process 
from c to e. Suppose further that S * is a structure of events occurring in w*, 
such that w and w* are governed by the same laws, and S * is the image of S  
under a structure-preserving mapping M. Our task now is to show that the 
image c* of c under M is process-connected to the image e* of e under M.  
 
From the fact that S  includes all the events involved in a genuine process 
from c to e, it follows (cf. section 3.1) that there is a set of series of events P, 
such that: 
 
a) some series of events P characterises a genuine process from c to e  
in virtue of belonging to P, 
b) if an event belongs to a series of events P+ in P, then it belongs to S, and 
c) for any two events, ei and ei+1, such that ei is followed immediately by ei+1 in 
a series of events P+ in P, it is the case that some basis Si for the fact that ei 
belongs to a time-sensitively sufficient set for ei+1 is a subset of S. 
 
Appendix A: Proofs 
 353 
Our first task is to show that the image P* of P under the mapping M 
characterises an apparent process.  
To see this, let ei and ei+1 be any two events in P, such that ei is 
immediately followed by ei+1. We know that S  contains every event in P, so S 
includes ei and ei+1. It follows from this that S * contains the image ei* of ei 
under M, and the image ei+1* of ei+1 under M. Furthermore, we know that S  
includes a set of contemporaneous events Si, such that ei belongs to Si and Si is 
time-sensitively sufficient for ei+1. From this it follows that S * contains the 
image Si* of Si under M. Obviously, ei* belongs to Si*. What we need to show 
now is that Si* is time-sensitively sufficient for ei+1*. 
From our Auxiliary result I (cf. section 3.2) together with the fact that Si is 
sufficient for ei+1, it follows that Si* is sufficient for ei+1*.  
To show that Si* is minimally sufficient for ei+1*, we now need to show 
that there is no set Si*´, such that Si* is a strictly more fragile version of Si*´, 
and Si*´ is a sufficient set for ei+1*. To see this, suppose for reductio that there is 
a set Si*´, such that Si* is a strictly more fragile version of Si*´, and Si*´ is a 
sufficient set for ei+1*. Let Si´ be the set of events in w, such that Si*´ is the 
image of Si´. It now follows from our Auxiliary result II that Si is a strictly more 
fragile version of Si´, and it follows from our Auxiliary result I that Si´ is 
sufficient for ei+1. Thus, we find that Si is not minimally sufficient for ei+1. But 
we already know that Si is minimally sufficient for ei+1. Thus, the supposition 
leads to a contradiction, and we can therefore conclude that Si* is minimally 
sufficient for ei+1*. 
 To show that Si* is time-sensitively sufficient for ei+1*, note that for any 
two events, ei and ei+1, such that ei is followed immediately by ei+1 in P, there is 
some basis Si for the fact that Si is time-sensitively sufficient for ei+1, such that 
Si is a subset of S. It follows from this that S * includes the image Si* of Si 
under M. For each more temporally fine-grained version of ei+1*, we can 
therefore apply exactly the same arguments as above. Thus, we find that Si* is 
time-sensitively sufficient for ei+1*. 
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The above argument applies to any two events, ei* and ei+1*, in P*. 
Hence, we find that P* characterises an apparent process.  
 
Our final step is to show that P* characterises a genuine process. To see this, note 
that it follows from the definition of S  that for any series of events P+ in P, S  
includes every event that belongs to P+. Correspondingly, S * includes every 
event that belongs to the image P+* of P+. Let P* be the set of series of events 
such that P* includes a series of events P+* just in case P+* is the image of a 
series of events P+ belonging to P. Our task now is to show that P* satisfies 
the conditions for characterising a genuine process based on P*. For ease of 
reference, I repeat the definition here (cf. Chapter 6 section 4): 
 
Genuine process: a series of events P, based on a time-series T, characterises a 
genuine process iff P belongs to a set P of series of events, such that 
a) there is a one-one mapping between P and the master-set T for T  
that maps a series of events Pi from P to a time-series Ti in T  
iff Pi is based on Ti,  
b) each series of events in P characterises an apparent process, and 
c) for any time t, all series of events in P that associate an event with t 
associate the same event with t. 
 
It is clear that P* belongs to P*, since P* is the image of the series of events P, 
and P belongs to P. I will now go on to show that each of the three conditions 
is satisfied: 
 
Condition a) of Genuine process 
Let T be the time-series on which P is based, and let T be the master-set for T. 
Let T* be the image of T under M, and let T* be the image of T under M. It 
follows from the fact that M is a structure-preserving mapping that T* is the 
master-set for T*. Furthermore, it is easily seen that for any series of events P+ 
that belongs to P and is based on a time-series T+, the image P+* of P+ belongs 
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to P* and is based on the image T+* of the time-series T+. From this it follows 
that there is a one-one mapping between P* and T* that maps a series of 
events Pi* from P* to a time-series Ti* in T* iff Pi* is based on Ti*.  
 
Condition b) of Genuine process 
By the very same arguments as we went through in the case of P*, we find that 
for every series of events P+ in P, the image P+* of P+ under M characterises an 
apparent process.  
 
Condition c) of Genuine process 
From the fact that P characterises a genuine process based on P, it follows that 
for every time t, all series of events in P that associate an event with t associate 
the same event with t. From this it follows that for every time t*, all series of 
events in P* that associate an event with t* associate the same event with t*.  
 
Hence, P* characterises a genuine process.  
 
From this result, the Intrinsicness of process-connection immediately follows: P* is 
the image of P under M. P characterises a genuine process from c to e. This 
means that P starts with c and ends with e. Thus, P* starts with the image c* of c 
under M and ends with the image e* of e under M. Furthermore, we have just 
seen that P* characterises a genuine process. Thus, we find that c* is process-
connected to e*. 
 
4.  The sufficiency of counterfactual dependence  
for security-dependence 
My aim in this section is to show that counterfactual dependence within a 
possibility horizon H   implies security-dependence within that same 
possibility horizon H.  This result is very useful: first, it provides a deeper 
understanding of the relation of security-dependence as a weakened version of 
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counterfactual dependence. Second, it makes it easy to reason about security-
dependence whenever we encounter a case where one event depends 
counterfactually on another within the relevant possibility horizon.  
The principle that counterfactual dependence implies security-
dependence (within a given possibility horizon) may be stated as follows: 
 
Sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for security-dependence:  
if e depends counterfactually on c within a possibility horizon H,  
then e security-depends on c within H.  
 
To see this, suppose that e depends counterfactually on c within a possibility 
horizon H,  and suppose further that c occurs at time t. We may now go 
through the following three steps to show that this entails that e security-
depends on c within H. (Note that all of the following is relativised to the 
chosen possibility horizon H ; to avoid clutter, I leave out these relativisations.) 
 Step 1: the first step is to assess e’s security at t in @. It follows from the 
fact that e depends counterfactually on c that there is at least one world where e 
does not occur. From this it follows that e has at least one minimal dependence 
set M at t in @. If there is more than one minimal dependence set for e in @ at 
t, it immediately follows that each of these minimal dependence sets is distinct 
from Ø. If there is just one minimal dependence set M for e in @ at t, we can 
similarly prove that M ≠ Ø.  
To see this, suppose for reductio that M = Ø. By the definition of a 
minimal dependence set, it follows that in the closest-at-t world(s) where all the 
events in Ø fail to occur, e also fails to occur. But @ itself is the closest-at-t 
world where all the events in Ø fail to occur. Thus, it follows that e does not 
occur in @. However, from the fact that e depends counterfactually on c, it 
follows that e does occur in @. Thus, the supposition that M = Ø leads to a 
contradiction, and we can therefore conclude that M ≠ Ø.  
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This shows that there is a non-zero distance-at-t from @ to the closest-
at-t world(s) where all the events in M fail to occur. Thus, e’s security at t in @ 
is not minimal. 
Step 2: the second step is to assess e’s security at t in the closest-at-t 
world(s) where c does not occur. Let w be an arbitrarily chosen world, such that 
w is among the closest-at-t world(s) where c does not occur. From the fact that 
e depends counterfactually on c, it follows that e does not occur in w. We 
therefore find that e has exactly one minimal dependence set at t in w – namely, 
the empty set Ø. From the standpoint of w, the closest-at-t world in which all 
the events in Ø fail to occur is w itself. This shows that e’s security at t in w is 
minimal. Since w was arbitrarily chosen among the closest-at-t not-c-world(s), 
the same argument applies to all the closest-at-t not-c-world(s).  
 Step 3: the third and final step is to compare e’s security at t in @ with e’s 
security at t in the closest-at-t world(s) where c does not occur. From the above 
results it now easily follows that e is less secure at t in the closest-at-t world(s) 
where c does not occur than it is in @.  
 Thus, we find, as desired, that e security-depends on c within H.  This 
result shows that counterfactual dependence within a possibility horizon entails 























Overview over cases 
 
In this Appendix, I give an overview over all the cases discussed in this 
dissertation, together with a few further cases that I have not had space to 
discuss in the body of the text. In my treatment of each case, I first show the 
relevant neuron diagram, together with any notes about its interpretation. I 
then apply the two conditions of process-connection and security-dependence 
within each of the contextually relevant possibility horizons. I summarise the 
results in a table of the form:  
 





Does A cause E? H ✓ ✓ 
Does B cause E? H – ✓ 
 
In the table, ‘✓’ indicates that the condition is satisfied, and ‘–’ indicates that it 
is not. On my proposed account, the two conditions of process-connection 
and security-dependence are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for 
causation – and thus, the verdict of my account can easily be read off from the 
table.  
Note that process-connection is a binary relation, and so it is entirely 
independent of the chosen possibility horizon whether an instantaneous event 
c is process-connected to a later event e. By contrast, the relation of security-
dependence is a ternary relation, and we may therefore find that e security-
depends on c within a possibility horizon H 1, but does not security-depend on 
c within a different possibility horizon H 2. 
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The following is a complete list of the cases included in this appendix. Cases 
that are discussed in the body of the text are marked with an asterisk, and I 
have indicated in the right-hand column where they receive their main 
treatment.   
 
Correlation without causation 
1.*  Correlation without causation    (Chapter 7 section 1) 
 
Redundant causation 
2.*  Early preemption      (Chapter 7 section 2.1) 
3.  A variant of early preemption 
4.*  Late preemption      (Chapter 7 section 2.2) 
5.  Lewis-style late preemption 
6.*  A variant of trumping preemption   (Chapter 7 section 2.3) 
7.*  Symmetric overdetermination    (Chapter 7 section 2.4) 
 
Omission-involving causation 
8.*  Causation by omission     (Chapter 7 section 3.1) 
9.*  Prevention       (Chapter 7 section 3.2) 
10.*  Double prevention      (Chapter 7 section 3.3) 
11.*  Redundant causation by omission   (Chapter 7 section 3.4) 
12.*  Redundant prevention     (Chapter 7 section 3.5) 
13.*  Redundant double prevention    (Chapter 7 section 3.6) 
14.*  Hall’s case       (Chapter 7 section 3.7) 
 
Cases that show the need for commensuration between cause and effect 
15.*  Scarlet       (Chapter 7 section 4.1) 
16.*  Red        (Chapter 7 section 4.2) 
17.*  Apparent counterexample to transitivity  (Chapter 7 section 4.3) 
 
Counterexamples to the transitivity of causation 
18.*  Switch       (Chapter 9 section 2.2) 
19.*  Boulder       (Chapter 9 section 2.3) 
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20.*  Switch – a modified version    (Chapter 9 section 2.4) 
21.*  Boulder – a modified version    (Chapter 9 section 2.4) 
 
Borderline cases between transitivity failure and preemption 
22.* A borderline case       (Chapter 9 section 2.5) 
23. A complex version of early preemption 
24. Tampering 
 
A problem case 
25.*  Case combining switch and preemption   (Chapter 9 section 2.6)  
 
Counterexamples to the intrinsicness of causation 
26.* Switch – with right-hand track blocked   (Chapter 9 section 3.2) 
27.* Switch – with right-hand track clear   (Chapter 9 section 3.2)  
28.*  Double prevention – without threat   (Chapter 9 section 3.3) 
 
The problem of profligate omissions 
29.* The queen and the flowers    (Chapter 10 section 1) 
 
Structurally isomorphic but causally different cases 
30.*  McDermott’s case      (Chapter 10 section 2) 
31.  First of Hall’s two structurally isomorphic cases 
32.  Second of Hall’s two structurally isomorphic cases 
 
Contrastive causation 
33. Contrastive causation     (Chapter 10 section 3) 
 
Joint causation 
34. Overdetermined joint causation     (Chapter 11 section 3.1) 
35.  Joint causation 
36.  Complex joint causation 
  
Appendix B: Overview over cases 
 362 
  
Appendix B: Overview over cases 
 363 













We here consider the effect D and its causes at time t2 within the possibility horizon 
illustrated below, where the worlds in which D does not happen are coloured grey: 
 












       





Does B cause D? H ✓ ✓ 
Does C cause D? H – – 
                                                
1 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 8. 
     A    B 
         C 
    D 
  t1        t2         t3 
w1: B does not fire 
      C fires 
@: B fires 
      C fires 
w2: B fires 
      C does not fire 
w3: B does not fire 
      C does not fire 
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A real-life case with this structure: 
 
Early preemption: Suzy throws a rock at a window and the window shatters. If 
Suzy had not thrown, Billy – who is standing right next to her – would have 
thrown his rock, and the window would still have shattered. 
 
We here consider the effect E and its causes at time t1 within the possibility horizon 
illustrated below, where the worlds in which E does not happen are coloured grey: 
 
  
                                                
2 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 1. 
     A    C 
     B    D 
     E 
  t1        t2     t3 
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Does A cause E? H ✓ ✓ 
Does B cause E? H – ✓ 
 
  
@: A fires,  
     B fires 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B fires 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire 
w3: A does not fire 
     B does not fire 
Appendix B: Overview over cases 
 366 

















We here consider the effect G and its causes at time t1 within the possibility horizon 
illustrated below, where the worlds in which G does not happen are coloured grey: 
 
  
                                                
3 Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 12. 
     A    D 
     B    E        G 
  t1          t2      t3 
     C    F 
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Does A cause G? H – ✓ 
Does B cause G? H ✓ ✓ 




@:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w4:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
w1:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w5:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w6:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
w3:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w7:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
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Note: the speed of the stimulatory signal from A to C is independent of whether or 
not B fires. The stimulatory signal from A reaches C exactly at time t2, whereupon C 
immediately fires, while the stimulatory signal from B reaches C at some slightly later 
time – say, at time t3. The effect we are interested in – against our usual practices when 
dealing with neuron diagrams – is a temporally robust event, namely the event C 
based on the interval I = [t2 , t3], and the class of states such that C fires.  
 
A real-life case with this structure: 
 
Late preemption: Suzy and Billy both throw rocks at a window. Suzy’s rock hits 
the window a moment before Billy’s and the window shatters. 
 
A here corresponds to Suzy’s throw, and B corresponds to Billy’s throw. 
 
The relevant possibility horizon is as illustrated below – where the worlds in which C 
does not happen are coloured grey: 
 
  
                                                
4 Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 18. 
     A             C      
     t1              t2      
     B              
     
Appendix B: Overview over cases 
 369 












       
 
 





Does A cause C? H ✓ ✓ 
Does B cause C? H – ✓ 
 
  
@: A fires,  
     B fires 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B fires 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire 
w3: A does not fire 
     B does not fire 
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Note: Neuron E is represented twice – at time t3 when it fires, and at time t5 when it 
does not fire, but would have fired if A had not occurred. The effect we are interested 
in – against our usual practices when dealing with neuron diagrams – is a temporally 
robust event, namely the event E based on the interval I = [t3, t5] and the class of 
states such that E fires.  
 
The relevant possibility horizon is as illustrated below – where the worlds in which E 
does not happen are coloured grey: 
 
  
                                                
5 This figure is closely based on Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 19. Cf. Lewis (1986e), p. 204. 
     A    C 
     B    D        F 
 E         E 
  t1        t2    t3      t4         t5 
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Does A cause E? H ✓ ✓ 
Does B cause E? H – ✓ 
 
  
@: A fires,  
     B fires 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B fires 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire 
w3: A does not fire 
     B does not fire 
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Note: neuron A can fire in different shades, and in different intensities: it can fire in 
blue or green, and it can fire with intensity I or some other intensity. Neuron B, by 
contrast, either fires or does not fire – with no distinctions between different shades 
or intensities. The nomological relationships are summarised below:  
 
 B fires B doesn’t fire 
A doesn’t fire C fires C doesn’t fire 
A fires in blue C fires C fires 
A fires with intensity I, not in blue C doesn’t fire C doesn’t fire 
A fires without intensity I, not in blue C fires C doesn’t fire 
 
In the case illustrated here, A and B both fire, and A fires in blue and with intensity I. 
We are interested in the effect C. At time t1, there are five candidate causes of C, 
namely:  
 
A-precise: essentially A’s firing in blue and with intensity I  
A-blue: essentially A’s firing in blue 
A-intensity-I: essentially A’s firing with intensity I 
A: essentially A’s firing 
B: essentially B’s firing 
                                                
6 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 26. 
    A 
     C 
    B 
    t1          t2 
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We may consider the case within two different possibility horizons, H 1 and H 2: 
The worlds included in possibility horizon H 1 are: 
 
Complete state at time t1:       Events at t1:     t2: 
@:  A fires in blue, with intensity I; B fires    A-blue,   B     C 
w1: A fires not in blue, with intensity I; B fires   A-blue,   B     C 
w2: A fires in blue, without intensity I; B fires   A-blue,   B     C 
w3: A fires not in blue, without intensity I; B fires   A-blue,   B     C 
w4: A does not fire; B fires      A-blue,   B     C 
w5:  A fires in blue, with intensity I; B does not fire  A-blue,   B     C 
w6: A fires not in blue, with intensity I; B does not fire  A-blue,   B     C 
w7: A fires in blue, without intensity I; B does not fire  A-blue,   B     C 
w8: A fires not in blue, without intensity I; B does not fire A-blue,   B     C 
w9: A does not fire; B does not fire     A-blue,   B     C 
 
Within H 1, we get the following results: 
 
 





Does A-precise cause C? H 1 – ? 
Does A-blue cause C? H 1 ✓ ✓ 
Does A-intensity-I cause C? H 1 – – 
Does A cause C? H 1 – ? 
Does B cause C? H 1 – – 
 
The question marks indicate that these verdicts depend on as yet unspecified details of 
the case.
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Does A-precise cause C? H 2 – ✓ 
Does A-blue cause C? H 2 ✓ ✓ 
Does A-intensity-I cause C? H 2 – ✓ 
Does A cause C? H 2 – ✓ 
Does B cause C? H 2 – ✓ 
 
  
@: A fires blue, 
     with intensity I,  
     B fires 
w4: A does not fire,  
     B fires 
w5:  A fires blue,  
      with intensity I, 
      B does not fire 
w9: A does not fire 
     B does not fire 
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We here consider the effect C and its causes at time t1. The relevant possibility 
horizon is as illustrated below – where the worlds in which C does not happen are 
coloured grey: 
 










           
 
 





Does A cause C? H ✓ ✓ 
Does B cause C? H ✓ ✓ 
                                                
7 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 11. 
     C 
    B 
    t1          t2 
    A 
@: A fires,  
     B fires 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B fires 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire 
w3: A does not fire 
     B does not fire 
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We here consider the effect C and its causes at time t1. The relevant possibility 
horizon is as illustrated below – where the worlds in which C does not happen are 
coloured grey: 
 










           
 
 





Does A cause C? H ✓ ✓ 
Does ¬B cause C? H ✓ ✓ 
                                                
8 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 3. 
    A 
     C 
    B 
     t1          t2 
@: A fires,  
     B does not fire 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B does not fire 
w2:  A fires,  
      B fires 
w3: A does not fire 
     B fires 
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We here consider the effect ¬C and its causes at time t1. The relevant possibility 
horizon is as illustrated below – where the world in which ¬C does not happen is 
coloured grey: 
 










           
 
  





Does A cause ¬C? H – – 
Does B cause ¬C? H ✓ ✓ 
                                                
9 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 22. 
    A 
     C 
    B 
 t1        t2 
@: A fires,  
     B fires 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B fires 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire 
w3: A does not fire 
     B does not fire 
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We here consider the effect F and its causes at time t1. The relevant possibility horizon 




                                                
10 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 29. 
     B             E    
     C 
     A      D      F 
 t1   t2  t3 
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Does A cause F? H ✓ ✓ 
Does B cause F? H – – 






@:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w4:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
w1:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w5:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w6:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
w3:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w7:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
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We here consider the effect H and its causes at time t1. The relevant possibility 
horizon is as illustrated below – where the worlds in which H does not happen are 
coloured grey:  
 
  
                                                
11 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 38. 
 B            D           F             H 
    C      E      G 
    A 
  t1   t2   t3   t4 
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Does ¬A cause H? H ✓ ✓ 
Does B cause H? H ✓ ✓ 




@:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w4:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
w1:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w5:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
w2:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w6:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
w3:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w7:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
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We here consider the effect ¬I and its causes at time t1. The relevant possibility 
horizon is as illustrated below – where the worlds in which ¬I does not happen are 
coloured grey:  
 
  
                                                
12 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 43. 
     A      D      G     I 
  B           E           H    
    C      F 
  t1   t2  t3  t4 
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Does A cause ¬I? H – – 
Does B cause ¬I? H ✓ ✓ 





@:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w4:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
w1:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w5:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w6:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
w3:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w7:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
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We here consider the effect N and its causes at time t1. For the sake of simplicity, I 
here treat A as a default event (doing so does not change the verdicts concerning B, C, 
and D). Given this, the relevant possibility horizon is as illustrated below – where the 
worlds in which N does not happen are coloured grey.  
 
  
                                                
13 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 44. 
     B      F        J    M 
  C           G           K    
    D      H 
  t1   t2  t3   t4  t5 
     A      E        I     L    N 
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Does B cause N? H – – 
Does C cause N? H ✓ ✓ 
Does D cause N? H – ✓ 
 
Note that, for the sake of simplicity, A is here treated as a background condition. 
 
  
@: A fires, 
      B fires,  
      C fires, 
      D fires 
w4: A fires, 
      B fires,  
      C fires, 
      D does not fire 
w1: A fires, 
      B does not fire,  
      C fires, 
      D fires 
w5: A fires, 
      B does not fire,  
      C fires, 
      D does not fire 
w2: A fires, 
      B fires,  
      C does not fire, 
      D fires 
w6: A fires, 
      B fires,  
      C does not fire, 
      D does not fire 
w3: A fires, 
      B does not fire,  
      C does not fire, 
      D fires 
w7: A fires, 
      B does not fire,  
      C does not fire, 
      D does not fire 
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We here consider the effect J and its causes at time t1. Treating A as a default event, 
we may consider this case based on two different possibility horizons, H 1 and H 2 
(note that treating A as a default event does not change the verdicts on B, C, and D). 
In my representation of both of these possibility horizons, the worlds where J does 
not happen are coloured grey: 
 
  
                                                
14 Cf. Hall (2007b), p. 52. 
     A      E       H    J 
 B            F           I    
    C      G 
    D 
t1  t2  t3  t4 
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Does B cause J? H 1 – – 
Does C cause J? H 1 ✓ ✓ 
Does D cause J? H 1 ✓ ✓ 
 
Note that A is here treated as a background condition. 
  
@:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C fires, 
      D fires 
w4:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C fires, 
      D does not fire 
w1:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires, 
      D fires 
w5:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires, 
      D does not fire 
w2:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire, 
      D fires 
w6:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire, 
      D does not fire 
w3:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire, 
      D fires 
w7:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire, 
      D does not fire 
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Does B cause J? H 2 – – 
Does C cause J? H 2 ✓ – 
Does D cause J? H 2 ✓ – 
 





@:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C fires, 
      D fires 
w1:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires, 
      D fires 
w2:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire, 
      D fires 
w3:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire, 
      D fires 
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Note: A can here fire in two different ways – in stripes or in uniform green. As shown 
in the figure, it in fact fires in stripes. The laws are such that B fires if and only if A 
fires in stripes. Let A be the event that is essentially A’s firing (but where it is not 
essential whether A fires in stripes or uniform green), and let A-stripes be the event 
that is essentially A’s firing in stripes. 
 
A real-life case with this structure: 
 
Scarlet: The pigeon Sophia has been conditioned to peck at scarlet to the 
exclusion of all other colours. She is presented with a scarlet triangle and pecks 
at it. 
  
A here corresponds to the triangle’s being red, A-stripes corresponds to the triangle’s 
being scarlet, and B corresponds to Sophia’s pecking. 
 
We here consider the effect B and its causes at time t1. We may consider this case 
within two different possibility horizons, H 1 and H 2. In my representation of both of 
these possibility horizons, worlds in which B does not occur are coloured grey. 
 
  
                                                
15 This case is closely based on a case presented in Yablo (1992a), p. 257. For similar cases, see 
Yablo (1992b), p. 415, and Sartorio (2010), pp. 266-69. 
     A            B 
 t1      t2 
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@: A fires  
      in stripes 



















Does A-stripes cause B? H 1 ✓ ✓ 




w2: A fires  
     in uniform green 
w1: A does not fire 
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@: A fires  
      in stripes 












Does A-stripes cause B? H 2 ✓ ✓ 
Does A cause B? H 2 – ✓ 
 
w1: A does not fire 
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Note: A can here fire in two different ways – in stripes or in uniform green. As shown 
in the figure, it in fact fires in stripes. The laws are such that B fires just in case A fires 
(whether A fires in stripes or in uniform green). Furthermore, the case is such that in 
the closest-at-t1 world(s) where A does not fire in stripes, A does not fire at all. Let A 
be the event that is essentially A’s firing (but where it is not essential whether A fires 
in stripes or uniform green), and let A-stripes be the event that is essentially A’s firing 
in stripes. 
 
A real-life case with this structure: 
 
 Red: The pigeon Delia has been conditioned to peck at red to the exclusion of 
all other colours. She is presented with a scarlet triangle and pecks at it. In the 
lab where she is, the researchers use just two colours – scarlet and emerald. If 
Delia had not been presented with a scarlet triangle, she would have been 
presented with an emerald triangle.  
 
A here corresponds to the triangle’s being red, A-stripes corresponds to the triangle’s 
being scarlet, and B corresponds to Delia’s pecking. 
 
We here consider the effect B and its causes at time t1. In my representation of the 
relevant possibility horizon, worlds in which B does not occur are coloured grey. 
 
  
                                                
16 This case is closely based on a case presented in Yablo (1992a), p. 257. For similar cases, see 
Yablo (1992b), p. 417, and Sartorio (2010), pp. 264-66. 
     A            B 
 t1      t2 
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@: A fires  
      in stripes 












Does A-stripes cause B? H  – ✓ 
Does A cause B? H  ✓ ✓ 
 
  
w1: A does not fire 
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Note: neuron C can here fire in two different ways – in uniform green and in stripes. 
The neuron laws are such that C fires in uniform green if and only if it receives a 
stimulatory signal from A and no stimulatory signal from B; and C fires in stripes if 
and only if it receives stimulatory signals from both A and B. Furthermore, D fires if 
and only if C fires (independently of whether C fires in uniform green or in stripes). 
By contrast, E is sensitive to the way in which C fires – and so, E fires if and only if C 
fires in stripes. Let C be the event that is essentially C’s firing (but where it is not 
essential whether C fires in stripes), and let C-stripes be the event that is essentially C’s 
firing in stripes. A real-life case with this structure: 
 
Skiing accident: while skiing, Suzy breaks her right wrist. The next day, she writes 
a philosophy paper, which is subsequently accepted for publication. Since 
Suzy’s right wrist is broken, she writes the paper by typing with her left hand. 
As she is not used to writing this way, she develops a cramp in her left hand. 
 
A here corresponds to Suzy’s having the idea for her paper, B corresponds to the 
skiing accident, C corresponds to Suzy’s writing her paper (either normally or by 
typing with her left hand), C-stripes corresponds to Suzy’s writing her paper by typing 
with her left hand, D corresponds to the paper’s being accepted for publication, and E 
corresponds to Suzy’s getting a cramp in her left hand. 
                                                
17 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 48. 
     A          D 
     B           E  
  C 
     t1       t2       t3 
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We begin by considering the effect D and its causes at time t1. The relevant possibility 
horizon is as illustrated below – where the worlds in which D does not happen are 
coloured grey: 
 





















Does A cause D? H ✓ ✓ 
Does B cause D? H – – 
 
  
@: A fires,  
     B fires 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B fires 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire 
w3: A does not fire 
     B does not fire 
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We next consider the effect E and its causes at time t1. The relevant possibility 
horizon is as illustrated below – where the worlds in which E does not happen are 
coloured grey: 
 



















Does A cause E? H ✓ ✓ 








@: A fires,  
     B fires 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B fires 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire 
w3: A does not fire, 
     B does not fire 
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Note: C can fire in two different ways – in uniform green and in stripes. C fires in 
uniform green if and only if A fires and B does not; and C fires in stripes if and only if 
A and B both fire. If C fires in uniform green, it sends a stimulatory signal to E, and 
not to D. If C fires in stripes, it sends a stimulatory signal to D, and not to E.  
 
A real-life case with this structure: 
 
Switch: Suzy is standing by a switch in the railroad tracks. She sees a train 
approaching in the distance, and flips the switch so that the train travels down 
the left-hand track. If she had not flipped the switch, the train would have 
travelled down the right-hand track instead. Since the tracks converge a few 
miles later, the train arrives at its destination all the same. 
 
A here corresponds to the approaching train, B corresponds to Suzy’s flipping the 
switch, C-stripes corresponds to the train’s being directed towards the left-hand track, 
and F corresponds to the train’s arrival. 
 
We here consider the effect F and its causes at time t1 within the possibility horizon 
illustrated below – where the worlds in which F does not happen are coloured grey: 
 
                                                
18 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 45. 
  
 A  C 
     B      E 
     F 
  D 
 t1  t2        t3    t4 
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Does A cause I? H ✓ ✓ 






@: A fires,  
     B fires 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B fires 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire 
w3: A does not fire 
     B does not fire 
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Note: F is a stubborn neuron that requires two stimulatory signals in order to fire.  
 
A real-life case with this structure: 
 
Boulder: ‘A boulder is dislodged and begins rolling ominously toward Hiker. 
Before it reaches him, Hiker sees the boulder and ducks. The boulder sails 
harmlessly over his head with nary a centimetre to spare. Hiker survives his 
ordeal.’ 
 
A here corresponds to the physiological processes that keep Hiker alive, B 
corresponds to the boulder’s fall, C corresponds to Hiker’s being attentive, F 
corresponds to Hiker’s duck, and I corresponds to Hiker’s survival.  
 
We here consider the effect I and its causes at time t1. We may consider this case 
based on two different possibility horizons, H 1 and H 2. In my representation of 
both of these possibility horizons, worlds in which I does not happen are coloured 
grey. 
                                                
19 This case is a modification of Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 10. Cf. Paul and Hall (2013),  
p. 222. 
     
    A      D     G     I 
     E      H 
    B      F 
    
    C 
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Possibility horizon H 1: 
Note: this is not a natural choice of possibility horizon, since we would in most 
























Does A cause I? H 1 ✓ ✓ 
Does B cause I? H 1 ✓ – 




@:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w4:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
w1:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w5:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w6:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
w3:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w7:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
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Possibility horizon H 2: 
Note: this is a more natural choice of possibility horizon, since it treats A (the 




















Does A cause I? H 2 ✓ – 
Does B cause I? H 2 ✓ – 






@: A fires,  
     B fires, 
     C fires 
w4: A fires,  
     B fires, 
     C does not fire 
w2: A fires,  
     B does not fire, 
     C fires 
w6: A fires,  
     B does not fire, 
     C does not fire 
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Note: the case is as described in Switch above, except that D is here a stubborn neuron 
requiring two stimulatory signals in order to fire – one from H and one from C. 
 
A real-life case with this structure is like Switch above, with the following addition: 
 
Addition to Switch: When the train is approaching, the left track is in fact 
disconnected. Just as Suzy flips the switch, Sally comes by and reconnects the 
track. If Sally had not reconnected the track, the train would have been 
derailed. 
 
G here corresponds to Sally’s reconnecting the left-hand track. 
 
We here consider the effect F and its causes at time t1. The relevant possibility horizon 




                                                
20 This case is a modified version of Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 45. 
  
 A  C 
     B      E 
     F 
G          H       D 
t1          t2        t3    t4 
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Does A cause F? H ✓ ✓ 
Does B cause F? H ✓ – 
Does G cause F? H ✓ ✓ 
 
  
@:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      G fires 
w4:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      G does not fire 
w1:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      G fires 
w5:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      G does not fire 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      G fires 
w6:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      G does not fire 
w3:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      G fires 
w7:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      G does not fire 
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We here consider the effect I and its causes at time t1. The relevant possibility horizon 




                                                
21 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 10. 
   A    D   G   I 
     E      H    
   B      F 
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Does A cause I? H ✓ ✓ 
Does B cause I? H ✓ – 
 
  
@: A fires,  
     B fires 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B fires 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire 
w3: A does not fire, 
     B does not fire 
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Note: D is a stubborn neuron that requires two stimulatory signals to fire. 
 
A real-life case with this structure: 
 
Window-shattering: Suzy throws a rock at the window. Her aim is slightly off, but 
a strong gust of wind brings her rock back on course. It hits the window and 
the window shatters. If Suzy had not thrown, Billy would have thrown a larger 
rock and hit the window, independently of whether there was wind or not. 
 
A here corresponds to the strong gust of wind, B corresponds to Suzy’s throw, C 
corresponds to Billy’s being ready to throw, D corresponds to Suzy’s rock being on 
course to hit the window, and F corresponds to the window-shattering. 
 
We here consider the effect F and its causes at time t1. We may consider the case 
based on two different possibility horizons, H 1 and H 2. In my representation of 
both of these possibility horizons, worlds where F does not occur are coloured grey. 
 
  
                                                
22 This is a modified version of Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 1. 
     B    D 
     C    E 
     F 
 t1         t2   t3       
     A 
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Does A cause F? H 1 ✓ ✓ 
Does B cause F? H 1 ✓ – 
Does C cause F? H 1 – ✓ 
 
 
The judgements of comparative security are made on the assumption that there is only 
a short distance-at-t1 from @ to w1, where A does not occur, but a long distance-at-t1 
from @ to w4, where C does not occur. 
 
  
@:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w4:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
w1:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w5:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w6:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
w3:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w7:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
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Possibility horizon H 2: 
Note: we may artificially restrict our possibility horizon to include only worlds where 
A occurs, by using the phrase ‘given that . . .’, as in ‘given that A in fact occurs, B is a 
cause of F’. Within this restricted possibility horizon, we find that F security-depends 






















Does A cause F? H 2 ✓ – 
Does B cause F? H 2 ✓ ✓ 
Does C cause F?  H 2 – ✓ 
 




@: A fires,  
     B fires, 
     C fires 
w4: A fires,  
     B fires, 
     C does not fire 
w2: A fires,  
     B does not fire, 
     C fires 
w6: A fires,  
     B does not fire, 
     C does not fire 
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Note: F is a stubborn neuron that requires two stimulatory signals in order to fire.  
 
  
                                                
23 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 14. 
     A      C 
D         F    
    B      E 
t1  t2  t3 
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We here consider the effect F and its causes at time t1. The most natural choice of 
possibility horizon is H 1, illustrated below: 
 



















Does A cause F? H 1 ✓ ✓ 
Does B cause F? H 1 ✓ – 
 
  
@: A fires,  
     B fires 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B fires 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire 
w3: A does not fire, 
     B does not fire 
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Within the H 1, E does not security-depend on B. However, we can restore E’s 
security-dependence on B by distinguishing between three ways in which A can fire: 
firing fully, firing left, and firing right. When A fires fully, it sends stimulatory signals 
to both C and D; when A fires left, it sends a stimulatory signal to C, but not to D; 
and when A fires right, it sends a stimulatory signal to D, but not to C. Let A be the 
event that is essentially A’s firing fully (we do not allow the disjunctive events of e.g. 
A’s firing either fully or left within the range of our quantifiers). Based on this 





















Does A cause F? H 2 ✓ ✓ 







@:  A fires fully, 
       B fires 
       
w4:  A fires fully,  
      B does not fire 
       
w1:  A fires left,  
      B fires 
w5:  A fires left,  
      B does not fire 
      
w2:  A fires right,  
      B fires 
     
w6:  A fires right,  
      B does not fire, 
     
w3:  A does not fire,  
      B fires 
w7:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire 
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Note: in this case, neurons can fire with different intensities. When a neuron is 
coloured dark green, this indicates that it fires with intensity 2. When a neuron is 
coloured light green, this indicates that it fires with intensity 1. A and C can fire in just 
one way – namely, with intensity 1. B and D can fire in two ways – with intensity 1 or 
intensity 2.  
The strength with which a neuron fires determines the strength of the 
stimulatory and inhibitory signals it sends. In the figure, A fires with intensity 1. This 
sends a stimulatory signal of intensity 1 to C, which in turn fires with intensity 1. It 
also sends an inhibitory signal with intensity 1 to D. B fires with intensity 2 and sends 
a stimulatory signal of intensity 2 to D.  
The rule for calculating the intensity with which D fires is this: D fires with an 
intensity corresponding to the intensity of the stimulatory signal from B, minus the 
intensity of the inhibitory signal from A. Thus, D fires with intensity 1.  
Finally, E fires if and only if it receives stimulatory signals of a combined 
intensity of at least 2. Since it receives a signal of intensity 1 from C and a signal of 
intensity 1 from D, E fires.  
Let A be the event that is essentially A’s firing; let B be the event that is 
essentially B’s firing (but where it is not essential that B fires with intensity 2); and let 
B-2 be the event that is essentially B’s firing with intensity 2.  
 
  
                                                
24 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 15. 
     A    C 
     B    D 
     E 
 t1         t2   t3 
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We here consider the effect E and its causes at time t1. We may for example judge this 
within the possibility horizon H   illustrated below: 
 


















Does A cause E? H  ✓ – 
Does B cause E? H  – ✓ 
Does B-2 cause E? H ✓ ✓ 
 
  
@: A fires 1,  
     B fires 2 
w4: A fires 1, 
     B does not fire 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B fires 2 
w3: A does not fire,  
     B fires 1 
w5: A does not fire, 
     B does not fire 
w2: A fires 1,  
     B fires 1 
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Note that a slight modification of the rule for calculating the intensity with which D 
fires changes the verdict on whether A is a cause of E. Consider the following rule: 
 
 If !  = 1 and !  = 2, then !  = 1 
 If !  = 1 and !  = 1, then !  = 1 
 If !  = 1 and !  = 0, then !  = 0 
If !  = 0 and !  = n, then !  = n. 
 
This rule restores E’s security-dependence on A, within the possibility horizon 
illustrated below: 
 

















Does A cause E? H ✓ ✓ 
Does B cause E? H ✓ ✓ 
Does B-2 cause E? H – ✓ 
 
  
@: A fires 1,  
     B fires 2 
w4: A fires 1, 
     B does not fire 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B fires 2 
w3: A does not fire,  
     B fires 1 
w5: A does not fire, 
     B does not fire 
w2: A fires 1,  
     B fires 1 
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Note: C can fire in two different ways – in uniform green or in stripes. C fires in 
uniform green if and only if A fires and B does not; and C fires in stripes if and only if 
A and B both fire. If C fires in uniform green, it sends a stimulatory signal to F, and 
not to E. If C fires in stripes, it sends a stimulatory signal to E, and not to F. 
 
We here consider the effect L and its causes at time t1. We may consider this case 
based on the possibility horizon illustrated below: 
 
  
                                                
25 I am grateful to Derek Ball for making me aware of cases of this kind. 
B       D    G        I     K 
A       C     F        H      J         L 
  E 
t1       t2    t3         t4     t5       t6 
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Does A cause L? H ✓ ✓ 






@: A fires,  
     B fires 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B fires 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire 
w3: A does not fire, 
     B does not fire 
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     B 
    G    H 

















Note: the case is as described in Switch above, except for the addition of neuron G  
and H. 
 
A real-life case with this structure is like Switch above, with the addition that the right-
hand track is blocked by a fallen tree. G here represents the presence of the tree lying 
across the right-hand track. 
 
We here consider the effect F and its causes at time t1. We may consider this case 
based on two different possibility horizons, H 1 and H 2. In my representation of 
these possibility horizons, the worlds where F does not occur are coloured grey. 
 
  
                                                
26 This is a modified version of Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 45, and makes the same point as 
Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 47. 
  
    A   C 
     E 
     F 
  D 
t1         t2         t3   t4   
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Possibility horizon H 1: 






















Does A cause F? H 1 ✓ ✓ 
Does B cause F? H 1 ✓ ✓ 




@:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      G fires 
w4:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      G does not fire 
w1:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      G fires 
w5:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      G does not fire 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      G fires 
w6:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      G does not fire 
w3:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      G fires 
w7:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      G does not fire 
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Possibility horizon H 2: 
Note: this is also a reasonable choice of possibility horizon, treating G (the presence 






















Does A cause F? H 2 ✓ ✓ 
Does B cause F? H 2 ✓ ✓ 
Does G cause F?  H 2 – – 
 
  
@: A fires,  
     B fires, 
     G fires 
w2: A fires,  
     B does not fire, 
     G fires 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B fires, 
     G fires 
w3: A does not fire,  
     B does not fire, 
     G fires 
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     B 
    G    H 

















This case is exactly like Switch with right-hand track blocked, except that neuron G does 
not fire. 
 
We here consider the effect F and its causes at time t1. We may consider this case 
based on two different possibility horizons, H 1 and H 2. In my representation of 




                                                
27 This is a modified version of Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 45. 
  
    A   C 
     E 
     F 
  D 
t1        t2         t3   t4   
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Possibility horizon H  1: 
Note: this is not a natural choice of possibility horizon, sine we will in most contexts 






















Does A cause F? H 1 ✓ ✓ 
Does B cause F? H 1 ✓ ✓ 
Does ¬G cause F? H 1 – ✓ 
 
  
@:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      G does not fire 
w4:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      G fires 
w1:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      G does not fire 
w5:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      G fires 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      G does not fire 
w6:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      G fires 
w3:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      G does not fire 
w7:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      G fires 
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Possibility horizon H 2: 
Note: this is a more natural choice of possibility horizon, since it treats ¬G (the 






















Does A cause F? H 2 ✓ ✓ 
Does B cause F? H 2 ✓ – 





@: A fires,  
     B fires, 
     G does not fire 
w2: A fires,  
     B does not fire, 
     G does not fire 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B fires, 
     G does not fire 
w3: A does not fire,  
     B does not fire, 
     G does not fire 
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We here consider the effect F and its causes at time t1. We may consider this case 
based on two different possibility horizons, H 1 and H 2. In my representation of 




                                                
28 This is a modified version of Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 29, and makes the same point as 
Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 40. 
     B             E    
     C 
     A      D      F 
 t1   t2  t3 
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Does A cause F? H 1 ✓ ✓ 
Does ¬B cause F? H 1 ✓ ✓ 
Does C cause F? H 1 ✓ ✓ 
 
  
@:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w4:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
w1:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w5:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
w2:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w6:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
w3:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w7:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
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Possibility horizon H 2: 
Note: this more restricted possibility horizon, where ¬B is treated as a background 























Does A cause F? H 2 ✓ ✓ 
Does ¬B cause F? H 2 ✓ – 
Does C cause F? H 2 ✓ – 
 
  
@: A fires,  
     B does not fire, 
     C fires 
w4: A fires,  
     B does not fire, 
     C does not fire 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B does not fire, 
     C fires 
w5: A does not fire,  
     B does not fire, 
     C does not fire 
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A real-life case with this structure: 
 
The flowers: Suzy goes on holiday and Billy promises to water her flowers while 
she is away. However, Billy does not water the flowers and the flowers die.  
 
The queen also does not water the flowers. A here represents the dry soil in the pot, 
¬B represents Billy’s failure to water the flowers, ¬C represents the queen’s failure to 
water the flowers, and D represents the death of the flowers. 
 
We here consider the effect D and its causes at time t1. We may consider this case 
based on two different possibility horizons, H 1 and H 2. In my representation of both 
of these possibility horizons, the worlds where D does not occur are coloured grey. 
 
  
                                                
29 This figure is closely based on a case discussed e.g. in Schaffer (2005), p. 300. 
     C 
     B 
     t1          t2       
     A 
      D 
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Possibility horizon H 1: 
Note: this is not a natural choice of possibility horizon, since we would in most 






















Does A cause D? H 1 ✓ ✓ 
Does ¬B cause D? H 1 ✓ ✓ 




@:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
w4:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w1:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
w5:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w2:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
w6:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w3:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
w7:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
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Possibility horizon H 2: 
Note: this is a more natural choice of possibility horizon, since it treats ¬C (the 






















Does A cause D? H 2 ✓ ✓ 
Does ¬B cause D? H 2 ✓ ✓ 







@: A fires,  
     B does not fire, 
     C does not fire 
w2: A fires,  
     B fires, 
     C does not fire 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B does not fire, 
     C does not fire 
w3: A does not fire,  
     B fires, 
     C does not fire 
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Note: in this case, a neuron has two states in which it does not send any outgoing 
signals – it can be dormant or it can fire in waves. A neuron is dormant if and only if 
it receives no stimulatory signals; a neuron fires in waves if and only if it receives at 
least one stimulatory signal and at least one inhibitory signal. Apart from this, the 
neuron laws are as usual. The following two cases both have this structure: 
 
Wall and window: Suzy throws a ball towards a window. Before the ball reaches 
the window, Billy leaps up and catches the ball. If Billy had not caught the ball, 
it still would not have hit the window – for between Billy and the window, 
there is a sturdy brick wall. 
 
Catcher and window: Suzy throws a ball towards a window. Before the ball reaches 
the window, Billy leaps up and catches the ball. If Billy had not caught the ball, 
it still would not have hit the window – for between Billy and the window 
stands Sally, who would have caught the ball if Billy had failed to do so. 
 
A represents the presence of the window, B represents Suzy’s throw, C represents 
Billy’s being ready to catch the ball, D represents the presence of the wall (or Sally’s 
readiness to catch the ball), and J represents the window’s remaining intact.  
                                                
30 This case was originally presented in McDermott (1995), p. 525. 
     A      E       H    J 
 B            F           I    
    C      G 
    D 
  t1  t2  t3  t4 
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We here consider the effect J and its causes at time t1. Treating A as a default event, 
we may consider this case based on two different possibility horizons, H 1 and H 2.  
 
Possibility horizon H 1: 
Note: this possibility horizon treats D as a candidate cause. This is a natural choice in 
the case where D represents Sally’s readiness to catch the ball, since this is categorised 
as a deviant event in most contexts. By contrast, it is not a natural choice in the case 
where D represents the presence of the wall, since this is categorised as a default event 























Does B cause J? H 1 ✓ – 
Does C cause J? H 1 ✓ ✓ 
Does D cause J? H 1 – ✓ 
  
@:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C fires, 
      D fires 
w4:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C fires, 
      D does not fire 
w1:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires, 
      D fires 
w5:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires, 
      D does not fire 
w2:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire, 
      D fires 
w6:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire, 
      D does not fire 
w3:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire, 
      D fires 
w7:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire, 
      D does not fire 
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Possibility horizon H 2: 
Note: This possibility horizon treats D as a background condition. This is a natural 
choice in the case where D represents the presence of the wall, since this is 
categorised as a default event in most contexts. By contrast, it is not a natural choice 
in the case where D represents Sally’s readiness to catch the ball, since this is 
























Does B cause J? H 2 ✓ – 
Does C cause J? H 2 ✓ – 




@:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C fires, 
      D fires 
w1:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires, 
      D fires 
w2:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire, 
      D fires 
w3:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire, 
      D fires 
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Note: neuron I is here a stubborn neuron that requires two stimulatory signals in 
order to fire. 
 
We here consider the effect I and its causes at time t1. We may consider this case 
based on two different possibility horizons, H 1 and H 2. In my representation of 




                                                
31 Cf. Hall (2007b), p. 44; Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 42. 
   A    D   G   I 
B      E         H    
   C      F 
   t1    t2    t3    t4 
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Does A cause I? H 1 ✓ ✓ 
Does B cause I? H 1 – ✓ 
Does C cause I? H 1 ✓ ✓ 
 
  
@:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w4:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
w1:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w5:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w6:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
w3:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w7:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
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Possibility horizon H 2: 
Note: This possibility horizon treats B as a background condition. This is not a natural 
choice, since it goes against the standard practice of treating neuron firings as deviant 













    
 
 





Does A cause I? H 2 ✓ ✓ 
Does B cause I? H 2 – – 
Does C cause I? H 2 ✓ – 
 
Note that B is here treated as a background condition.  
@: A fires,  
     B fires, 
     C fires 
w4: A fires,  
     B fires, 
     C does not fire 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B fires, 
     C fires 
w5: A does not fire,  
     B fires, 
     C does not fire 
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We here consider the effect I and its causes at time t1. We may consider this case 
based on two different possibility horizons, H 1 and H 2. In my representation of 




                                                
32 Cf. Hall (2007b), p. 43; Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 41. 
   A    D   G   I 
B      E         H    
   C      F 
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Does A cause I? H 1 ✓ ✓ 
Does ¬B cause I? H 1 – ✓ 




@:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w4:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
w1:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w5:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
w2:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w6:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
w3:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w7:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
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Possibility horizon H 2: 
Note: in this possibility horizon, ¬B is treated as a background condition. This 
possibility horizon is just as appropriate as H 1, since it is appropriate to treat a 























Does A cause I? H 2 ✓ ✓ 
Does ¬B cause I? H 2 – – 
Does C cause I? H 2 ✓ – 
 







w1: A does not fire,  
     B does not fire, 
     C fires 
@:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w4:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
w5:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
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Neuron B can here be in three different states: it can fire in green, yellow, or red (it 
cannot be dormant). Neuron C can be in four different states: it can fire in green, 
yellow, or red, or it can be dormant. C fires in green if and only if A fires and B fires 
in green; C fires in yellow if and only if A fires and B fires in yellow; and C fires in red 
if and only if A fires and B fires in red. Finally, C is dormant if and only if A does not 
fire. The neuron laws are such that when C fires in green, it sends a stimulatory signal 
to D (and no signal to E or F); when C fires in yellow, it sends a stimulatory signal to 
E (and no signal to D or F); and when C fires in red, it sends a stimulatory signal to F 
(and no signal to D or E). Finally, G fires in green if and only if it receives a 
stimulatory signal from D; G fires in yellow if and only if it receives a stimulatory 
signal from E; and otherwise G remains dormant. 
 
A real-life case with this structure: 
 
Switch - variation: Suzy is standing by a switch in the railroad tracks. She sees a 
train approaching in the distance, and flips the switch so that the train travels 
down the local track. She could also have flipped the switch so that the train 
had travelled down the express track, or the broken track. If she had chosen the 
express track, the train would have arrived at its destination more quickly. If 
she had chosen the broken track, the train would have derailed.  
                                                
33 A case with this structure is presented in Schaffer (2012), pp. 38-39. 
  
 A  C 
     B      F 
     G 
  D 
 t1  t2        t3    t4 
     E 
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The possibility horizon H 1 below includes all the nomologically possible worlds in 
this case. The worlds in which G occurs match the colour in which G fires; the worlds 














Note that I am assuming that the distance-at-t1 between @ and w1 is exactly the same 
as the distance-at-t1 between @ and w2, which is exactly the same as the distance-at-t1 
between w1 and w2.  
 




@: A fires,  
      B fires yellow 
w1: A fires,  
      B fires green 
w2: A fires,  
      B fires red 
       
w3: A does not fire,  
      B fires yellow 
w4: A does not fire,  
      B fires green 
w5: A does not fire,  
      B fires red 
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Consider first the contrastive claim ‘B-yellow rather than B-green is a cause of G’. To 
evaluate this claim, we need to consider the restricted possibility horizon H 2, where 
either B-green or B-yellow occurs in every world: 
 




















Does B-yellow rather  
than B-green cause G? 
H 2 ✓ – 
  
@: A fires,  
     B fires yellow 
w3: A does not fire,  
     B fires yellow 
w1:  A fires,  
      B fires green 
w4: A does not fire, 
     B fires green 
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Next, consider the contrastive claim ‘B-yellow rather than B-red is a cause of G’. To 
evaluate this claim, we need to consider the restricted possibility horizon H 3 
illustrated below: 
 





















Does B-yellow rather  
than B-red cause G? 
H 3 ✓ ✓ 
 
  
@: A fires,  
     B fires yellow 
w3: A does not fire,  
     B fires yellow 
w2:  A fires,  
      B fires red 
w5: A does not fire, 
     B fires red 
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As our next example, consider the two contrastive claims ‘A caused G-yellow rather 
than G-green’ and ‘B-yellow caused G-yellow rather than G-green’. To evaluate both of 
these claims, we need to consider the restricted possibility horizon H 4 illustrated 
below: 
 













Does A cause  
G-yellow rather than G-green ? 
H 4 ✓ – 
Does B-yellow cause  
G-yellow rather than G-green? 
H 4 ✓ ✓ 
 
  
@: A fires,  
     B fires yellow 
w1: A fires,  
     B fires green 
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Finally, consider the following quaternary causal claim ‘B-yellow rather than B-red 
caused G-yellow rather than ¬G’. This requires us to consider the possibility horizon  
H 5 illustrated below: 
 





















Does B-yellow rather than B-red 
cause G-yellow rather than ¬G? 





@: A fires,  
     B fires yellow 
w3: A does not fire,  
     B fires yellow 
w2:  A fires,  
      B fires red 
w5: A does not fire, 
     B fires red 
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Note: D fires if and only if it receives signals from both A and B, or from C.  
 
We here consider the effect D and its causes at time t1. The relevant possibility 




                                                
34 I have constructed this case to illustrate a particular point about the statement of the 
intrinsicness principle; I have not seen it discussed elsewhere. 
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     B 
     t1          t2       
     A 
      D 
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Does A cause D? H ✓ ✓ 
Does B cause D? H ✓ ✓ 






@:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w4:  A fires,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
w1:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C fires 
w5:  A does not fire,  
      B fires, 
      C does not fire 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w6:  A fires,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
w3:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C fires 
w7:  A does not fire,  
      B does not fire, 
      C does not fire 
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Note: C is a stubborn neuron that requires two stimulatory signals in order to fire. 
 
We here consider the effect C and its causes at time t1 within the possibility horizon 
illustrated below – where the worlds in which C does not happen are coloured grey: 
 


















Does A cause C? H ✓ ✓ 
Does B cause C? H ✓ ✓ 
                                                
35 This is a very familiar causal structure, not explicitly illustrated in Paul and Hall (2013). 
    t1          t2 
    A 
     C 
    B 
@: A fires,  
     B fires 
w1: A does not fire,  
     B fires 
w2:  A fires,  
      B does not fire 
w3: A does not fire, 
     B does not fire 
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In this case, neurons can fire with different intensities. When a neuron is coloured 
dark green, this indicates that it fires with intensity 2. When a neuron is coloured light 
green, this indicates that it fires with intensity 1. In the figure, A fires with intensity 2, 
and sends a stimulatory signal of intensity 2 to C and an inhibitory signal of intensity 1 
to D. B similarly fires with intensity 2, and sends a stimulatory signal of intensity 2 to 
D and an inhibitory signal of intensity 1 to C. If A had fired with intensity 1, it would 
have sent a stimulatory signal of intensity 1 to C and no inhibitory signal to D, and 
similarly in the case of B.  
 The rule for calculating the intensity with which C fires is this: C’s intensity is 
given by the intensity of A’s stimulatory signal minus the intensity of B’s inhibitory 
signal. The corresponding rule applies in the case of D. 
Finally, E will fire if and only if it receives stimulatory signals of a combined 
intensity of at least 2. 
 Let A be the event that is essentially A’s firing, and let B be the event that is 
essentially B’s firing. Furthermore, let A-2 be the event that is essentially A’s firing 
with intensity 2, and let B-2 be the event that is essentially B’s firing with intensity 2. 
 The following is a real-life case with this structure: 
 
Moving furniture: Suzy and Billy move a sofa together. Each of them is strong 
enough to move it on their own. However, since they are doing it together, they 
both scale back their efforts. 
 
                                                
36 Cf. Paul and Hall (2013), Figure 16. 
     A    C 
     B    D 
     E 
  t1        t2     t3 
Appendix B: Overview over cases 
 451 
We here consider the effect E and its causes at time t1. The relevant possibility 
horizon is as illustrated below – where the worlds in which E does not happen are 
coloured grey: 
 





















Does A cause E? H ✓ ✓ 
Does A-2 cause E? H – ✓ 
Does B cause E? H ✓ ✓ 







@: A fires 2,  
     B fires 2 
w8: A does not fire, 
     B does not fire 
w6: A fires 2, 
     B does not fire 
w2: A does not fire,  
     B fires 2 
w1: A fires 1,  
     B fires 2 
w4: A fires 1,  
     B fires 1 
w7: A fires 1, 
     B does not fire 
w5: A does not fire,  
     B fires 1 
w3: A fires 2,  
     B fires 1 
